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This study investigates the practice of public procurement fraud in Malaysia. The aim 
of this research is to understand the nature and extent of the persistence of 
procurement fraud in the Malaysian public sector. Fraud in public procurement results 
in large losses of public funds which are needed by the government for delivering 
public services in order to build public infrastructure and facilities for healthcare and 
education, poverty eradication, security, defense and economic growth.  
 
A primarily qualitative methodology is employed in this study using the political 
economy approach in order to understand this social phenomenon. First, documentary 
analysis helps identifying some possible factors for the existence of fraud in public 
procurement in Malaysia. Then, qualitative data from semi-structured interviews are 
obtained using the Snowball Sampling Method (SSM). The interviews with 40 
stakeholders (regulators, professionals, politicians, academics and media actors) 
reveal their „hidden‟ voices so as to understand public procurement fraud in Malaysia. 
Nevertheless, this study does not aim to make generalizations and reach concrete 
conclusions about this issue, but instead seeks to understand why public procurement 
fraud persists in Malaysia through an analysis of the subjective narratives of the 
stakeholders.   
 
This research identifies several possible factors explaining why fraud in Malaysian 
public procurement continues to exist: (1) the prevailing power of political and 
economic forces, (2) complexities in the check and balance system, (3) deficiencies in 
procurement practices, (4) constraints on the civil servants, and (5) characteristics of 
the Malaysian society. The findings contribute to the body of knowledge by focusing 
on an unexplored area of the institutional arrangements between the state and 
businesses in Malaysia. The institutional arrangements between state and private 
sector appear to be legitimate, but they have the potential to conceal fraudulent 
practices, thus making fraud possible. Given the sensitive nature of the subject matter 
of this research and the fact that fraud by its nature is often concealed, it is possible 
that the findings have only revealed the „tip of the iceberg‟ of public procurement 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.0 Introduction 
 
This study investigates the underlying factors that influence the persistence of public 
procurement fraud in Malaysia. It focuses on fraudulent practices and corrupt 
activities arising from the procurement process in the context of the Malaysian public 
sector. Bearing in mind the sensitivity and controversial nature of the topic, this study 
attempts to address the political and economic influences on and the prevailing mode 
of power over most government purchasing in Malaysia. However, one of the 
difficulties in pursuing this topic is that a large part of the public procurement process 
is shielded with organised secrecy and it is not easily visible to the public at large. 
Arguably, most Malaysian governmental information and documentation is classified 
as „private‟ and „confidential‟. However, there is an increased concern by the public 
about the issue of accountability and good governance
1
 since the institutional 
arrangements between the state and private sectors are inextricably intertwined in 
many government procurements. As a result, the perceptions of lack of transparency 
and accountability within the institutional arrangements for Malaysian government 
purchasing provide opportunities for and potentially enable fraudulent practices to 
take place. The overall perceptions of the interviewees suggest that there is a complex 
web of acts of collusion among politicians, political parties, top bureaucrats, private 
                                                          
1
 Good governance is needed for directing, controlling, monitoring organizational practices, which are 
concerned with structure and processes to ensure an accountable and transparent decision-making 
practices. Governance is somehow greatly influenced by the country‟s ownership structure, legal 
systems, cultural, customs and religious traditions and socio-political and economic environments  (see 
N. M. Brennan & Solomon, 2008; Nahar & Zulkeppeli, 2015; Samuel, 1992; Shaoul, Stafford, & 
Stapleton, 2012).  
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entrepreneurs, the intermediaries, brokers, financiers and others in the procurement 
process that are possibly pursuing divergent interests.  
 
The introduction section of this chapter discusses fraud and the pervasiveness of 
fraudulent practices. The discussion is followed by a review of fraud in public 
procurement and a justification on the selection of Malaysia as the context for this 
study. The chapter continues with a description of the motivations and aims for the 
research (section 1.1). Then, section 1.2 presents the research questions and 
objectives underpinning the study. This is followed by a discussion on the research 
approach and methodology in section 1.3. This section explains the philosophical 
choice for the study, the theoretical framework, the research methodology and the 
data analysis process and it gives information on the interviewees. Section 1.4 
presents a brief description of the research findings. Succinct contributions of the 
study are presented in section 1.5. Finally, section 1.6 gives an overview of the 
remaining chapters of this thesis.  
Pervasiveness of Fraudulent Practices 
„Fraud‟ is a provocative term that frequently conveys ideas about human interaction, 
institutionalised practices and a variety of public policy issues. The social 
construction of fraudulent practices blends into predatory and illicit behavioural 
issues, which are often associated with the intersection of other practices such as 
corruption (Doig, 2014; Sargiacomo, Ianni, D‟Andreamatteo, & Servalli, 2015; 
Venkatesan, 2014), white collar crime (Barak, 2015; Ramamoorti, Morrison, & 
Koletar, 2014), bribery (Goel, Budak, & Rajh, 2014; Khoman, 2015; Li, Yao, & 
Ahlstrom, 2015), money laundering (Dimon, 2013; ICIJ, 2013; Oxfam, 2013), 
transfer pricing (de Boyrie, Pak, & Zdanowicz, 2005; Sheppard, 2012), tax evasion 
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(Hasseldine & Morris, 2013; Otusanya, 2011), price fixing (Pressey, Vanharanta, & 
Gilchrist, 2014) and misappropriation of asset (Baird & Zelin Ii, 2009; Rozaiha Ab 
Majid, Mohamed, Haron, Omar, & Jomitin, 2012). In spite of the presence of various 
practices associated with fraud activities which appear to violate laws and regulations, 
there is scant research in exploring fraud mechanisms which are highly effective and 
work within legal boundaries and can outsmart „the system‟ in the pursuit of self-
interests (see Bernhut, 2006; Robertson, 2006; Young, 2005). 
 
The reporting on fraudulent activities through press coverage shows the occurrence of 
illicit and illegal activities such as false accounting, deception, collusion, 
concealment, cheating and violation of trust (see AASB, 2008; ACFE, 2012; Eskow, 
2013; Ndofor, Wesley, & Priem, 2013). Examples of fraudulent practices reported by 
the media include a former bank employee of JP Morgan who violated the US laws; 
an act which ultimately cost the bank $6 billion for distorted accounting practice in 
the market (BBC, 2013). In another case, a court charged the former CEO of 
WorldCom of fraud, conspiracy and false claims (Scharff, 2005). Media also reports 
on several senior executives of HTC being arrested because they stole trade secrets 
and falsified commission fees (Vincent, 2013). Also, there was a breach of trust by a 
former politician in Canada for spending the province‟s constituency allowance (The 
Canadian Press, 2013). In a high-profile case in Argentina the employees of Ralph 
Lauren Corporation paid bribes of $593,000 to government officials from 2005 to 
2009 for importing goods (Bloomberg, 2013). In another high-profile case, Hewlett-
Packard violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices (FCPA) when its subsidiaries made 
improper payments of $2 million to government officials to retain lucrative public 
contracts (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2014). The next case which 
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used the tactic of bribing government officials was discovered in Orthofix 
International N.V. (Orthofix) when a former employee reported that the company‟s 
executive paid bribe of $5 million to obtain sales contracts with state owned hospitals 
(Overley, 2012). More recently, Wal-Mart de Mexico was alleged to have paid bribes 
of $24 million to government officials for approval of a new store permits,  acquired 
confidential information and reduced fines impose by government agencies (Barstow, 
2012; Viswanatha & Barrett, 2015). As a result, the fraud cases exposed by the media 
have increased public awareness and raised questions about the amount of loss due to 
the fraudulent practices.  
 
Losses from fraudulent practices are large and capable of making a difference to the 
economic and social development of a country. In the UK, the National Fraud 
Authority estimated that fraud losses in the year 2013 were around £53 billion. The 
total losses in the public sector were £20.6 billion, enough to affect its social welfare 
provision (National Fraud Authority, 2013). It is also reported that US retailers suffer 
$191 billion in fraud losses every year (LexisNexis, 2012). Internal employee fraud 
victimised 53 Australian government agencies, with losses of $2 million in 2009 and 
2010, compared to $1.86 million in 2008 and 2009 (Lindley, Jorna, & Smith, 2012). 
The report on the cost of financial fraud losses in nine developed countries
2
 for the 
years 2012 and 2013 shows that losses are 29% higher than those of the period of the 
recent financial crisis and recession, i.e., from 1997 to 2007 (Gee & Button, 2015). 
Arguably, losses due to fraud practices on this scale affect a country‟s growth in 
terms of infrastructure and facilities aiming to improve healthcare and education, 
                                                          
2
 Data on fraud losses were obtained from UK, US, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand.   
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combat poverty, bolster the economy, and fund the security and defence of a country 
(Button, Gee, & Brooks, 2012; LexisNexis, 2012; The Huffington Post, 2012). 
Therefore, fraudulent and corrupt practices have severe consequences on investors, 
employees, customers, and the society in a globalised economy. 
 
The effects of prevailing fraud practices on the economy of developed countries can 
have the same impact with those of the developing countries. For example, in Uganda 
the pervasiveness of embezzlement, electronic fraud, neglect of duties and 
unauthorized disclosure defrauded customers of huge amounts of money 
(Morawczynski, 2015). The Ponzi schemes, money laundering as well as tax evasion 
and avoidance prevail in developing countries and in emerging markets (ICIJ, 2013; 
Malaysia Kini, 2013b; Malaysia Today, 2013; Otusanya & Lauwo, 2012; Oxfam, 
2013). In 2003 and 2012, developing countries incurred losses of $297.4 billion and 
$991.2 billion, respectively, due to illicit financial flows (Kar & Spanjers, 2014). The 
losses were usually regarded as flows of dirty money coming out of a developing 
country and being sent abroad. For the past ten years, Malaysia is among the top five 
exporters of illicit capital. Malaysia shows cumulative losses of unrecorded money
3
 
of $394,869 million from year 2003 until 2012 (Kar & Spanjers, 2014). The amount 
of losses from fraudulent practices is such that it is likely to be detrimental to 
Malaysia‟s development and growth, especially in the public sector. Furthermore, it 
can be argued that these activities undermine the Malaysian government‟s social 
obligations to provide efficient, effective and value for money public service.  
                                                          
3
 The vast majority of illicit financial outflows for the developing countries are due to trade 
misinvoicing either through export under-invoicing or import over-invoicing (see Kar & Spanjers, 
2014). 
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Fraud in Public Procurement 
Notwithstanding the appeals for investigating the wide range of fraudulent activities 
in relation to social relations and human interactions, there appear to be limited 
studies about procurement fraud (Caulfield, 2014; Murray, 2014). Fraud in 
procurement arguably occurs at three stages: the pre-contract, contract and post 
contract phase of a procurement process (Mamavi, Nagati, Wehrle, & Pache, 2014; 
OECD, 2010). Because procurement fraud can normally occur at several points 
during the procurement life cycle, fraudulent activities can be easily carried out and it 
is a perennial problem (Burguet & Che, 2004; Davies, 1995). Fraud and corruption 
arising from procurement activities are regarded as „hidden‟ crimes, which makes 
them hard to detect, prosecute and, thus, they are often not reported (Findlay, 2007; 
Robertson, 2006). Fraudulent activities in procurement suggest the existence of a vast 
network of collusions of various actors at the nexus of government and private sectors 
(Sargiacomo et al., 2015). There is indication that research on procurement does not 
focus on the accounting area of procurement life cycle (see Neu, Everett, & Rahaman, 
2015). Further,  there is a dearth of empirical research focusing on procurement fraud 
in public sector settings (ADB, 2014; Sargiacomo et al., 2015).  
 
In many countries, a large portion of public funds is allocated to procure the 
necessary goods, services and works to deliver public services. According to 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), public 
procurement accounts for 15% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in OECD 
countries
4
 and the percentage is higher in many non-OECD countries (OECD, 
                                                          
4
 OECD countries originally signed the Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development. The organisation aims to assist governments for their prosperity so as to combat 
poverty and achieve economic growth and financial stability. Among others, members are the UK, the 
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2007a). As most governments are the largest spender of goods and services in the 
world, fraud in government purchasing can make a significant impact upon the 
economic, social, political policy making, and upon the benefits of the public at large 
(Ghedini Ralha & Sarmento Silva, 2012; Matthew, Patrick, & Denise, 2013). In 2014, 
the World Bank reported 10,838 government procurement contracts from various 
regions with a total value of $12.8 billion. Overall, procurement transactions under 
the World Bank projects include 2,764 contracts with a value of $3.5 billion (Africa), 
1,567 contracts with a value of $2.2 billion (East Asia and Pacific), 1,547 contracts 
with a value of $2.9 billion (Europe and Central Asia), 2,960 contracts with a value of 
$1.3 billion (Latin America and Caribbean), 448 contracts with a value of $0.38 
billion (Middle East and North Africa) and 1,552 contracts with a value of $2.6 
billion (South Asia) (World Bank, 2014). Because of the large amount of money 
spent by governments for the acquisition of goods and services in the market, fraud 
and corruption in government procurement requires considerable scrutiny and has 
increased the pressure to ensure accountable and transparent procurement practices 
(see Neu, Everett, & Rahaman, 2014; Sikka & Lehman, 2015). 
 
Public procurement is a major economic activity for many countries; thus, the 
prevalence of fraud in public procurement can be considerably damaging for those 
countries (Cram, 2011; Singh, 1999). The World Bank estimated $200 billion of bribe 
spent by developed and developing countries to secure public procurement bids 
annually (World Bank, 2004). According to the World Economic Forum in 2005, the 
frequency of bribery in public procurement was as follows: OECD (15%), East Asia-
                                                                                                                                                                     
US, Australia, Belgium, Japan, Greece and Switzerland. See 
http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/.  
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NIC (15%), East Asia developing (58%), South Asia (70%), Sub-Saharan Africa 
(60%), Former Soviet Union (50%) and Latin America (58%) (OECD, 2008b). 
Alternatively, Raymond (2008) suggests that procurement-related corruption is a 
more serious problem in developing countries rather than in developed ones.  He 
claims that social practices operate in specific cultural contexts and peculiar practices 
may not be easily constrained when they are already normalised in a particular 
society. At the same time, mass poverty and limited economic freedom, the 
pervasiveness of corruption, and poor enforcement can have a dampening effect on 
developing countries (Nwabuzor, 2005). Consequently, public procurement fraud 
reduces the limited resource of public funds to benefit citizens in social services, 
national defence, homeland security and natural disaster relief (Lander, Kimball, & 
Martyn, 2008). 
 
Research on fraud and corruption related to public procurement transactions can offer 
a broaden understanding of the power relations embedded in specific social and 
political contexts (see Breit, Lennerfors, & Olaison, 2015; Matechak, 2002). A 
systemic and organised institutional arrangement of power relations and its effect on 
how power is created, maintained and transformed may be able to conceal fraud and 
corrupt activities in the public office (Global Integrity, 2014; Hellman, Jones, & 
Kaufmann, 2000; Hessami, 2014). Public sector fraud may perpetually generate the 
negative perception that public sector officials and/or politicians make policy and 
spending decisions in favour of certain groups, industries or suppliers for private gain 
(Doig, 2011). A report by U.S. Government in the year 1988 on military 
procurements showed that there were cases of conflict of interest among powerful 
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government procurement officials, exercised nepotism,
5
 favouritism, and other forms 
of corruption in the public procurement system (M. Chwastiak, 1998). Grindle (1996) 
asserts that fraud and corruption activities “stimulated the rapid expansion of the 
politics of cronyism, rent seeking, and corruption that further undermined faith in the 
system” (p.78). As a result, corrupted officials may negatively affect the 
accountability, transparency and public interests in the government institutional 
structure (E. Brown & Cloke, 2005).  
 
Fraud in public procurement is closely associated with the government‟s 
policymaking for the distribution of public funds. In implementing public policy and 
public service delivery in particular in a free market economy system, fraudulent 
practices and corrupt activities may be influenced by underlying tensions and 
conflicts in the public office (Raymond, 2008; Tremblay, 2012). Raymond (2008) 
highlights several governance issues such as public accountability, transparency, 
value for money and professional work ethics, as key principles underpinning 
government purchasing. However, to some extent, government resource allocations 
creates opportunities for profit seeking and private appropriation of national wealth, 
which is perhaps facilitated by the neoliberal capitalism ideology of privatisation, 
deregulation and trade investment (Morales, Gendron, & Guénin-Paracini, 2014; Tan, 
2012). 
 
Fraud and corruption in public procurement shows linkages between several actors 
and divergent interests in government purchasing. For instance, a study by Hawkins 
                                                          
5
 Nepotism is the practice of securing or influencing a contract or job in favour of the relatives or 
friends of powerful actors (Eicher, 2009). 
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et al., (2011), Søreide (2002) and Rose-Ackerman (1999) revealed that public 
procurement practices are intermingled with political discretion and that there is 
interdependence of political, bureaucrats, and business actors. Consequently, it was 
noted that fraud in public procurement is designed to serve narrow self-interests 
which are profit oriented (see David Seth Jones, 2013). 
 
There is an increased attention to the interactions between government and private 
entrepreneurs, which engage in fraud and corruption in procurement (Khoman, 2015; 
Neu et al., 2014). A complex range of immoral and unethical acts of behaviour in 
government purchasing involves bribery and kickback actions, rent-seeking activities, 
cronyism, collusion, favouritism, cartels, monopoly, nepotism, and patronage system. 
Johnston (2005) has classified a „syndrome to corruption‟ as factors of likelihood for 
corruption as follows: (1) Influence Markets, (2) Elite Cartels, (3) Oligarchs and 
Clans, and (4) Official Moguls. The exchange relations between government and 
private sectors are institutionally enabled and allowable as economic behaviour and 
collective business actions in procurement (Andrews, Esteve, & Ysa, 2015). Thus, 
various wrongdoings are assumed to be „normal‟ practices (see Ashforth & Anand, 
2003; Ashforth, Gioia, Robinson, & TreviÑO, 2008), because the government-
business transactions may also act as catalyst for state and political capture through 
lobbying practices, political funding and finance political party during election. 
Therefore, a corrupt network of relationships between interconnected players in 
public procurement may suggest lack of transparency and accountability landscape, 
which creates governance challenges to public officials (Miettinen & Poutvaara, 
2015; Never, 2015; Sargiacomo et al., 2015). 
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A number of cases have shown how misallocation of public fund is associated with 
fraudulent and corrupt practices in public procurement (Miroslav, Miloš, Velimir, 
Božo, & Đorđe, 2014; Newman, 2012; PwC EU Services, 2011). One such case 
shows that there has been an increase of military procurement prices in the UK 
because of fraudulent activities, misconduct, mismanagement and misallocation of 
public resources (Plymouth Herald, 2012). In a high-profile case in Malaysia, there 
were alleged misappropriations of fund, mismanagement and unauthorised contracts 
by the CEO of Perwaja amounting to hundreds and millions of ringgit with a claim 
that his actions had the full support and were conducted under the directions of the 
highest political figure in the country (Malaysia Today, 2015; Norwani, Mohamad, & 
Chek, 2011). The above examples illustrate a combination of mismanagement, 
collusion and theft from actors in the form of breach of trust and the manipulation of 
the power given to them because of the key positions they hold. Arguably, the lack of 
transparency and accountability in the public office creates opportunities for fraud 
and corrupt practices to thrive which compromise public accountability, transparency 
and governance framework (see Priemus, 2004; Warren, 1974). 
 
This study examines the persistent of procurement fraud in the Malaysian public 
sector. The aim of this thesis is to understand the factors that influence to the 
persistence of fraud; these factors are influenced and shaped by the larger institutional 
framework in which they are embedded and in which they operate.  
 
The following section justifies the choice of Malaysia as the context of this study. 
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The Case for Studying Public Procurement Fraud in Malaysia 
This thesis aims to explore the nature and extent of fraud in public procurement by 
focusing on its prolongation within the established governance system in Malaysia. A 
series of public procurement scandals within Malaysia‟s public sector is inevitably 
embedded within the socio-political and economic context involved with different 
stakeholders (Hwang, 2003; Kamal, 2012; D. Leong, 2014). For example, there was a 
high-profile case of a chairman (a husband to a prominent politician) in Malaysia 
alleged to have misused and misappropriated funds of RM 50 million soft loans given 
by the federal government by buying a luxury car, two plots of land and holiday 
packages (Kamal, 2012; The Star, 2012a). In another high-profile procurement fraud 
case, a former transport minister was allegedly responsible for the overpriced land 
purchased for RM129.5 billion for Port Klang Free Zone‟s project  (Baharom, 2012; 
Ming, 2012). A study by William Case (1994) shows that the long tenure of the ruling 
party enables the government to intervene in the economy and promote patronage 
networks to secure lucrative contracts and licences for their political members. In 
relation to the promotion of state patronage in the form of government contracts, 
licenses and development grants, Teh (2002) describes the prevailing nature of 
„money politics‟ in Malaysia. Finally, KPMG‟s report on Fraud, Bribery and 
Corruption Survey in the year 2013 revealed that most businesses think that bribery 
and corruption are important strategies for business survival  in Malaysia (KPMG 
Malaysia, 2013). Generally, there is alleged manipulation, mismanagement and theft 
within the public procurement practice in Malaysia (The Malaysian Insider, 2013a). It 
is profoundly noted that fraudulent practices and corrupt activities in Malaysian 
public procurement appear to be embedded in the governance of Malaysian public 
sector and the activities of corrupt politicians, business elites, bureaucrats or public 
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officials (Gomez & Jomo, 1997; Siddiquee, 2010). Malaysia is a particularly 
interesting case worthy of studying public procurement fraud for the following 
reasons.  
 
First, Malaysia is predominantly a traditional Islamic state, with a multicultural and 
multi-ethnical background. Because of that, and because of her colonial experience, 
Malaysia is a nation culturally distinctive from Western ones.
6
 The transformation 
and evolution of its structural attributes and its economic growth development in a 
fundamentally different socio-culturally setting (Teik, 2012; Yoong, Mui, & Heong, 
2007), makes it a valuable setting for investigating and understanding fraudulent 
practices in public entities. The motivation behind investigating public procurement 
fraud in Malaysia comes from the fact that it is a setting with distinctive cultural 
features
7
, ideologies, religion, practices, customs, ethical values as well as a different 
socio-political and economic context.  
 
Second, in its pursuit of economic growth and development, Malaysia offers 
distinctive elements for investigating fraud and corruption in public procurement 
because of the existence of large operational and development budgets for public 
service delivery (Ministry of Finance, 2011). Large operational and development 
budgets for government projects and contracts are on the increase as prevalent forces 
                                                          
6
 The population in Malaysia comprises 60% Bumiputera, which is the indigenous peoples, 27% of 
Chinese ethnic community, 7% from the India community and around 6% from other ethnic 
communities. All communities are free to practice their religion, customs, and they are free to have 
education and rights as Malaysians according to the Malaysian Constitution (see A. Harding, 2012; V. 
T. King, 2012; Loh, 2011; Sundaram & Hui, 2014). 
7
 Here we refer, for example, to differences from Western cultures in terms of different identities, 
different ways of learning and thinking, different languages, spiritual values and behavioural attitudes, 
among others. 
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of economic globalisation in Malaysia (Nambiar, 2014),
8
 which have intended and 
unintended consequences for the country. For example, the transformation of the 
private sector for the provision of public services has opened up opportunities for 
wealth creation and capital. Gomez (2007) highlights that the government‟s 
intervention through state-owned companies in the form of privatisation has given 
business people incentives to acquire political influence in order to achieve 
favourable policy outcomes. The formulation and implementation of public policy 
legitimizes state intervention in the market and the increase of public sector 
investment (Welsh & Chin, 2013). It is in this context that the profit motive 
orientation affects the annual budget, in particular the budget for public procurement
9
 
for Malaysia‟s development and growth (such as public infrastructure, education, 
healthcare, defence and security). 
 
Studies by Gomez and Jomo (1997) as well as J. Tan (2008) highlight the 
privatisation strategy followed for the „creation‟ of state-owned public enterprises, 
which they argue has generally increased public service spending for government 
expenditure, resulting in inefficient economy, high costs, less productivity and limited 
creativity and innovation. Indeed, some of the (non)performance of the privatisation 




                                                          
8
 The economic globalisation in Malaysia is underpinned by the neoliberal agenda of privatisation, 
deregulation and trade investment which have offered a competitive ideology (K. S. Jomo, 2003). 
9
 This is generally evident in public-private partnerships which have been increasing the Malaysian 
federal government expenditure with RM151 million in 2010, RM180 million in 2011 and RM181 
million in 2012 (Ministry of Finance, 2011). 
36 | P a g e  
 












































violation of law 
























its misuse of 
public fund, 
the project 





Closed case as 
there was no 
evidence of 
abuse of power 

























































charges and it 




















no action was 





































Source: Current Study 
 
Despite the non-performance of privatisation projects due to mismanagement, 
malpractices and cases of unviability in state-owned companies, the Malaysian state 
continues to provide its assistance and support under the pretext of the national 
interest. Gomez (1997) and Gomez and Sundaram (1999) critically emphasize the 
loss of public funds to „save‟ most of the public enterprise through bailouts, capital 
injections, capital controls and debt restructuring even though the state-owned 
companies may be involved in acts of mismanagement and abuse of power. It is 
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important to realize that under the pretext of saving the public enterprise, the 
resoluteness shown by the Malaysian state to save certain companies can also be 
viewed as suspicious in that it helps politically-connected companies, and as a result, 
no one is held accountable for the mammoth losses of public funds (E.T. Gomez, 
2002; Johnson & Mitton, 2003). As a result, the wide spread occurrence of fraud and 
corruption phenomena related to procurement raises serious questions in relation to 
the pursuit of Malaysia‟s policy objectives, which have been undermined by the 
global and domestic institutional pressures in favour of the various interests of 
politicians, political party, public officials, and business leaders (Cross & Stuart, 
2006; Sundaram & Hui, 2010). 
 
Third, despite the government‟s effort to reduce fraud and corruption in Malaysia by 
taking various initiatives through the government‟s transformation plan (Kapeli & 
Mohamed, 2015; Pemandu, 2009), Malaysians feel that the country faces an 
„integrity‟ crisis because of the lack of total transparency and accountability. For 
example, the Fraud, Bribery and Corruption Survey 2013 revealed that 90% of 
business organisations considered bribe and corruption to play a prominent role in the 
conduct of business in Malaysia (KPMG Malaysia, 2013). The Malaysia Corruption 
Barometer (BRM) 2014 indicated that only 24% of the participants believe that 
corruption is not a problem with corruption increasing and becoming prevalent with 
more cases of bribery so as to „speed things up‟. The survey also revealed that 
Malaysians believe political institutions are the most corrupt form of organizations, 
followed by the police force and public services. On top of that, the „alarming‟ 
position of Malaysia in relation to its public sector corruption and, in particular, 
bribery activities is reported in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2014 which 
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shows that Malaysia is now ranked 50
th
 among 175 countries worldwide with a score 
of 52 (on a scale from 0-highly corrupt to 100-very clean) (Transparency 
International, 2014). Although, Malaysia has been able to improve her ranking from 
2013 (Malaysia was ranked 53th with a score of 50), the position of Malaysia in this 
ranking does not offer a comprehensive and conclusive picture of the corruption 
problem in Malaysia. Thus, there is a need to understand the underlying causes of the 
persistence of fraud and corruption in the country. 
  
Finally, this study considers the governance of Malaysia‟s public procurement 
practices. Inevitably, the relationship between the state and private sectors has 
promoted a political business model, which is allowable in most government 
purchasing. Within this context, the accumulation of capital and wealth creation are 
nurtured by the state for the distribution of rents through government contracts, 
licenses, subsidies, privatised projects, and allocation of shares (Gomez, 2009; 
Sundaram & Hui, 2010). Notably, the Malaysian developmental state actively 
promotes wealth and capital so as to develop entrepreneurial activities in the country 
(Gomez, 2009). Sundaram and Hui (2014) argue that the Malaysian development 
policy has been influenced by, and has, in turn, influenced economic distribution and 
public finance. Sundaram and Hui (2014) believe that this is the result of resilient 
federation and the ruling coalition, which, to some extent, advocates „patron‟ and 
„client‟ relationships in many operational practices. For this reason, when „patron‟ 
and „client‟ relationships are promoted in procurement practices, rent-seeking, state 
capture and money politics flourish  in Malaysia (Searle, 1999; Tan, 2015). This 
study seeks to understand how the influence of politicians, top bureaucrats and 
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business elites through using the power embedded in the state machinery affects the 
dynamics of policymaking and policy implementation in procurement practices. 
 
An understanding of the extent of procurement fraud in the Malaysian public sector is 
important for several reasons. First, this study aims to locate procurement fraud 
practices within a broad political economy framework, thus emphasizing the 
important interplay between the political, social and economic spheres in Malaysia.
10
 
In particular, this thesis aims to address fraudulent practices and corruption related to 
procurement which do not only violate the law, but also those immoral and unethical 
acts of behaviour in government purchasing that are not necessarily illegal or 
unlawful but are nevertheless socially amiss and detrimental to the public at large. 
Second, there appear to be few studies on procurement fraud in the public sector 
settings (W. S. Hui, Othman, Omar, Rahman, & Haron, 2011; Ishak & Said, 2015), a 
gap that this study aims to fill. Third, this research considers the legitimate 
framework of business-government relations. It seems that the web of crony networks 
embedded in public procurement practices requires further investigation. Fourth, by 
adopting a political economy approach, this study also acknowledges the significant 
roles of other actors in the conduct of fraud practices in public procurement. These 
include the conflicting role of the developmental state (Malaysian state) which 
formulates laws and legislation to curb fraud and corruption but also wants to attract 
capital for wealth and profit maximization. Finally, this study seeks to examine the 
institutionalised power relations in the governance of the Malaysian public sector. 
Thus, perhaps this study can shed light on the possible misconduct practices of the 
                                                          
10
 Considering that contemporary literature tends to focus on Western countries, it would be useful to 
determine the nature and extent of public procurement fraud in Malaysia which has a different socio-
political, economic and cultural setting from the Western societies. 
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powerful actors and institutions acting in various political and business spheres of 
Malaysian society (see Abidin & Ahmad, 2007; Gomez & Jomo, 1997; Malaysia 
Kini, 2010; Welsh & Chin, 2013). 
 
In considering the above issues, this thesis provides an alternative and much needed 
perspective in understanding the continuity of public procurement fraud in Malaysia. 
Having considered the rationale for studying fraud in public procurement, the 
following section outlines the motivations and aims of the research.  
1.1 Motivations and Aims for Research  
 
This study has been influenced by my own experience in inspecting and monitoring 
procurement issues in the Malaysian public sector for more than a decade. My job as 
a public auditor
11
 involves closely monitoring, investigating and reporting on findings 
of fraud issues regarding procurement practices in Malaysia. My observations would 
suggest that public procurement is prone to fraud and corruption activities, which 
have led to substantial losses of public funds and have badly affected public service 
delivery. Furthermore, the problem is very difficult to address because investigation 
of its persistent nature is difficult to conduct. Despite a variety of policies, 
administrative rules, laws, instruction manuals, hierarchical structures, the custody of 
invoices, records and contracts (Adham & Siwar, 2012; Ministry of Finance, 1997), it 
                                                          
11
 A public auditor works mainly in a government department to ensure compliance of laws, rules and 
regulations which are set up for government agencies. Among  the duties of public auditors are to to 
plan, execute and complete audit work; identify any ineffective, inefficient and inadequate internal 
controls, management and accounting procedures; to give recommendations to improve flaws and lack 
of internal control. For the context of this research it is important to note that I am a public auditor who 
works for the National Audit Department, Malaysia to ensure the highest accountability and good 
control mechanisms for all government operations, projects and  for the effectiveness of the delivery 
system (National Audit Department, 2012) 
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seems that the internal controls, surveillance systems and procurement procedures 
that have been established in the Malaysian public sector are somehow unable to curb 
fraudulent and corrupt activities within procurement practices. This is possibly 
because the networks of power and the legitimacy of the state and private sectors are 
inevitable in many government procurement practices (Ashari, 2013; Othman, 
Zakaria, Nordin, Shahidan, & Jusoff, 2010). As a result, fraud and corruption issues 
would very frequently come up in my own audit findings and supervision (see Berita 
Semasa, 2009; National Audit Department, 2010, 2011). 
 
From my experience, I have always encountered problematic issues when reporting 
fraud and corruption related matters. Many questions have arisen that begged for 
answers. I decided to undertake this study so as to understand why fraud endures in 
public office, how it manages to persist for so long, whether or not check and balance 
mechanisms which are established in Malaysia are able to curb fraudulent and corrupt 
practices, what factors limit the investigation and prosecution of the wrongdoers so as 
to secure their conviction, why we cannot identify the perpetrators and hold them 
accountable, to what extent the subservient Malaysian public officer and the 
bureaucratic hierarchy of power can be held responsible for the wrongdoings in the 
public office, and if social, cultural and political factors influence public procurement 
fraud in Malaysia.  
 
I am aware that there are many challenges in the investigation of fraud and 
corruption, which is a complex and provocative social phenomenon, in a developing 
country like Malaysia. Nevertheless, even though there are difficulties in conducting 
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research of this nature, its aim is to gain insight into fundamental forces that ensure 
the durability and persistence of procurement fraud in the Malaysian public sector.   
 
The next section presents the underpinning research questions and the research 
objectives. 
1.2 Research Questions and Research Objectives  
 
The study focuses on the nature and extent of public procurement fraud in Malaysia, 
its development, the institutional prevailing power structure and arrangements, the 
practices of social networks and governance mechanisms, the deficient areas of 
procurement practices, constraints and the conflicting role of the civil servant and the 
peculiarities of the Malaysian society in relation to fraud and corruption issues. This 
study aims to answer the following primary research question: 
Why does procurement fraud persist in the Malaysian public sector? The 
objective is to investigate the possible factors accountable for the durability of 
procurement fraud in the Malaysian public sector. Answering this research question 
requires an understanding of the nature and extent of public procurement fraud in 
Malaysia. This is achieved by taking into consideration the evidence from 
documentary analysis and the accounts of the „hidden voices‟ from the main 
stakeholders.
12
 Answering this question provides a tremendous richness and depth to 
this study because it takes into account what the main stakeholders have to say about 
this matter and, in doing so, sense can be made of certain social practices. 
 
                                                          
12
 There are five groups of interviewees that act as the main stakeholders. These are public 
procurement officers, public professionals, politicians, academics and media actors (see Chapter 3).  
44 | P a g e  
 
In order to answer the primary research question, the study also provides five 
narrower sub-research questions as follows: 
 
Sub-research Question 1: To what extent political and economic institutional 
arrangements contributed to public procurement fraud in Malaysia? This research 
question examines the political and economic forces that influence procurement fraud 
in the public office. The objectives are to evaluate the prevailing power structure of 
political and economic institutions in Malaysia and whether or not they support the 
prolongation of fraudulent practices in public procurement. In order to address this 
question, one needs also to address the institutionalised power structure of political 
and economic institutions in rewarding government contracts. This study also 
examines the nexus of public-private relations for most government purchasing. 
Lastly, this research question analyses the public procurement policy framework that 
perhaps complicates procurement practices in the public office. 
 
Sub-research Question 2: Why do check and balance mechanisms fail to work to curb 
fraudulent practices in the Malaysia public sector? This research question aims to 
review the governance system in Malaysian public sector in order to restrain 
fraudulent practices. This question narrows down the research to the elements of 
check and balance framework as ways to promote public accountability and 
transparency in procurement practices.  
 
Sub-research Question 3: What are the deficiencies in procurement practices in the 
Malaysia public sector that are linked to procurement fraud? This domain of enquiry 
explores the spectrum of opportunities for fraudulent practices and corrupt behaviour 
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within the procurement process in the public office. The objective is to uncover any 
institutional deficiencies that perhaps facilitate lack of transparency of practices in 
government purchasing.  
 
Sub-research Question 4: To what extent the accountability constraints of the 
Malaysian public officers preserved fraudulent practices in procurement? This 
question constructs an argument on the pressure and the restrained forces 
accompanying the exercising of public accountability by the civil servants. This 
research question aims to examine the possible environment that results in the 
creation of the conflicting role of the Malaysian civil servant in delivering public 
services.  
 
Sub-research Question 5: What are the peculiarities of the Malaysian society in 
relation to fraud and corruption phenomenon? The objective here is to discuss the 
factors associated with the development of fraud and corruption in the context of the 
Malaysian culture. This research question investigates the distinctiveness of 
institutional and structural arrangements within the Malaysian society that perhaps 
provide fertile ground for fraud and corrupt activities.  
 
The next section discusses the research approach and method adopted in the study. 
1.3 Research Approach and Method 
  
In order to address the research questions, this study primarily uses a qualitative 
methodology (see Chapter 3). This research uses the understanding of the 
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construction of meaning-making and making sense of action, views and perspectives 
by relying on the experience, interpretation and understanding of social actors 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2013). The justification for this choice of methodology comes 
from my own philosophical assumptions, on how I perceive the world; this reflects 
the ontology, epistemology, human nature and the use of ideographic ideology (see 
section 3.1). This study critically examines the nature and the extent of public 
procurement fraud within the context of promoting a better society. Nevertheless, 
although the study seeks an understanding of the nature and extent of public 
procurement fraud in Malaysia, it does not aim to make generalisations and draw firm 
conclusions regarding the social phenomenon. There is no „objective‟ truth out there 
to find, as this study is merely a search for an understanding of this social practice in 
the light of the subjective narratives perspectives of the stakeholders. In addition, 
through a critical examination, this study also challenges and criticizes the modes of 
prevailing social institutional arrangements in Malaysia.  
 
This study employs the political economy approach as its theoretical framework. The 
framework uses four pillars to help understand fraud in public procurement in 
Malaysia as follows: (1) the dynamic of political and economic institutions, (2) the 
rational behaviour of economic man, (3) public policy environment and (4) the nexus 
of government and business interactions (see section 3.2). Political economy theory 
benefits this study by offering an interdisciplinary account, which addresses the 
complexity of the subject under study (Acosta & Pettit, 2013; Antinori, 2012).  
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Understanding public procurement fraud in Malaysia was sought by obtaining the 
views and perspectives of 40 prominent stakeholders; 13 procurement officers, 13 
professionals, 5 politicians, 4 academics and 5 media actors (see Chapter 3). 
 
Two qualitative research methods are employed in this study: documentary analysis 
and semi-structured interviews conducted by using the Snowball Sampling Method 
(SSM) to locate the interviewees. The reflections from the documentary analysis aid 
the interpretation of the social phenomenon. Documentary analysis also facilitates the 
process of forming relevant themes and coding contents which are similar (or not) to 
the interview data (G. A. Bowen, 2009). At the same time, semi-structured interviews 
provide fertile ground for a variety of ideas to take into consideration for the 
understanding public procurement fraud in Malaysia.  
 
The analysis of data is consolidated by following a thematic approach. Guest, 
MacQueen, and Namey (2012) outline a flexible thematic analysis that searches for 
themes or patterns. This study uses a process that involves 6 stages of data analysis 
process: (1) familiarization of data; (2) generating of initial codes; (3) themes and 
subthemes inquiry; (4) scrutiny of themes and subthemes; (5) clarification of themes; 
and (6) reporting the analysis (see section 3.4) 
 
The following section gives a brief overview of the findings of the study. 
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1.4 Summary of the Findings of the Study 
 
The current study found that public procurement fraud in Malaysia occurs because of 
several factors. The important findings of the thesis are outlined below. 
 
1) It seems that public procurement fraud in Malaysia benefits from prevailing 
political and economic forces, which are the result of institutional arrangements 
of a political business model in relation to its procurement practices, the bed-
fellows relationship between the state and private capitalists, the prolonged 
incumbent ruling coalition and its supremacy and the direction of public policy 
as an avenue to gain access to government rents, contracts and projects. 
 
2) It appears that the complexities of the governance system related to check and 
balance mechanisms involving the three pillars of institutions established in 
Malaysia (i.e., the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary branch as 
stipulated under the Malaysian Constitution) result in the system having only 
little success in curbing fraud and corrupt practices within the government 
procurement. The findings show an institutional decline for check and balance 
apparatus that suggests that it is hard to achieve accountable and transparent 
procurement practices. 
 
3) It is shown that there are various ways in which the misuse of power creates 
opportunities to commit fraud and corruption in the Malaysian public sector. 
Likewise, it seems that the deficiencies of procurement practices aid the 
continuity of fraud in public procurement. 
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4) It seems that the conflicting role of the Malaysian civil servants can in fact 
function in inefficient contexts in ways that make fraud and corruption more 
likely to occur. Instead of having public accountability and transparency in 
procurement practices, it seems that the civil servants‟ „fear‟ of and „obedience‟ 
towards their superior silences them; this, in turn, results in the non-disclosure 
of the wrongdoings in the public office.  
 
5) The current study shows that the idea of transforming Malaysia has embraced 
the „successful ideology‟ promoted by the ruling government. It appears that the 
promulgated idea of being successful (e.g., people who have money and enjoy a 
luxurious life, people who have higher social status, people who are 
respectable) supports the institutionalization of fraud and corruption practices 
for the transformation of the Malaysian society. It is argued that fraud and 
corruption have tainted Islamic values, they clash with norms and ethical 
behaviour, and can be considered socially „unfair‟; all these are the result of the 
need for creation of wealth and accumulation of capital, which is usually 
justified on the grounds of the good of the country and the national interest.   
 
Section 1.5 briefly discusses the contributions of this study. 
1.5 Contributions of the Study 
 
The study contributes in a number of ways to the body of knowledge of the field. The 
major areas of contribution are the following. 
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(1)  From a theoretical perspective, the study investigates the nature and extent of 
the persistent nature of public procurement fraud in Malaysia through the lens 
of political economy approach. The study provides insights into the prevailing 
power relations of political and economic institutions, the rational interest of 
the economic man for rewarding government contracts, the taken-for-granted 
aspects of governance in public policy mechanisms for fraud and corruption 
related to procurement, and the problematic crony network of blurred 
relationships of government organizations and private entrepreneurs (see 
detail in section 7.2) 
 
(2)  This research contributes to research on accountability and governance in the 
public sector by revealing weaknesses and inefficiencies of check and balance 
mechanisms that have been established in order to curb fraud and corruption 
in Malaysia public procurement. Thus, the thesis indirectly asks for and 
promotes the improvement of the governance system in the country in order to 
combat the corrupt practices, as well as the immoral and unethical behaviour 
in the public procurement practices. 
 
(3) The study contributes to the literature by acquiring empirical evidence from a 
developing country, where managerial implications are also significant 
contributions in such a context.  
 
(4) What is more, a paper and a poster reporting on the findings of this thesis 
underwent a peer review process and were then presented at the 15
th
 European 
Conference on eGovernment ECEG 2015 at University of Portsmouth, UK on 
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18-19 June 2015. My paper received the Best PhD paper award in that 
conference. Consequently, my paper was also published in the Journal of e-
Government Volume 13 Issue 2, 2015 with the title of „e-Procurement: A 
Tool to Mitigate Public Procurement Fraud in Malaysia?‟. 
 
Further details of these contributions are offered in Chapter 7 (section 7.2). The 
structure of the thesis is presented in the next section. 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
 
There are seven chapters in this thesis. Each chapter is presented with an explanation 
of its direction and a summary of its contents. The thesis‟ structure is as follows. 
 












Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Chapter 1: Introduction  
Chapter 3: Research Methodology and Method 
Chapter 4: Socio-Political and Economic Context of Malaysia 
Chapter 5: Findings 
Chapter 6: Discussion  
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
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Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature on the conceptualization of fraud in 
general and, specifically, in relation to public procurement fraud. The chapter reviews 
key themes and issues related to the persistence factor of procurement fraud in public 
sector settings. This chapter also identifies the main sites of procurement fraud in 
relation to Malaysia, as the focus of the study, as well as the gaps of the current 
academic literature.  
 
Chapter 3 is concerned with the research methodology and method underpinning the 
current study. It draws from the researcher‟s fundamental philosophical assumptions 
adopted in the study and it critically examines the current institutional structure and 
arrangements to investigate social phenomenon.  In this chapter, the merits of using 
the lens of political economy theory are discussed and the use of qualitative 
methodology of documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews is argued for.  
 
Chapter 4 presents a discussion on the country‟s social and economic development. 
The chapter sheds light on historical institutionalism, political and government 
structures, the economic structure and development, the transformation aspects of the 
Malaysian society and the Malaysian public sector. The documentary analysis 
indicated the need to review the socio-political and economic context of Malaysia in 
order to show how they affect the persistence of fraud in public procurement. 
 
Chapter 5 discusses the semi-structured interview data that comprise the views and 
perceptions of the 40 stakeholders who were interviewed. It concentrates on the views 
given regarding the nature and extent of public procurement fraud in Malaysia. The 
findings are thematically divided based on the research questions (see section 1.2). 
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Chapter 6 summarises the research findings in the context of the theoretical 
framework outlined in Chapter 3. It considers the potential explanations for the 
persistent nature of fraudulent practices in the Malaysian public sector.  
 
Chapter 7 concludes the study by providing reflections on the findings by addressing 
each research question. This chapter also discusses the contributions of the study, 
highlights its limitations, suggests future research and provides concluding remarks. 
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Chapter 2: A Literature Review 
2.0 Introduction 
 
The aim of this thesis is to discuss and understand the persistence of public 
procurement fraud in Malaysia. This chapter aims to discuss and offer the reader 
some critical insights into the literature on fraud in public procurement. It identifies 
the main areas of investigation which are absent from the current academic literature. 
This chapter provides a general review of fraud in public procurement in both 
developed and developing countries, and particularly focuses on Malaysia as the 
context of this study. The review identifies the key trends and themes, which will 
inform this study. Thus, the review helps in developing a basis for the methodological 
framework of this study, which is discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
This chapter is divided into 5 sections (see Figure 2.1). Section 2.1 provides a 
detailed review of the notion and conceptualization of fraud by exploring various 
definitions of fraud (Coleman, 2006; Doig, 2011). The section then reviews various 
types of public procurement fraud as the main investigation of the current study 
(Deloitte, 2012; OECD, 2010). This is followed by a discussion on public 
procurement fraud from various disciplinary viewpoints. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
activities of procurement represent a huge fraction of total economic activity (Gee & 
Button, 2015; OECD, 2013). According to Khi V. Thai (2009), procurement activities 
are involved with the act of acquiring, buying goods, services or works from an 
external party. Dimitri, Piga, and Spagnolo (2006), on the other hand, particularly 
highlight a complex procurement process, which entails the pre-contract, contract and 
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post-contract stage of the procurement life cycle. This chapter continues the literature 
review with Section 2.2 addressing the existing research on public procurement fraud. 
The assessments from the existing research provide the possible reasons for the 
opportunities for public procurement fraud to take place. The examination shows the 
relationship between public and private organizations in relation to the creation of 
wealth and capital (Kenny & Søreide, 2008; Prechel, 2003); public sector reform 
(Heinrich, Lynn Jr, & Milward, 2010; Mir & Rahaman, 2007); deficient governance 
institutions (Iyoha & Oyerinde, 2010) and the opportunities arising in a procurement 
process (Caulfield, 2014; Lansing & Burkard, 1991; Tabuena, 2010). Section 2.3 
examines public procurement fraud and Malaysia, which is the context of the current 
study. Section 2.4 highlights the gaps in our knowledge of public procurement fraud, 
which this study has identified and aims to fill. Finally, section 2.5 provides a 
succinct summary of the key themes of each section.  
 











2.1 Notion of Fraud 
2.0 Introduction  
2.2 The Persistence of Public Procurement Fraud 
2.3 Public Procurement Fraud and Malaysia 
2.4 Gaps of Interest 
2.5 Summary 
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2.1 Notion of Fraud  
 
Fraud is often labelled as malaise, illegal behaviour, misconduct, cheating, swindling, 
trickery, dishonesty, deception, double-dealing, manipulation, treachery, chicanery, 
skulduggery, imposture, embezzlement, shadow activities, funny business, 
crookedness, hanky-panky, shenanigans, camouflage, betrayal and illegal practices 
(Calavita & Pontell, 1991; Carmichael, 1974; HM Revenue & Customs Press Office, 
2013; Levi, 1987; Pawlowski, 2001). As illustrated in Chapter 1, losses due to 
fraudulent practices are increasing and have a detrimental impact on society (Ball, 
2009; Froud, Johal, Papazian, & Williams, 2004; Ladd, 2010). Despite the wide 
concern and awareness of the growing number of occurrences of fraud worldwide, it 
is noted that most studies focus mainly on fraud in Western countries (Doig, Johnson, 
& Levi, 2001; Kerler & Killough, 2009; Prechel & Morris, 2010; Punch, 1996). In 
other words, there is lack of research that locates and discusses fraud in developing 
countries (P. A. Bowen, Edwards, & Cattell, 2012; Doig, Watt, & Williams, 2007), 
and in Malaysia in particular (A. A. Aziz, Nor, & Ahmad, 2010; Chin-Hong, Sze-
Ling, & Entebang, 2009); the latter being the focus of this study.  
2.1.1 Defining Fraud 
The study of fraud is an area of research that has been approached and theorized in 
various ways by different disciplines (C. Albrecht, Holland, Malagueño, Dolan, & 
Tzafrir, 2014; Gee & Button, 2015; Ramamoorti et al., 2014). Yet, research so far 
lacks in showing examples of fraud that are not necessarily illegal or unlawful (i.e., 
not breaking any rules and regulations) but are immoral, socially amiss and which 
have detrimental effects on others (Kramer, Michalowski, & Kauzlarich, 2002; 
Michalowski & Kramer, 2006; Quinney, 2003). The current study, in particular, takes 
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some aspects of fraud, such as deception or violating trust, which are not necessarily 
illegal or unlawful, but do clash with social norms and expectations, as part of the 
basis for the study. Therefore, it is necessary to explore different interpretations and 
expressions of fraud, its meaning and the variations in its definition as a basis for the 
understanding of fraud.   
 
At a very broad level, the Oxford Dictionary (2013) defines fraud as a wrongful or 
criminal deception intended for financial or personal benefits. The Accounting 
Dictionary (2013) offers a more refined definition of fraud as dishonest and deceptive 
action, either by stating what is false or by concealing what is true, in order to mislead 
and deceive a person. Alternatively, Doig (2006) as well as Duffield and Grabosky 
(2001) somewhat integrate the above definitions and define fraud as a crime violating 
trust by intentionally misrepresenting a material fact to the victim through deception 
and, thus, causing considerable loss. In short, fraud is generally defined as breaking 
the law and/or violating a regulatory framework for financial advantages. 
 
There are competing perspectives on the understanding of fraud (see Appendix 2.1). 
Further analysis of the fraud literature involves the role of the law in defining fraud 
(M. D. Green, 1943; Ormerod, 2007), fraud as a crime (e.g., white collar crime) in the 
area of criminology and sociology (Sutherland, 1945; Tappan, 1947; R. P. Tillman, 
Henry N., 1992), fraud in the accounting and auditing field (AICPA, 2002; Rezaee, 
2005), fraud as deviance, an illegal act and misconduct from the management and 
governance‟s perspectives (Baucus & Near, 1991; Greve, Palmer, & Pozner, 2010), 
and fraud as violating ethical and moral values (T. M. Jones, 1991). There is an 
almost endless array of interpretations of fraud in the literature; this is perhaps due to 
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the many competing disciplines that have been preoccupied with understanding the 
nature of fraud.  
 
Doig (2006) states that there are various definitions of fraud because most of the 
attention of the scholars is given to the process of fraud. At the same time, Jones 
(2011) asserts that it is impossible to provide a comprehensive description for fraud 
because of the inconsistencies and the scattered views expressed through various 
disciplinary traditions and empirical studies. It has been observed that there is 
difficulty in proving intent and the underlying motive behind fraud. Specifically, 
blurred definitions of fraud create a thin line that separates right from wrong, which 
arguably makes fraud perennial (Greve et al., 2010). Following this, many instances 
of wrongful conduct, specifically conducted by the elites, fall within the legitimate 
purview of law even though they are unethical and immoral (Barak, 2015). Ormerod 
(2007) claims that failure to demonstrate the element of fraud in court – because 
intent and underlying motive are not easily proven in court - can have serious 
consequences on the fraudster‟s conviction and the latter may easily get away with it. 
Finally, the task of giving an exact definition of fraud is a daunting one as it is rather 
a complex concept of a usually successfully hidden crime, which is hard to detect, 
prosecute and it is rarely reported; this results in the fraudster believing that they can 
escape from being caught and/or will not be detected and prosecuted (Brytting, 
Minogue, & Morino, 2011). 
 
The range of perspectives used to understand the nature of fraudulent practices may 
provide insightful views on understanding fraud. The latter provide a basis for the 
current study which suggests that (1) fraud is not only committed through violation of 
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law and is not necessarily illegal (Baer, 2008; Button, 2011), but (2) it needs to be 
understood within the context of breaching and clashing the norms, ethical values and 
beliefs of a community (Boyce, 2014; Weiskopf & Willmott, 2013), (3) and/or is 
socially amiss. Examples include misusing one‟s position in giving government 
contracts, abuse of power for personal gain under the pretext of the development of 
the country, which is done at the expense of the society, and decisions that are legally 
acceptable (not violating rules and regulations) but which, in reality, incur losses to 
the community, whether financial or non-financial. As a result, the current study sees 
fraud as a violation of legal restrictions, laws and regulations, or as any behaviour or 
action which is not considered illegal, but it is morally wrong and based on unethical 
decisions, and thus it is socially amiss.  
 
The coming sections discuss various types of public procurement fraud and the extant 
literature on this social phenomenon.  
2.1.2 Various Types of Public Procurement Fraud 
The increased attention to fraud and corruption related to procurement in public 
settings has often been implicated in losses of public money (Accountancy, 2011; 
OECD, 2010). The nature of public procurement fraud as depicted in the existing 
literature offers several perspectives on the matter. First, fraud is embedded within the 
complexity of the procurement process (OECD, 2007a). Researchers have suggested 
that the complex system of procurement process at pre-contract, contract and post-
contract phase can open up opportunities for fraud and corruption (ADB, 2014; 
Caulfield, 2014). Second, fraud in procurement is a hidden crime which is difficult to 
detect, prosecute and, thus, it is rarely reported, which makes it perennial (Deloitte, 
2012). For example, fraud in public procurement is hard to detect when it is 
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justifiable through formulation and implementation of the procurement policy. Some 
researchers have suggested that fraud and corruption are prevalent because they are 
closely related with state capture, rent-seeking behaviour, patronage system and many 
other human interactions (Johnston, 2005; Tabuena, 2010; Transparency 
International, 2006). Lastly, procurement fraud arguably exists because of the 
possibility of arrangements between several actors engaging in collusive actions 
(Lambert-Mogiliansky & Sonin, 2006). Yet, within the accounting area of the 
procurement life cycle, fraud in public procurement appears to be under-researched 
(Caulfield, 2014; Heggstad, Isaksen, & Frøystad, 2010). This section aims to list 
various types of fraud in public procurement in the pre-contract, contact and post-
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Source: Adapted from ACFE (2012), ADB (2014), Deloitte (2012); OECD (2010) 
 
 
1) PRE-CONTRACT STAGE 
 Unnecessary and unrealistic purchase  
 Bribery and kickbacks 
 Bid-rigging or collusive procurement (e.g., change order 
abuse, excluding qualified bidders, leakage of bid 
information, manipulation of bid, unbalanced bidding, 
split purchases, unjustified sole source awards, cover 
bidding, bid suppression, bid rotation and repetitive 
bidding) 
 
 2) CONTRACT STAGE 
 Conflict of interest 
 Collusion between contractor and public official  
 Failure of the contractor to meet contract 
specifications and, thus, a poorer quality of product 
 Modifications of contract based on renegotiation in 
order to allow for more time and/or higher prices for 
a contractor 
 Inflated cost price and different specifications than 
those stated in the contract 
 Assets stolen 
 No delivery of goods and services 
 
  3) POST-CONTRACT STAGE 
 False, inflated or duplicated invoices 
 Questionable contract amendments (e.g., change of orders) 
 Lack of proper documentation for payment 
 Payments for substandard work 
 Overpricing of goods and services 
 Inadequate supporting documents for payment 
 Shell companies and phantom vendors 
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Fraud schemes in the pre-contract stage suggest that abuse can occur at the very 
beginning of the procurement process through bribery and kickbacks for unnecessary 
and unrealistic purchases (Burguet & Che, 2004; Venkatesan, 2014) and through bid-
rigging and collusive activities between corrupt actors (Johnston, 2005; OECD, 2010; 
Khi V. Thai, 2009). Next, fraud and corruption in the contract stage
13
 exists because 
there is no longer a competitive bidding process but a bilateral negotiation between 
state officials and the winning bidder. The opportunities arise when the negotiation 
process provide opportunities of deliverables of poor quality and at inflated prices (de 
Brux, 2010; Mizoguchi & Van Quyen, 2014). Finally, fraud in the post-contract 
stage
14
 occurs in relation to contract management through conspiracies of multiple 
players for false and duplicate invoices, lack of proper documentation, overpricing of 
goods and services, inadequate supporting documents for payment, shell companies 
and phantom vendors, accounting mischarges and missing documents, and by 
receiving bribes or kickback in the process (Davies, 1995; Deloitte, 2012; Doig, 
2012; OECD, 2007a; Ziegenfuss, 1996).  
 
This section does not aim to discuss in detail the many types of fraud that generally 
exist at the three broad phases, i.e., pre-contract, contract and post-contract stage of 
procurement process. Fraud phenomenon in public procurement is often linked to 
corrupt activities, such as conflict of interest, bribery, kickback and bid-rigging 
(Guile, 2012, Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., 1999). Fraud in public procurement may 
                                                          
13
 Fraud schemes in the contract stage involve conflict of interest, collusion, failure to meet 
specifications, poor quality, higher prices, theft and no delivery (de Brux, 2010; Deloitte, 2012; 
Demski & Magee, 1992; Grødeland & Aasland, 2011). 
14
 Bose (2004) and C. Bliss and Di Tella (1997) have drawn attention to the ability of bureaucrats to 
abuse their power in exchange for bribes. Kanter (2008) reported that a contractor defrauded £297,600 
for over-pricing claims and another vendor cheated the UK government out of £367,500 with a false 
time sheet.  At the same time, shell companies in India are used as a separate entity to disguise and 
conceal fraudulent transaction (D. Singh, 2010). 
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involve elements of asset misappropriation either by theft of cash or inventory 
(Weber, Kurke, & Pentico, 2003; Ziegenfuss, 1996), misuse of assets for private gain 
(Treisman, 2000) or false claims (Action Fraud, n.d.).  
2.1.3 Research in Public Procurement Fraud 
Public procurement fraud has been investigated and discussed in many fields, such as 
accounting, auditing, law, criminology, sociology, business ethics, political economy, 
organization studies and governance. Here, the aim is not to summarize all these 
discussions, but to explore previous research and locate various gaps in the existing 
literature.  
 
The accounting and auditing literature research on fraud suggests that fraudulent 
practices occur somewhere in the procurement process (Caulfield, 2014; Matthew et 
al., 2013). Research on government procurement fraud argues that the complex 
system of procurement process at pre-contract, contract and post-contract stage 
provide the opportunity for committing various types of procurement fraud (Deloitte, 
2012; Heggstad et al., 2010; OECD, 2007b).
15
 For instance, the OECD‟s report gives 
significant examples of domestic cartels associated with bid rigging or collusive 
practices that are very difficult to detect as most procurement documentation and 
information is usually secret and, therefore, offers scarce opportunities for the study 
of fraud from an accounting perspective (Demski & Magee, 1992; Neu et al., 2015; 
Khi V. Thai, 2009). While the existing literature tends to focus on procurement fraud 
                                                          
15
 There are various procurement fraud schemes in government purchasing. These are bribery, gratuity, 
kickbacks, split purchases, leaking of acquisition data, change order abuse, bid manipulation, bid-
rigging, unjustified sole source, unnecessary purchases, purchases for personal/resale, conflict of 
interest, market sharing, bid-rotation, bid-suppression, defective pricing, fraudulent cost, false claims, 
inflated price, multiple claims, defective quality, manipulation of delivery, and false 
statement/certification among others (Caulfield, 2014; Matthew et al., 2013). 
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schemes, it also links the fight to prevent fraud in public procurement through 
monitoring and compliance mechanisms.  
 
For example, the current literature emphasizes the role of internal control and 
monitoring practices in the procurement process (Bartle & Korosec, 2003; Neu et al., 
2014). The fight against corruption has been illustrated in the recent studies of Neu et 
al. (2015), Sikka and Lehman (2015) and Sargiacomo et al. (2015).
16
  These scholars 
argue that limitations in the effectiveness and completeness of internal control 
systems mean that they are unable to curb fraud and corruption in government 
procurement, especially when there are collusive networks of powerful actors within 
the institutional power structure. Therefore, fighting fraud and corruption in the 
context of public procurement requires considerable institutional attention to 
strengthen the accountable and transparent practices in awarding public contracts 
(Grødeland & Aasland, 2011; Iyoha & Oyerinde, 2010). It is noted that the majority 
of the accounting and auditing studies that focussed on understanding the fight to 
prevent fraud in public procurement are mostly concentrated on Western countries 
(Coram, Ferguson, & Moroney, 2008; Lander et al., 2008). There are, however, few 
studies in the context of developing countries, like Malaysia, for example.  
 
Besides studies that focussed on the fight to prevent fraud and corruption in public 
procurement through effectiveness of internal control system as described within 
accounting and auditing research, law and criminology studies often discuss the 
                                                          
16
 Sargiacomo et al. (2015), for example, show how corruption and fraud cases in Italian government 
procurement involve a vast web of corrupt politicians, businessmen and bureaucrats. The reformulation 
of anti-corruption policies and several institutions in Italy can somehow easily be manipulated by the 
powerful groups in order to work with and around the system. 
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limited chances to bring culprits to the court (DeSouza, 1985; Fickey, 2009; 
Ormerod, 2007). Although there are numerous civil and criminal laws which enable 
the state to punish defrauders, Otusanya (2012) explains that prosecution for many 
fraud cases is difficult, especially when powerful elites are involved. While 
fraudulent acts have constrained transparent and accountable bidding process, in 
many cases the court has primarily stringent requirements for evidence and thus they 
are unable to obtain conviction for fraudulent behaviour, especially for abuse of 
power (Button et al., 2012; Petrucelli, 2012; Singh, 1999). The existing literature 
rarely focuses on the illegal, unethical, deviant activities or crimes of respectable and 
powerful people(Barak, 2015; Goldstraw-White, 2012).
17
. There is still shortage of 
research on the crimes or practices of the powerful people, which are more harmful 
and bring systemic forms of damage (see Doig, 2011; Whyte, 2009). 
 
Irrespective of many appeals for investigating and drawing attention to public 
procurement fraud in accounting and auditing literature and law and criminology 
studies, the existing sociology literature in general describes how ethical conducts are 
used as self-guidelines for making decisions whether to indulge in fraudulent and 
corrupt acts of behaviour (Kaptein, 2008; Kulik, O'Fallon, & Salimath, 2008; Meisel, 
2008). Despite the publicity and increased attention given to the decline of ethical 
conducts in many fraud scandals and accounting failures (Froud et al., 2004; Linsley 
& Shrives, 2009), it is noted that sociology literature emphasizes the values, attitudes 
and behaviour of various social actors and groups, the social organization, culture and 
                                                          
17
 Comparatively little scholarly attention has been given to fraud and corrupt practices conducted by 
politicians, governments, corporations, and capitalist businessmen (see Button et al., 2012). The 
current study considers fraud and corrupt practices committed at the interplay of organizational and 
institutional network of the powerful groups. The crimes committed by the powerful groups are 
sometimes not necessarily illegal or unlawful, but they are immoral and socially amiss within the 
context of Malaysia‟s public procurement. 
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social change relations. For example, there are studies in the literature which address 
misconducts through misuse of position in government agencies (McCampbell & 
Rood, 1997), the prevalent values of moral schemes (Ntayi, Ngoboka, & Kakooza, 
2013), attitudes of favourable and preferential procurement treatment (Berrios, 2006) 
and opportunistic behaviour within the procurement life cycle (Hawkins, Gravier, & 
Powley, 2011) in most procurement practices. The complexity of misusing one‟s 
position as illustrated by McCampbell and Rood (1997) sheds light on the rampant 
unethical acts of behaviour in government purchasing. The distinctive misconduct in 
the form of favourable and preferential treatment in many government contracts 
through social change relations have often provided opportunities for the fraudster to 
engage in fraud and corruption practices (Berrios, 2006). 
 
Next, it is important to note that the dynamic nature of fraud and corruption in the 
literature of political economy invariably involves mathematical and econometric 
models that mostly follow conventions of economic analysis (Clarke & Xu, 2004; 
Kingston, 2007; Mougeot & Naegelen, 2005). The statistical analysis, however, 
seems incapable of addressing the complex social ramifications of fraud in public 
procurement (see C. R. Baker & Bettner, 1997).  
 
The existing political economy literature, in particular, indicates institutional 
arrangements for and influences in the making of corrupt agreements in exchange for 
bribes in the pursuit of personal enrichment (Auriol & Blanc, 2009; Lambsdorff, 
2002). Corrupt deals often lead to bribery, collusion, cronyism or favouritism. For 
instance, Lambsdorff (2002) illustrates the mutually constituted relations between 
corrupt actors to make corrupt deals through „camouflaged‟ legal procurement 
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agreements and to conceal
18
 contractual corrupt relationships and the transactions 
between corrupt actors. Moreover, the existing political economy literature 
perceptively discussed acts of preferential treatment as discrimination in procurement 
practices (Evenett & Hoekman, 2005; Mougeot & Naegelen, 2005). The existing 
literature has increasingly showed that the formation of a protectionist policy through 
preferential treatment in government purchasing is likely to be characterised by crony 
capitalism, lobbying practices, state capture, and rent-seeking activities that involve 
distribution of rent by the state (Clarke & Xu, 2004; D. C. Kang, 2002; Seim & 
Søreide, 2009). In subscribing to the same notion, studies by Bjorvatn and Søreide 
(2005), Turnovec (1999) and Hessami (2014) suggest that the creation of rent by the 
state for profit making and wealth accumulation appropriated by capitalist actors has 
also created licit and illicit ways for people to indulge into fraud and corruption. 
Joseph Stiglitz (2002) points out that: 
“Perhaps the most serious concern with privatisation,
19
 as it has so often been 
practiced, is corruption…Not surprisingly the rigged privatisation process was 
designed to maximize the amount government ministers could appropriate for 
themselves not the amount that would accrue to the government‟s treasury let alone 
the overall efficiency of the economy” (p.58). 
 
Previous research into political economy also points out to the dynamics of influence 
from powerful corrupt actors and their close relationships that enable them to sustain 
their status quo in public procurement regimes (Boehm & Olaya, 2006; Hellman et 
al., 2000; Pesic, 2007). Hellman et al. (2000) describe the practices of state capture
20
 
                                                          
18
 The concealment of corrupt deals promotes a high degree of secrecy, limited transparency, 
institutional power structure of hierarchical interactions and the reformation of social structure 
(Kingston, 2007, 2008). 
19
 The neoliberal logic of privatisation, deregulation and trade investment embraced by the public 
sector institutions has only led to private appropriation of national wealth (Turnovec, 1999). 
20
 The phenomenon of systemic state capture has driven politicians of political parties to abuse their 
power over rewarding government contracts in order to return the political favours of the powerful 
business elites. Such capture may include contributing money to election campaigns, sponsoring media 
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which expose the ambiguity of public procurement process because of political 
discretion and the interdependence among political, bureaucrats, and business actors 
which constrain accountable and transparent procurement practices. Further analysis 
on the insights gained from the existing political economy literature addresses the 
structure of power among political and economic actors (Dastidar & Mukherjee, 
2014).  It importantly lays a foundation for understanding the influence of the 
embeddeddness of power relations for investigating fraud and corruption in public 
procurement and public policy arrangements; these have been discussed in many 
studies in the literature in the West (Bernhagen, 2007; Glaeser, 2001; Matechak, 
2002). Yet, insights of entrenched institutional arrangements
21
 into how societies and 
states create and maintain distinct ways of structuring a public procurement regime 
need to be explored from the perspective of Malaysia. Further, there are very few 
studies which analyse whether public procurement fraud is shaped and created by the 
systemic institutional elements that are link to the patterns of close relationships 
between corrupt actors (Gayton, 2004). 
 
A further analysis of public procurement fraud in the existing literature shows that 
there are emerging issues in the governance literature, particularly when focusing on 
how public sector institutions manage, control and are held accountable through 
public policy implementation and public service delivery (S. P. Osborne, 2010; 
                                                                                                                                                                     
campaigns, donating money legally or illegally. The state capture is manifested by lobbying practices 
as an effort to influence policy processes so as to favour their private interests (see Fuller, 2006; 
Hellman et al., 2000; Yakovlev & Zhuravskaya, 2006). 
21
 The complex ramifications of fraud in the Malaysian public procurement are socially constructed 
and embedded in a particular socio-economic and political context that takes into account Malaysia‟s 
historical dimension, power relations, businesses, and the role of the state. Alvesson and Willmott 
(2012) argue that these complex ramifications can be critically examined in order to explore various 
questions and conditions in relation to the reproduction and transformation of society by criticizing the 
status quo concerning unequal power relations in which an individual or powerful group advance their 
interests (Held, 1980) (see Chapter 3).  
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Tremblay, 2012). The existing literature generally discusses the exercise of 
accountability mechanisms of public sector organisations (Matthews, 2005; 
McDonald, 2008). It has been noted that there is a lack of research in linking the 
governance mechanisms with the emergence of public procurement fraud in various 
public organisations (Lindskog, Brege, & Brehmer, 2010). Furthermore, there is little 
exploration on the moral choices and ethical concerns of the government officials 
regarding their support of the governing principles of public procurement (Raymond, 
2008).  
 
From  the governance perspective approach, some scholars have paid attention to the 
fact that reforms
22
 have inevitably affected how a government allocates its resources 
for public spending  (Aberbach & Rockman, 2001; Hood & Peters, 2004). Yet, these 
reforms may be undermined by fraudulent and corruption practices in the context of 
public procurement (David S. Jones, 2007b; Morales et al., 2014; Tan, 2012). For 
instance, David Seth Jones (2013) shows that the reformation of the procurement 
system in the Philippines is constrained due to the:   
„elite capture of the government and bureaucracy by a powerful network of business 
leaders from well-established landed families, who have close links with the political 
establishment; and …a long-established culture of informal influence in the 
Philippine state bureaucracy (what may be termed the informal bureaucracy), which 
has been used to maximum effect by the elite network of business leaders‟. (p.375) 
 
 
Finally, governance research is more likely to acknowledge the collaborative 
relationship of public and private spheres (Shaoul et al., 2012; M. Smith, Mathur, & 
Skelcher, 2006). It is in the context of public-private interactions that fraud and 
                                                          
22
 The proliferation of public sector reforms has been discussed in the governance‟s literature. The idea 
is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public offices of New Public Management (NPM) 
through privatisation, de-regulation or trade investment. 
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corruption in public procurement needs to be addressed as it explores how practices, 
norms, values and processes might lead to fraud and corrupt practices (Gellér, 2009). 
Gellér (2009) argues that the influence of an environmental framework of cultures, 
behaviour, motivations and preferences affects the decision-making process which 
may evade oversight mechanisms. Many evidence is needed to support why oversight 
mechanisms (e.g., check and balance mechanisms) do not work despite the various 
rules and regulations in place within a procurement process. Any investigation on 
public procurement fraud needs to focus on public-private activities and how they 
interlink. 
 
This section has examined the notion of fraud by discussing studies in the existing 
literature on defining fraud, the various types of public procurement fraud and the 
extant literature about this social phenomenon. Rather than positioning fraud in 
public procurement in relation to previous research, the next section discusses why 
public procurement fraud continues to exist; this is one of the main questions 
addressed in the current study.  
2.2 The Persistence of Public Procurement Fraud 
 
Inevitably, the acquisition of goods and/or services at the best possible value is 
profoundly influenced by both public and private organisations. The interactions 
between the state and private capitalists in the process of obtaining and procuring 
goods and services sometimes involve an opaque procurement process (Kühn & 
Sherman, 2014). Tabuena (2010) describes how a complicated procurement process 
at the nexus of government and businesses has created opportunities for fraud and 
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corruption activities and has given an unfair advantage or rewards to the fraudsters. 
Caulfield (2014) suggests that fraudsters are able to manipulate opportunities arising 
in procurement procedures and interactions between state officials and entrepreneurs. 
On the one hand, Priemus (2004) and Dastidar and Mukherjee (2014) observe 
bribery, kick-backs, price-fixing, conflict of interest, bid-rigging, manipulation of 
price, collusion and many other activities in government procurement. On the other 
hand, other studies have indicated that fraud and corruption in public procurement is 
closely related with rent-seeking behaviour, the prevalence of state capture by private 
interest, and abusive of power within institutional contexts (Hessami, 2014; Kenny & 
Søreide, 2008). Therefore, public procurement fraud often succeeds at the nexus of 
the public and private sector (Asquer, 2011; Priemus, 2004).  
 
This section aims to illustrate the persistence of fraud in public procurement in both 
developed and developing countries by discussing the intertwined relationship 
between public and private institutional arrangements and the collusive actions of 
multiple social actors with common interests. Section 2.2.1 concentrates on the 
dynamic power of government and business relationship that plays a role in public 
procurement fraud. The section shows the outcome of the role played by the state and 
business in procurement activities by using their economic and political power. 
Section 2.2.2 discusses public sector accountability and governance transformation. 
The section shows how powerful groups are able to secure government contracts, 
licences and subsidies for example through public policy mechanisms. Section 2.2.3 
examines the dynamics of institutional arrangements, which are unable to curb 
fraudulent practices in procurement. This section suggests that the volatile 
institutional capacity has provided an opportunity for fraud and corruption. Lastly, 
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section 2.2.4 explores the opportunities existing in procurement process, which 
facilitate fraud and enable corrupt acts of behaviour. Such opportunities arguably 
create a dysfunctional procurement process environment and a drive for personal 
enrichment and fulfilment of private interests.  
2.2.1 The Nexus of Government and Business Interactions 
In many government purchases, it is argued that there is an undeniable relationship 
between public and private organisations (Tirole, 1986). The negotiation for 
government spending between two parties (e.g., government and businesses) may 
provide a motivation for businessmen and/or state officials to maximize profits and 
create opportunities to engage in fraudulent practices. Figure 2.3 highlights the 
interconnections between private and public relationships.  
 















Source: Adopted from http://www.edunote.info/2012/12/government-and-business-
organizations.html 
 
Government Government influences the 
business by: 
 Laws and regulation 
 Government agencies and 
regulatory bodies 
 Public policy development 
 Organization of the economic 
market 
 Achieving security and 
protection of the market 
Business 
Business influences the government 
by: 
 Personal conduct and lobbying 
 Sources of revenue: e.g., 
taxation, political donation, 
financing during general election, 
large investments 
 Market forces 
 Forming trade unions and 
chambers of commerce 
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The above diagram shows the relationship between government and business. It 
suggests that the two are interconnected, complementing and dependent on each 
other. Various scholars have described how both government and business 
institutions can affect and influence institutional arrangements (Chomsky, 1999; 
Schneider, 1998). Schneider (1998) affirms that the elusive synergy between business 
and government has accelerated development and growth. The existing literature 
attempts to explain that close connections between government and business 
institutions have established considerable political and economic power (see Korten, 
2001). The examination of institutional power structure offers rich insights into this 
matter, but it is frequently located in economically advanced countries. 
Comparatively, some studies in the literature claim that the webs of public-private 
ties in many developing countries need to be explored within their peculiarity of 
historical development, socio-political, economic and cultural contexts (Gould & 
Amaro-Reyes, 1983; Woo-Cumings, 1999). From the diagram, it is apparent that the 
role of the state
23
 is closely linked with the influence of business by formulating rules 
and regulations, and by making policymaking decisions. The state also has a role to 
play in ensuring security; they must develop initiatives to raise revenues, and provide 
a range of social services. As a result, their role helps to maintain the state‟s 
legitimacy by asserting the latter‟s economic influence and control.  
 
On the other hand, businesses seek to gain influence over the government by 
providing tax revenues, political donations, financing during general elections, large 
investments in return for the provision of public services. The important arguments 
                                                          
23
 The institutions of the state are all „public‟ institutions and include „the government‟ and legislature, 
the courts, the civil service, the army, the police, the church, and state-owned public agencies (Dean, 
1989; Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1987; Jessop, 1990; Pablo, Javier, Carlos, & Crawford, 2009). 
P a g e  | 75 
 
 
that have been raised from the current literature about the relationships between 
government and business are examined in relation to the close collaboration or 
structural intersections among political and economic actors (Andrews et al., 2015). It 
is observed that their close relationship may provide both state officials and 
businesspeople with opportunities for personal gains from entering into procurement 
transactions in the context of the existing institutional relationships. In other words, 
both social actors (in government and private sector) may exploit the institutional 
relationships to their personal benefit (McCampbell & Rood, 1997). Consequently, 
certain social actors who seek to maximize profits and personal gains might result in 
carrying out fraudulent activities.  
 
A number of studies on the nexus of business-government relationship attempt to 
explore a range of conceptions related to fraud and corruption in public procurement. 
Some scholars have identified that bribery and kickback activities
24
 are commonly 
conducted in order to seal a government contract (Matechak, 2002; OECD, 2008b; 
Vaughan, 1982). For example, Vaughan (1982) has shown that activities of bribery 
are necessary to ensure licensing, inspection and contract relations at the resource 
exchange between government agencies and business firms. Recently scholars have 
argued that the recipient of bribery and kickback money can be: public officials, 
ministers, politicians, and political parties with common interests (Neu et al., 2014; 
OECD, 2010). Studies on rational decisions of the economic man to indulge in fraud 
and corruption in government purchasing between state and non-state actors illustrate 
                                                          
24
 The bribe and kickback values need not be in the form of money/cash but in the form of any benefits 
received with the intention to influence the rewarding decisions. 
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the interplay of collusive practices
25
 for exchanging favours (M. Chwastiak, 1998; 
Grødeland & Aasland, 2011), bid rigging (Davies, 1995), and conflict of interest 
cases
26
 (Deloitte, 2012; Lambsdorff, 2002; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Therefore, it is 
important to realize that the nexus of government and business seems to have 
benefitted from the influence exerted by and/or from the interference from power 
relationships in rewarding government contracts. As Hawkins et al. (2011) put it,  
„Government procurement has increased the interaction between public and private 




In relation to the network of power relationships in government purchasing, the 
practice of government-business transactions has to some extent created a patron-
client network in allocating public resources. Recent scholars have disclosed that 
rent-seeking activities aim to make economic gains from the government (Asquer, 
2011; Hessami, 2014). Correspondingly, Asquer (2011) illustrates that rent-seeking 
behaviour of multiple actors in a network has undermined liberalization and 
regulatory reforms in Italy. Subsequently, rents are secured and distributed by 
politicians with power in government offices. In framing rent-seeking activities in this 
way, some studies believe that these activities correspond with the concept of 
cronyism
27
 and favouritism (Matechak, 2002; U.S Government, 1988), cartels 
                                                          
25
 Collusion is manifested when a public official is willing to cooperate with other corrupt actors by 
undermining his role as a government official and failing to disclose having such interests. Collusion 
may result in inflated prices or higher prices bid-rigging, fixed pricing and many others as responding 
to incentives to influence or interfere with the rewarding of a contract and for a large infusion of 
money (Lambert-Mogiliansky & Sonin, 2006; Porter & Zona, 1993).  
26
 A conflict of interest exists when state officials have financial concerns in a contract. For example, a 
procurement officer knows someone who is very close to them – a spouse or other family members 
who work for the company, a politician who has a majority share for that company or state officials 
frequently accepting gifts from the company. 
27
 Cronyism exists when two parties have a close relationship because of mutual acquaintances and 
social interactions in order to benefit each other. Crony capitalism is conducted among businesses, 
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(OECD, 2008a; Priemus, 2004), nepotism (Islam, 2004), patronage system
28
 (Fraser 
et al., 2006; Jeff Tan, 2008), monopoly
29
 (Rose–Ackerman, 2008; O. E. Williamson, 
1976) and oligopoly
30
 (Luo, 2005). In some cases, the exercise of patron-client 




 alongside with the 
practice of political business. 
 
The next section considers the accountability and governance transformations for 
more transparency and value for money in public procurement. 
2.2.2 Public Sector Accountability and Governance Transformation 
Fraud in public procurement evades transparency and accountability (OECD, 2013; 
Søreide, 2002). The modernisation programmes enacted through the reform of public 
sector governance seem to have increased efficiency, transparency and accountability 
especially in the public sector (Brewer, Choi, & Walker, 2008; Mansor & Ariffin, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
politicians and public officials as an ethical breach of the principles of the market economy (Chomsky, 
1999). For example, a politician who has been sponsored by business leaders for a political campaign 
will award government contracts to their sponsors or supporters. This is important to maintain their 
political survival (Garza, 2012). 
28
 A patronage system is the support, encouragement, privilege, or financial aid given by a relevant 
organization. A patronage system, however, is likely to exhibit opportunism behaviour by social actors 
so as to enrich themselves and their family (Fraser, Zhang, & Derashid, 2006; Gomez & Jomo, 1997).  
29
 Monopoly exists when there is a domination of the market by a single entity. That is to say, a single 
enterprise is the only supplier of a particular commodity. The main elements in monopoly are: lack of 
economic competition to produce goods or services and a lack of viable substitute of goods. 
30
 An oligopoly is a market form in which a market or industry is dominated by a small number of 
sellers (the oligopolists; e.g.,, the ruling elites). Oligopolies result from various forms of collusion 
which reduce competition and lead to higher prices for consumers. 
31
 The term clientelism refers to a pattern of social exchange and power between patrons (particularly 
the ruling elite), normally top ranking bureaucrats, such as the political master, public officials and 
clients (business elites). The clients normally offer financial and electoral support, political donations 
or personal gifts. In return, the ruling elite, as a politician, abuses their power and role to influence 
government decisions in favour of the clients  (Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, & Brusco, 2013).  
32
 Patrimonialsim is a form of governance and personal ties (for example, leaders and their 
subordinates). It is argued that with patrimonialism the power relation of the leader is so strong that 
official duties are defined not by rules and regulations but by their personal loyalties. For example, 
Kelman and Hamilton (1989) highlight the crimes of obedience by the subordinates who only follow 
orders/instructions of their superior as obedience towards authority.  
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2015; Siddiquee, 2006b). The current study, however, argues that the modernisation 
programmes through the reforms of public sector governance can also become the site 
where fraudulent and corrupt activities are carried out. Consequently, it is noted that 
there is lack of studies in linking fraud and corruption activities and the 
transformation of the public sector to increase its accountability, curb fraud and 
corruption and improve government effectiveness (Apaza, 2009; Brewer et al., 2008; 
David Seth Jones, 2013).  
 
There are increased concerns in the existing literature in relation to the need to reform 
public sector governance, especially in public policy mechanisms, as a way to 
improve the public sector (Heinrich et al., 2010; D. Osborne & Gaebler, 1992).  
Scholars have discussed the public sector transformation as a way of improving the 
governance system by modernising the public office (Heinrich et al., 2010; Mir & 
Rahaman, 2007). Others suggest the private sector‟s „ethos‟ of competition, of being 
profit-oriented towards a market-based approach and driven to create wealth and 
capital for maximizing revenues, are values which are regarded as „dysfunctional‟ and 
„defective‟ in the private sector, and which are then transferred  to public 
organisations (Broadbent & Guthrie, 2008; Humphrey & Miller, 2012). Further 
analysis on public sector reforms with private sector involvement illustrates 
regulatory failures of institutional structures (Kessides, 2004; D. Parker & 
Kirkpatrick, 2005) and lack of accountability and transparency (Lapsley, 2009; 
Samaratunge, Alam, & Teicher, 2008). Interestingly, fraud and corruption in public 
procurement may arise at the same time as the transformation of the public sector by 
providing opportunities for fraudulent and corrupt behaviours, thus „camouflaging‟ 
the intention to improve accountability, transparency and governance (David Seth 
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Jones, 2013; Priemus, 2004; Tan, 2012). It is important to argue that the assumptions 
of the superiority of the business sector to the public sector have recently become the 
dominant principles in the adoption of policies and reforms in the socio-political and 
economic context of public governance (Ezzamel & Willmott, 1993; Potter, 1994). 
This has influenced many of government procurement policies as a modernisation 
reforms for allocation and distribution of resources (Adham & Siwar, 2012).  
 
Given the variety of considerable transformations, the New Public Management 
(NPM) is favoured and allows for more managerial private intervention in 
procurement processes. In light of this, there has been a considerable debate about the 
ambiguity of the public sector‟s transformation via the neo-liberal logic of 
privatisation,
33
 de-regulation and trade investment (Andrew, 2007; E. Brown & 
Cloke, 2005; Chomsky, 1999). Harvey (2005) and Arestis and Sawyer (2005) argue 
that rapid changes conducted by neoliberal capitalism
34
 have transformed both the 
economy and the state into „entrepreneurial subjects‟ (e.g.,, transfer of ownership 
from the public to private sector). In another study, Bjorvatn and Søreide (2005) 
reveal that privatisation has allowed for more corrupt acts when market reforms 
through neoliberal ideology contribute to economic inefficiencies with corruption and 
market concentration. It can be argued that procurement activities in a neoliberal 
                                                          
33
 The changes in market reform (e.g.,, privatisation) do not necessarily lead to  improved competition 
and efficiency. For example, Turnovec (1999) demonstrates that rapid privatisation in Czech Republic 
was an illusion as privatisation has only led private appropriation of national wealth. He concluded that 
such reasonable action allowed the formation of corrupt collusions among other actors within a state 
capitalism. 
34
 Neoliberal policies and programs have been orchestrated by a whole range of agencies, such as the 
International Monetary Fund, United Nations, OECD and World Bank, with international audiences 
rather than domestic ones (Cammack, 2003; Scholte, 1997). It has been argued that the same policies 
and programs have advocated the use of foreign investment as an economic development strategy, but 
it is a form of exploitation and extraction that curtails or distorts economic growth, particularly in 
developing countries (see O.M. Bakre, 2010; Kehl, 2009; Otusanya, 2011). 
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economy allow profit seeking
35
 to dominate the economy as well as the social and 
political life. As can be seen from current literature, a number of studies have 
suggested that the market reforms advocated by many governments for its public 
service delivery may also foster fraud and corruption activities (O.M. Bakre, 2010; 
Schwartz, 2008). It is argued that empirical research on examining market reforms in 
Malaysia is diverse and remains unsystematic (see Demery & Demery, 1991; C. Lee, 
2012). There is, however, little empirical work on market reforms in Malaysia 
considering their negative impact (e.g., fraud and corruption) on the Malaysian 
society (Haque, 2002; Siddiquee, 2006b). 
 
Finally, while some studies may have examined public procurement policy, it appears 
that lobbying practices
36
 influence the regulation of public policy in serving private 
business interests rather than the citizens (Schepers, 2010). Some scholars emphasise 
the power of powerful vested interests to influence public policy making 
(Dharmapala & Hines Jr., 2007; Kehl, 2009). Auriol (2006) specifically argues that 
regulatory capture by the ruling elites in the public procurement framework has 
increased bribe money as „facilitation payments‟ in order to win a contract. Auriol 
(2006) further emphasizes that those facilitation payments and bribery have led 
political parties and their leaders to finance campaigns and personal accounts, and 
that in return they are expected to engage in corrupt activities in the process of 
                                                          
35
 Despite the market reforms of privatization, deregulation and trade investment, the competing form 
of capitalist globalization is closely associated with profit making and wealth creation (Boyce, 2008). 
36
 Business leaders are normally associated with the lobbying process, which aims to influence public 
authorities to take into account particular vested interests through, for example, large investment in a 
political party. This is done by a great variety of actors i.e., by other governments, by other 
decentralized public bodies and authorities and by private interests, such as those of companies, trade 
unions and other civil society organizations (Schepers, 2010). 
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awarding of government contracts and the like.
37
 It is imperative to notice the work of 
several scholars that have reviewed lobbying and money politics practices, which 
affect the rewarding of government contracts (Campos & Giovannoni, 2007; Korten, 
2001; Teh, 2002). It is thus becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the importance 
of development of public procurement policy, when public procurement fraud and 
corruption are related to policy outcomes being implemented in favour of special 
interest groups (Auriol, 2006). 
 
The next section examines the dynamic of institutional arrangements that facilitate 
fraud in public procurement. 
2.2.3 The Dynamic of Institutional Arrangements 
Political and economic arrangements are among the important ways of curbing and 
prohibiting fraud and corruption in public procurement. Dimitri et al. (2006) 
perceptively state that any institutional environment deficiencies that are entrenched 
in a procurement regime, such as lack of monitoring mechanisms may result in lack 
of transparency, accountability and governance in procurement process. As a result, 
allocations of public resources from government contracts may favour the selected 
few at the expense of the wider society (Hellman et al., 2000; Khoman, 2015). The 
embeddedness of public procurement fraud is closely associated with the institutional 
setting of formal and informal practices, which nurture a particular culture, social 
norms and moral values at the interaction of human relations (see Sargiacomo et al., 
2015). However, there is still a lack of research in investigating fraud in public 
                                                          
37
 It is said that public policy agenda is used to serve the vested interests of powerful groups within the 
institutional and organizational structure of government (March & Olsen, 1984; Rose & Miller, 1992).  
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procurement in relation to the norms, rules, procedures and routines, which direct and 
constrain human interactions (Guile, 2012; Lansing & Burkard, 1991).  
 
Some studies have reviewed the historical institutions‟ authoritarian governance of 
coercion and consent to their colonies (Mann, 1986; Migdal, 1988). Chiriyankandath 
(2008) proposes that the pattern of colonial rule of patronage and patron-client 
relations and the entrenched legacy of autocratic government distribute power and 
resources unevenly among groups. In this way, opportunities and motivations for 
fraud and corruption in public procurement are created. As Adrian Leftwich (2008) 
puts it, “Colonial rule commonly built on, extended, and institutionalized patron-
client relations, from top to bottom” (p.222). Subscribing to a similar view, 
Malaysia‟s legacy of colonialism (e.g.,, its legacy of British, Portuguese, Dutch and 
Japanese colonialism) especially its legacy of British colonial experience has shaped, 
created and influenced Malaysia‟s institutionalised power structure, values and social 
order (M. Abdullah, 1965; Milner, 2002). As a result, fraud in public procurement is 
the result of the historical institutionalism of the institutional power, which continues 
to exist in public bureaucracy in modern societies.  
 
A strong institutional power
38
 is embraced by the local ruling elites as influential 
groups (W. Case, 1994; Stokke, 1998). The powerful groups seek to remain powerful 
and maintain the status quo by nurturing the procurement system that favours 
                                                          
38
 Through the myriads of networks, powerful groups with strong power relations are able to engage in 
fraud and corruption in public procurement at the arrangements of institutional contexts and relations. 
For example, Migdal, Kohli, and Shue (1994) have studied state power and social forces in the third 
world. They argue that the prevailing domination and transformation in the third world requires a more 
balanced study on state-society analysis. Whyte (2009) focuses on the crimes of the powerful – by 
state institutions, business elites and corporations. By capturing all check and balance institutions (e.g., 
judicial institutions), the concentration of power and implementation of laws work in favour of 
political elites.  
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cronyism, favouritism, rent-seeking activities, bribery, fraud and corruption activities 
(Bjorvatn & Søreide, 2005; Hessami, 2014). The design of procurement rules and 
regulations is created in such a way so as to dictate transparency, accountability and 
value for money for various government projects and contracts. However, the same 
institutional frameworks can be put aside to award unmerited companies contracts in 
exchange for bribes. Although the procurement rules and regulations are not violated, 
those perpetrators are able to manipulate the procurement process by abusing power 
for private gains (see Gray & Kaufmann, 1998; Kaufmann & Siegelbaum, 1997). 
Most importantly, it is noted that Malaysia‟s procurement system is established by the 
existing institutional environment, which nurtures the practices of money politics, 
patronage and political business (Tan, 2015). In that sense, Tan (2015) explains that, 
„…powerful economic interests typically seeking to influence the allocation of rents 
through state capture, money politics in Malaysia refer to the political capture of the 
state by politicians and bureaucrats, with the allocation of rents initially controlled 
by an autonomous state, and subsequently by political parties and individual political 
leaders‟. (p.201)  
 
Next, a volatile institution is also influenced by the politicization of state 
bureaucrats.
39
 Amosa (2008) reveals that the politicization of bureaucracy is a 
condition in which a political ruler uses the civil service to benefit their narrow 
political interests. The approach taken by the ruling elites as guiding principles in the 
appointment and promotion of public servants encourages loyalty and threatens the 
impartiality and neutrality principle. This influences public policy formulation and 
implementation,
40
 the establishment of rules and regulations, public service delivery, 
                                                          
39
 The consequence of this phenomenon, however, makes the civil servants to always take a cue from 
their political master, and thus they perhaps are inefficient, ineffective and unfair when providing 
social services (Hart & Wille, 2012). 
40
 For example, in formulating public policy, there is a tradition of „stronger politicians, and weaker 
bureaucrats‟ or „weak politicians, strong bureaucrats‟ (Bowornwathana & Poocharoen, 2010). The 
former indicates manifestation of power and control of politics over bureaucrats of the state machine. 
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oversights and accountability mechanisms aiming to restrain fraud and corruption in 
public procurement process (see Crane, 2013). Rothstein (2012) asserts that 
overreaching degrees of patronage, clientelism and corruption in allocating and 
distributing public resources are normally at the discretion of the political ruler. On 
the one hand, political hegemony is governed by various government agencies in 
distributing rents and public resources (Dahlstrom, 2012). On the other hand, 
procurement officers follow rules and regulations stipulated within the procurement 
process. On the contrary, Grødeland and Aasland (2011) report that procurement 
officers just obey unreasonable or unjust laws in the procurement system so as to 
return favours to local elite‟s contacts. The multiple factors deriving from the 
politicization of state bureaucrats result in conflict of interest on part of the civil 
servants in discharging their responsibility and accountability when handling public 
funds (Christensen, 2010). Therefore, one can say that the institutional arrangements 
within the politicization of the civil service threaten their professionalism and 
„contaminate‟ the function of public service delivery (Simmonds, 1985) .  
 
A study by Colombatto (2003) shows that the institutional arrangements exemplify 
the traditions of rational and understandable reaction towards corrupt behaviours. 
Colombatto (2003) argues that there is tolerance of corrupt behaviour when „authority 
is abused and the constraints [are] violated‟ (p.363). Ashforth and Anand (2003), on 
the other hand, argue that wrongdoings are institutionalized when corrupt decisions 
and actions are embedded in structures, processes and routinized. As social structure 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Bowornwathana and Poocharoen (2010) and Woo-Cumings (1999) suggest that the power of 
bureaucrats is reduced particularly in developmental states as the political master constantly builds 
empires and they struggle to survive within the state machinery. The latter (i.e., weak politicians and 
strong bureaucrats) occurs when high level bureaucrats are able to be policy strategists responsible for 
policy making, for recreating, redesigning, evaluating and supervising the operational matters without 
so much interference of politicians. 
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and individuals are mutually reinforcing each other, a culture of misconduct can be 
developed as „the way things are done‟ in the organization (Greve et al., 2010). Thus, 
fraud and corrupt actions continue to undermine public procurement practice.  
 
Lastly, it is important to realize that the dynamic of institutional arrangements 
influences the systemic nature of fraud and corruption in public procurement fraud, 
which means that there is a need to improve institutions. Government procurement 
requires transparent transactions, value for money and more accountability practices 
(Erridge & Nondi, 1994; Matechak, 2002). However, these procurement principles 
cannot be applied if fraud and corruption in public procurement practices become 
entrenched in various government agencies. For example, P. A. Bowen et al. (2012), 
Rooney (2007) and Nwabuzor (2005) provide evidence that it is common and seems 
normal to pay and accept bribes to seal a government contract. The decay in moral 
values and corrupted societal norms in procurement practices further reinforces 
inefficiencies in various government departments (Hawkins et al., 2011; McCampbell 
& Rood, 1997). Stefes (2007) rightly points out that, 
„Systemic corruption is characterized by extensive corrupt activities such as bribery, 
extortion, and embezzlement, ranging from petty to grand corruption…….Moreover, 
systemic corruption is characterized by the presence of rules and norms (institutions) 
that are commonly known and adhered to by most officials and citizens most of the 
time. These institutions are informal insofar as they are neither explicitly codified nor 
externally enforced. Nevertheless, they powerfully shape the interests and strategies 
of public officials and citizens‟. (p.7) 
 
 
While considerable efforts have been made to understand fraud and corruption, the 
systemic and institutionalised nature of fraudulent and corrupt practices has largely 
remained unexplored (Colombatto, 2003; Gabbioneta, Greenwood, Mazzola, & 
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Minoja, 2011, 2013; Stefes, 2008). This is also true in relation to Malaysia, which is 
the context of the current study.  
2.2.4 Opportunities in the Procurement Process 
The prevention of fraud and corruption within government procurement has been 
regarded as an essential element to ensure transparency, accountability and value for 
money (Doig, 2012; Miroslav et al., 2014; National Fraud Authority, 2011). The 
existing literature has discussed and suggested various measures for reforming and 
improving the procurement system. Some studies emphasize internal controls 
structure and monitoring practices (Araujo, 2013; Ghedini Ralha & Sarmento Silva, 
2012). In this context, various mechanisms have been established to limit the 
opportunities for fraud in government purchasing activities. Among others, 
governance mechanisms for curbing fraud and corruption practices are associated 
with improving internal control system (Carmichael, 1974; Coxson, 2009; Neu et al., 
2014), board composition (Beasley, 1996; Quinn & Jones, 1995) and auditing 
practices (Makkawi & Schick, 2003). However, deficiencies in the institutional 
environment have created substantial opportunities for abuse in the procurement 
process and the evasion of rules and regulations and exploitation of weaknesses in the 
monitoring mechanisms (see Iyoha & Oyerinde, 2010). 
 
There are opportunities to abuse or manipulate the procurement process because of 
the complexities and opaqueness of procurement processes and procedures, thus 
public procurement officials seek to exploit deficiencies in the government 
acquisition system. (Ashari, 2013; Trepte, 2004). Because of their specialised role, 
there is a possibility that many procurement officials know better than anyone does 
how to manipulate the procurement system. Lambsdorff (2002) describes how corrupt 
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actors are continuously making corrupt deals in any kind of government contractual 
relationship. Lambsdorff (2002) further argues that many government contracts 
require a process of exchanging goods and services between government agencies 
and private sector. Thus, a government contract might end up with a mutually corrupt 
agreement. On the other hand, Bose (2004) illustrates the bureaucratic delays in many 
government agencies. The potentials for bribe-taking practices are great because of 
the lengthy processes and delays in getting the appropriate government services. In 
order to speed up the government process, the public officials may use their power to 
demand for „speed money‟ in exchange for government normal processing  (Marjit, 
Mukherjee, & Mukherjee, 2000). Thus, a core element of abuse of power by state 
officials seems to be camouflaged within the procurement process. Therefore, 
opportunism arises via the misuse of one‟s position by mutual understanding and by 
promising favourable treatments to others (see McCampbell & Rood, 1997; 
Mizoguchi & Van Quyen, 2014).  
 
There are many opportunities in public procurement system for misuse or abuse of a 
government position for fulfilling private interests and making personal gain, thus 
violating the public trust due to unethical behaviour or misconduct in government 
purchasing (McCampbell & Rood, 1997; Wensink & Vet, 2013). McCampbell and 
Rood (1997), in particular, affirm the rampant unethical behaviour in government 
purchasing. The opportunities arise when both government officers and contractors 
tend to exploit close relationships for their personal gain. The authors shed light on 
the violation of ethical codes by government officers who closely interact with 
contractors for private gains and who are mostly never prosecuted. McCampbell and 
Rood (1997) show,  
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„that private gains are never fully reprimanded….the violators were able to stay in 
their jobs, receive benefits, and most did not have a mark on their permanent record‟ 
(p.1114). 
 
On top of  the worrying trend of misuse of one‟s position and misconduct behaviour 
in government procurement, it is also noted that there is difficulty in proving intent to 
commit fraud and corruption in public procurement and thus culprits are not punished 
(G. Lewis & Bajari, 2011). It should also be noted that opportunities arise when fraud 
in public procurement goes undetected, unreported and unmeasured (ADB, 2014; 
Matechak, 2002). This is especially so when the corrupt activities are arranged by 
politicians, entrepreneurs and bureaucrats in public sector procurement, thereby 
making it difficult to detect and report a network of systemic corruption generally 
shrouded in secrecy (see Neu, Everett, & Rahaman, 2013). 
 
Lastly, opportunities in the procurement process to indulge in fraud and corruption 
arise when most government procurement documentation is secretive and not publicly 
available thus allowing for collusion. Information in procurement documentation can 
be used by corrupt actors to collude with a contractor to win a contract (Della Porta & 
Vannucci, 2007; OECD, 2010; Porter & Zona, 1993).  A study by Della Porta and 
Vannucci (2007) in Italy discloses the payment of bribes to win government contracts 
by entrepreneurs, something that is facilitated by close friendships and political 
contacts. The corrupt practices cannot be easily revealed or exposed as the „clean 
hands‟ investigation outcomes led the inquiries to the judiciary, politicians, business 
elites and bureaucrats. It is important to realize that in Malaysia those who reveal 
secrets of government documentation can be punished by law, thus this may aid in the 
„concealment‟ of fraudulent and corrupt practices (Khan, 2014; Malaysia Kini, 2016). 
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In other words, the „concealment‟ of government documentation especially that 
related to sensitive issues in public procurement leave a lot of room for abuse, 
especially when bureaucrats act at the discretion of their political bosses (Christensen, 
2010). Thus, the imperative of secrecy in public procurement transactions makes the 
latter more vulnerable to fraud and corrupt behaviour. Therefore, one can say that the 
existence and requirement of confidential information in procurement documentation 
may contribute to the persistence of public procurement fraud.  
 
It is important to point out in this section the possible reasons for the persistence of 
public procurement fraud as follows. First, there is an undeniable relationship 
between government and business in any procurement transaction (Kettl, 2010). 
While the interactions at the nexus of government and business are inevitable for 
government purchasing, the same platform can be used by corrupt actors to engage in 
fraud and corruption (Luo, 2005). Second, the legitimation of new governance and 
accountability mechanisms through New Public Management with the neoliberal 
logic of privatisation, deregulation and trade liberalization may serve the 
collaboration and coordination of various actors (at both the international and the 
local levels) (Lauwo & Otusanya, 2014). However, the governance and accountability 
mechanisms may have been weakened by taking various opportunities for fraudulent 
practices while implementing New Public Management programs in the public sector 
(Iyoha & Oyerinde, 2010; Morales et al., 2014). This has raised further questions on 
the accountability, transparency and efficiency of public procurement and this is what 
motivates the current study. Third, the arrangements of institutions and the actions of 
social agents may both constrain and contribute to public procurement fraud. Fraud 
may flourish because of institutional arrangements (Appolloni & Nshombo, 2013). 
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Lastly, opportunistic acts of behaviour in the procurement process may have 
constrained transparent and accountable government purchasing (Compte, Lambert-
Mogiliansky, & Verdier, 2005).  
 
The following sections discuss the literature on public procurement fraud in relation 
to Malaysia. 
2.3 Public Procurement Fraud and Malaysia 
 
The previous section concentrated on defining fraud, the various types of public 
procurement fraud and on the extant literature (section 2.1). The factors that enable 
public procurement fraud persist are examined in section 2.2. This section discusses 
the distinctiveness of fraudulent practices within Malaysia‟s procurement practices.  
 
There is an increasing number of studies on investigating fraud in Malaysia from 
various perspectives. In the broadest perspective, fraud research in Malaysia 
commonly refers to the fraud triangle model
41
 within the accounting and auditing 
domain (Hasnana, Rahman, & Mahenthirana, 2008; Moyes, Young, & Din, 2013), 
financial statement manipulation (Christopher & Brady James, 2009; Nahariah Jaffar, 
Salleh, Iskandar, & Haron, 2008), fraud prevention mechanisms (N. Jaffar, Salleh, 
Mohd Iskandar, & Haron, 2006; Nahariah Jaffar et al., 2011; Sanusi, Marjuni, 
Mohamed, Johari, & Sari, 2014), effective monitoring and enforcement to improve 
governance (Nelson, 2012; Rachagan & Kuppusamy, 2013; Sadique, Roudaki, Clark, 
                                                          
41
 In general, the fraud triangle model offers opportunity, pressure and rationalization elements which 
have broadly served as an aid for anti-fraud community known as red flags indicators (C. C. Albrecht, 
Albrecht, & Dunn, 2000; Malcolm, Normah Haji, Syed Iskandar Zulkarnain Sayd, & Ithnahaini, 
2005); risk assessments (Nahariah Jaffar, Haron, Iskandar, & Salleh, 2011; LaSalle, 2007); and fraud 
prevention (Dorminey, Fleming, Kranacher, & Riley Jr, 2010, 2012; Peterson & Zikmund, 2004). 
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& Alias, 2010); and ethical considerations (Adil, Muhamad, Yaakub, & Ishak, 2010; 
Rozaiha Abd Majid, Mohamed, & Mahmud, 2010; Saeed, Ahmed, & Mukhtar, 
2001). Although there are many studies focusing on understanding fraudulent 
practices in Malaysia, very few studies place fraud within the accounting domain of 
public procurement. The existing literature typically addresses Malaysia‟s 
government procurement regime and its transformations (Adham & Siwar, 2012; 
Stolfi & Murniati, 2014). Notably, the persistent nature of fraud within Malaysia‟s 
procurement regime has raised questions about the accountable and transparent 
practices in the public sector governance (W. S. Hui et al., 2011; Othman, Zakaria, et 
al., 2010; Stolfi & Murniati, 2014). Despite the economic transformation that 
Malaysia has undergone, there are some questionable procurement practices that may 
undermine key principles
42
 in the Malaysian government procurement. 
2.3.1 Public Policy Environment 
The Malaysian government undertook an affirmative action policy to strengthen its 
domestic industry and restructure the wealth among its multi-racial community in 
order to create a level playing field for all private domestic entrepreneurs (Ministry of 
Finance, 1995). The reform of Malaysia‟s government procurement, as described by 
Adham and Siwar (2012), is conducted through initiatives and strategies
43
 of 
affirmative action based on its public policy. In order to ensure business opportunities 
for wealth creation and capital, there are policies in Malaysia‟s procurement 
framework to „set asides, preferential margins and quota restrictions‟, especially for 
                                                          
42
 The Malaysian government aims to pursue effective public procurement with the principles of public 
accountability, transparent, value for money, open and fair competition, and fair dealing (Adham & 
Siwar, 2012; Ministry of Finance, 2013). 
43
 In order to improve the Malaysian government purchasing, various actions have been taken to 
provide direction for its procurement practices, such as Malaysian Plan, Government Transformation 
Program (GTP), Economic Transformation Program (ETP), and the New Economic Model (NEM) 
(Pemandu, 2011). 
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the indigenous community (David S. Jones, 2007b, p.12). For that reason, all 
government agencies are required to procure supplies, goods and services from 
domestic sources while international tenders are limited. Therefore, open competition 
bidding and equal access is explicitly curtailed in Malaysian procurement regime 
(David S. Jones, 2007b; Stolfi & Murniati, 2014). 
 
The policy paper by Stolfi and Murniati (2014) talks about transparency and 
competitiveness in Malaysia‟s public procurement system when exercising its 
Bumiputera preferences, and suggests benefiting from the European public 
procurement mechanisms. Although the policy paper encourages open competition 
and transparent practices in public procurement, there is no empirical evidence on the 
success of improving the competitiveness and transparency of Malaysia‟s 
procurement system. On the other hand, the Minister of Finance in Malaysia has 
obliged all government documentation to have at least 3 quotations from companies 
to bid any government projects and encourages surveying the cost based on market 
research (see Ministry of Finance, 2013). Moreover, a study by Stolfi and Murniati 
(2014)  raises questions on the suitability of adopting the European procurement 
system as there is no „one size fits all‟ concept to improve transparency in 
procurement system (Trepte, 2004). After all, to pursue an accountable and 
transparent procurement practices, one needs take into consideration the dynamic 
nature of different socio-political cultural settings and economic development, like 
Malaysia for example (Embong, 2008; Siddiquee, 2006a). 
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W. S. Hui et al. (2011) discuss the Malaysian procurement regime by focusing on six 
main themes.
44
 The study casts light on the prevailing issues of accountability, 
transparency, corruption, integrity and cronyism that exist in public procurement 
system as experienced by procurement officers and contractors. Most interviewees 
suggest conducting frequent checks as to avoid the „Ali Baba‟
45
 contractors during a 
procurement process. While the affirmative policy of favouring the indigenous aims 
to make the Malay capitalists competitive in the market, to some extent, the policy 
has encouraged the abuse of the system by using „Ali Baba‟ deals (R.S. Milne & 
Mauzy, 1999). Hence, the study of W. S. Hui et al. (2011) does not describe how a 
political and economic powerful group is able to shape and influence fraud and 
corrupt activities within procurement practices. 
 
It is noted that Malaysia‟s public policy mechanisms have demonstrated constant 
conflicts between the wider social and political pressures within the dynamic of 
power, political and transformational routines and practices (Abdul Aziz, Jaafar, & 
Hussin, 2007; Adhikari, Derashid, & Zhang, 2006). Yet very little is known about 
precisely how public policy mechanisms contribute to the persistence of public 
procurement fraud in Malaysia.  
                                                          
44
 These are:  (1) transparency, (2) procurement policies and procedures and their implementation, (3) 
personnel involved in the procurement system, (4) estimation/budget/pricing, (5) professionalism and 
ethics, and (6) timeliness. 
45
 The „Ali Baba‟ concept in Malaysian procurement practices is perennial. The concept allows the 
Malay contractors to get government contracts based on affirmative policy pursued by the Malaysian 
government which sub-contracts the project to non-Bumiputera companies. The benefits of the policy, 
however, are not gained; instead „quick‟ money is earned from the profits by giving unfair advantages 
to certain contractors (Crouch, 1996; R.S. Milne & Mauzy, 1999). 
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2.3.2 Classified and Secret 
The Malaysian Official Secrets Act 1972 endorsed the prohibition of the 
dissemination of information classified as official secrets
 
(Law of Malaysia, 1972).
46
 
The Act explicitly states that official secrets include cabinet documents, records of 
decisions and deliberations including those of the Cabinet committees and any other 
official document, information and material. Dissemination of classified government 
documentation is a criminal offence with a maximum penalty of seven years 
imprisonment (Liu, 2015). Procurement documentation in the public office is 
explicitly classified and the information is often not freely and easily available. 
Because the dissemination of classified information may implicate criminal 
conviction, the discharge of private and confidential information in the Malaysian 
public sector can also be open to abuse. 
 
Opportunities to engage in fraud and corruption in public procurement arise when 
most of the procurement process is shrouded in secrecy (David S. Jones, 2007a). 
Malaysian procurement practices including processing, evaluating, justifying and 
selecting contractors are not disclosed and/or open to public scrutiny. It seems there is 
lack of transparency for procurement documentations by classifying them as „private‟ 
and „confidential‟ documents where document tenders, bids and other relevant 
information are not published apart from the contract award decisions which are only 
made public (W. S. Hui et al., 2011). Consequently, lack of transparency in selecting 
a contractor may provide opportunities to select particular companies that are 
favoured by or closely connected with certain people (Gomez, Saravanamuthu, & 
Momamad, 2013). Under the cloak of secrecy, manipulation and abuse in 
                                                          
46
 According to Official Secret Act 1972, all Malaysian government documentation is classified 
ranging from „restricted‟ to „top secret‟. 
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procurement practices may contribute to the persistence of fraud and corruption 
activities in the public office. 
 
Cross and Stuart (2006) examine fundamental arrangements in the sensitive area of 
preferences of Malaysian procurement affirmative policy. The study acknowledges 
the sensitive developmental policies which have the aim of improving the economic 
strength of the Malay community. Yet, some areas require attention in order to 
improve the transparency of Malaysian procurement practices, including the need for 
the government to balance its procurement contract decisions for privacy and for the 
public‟s need for information.  
 
Generally, however, there is not much consideration for the link of the lack of 
transparency due to little access or secretive of government information in Malaysia 
in the literature. 
2.3.3 Compliance with Rules and Regulations 
As a central procurement authority, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) is responsible to 
watch over the procurement policy and implementation, review and improve 
procurement rules and regulations, draft relevant bidding documentations, advertise 
significant tenders, and monitor compliance to the rules (Ministry of Finance, 2013). 
While the legal and procedural procurement framework has been well-regulated in 
Malaysia by the MOF (Ministry of Finance, 1997), the institutional deficiencies may 
contribute to the shortcoming of its procurement practices. The MOF‟s function 
serves the needs of the Minister of Finance who, at the same time, holds the position 
of the Prime Minister of the country. The expanded power of the Prime Minister, who 
is also the Minister of Finance, means that nobody checks or control his power (O. K. 
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Beng, 2013; Hutchinson, 2014). In particular, in the endorsement of direct negotiation 
contracts,
47
 the absence of check and balance mechanisms offers opportunities for 
abuse of power. 
 
There are some restrictions in the law that can hinder punishment for abuse in the 
Malaysian procurement regime. According to Public Officers (Conduct and 
Discipline) Regulations 2002, public officials are required to declare conflict of 
interest cases or potential interest if they believe they can affect discussions and 
decision making of a specific tender (Bernama, 2014). It seems that by declaring their 
interest,
48
 state officials can avoid punishment and conviction because they have 
declared their interest as required by regulations and there is no law or legislation that 
can explicitly link this with abuse of power (Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission, 
2012). In other words, the declaration of cases of conflict of interest is used to 
„safeguard‟ those in a powerful position in the public office with vested interests. 
Given that link however, to what extent the declaration of interest will not interfere in 
the evaluation of the tender and the decisions to select the contractor is open to 
question. It can also be argued that even state officials declare their interest 
accordingly; they may be involved in a contract discussion. 
 
By examining the effect of internal control procedures on fraud incidents in 
government agencies, Sanusi et al. (2014) found that management can override the 
internal control system and/or collude with and as part of a corrupt network to 
                                                          
47
 MOF is the only procurement authority that can approve applications for direct negotiation in the 
country. 
48
 The declaration of interest is to prevent public officials from using their public position for their 
personal and private advantage. 
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commit fraud and corruption. The study supports the empirical research by Neu et al. 
(2015), Neu et al. (2014) and Sikka and Lehman (2015) that internal control may not 
be able to limit and curb fraud and corruption in government procurement. Given the 
lack of the effectiveness of rules and regulations to limit fraud and corruption in 
government purchasing, there is still limited research into examining the 
shortcomings of the monitoring mechanisms in order to restrict public procurement 
fraud in Malaysia (Sanusi et al., 2014). 
2.3.4 Collaborations of Social Actors 
While there are many studies that examine the importance of structural collaborations 
between legitimate interactions between business and politics (see Gomez & 
Sundaram, 1999; Gomez, 2013), there are fewer studies on business and politics that 
focus on the persistence of fraud in Malaysia public procurement. Most fraud and 
corruption activities in government procurement occur at the nexus of government-
business interactions and suggest the existence of cronyism and favouritism (Gul, 
2006; Johnson & Mitton, 2003), money politics (William Case, 2013; Pua, 2011), 
lobbying practices (Soong, 2010), state capture (Gomez, 2009; Gomez, 2012b; 
Vithiatharan & Gomez, 2014), opportunities for patronage (Ebrahim, Girma, Shah, & 
Williams, 2014; Johansson, 2014), and rent-seeking behaviour (Searle, 1999; Tan, 
2012). Specifically, rent-seeking activities flourish in the context of ersatz capitalism 
in capturing rents from the Malaysian state. The ersatz capitalism concept 
(entrepreneurially weak because of cronyism) emerged when government and 
business leaders contributed to economic growth and economic activities through 
intensive state intervention in the allocation capital and wealth of the country. Yet, 
ersatz capitalism has the political goal to generate a class of domestic industrial 
entrepreneurs, who are closely connected to those in power through cronyism and the 
98 | P a g e  
 
promotion of patronage networks (see K. S. Jomo, 2005; Nicolas J. White, 2004). As 
Searle (1999) puts it, 
„Rents generally arise through state intervention in the economy, interventions that 
allegedly distort market processes and create opportunities for rents. It is argued that 
the existence of such rents encourages corrupt or unproductive profit-seeking 
behaviour (to capture such rents) and that rents in turn usually lead to monopoly 
situations‟ (p.11). 
 
Eventually, rewarding state-rents to selected companies that are linked to the families 
and friends of state officials are part of the web of collusive practices among 
politicians, political party, top bureaucrats, and business elites (W. S. Hui et al., 2011; 
Wain, 2009). 
 
Despite the collusive corrupt network in public procurement fraud, there are 
difficulties in defining and punishing crimes in which the powerful are engaged (see 
Michalowski & Kramer, 2006). Michalowski and Kramer (2006) further argue that 
wrongdoings committed by those holding a powerful position are hard to detect and 
prosecute because of their social status and reputable position in the society. 
Therefore, more complex action is required in order to bring them (powerful actors) 
to justice (Doig, 2011). Furthermore, this can become more difficult as L. Lim (2014) 
has argued, since the exposure of powerful groups, involving corrupt government 
leaders, parliamentarians, and reputable business leaders can be politically damaging. 
 
In examining corruption in the construction industry, Nordin, Takim, and Nawawi 
(2013) relate a large number of stakeholders in a complex contractual structure 
engaging in corrupt activities. Nordin et al. (2013) illustrate that behavioural factors 
lead to the desire and intentions of the corrupt actors to indulge in illicit human 
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behaviour. Thus, the desire and intentions to engage in corrupt practices have 
provided a motivation factor to engage in corrupt acts, such as paying bribes, 
demanding of bribes and dishonest dealings, tend to arise when there are 
collaborations that diverge from the normal duties to serve the public, violate ethical 
and moral values in delivering public services (Nordin et al., 2013). 
 
In a different study, Othman, Zakaria, et al. (2010) acknowledges that the system of 
Malaysia‟s procurement practices is open to potential abuse and mismanagement and 
that this can lead to fraud and corruption. Case studies demonstrated by Othman, 
Zakaria, et al. (2010) showed that the excessive collusive human intervention in 
procurement process has the potential to increase the chances for the system to 
become open to abuse, profiteering and corruption. The study concluded that the 
weak system of check and balance mechanisms has created numerous loopholes 
within procurement process, which results to losses of public funds.  
 
There are limited studies in Malaysia addressing practices that are not necessarily 
illegal or unlawful but they are in fact and corrupt activities at the nexus of public and 
private interactions in the context of government purchasing. It is said that public and 
private interactions provide an opportunity site for (un) accountable and (non) 
transparent acts committed by the powerful groups (Vithiatharan & Gomez, 2014). 
Thus, this has raised concerns about the interface of accountability at public-private 
domains (N. B. A. Bakar, Saleh, & Mohamad, 2011; Rodan & Hughes, 2014) and the 
network of the powerful actors to collude and get involved in wrongdoings (Gomez & 
Sundaram, 1999; Wain, 2009). 
 
100 | P a g e  
 
All things considered in relation to the nature of public procurement fraud in 
Malaysia point to its  distinctiveness when it comes to (1) public policy framework, 
(2) government documentation as classified and secret, (3) procurement practices that 
comply with rules and regulations, and (4) the powerful collaborations of business 
and politics.  
 
In light of the above studies, the next section identifies the gaps in the current 
academic literature that this study wishes to fill. 
2.4 Gaps of Interest 
 
The literature review has shown that there are gaps in the existing literature in relation 
to understanding why public procurement fraud persists in the Malaysian public 
sector. The debates lead to an attempt to understand the conceptualization of fraud 
and the position of the current study in understanding fraud. Despite the fact that the 
existing literature suggests that there are various views about fraud, there are few 
studies that examine fraud that is not necessarily illegal or unlawful, but that is 
socially amiss and brings detrimental effects to public at large (Kramer et al., 2002; 
Quinney, 2003). P. Green and Ward (2004) have clarified that some social practices 
may not be against the law, but they have „negative‟ effects on the welfare of citizens. 
Within this context, it is noted that there is dearth of research investigating behaviour 
that is immoral but legal, in particular in the context of rewarding government 
contracts in Malaysia (Searle, 1999). Those practices should not be disconnected 
from the economic and political spheres they occur in since such behaviour is 
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intrinsically nurtured by particular social contexts and values (Hessami, 2014; D. 
Kang, 2002). 
 
While there is an increasing number of studies examining the phenomenon of fraud, 
there is less exploration about fraud within the procurement context (Blundo, 2006; 
Khi V Thai, 2001). The literature on procurement has emphasized that the complexity 
of the procurement process is susceptible to fraud and corruption practices (Heggstad 
et al., 2010). Furthermore, despite the public sector being the „biggest‟ spender in the 
world, there is still a lack of research examining fraud in procurement within the 
public sector (Guile, 2012). Questions have been raised regarding the complexity, 
secrecy, rules, norms, customs and habits embedded in the public procurement 
process. This includes the collective actions that lead to collusion, collaboration 
between corrupt actors, and opportunity for bribery as well as inducement for 
rewarding government contracts (Burguet & Che, 2004; Pressey et al., 2014; Rooney, 
2007). Furthermore, the rewarding of secret payments is somewhat a neglected issue 
in public procurement practices (OECD, 2008a). What is more, the emergence of  
public procurement fraud in a developing countries has seldom been addressed (ADB, 
2014; Snell, 2006). Research in public procurement fraud in a different historical, 
socio-political, cultural, economic setting like that of Malaysia seems to be warranted 
(Ariffin, 2011; Ashari, 2013). 
 
Provided that the existing literature suggests government and business interactions 
are inevitable in any government contract, there is lack of research investigating the 
political power of business and vested interests in rewarding government contracts 
(McCarthy, 2013; Murray, 2009). Although the relationship between public and 
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private organisations in many government contracts is legitimate, the blurred 
institutional environment in which business and policymakers interact has tainted the 
public procurement policy and process (Grødeland & Aasland, 2011). This blurred 
dimension seems to suggest the possibility for a crony capitalism system within 
public policy mechanisms that favours political connected economic agents by 
rewarding many government contracts as rents,
49
 subsidies, license, permits and loans 
(see Haber, 2002; Nicolas J. White, 2004). It is within this context that fraud and 
corruption in Malaysian public procurement are influenced in the form of state 
patronage. This form of state patronage in the nature of political business has been 
justified because „the best way to create Malay capitalists is to distribute rents to 
those most capable of generating wealth‟ (E.T. Gomez, 2002, p.83). 
 
In the context of public policymaking, the opportunities for fraud and corruption in 
government purchasing permits rent seeking activities as well as the possibility of 
earning and distributing rents among cronies (Embong, 2012; Edmund Terence 
Gomez, 2002). Consequently, the platform of government-business relations
50
 is 
confined only to those with vested interests at the expense of other societal interests. 
Seemingly, the interaction between government and business institutions has 
persistently facilitated fraud and corruption within public procurement process 
through state and regulatory capture (Dobovsek, 2012; World Bank, 2004). Despite 
the legitimate institutionalised dimension of the integration of business elites and 
                                                          
49
 It is somehow said that selective rent distribution can also facilitate growth by promoting greater 
industrialization and diversification of economy (Gomez, 2012a; Tan, 2012). 
50
 Generally, another body of literature has drawn attention to government and entrepreneurs‟ 
connections (Hawkins et al., 2011; Matthew et al., 2013; McCarthy, 2013; World Bank, 2013). This 
body of literature also discusses rent-seeking behaviour, crony capitalism, conflict of interest, collusion 
and bribery in exchange of favours.  
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policymakers, there is still a dearth of research to link the broader picture of public-
private interactions and public procurement fraud in Malaysia. 
 
The gaps of interest for the current study specifically involve the networking between 
powerful political and economic actors who collaborate in public procurement fraud 
in Malaysia. The consequences of public-private exchanges in society, the structural 
relationships between politics, capitals, administration and society are, needless to 
say, diverse and complex (B. G. Peters, 2010). Deliberately, the relationship between 
powerful agents enables legitimate institutions to interact with social actors for 
fraudulent and corrupt acts of behaviour (Gomez, 2009). Finally, Campos and 
Giovannoni (2007) make the important point that procurement public policy making 
and its implementation are often in the hands of powerful groups from political and 
economic institutions.  
 
Similarly, Murray (2009) argues that the influence of politicians on public 
procurement policy is pervasive. The author further claims that there are many facets 
to the interplay of institutional power structure of politicians and procurement 
managers in public procurement strategy and management. Yet, when analysing 
power relation within a state‟s machinery and frauds in procurement (e.g.,, price-
fixing cartels) many previous studies have focused on Western countries (Pressey et 
al., 2014). Very few studies focus on the institutional power of developmental states 
in exploring public procurement fraud, such as Malaysia.  
 
Finally, fraud and corruption are difficult to study by nature. This is because fraud 
and corrupt activities are normally hidden and secret. This study seeks to explore the 
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potential spaces for secrecy that exist in institutional regulations, classification of 
procurement documentations, acts to conceal and hide fraudulent transactions and 
criminal collusive of powerful networks (see Neu, Everett, Rahaman, & Martinez, 
2013). The prevailing understanding of the collusive networks, which endure and are 
institutionalised in public procurement practices, is examined in the current study. 
The lack of knowledge in understanding the nature and extent of fraud and corruption 
related to procurement is tremendously challenging, as most interviewees do not want 
to draw attention to it and its investigation tends to undermine the public‟s faith and 
trust in government (Burke, 2011). The public sector settings illustrated in the study 
are indeed not easy sets to approach or work with for research purposes. It is ironic 
that the public sector settings which are those that are most difficult to study are also 
the very settings where it is important to understand how fraud in public procurement 
actually works. This reality adds yet another dimension to Murray (2015)‟s claim that 
we need to better understand the complexities of public procurement fraud practices.  
The next section concludes with a summary. 
2.5 Summary  
 
This chapter has provided an overview of the existing literature on public 
procurement fraud. Specifically, it has identified the gaps in the current academic 
literature specific for the current research that this study aims to fill (see section 2.4).  
 
Some contextualization of the notion of fraud is presented in order to examine various 
competing definitions of fraud (AICPA, 2002; Greve et al., 2010; Kaptein, 2008; R. 
Tillman & Pontell, 1992; Tullo, 2006). The current study portrays fraud involving 
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misconduct that does or does not violate laws and regulations; in the latter case it 
deviates from ethical and moral values and it is detrimental to the public at large. The 
literature also highlights the various types of public procurement fraud (Caulfield, 
2014; PwC EU Services, 2011). Various distinctive features of fraud in public 
procurement indicate an opaque procurement life cycle (OECD, 2007a; Tabuena, 
2010), a hidden crime that is difficult to detect, prosecute and one that it is rarely 
reported, because it is sometimes associated with rent-seeking activities, patronage 
system and cronyism (Deloitte, 2012; Johnston, 2005) as well as one that operates at 
the peculiar conjuncture of particular and varying features of social structures and 
patterns of engagements of economic agents (David Seth Jones, 2013; Lambert-
Mogiliansky & Sonin, 2006).  
 
The chapter then summarises the key elements on the persistence of public 
procurement fraud. The themes focus on government-business interactions 
(Matechak, 2002; McCampbell & Rood, 1997), public sector transformations (Auriol 
& Blanc, 2009; Bjorvatn & Søreide, 2005; Morales et al., 2014), the institutional 
arrangements (W. Case, 2004; L. Y. Lim & Stern, 2002; Nwabuzor, 2005) and 
opportunities arising in the procurement process (Trepte, 2005). The gaps in the 
existing literature demonstrate the need for the current study (as described in section 
2.4). 
 
A review of current empirical research discusses the fraudulent practices within the 
governance of Malaysian public procurement. The distinctiveness of fraud in 
Malaysia‟s procurement practices has to do with the prolonged nature of fraud and 
corruption in public policy mechanisms, classification of procurement 
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documentations as secret, compliance with administrative rules and collusive 
powerful networks seeking for capital and wealth.  
 
The review of literature provides some basis for developing the theoretical framework 

















































108 | P a g e  
 
Chapter 3 Research Methodology 
3.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the methodology employed to meet the objectives identified in 
chapter one. The literature review (see Chapter 2) discusses the significance of 
previous studies in both developed and developing countries. This chapter lays out 
the methodology employed in this thesis in order to investigate public procurement 





To develop a meaningful methodological framework, this chapter is divided into 
seven sections (see Figure 3.1). The chapter begins with an overview of the 
philosophical stance and research paradigm underpinning the study (section 3.1). This 
study promotes a critical reflection of a political ideological and social phenomenon 
embedded in the particular settings within Malaysia, as the context of the current 
study. There is then a discussion of the choice and use of political economy theory as 
the theoretical framework (section 3.2). Specifically, the political economy approach 
is able to articulate the interconnection of political and economic institutions, the 
rational interests of economic man, public policy disputes and human activity at the 
nexus of public-private interactions.  
 
                                                          
51
 The chapter does not seek to develop a new paradigm in sociology, politics or philosophy. Instead, 
the intention is to develop methodological tools by borrowing from the existing literature so as to guide 
the researcher to understand the broader social forces that shape fraudulent practices in the Malaysian 
public procurement. 
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The chapter continues with a discussion of the qualitative research design (section 
3.3). This section provides details on the sampling methods, issues of data access, 
discusses the research method of documentary analysis and the semi-structured 
interviews, which were collected through the Snowball Sampling Method (SSM). The 
efficient use of SSM for this study is discussed at length in section 3.3.3.2. Section 
3.4 describes the data analysis, which was conducted following a thematic approach 
with six stages of analysis. Section 3.5 talks about ethics while section 3.6 discusses 
the challenges as well as limitations of this study. Lastly, section 3.7 presents a 
summary of the chapter.  
 
















3.7 Summary  
 
3.1 Methodological Perspectives 
 
3.0 Introduction  
3.2 The Use of Political Economy Theory 
 
3.3 Qualitative Research Design 
 
3.4 Data Analysis 
 
3.5 Ethical Considerations 
 
3.6 Challenges and Limitations 
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3.1 Methodological Perspectives 
 
In recent years, a considerable body of scholarly attention has been given to the 
expansion of public procurement fraud, predominantly in mainstream Western 
countries (Caulfield, 2014; Dorn, Levi, & White, 2008; Hessami, 2014). Some 
researchers, however, argue that all social practices are institutionalised within the 
social context and values which are connected to the historical experience and routine 
practices based on the culture, ideology, beliefs system as well as language and 
organization where they operate (O.M. Bakre, 2004; Otusanya, 2011; Singh, 1999). 
As O.M. Bakre (2004) argues, this also applies when investigating social practices in 
developing countries,    
„In the specific case of developing countries…..research can better be conducted by 
adopting frameworks
52
 that account for local history and the nesting of these 
histories within the complex social structures that encompass these continuous socio-
political and economic realities‟. (p.3) 
 
Within that context, there is little exploration of the occurrence of procurement fraud 
in the public sector and little research on whether the governance of the public sector 
encourages such practices, especially in a developing country like Malaysia. The 
current study follows O.M. Bakre (2004)‟s advice and is carried out from a particular 
point of view that takes into account the historical development, socio-political and 
economic conditions of Malaysia. 
 
This section discusses the methodology employed in the current research. First, the 
philosophical stance I take in order to investigate the social phenomenon is discussed 
                                                          
52
 The framework encompasses particular views held by the researcher based on their belief regarding 
the nature of reality of the social world (ontology), how they can best understand the knowledge 
(epistemology), in relation to them understanding the connection between human beings and their 
environment (human nature), and what informs the process of investigation (methodology). 
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and, subsequently, the paradigm underpinning the study is described. Then, 
justification of the paradigm choice is given.  
3.1.1 The Philosophical Stance 
A philosophical direction is important for a researcher as it helps to recognise which 
design will work or fail to work; consequently, one can find a suitable design for 
one‟s research or create a new one (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe, 1991). This 
research specifically assumes that social actors are part of the social world that exists 
due to the interactions and actions of human beings. It is within this context that this 
study is closely connected with the social relations of human actors and their 
relevance to history and natural environment (see Skocpol, 1987). Therefore, the 
current study advocates a qualitative research approach based on the methodological 









 in its investigation of public procurement fraud in Malaysia (see 
Appendix 3.1).   
 
                                                          
53
 J. Ritchie, Lewis, Nicholls, and Ormston (2014) and Bailey (2007) suggest that ontology is 
concerned with the reality nature of the social world that needs to be investigated. This position brings 
a researcher to acknowledge whether reality is objective, hard, real and independent from the actor in 
social life or whether reality is subjectively constructed. Besides, in a very broad term, social science 
has been shaped by two overarching ontological positions: realism (as objectivist ontology) and 
idealism (as subjectivist ontology) (J. Ritchie et al., 2014). 
54
 An epistemological assumption is important for any research in order to ask questions about 
knowledge and to reflect on how knowledge is acquired. With the previous assistance of an ontological 
position, a researcher needs to locate their epistemological stands in the view of knowledge. 
55
 Assumptions about the human nature emphasize the connection between human beings and their 
environment. Hopper and Powell (1985) distinguish between people‟s behaviour and experience which 
can be completely determined and constrained by their external environment and people who can be 
seen as independent and free-willed, capable of creating their own environment. 
56
 Methodology is often seen as a tool-kit for any researcher to investigate social phenomenon. 
According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), “each one has important consequences for the way in which 
one attempts to investigate and obtain „knowledge‟ about the social world” (p.2). They further explain 
that methodological standpoints are closely connected with the three sets of assumptions (ontology, 
epistemology and human nature) by adopting either a nomothetic or an ideographic approach. 
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The position of ontology adopted for this socially constructed research advocates 
subjectivist ontology based on various elements. First, this research shows that human 
beings‟ behaviour or/and actions are closely connected with the influential social 
structures surroundings them (Chua, 1986). Second, the current study assumes that 
reality is not some kind of an objective, independent and external reality, but it is 
rather determined by the subjective experiences and perceptions of people as 
individual consciousness (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Hopper & Powell, 1985). Finally, 
individual consciousness
57
 typically emphasizes how human ideas, especially beliefs 
and values systems that have created and shaped society, are socially constructed.  
 
The epistemological position on acquiring knowledge for the current study employs 
anti-positivism for the following reasons. First, the current study focuses on people‟s 
interactions in relation to how socio-political and economic contexts, cultural and 
historical elements have shaped public procurement fraud in Malaysia. The current 
study examines how political and economic groups acquire wealth by using 
legitimate power relations. Arguably, the social phenomenon and its complexity is 
embedded in complex human relations and is shaped by dynamic interrelations 
between institutional structures and social actors in a particular society (O.M. Bakre, 
2004; Johnston, 2005). For this reason, positivist approach that uses scientific testing 
in order to show patterns, causal relationships and make generalisations whether to 
accept or reject hypotheses perhaps has limited capacity to explain social 
phenomenon which is embedded in complex human relations (C. R. Baker & Bettner, 
1997; Chua, 1986). It is important to note that this study shows on the subjectivity of 
                                                          
57
 This is pointed out by Hopper and Powell (1985) who claim that any individual consciousness is 
“simply [made] of concepts and labels created by people to help them understand reality and negotiate 
a shared conception of its nature with others” (p.431).  
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action and understanding of public procurement fraud practices in Malaysia that is 
shaped by the complex relationships between social actors and institutional structures. 
As Chua (1986) argues: 
„Mainstream accounting is grounded in a common set of philosophical assumptions 
about knowledge, the empirical world, and the relationship between theory and 
practice. This particular world-view, with its emphasis on hypothetica-deductivism 
and technical control, possesses certain strengths but has restricted the range of 
problems studied and the use of research methods‟ (p.601). 
 
Second, the study acknowledges human interactions through subjective 
interpretations with other actors in creating, modifying and interpreting the world 
(Chua, 2005). In understanding the creation and shaping of the social construction 
reality of a social phenomenon, this study demonstrates the use of routine language, 
which is based on the day-to-day individual experience. In order to understand 
people‟s working lives and organizational involvement in social practices, the current 
empirical research draws on the perceptions, actions and stories from the interviewees 
(Watson, 2009). In understanding the nature and extent of public procurement fraud 
in Malaysia, the current study uses political economy theory by emphasising the 
integrating economic and political forces that show interdependence of the two in 
contemporary globalization (Held, 1984). The use of the political economy approach 
seeks to apply a series of evolving institutions in response to iterative individual 
process in (re)creating and (re)producing fraudulent practices (see detailed in section 
3.2). Specifically, the interaction of political and economic systems shows the 
coexistence between structure and agency framework within institutions and public 
policy (Banks & Hanushek, 1995). Therefore, within the structure-agency framework, 
the political economy theory also provides insights on conscious decision making of 
individual and collective behaviour based on continuous sense making, interpretation 
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and interactions and social relations and how these dynamics interrelations further 
construct and (re)construct public procurement fraud in Malaysia.  
 
Third, this study employed some elements of critical paradigm for its methodological 
approaches in conducting the research. First, critical approach is interested in gaining 
insights into the relationship of social practice and context (Cooper & Hopper, 1987). 
This is because social practices are often embedded in a particular socio-economic, 
cultural and political context. It is from this context, critical paradigm can articulate 
the interaction between context and social practices, when the context influences and 
is reflected in social practices and vice versa (Alvesson & Willmott, 2012). Next, 
Deetz (1996) opined that the discourse of critical studies put emphasis on the 
relevance of historical analysis. It is argued that critical approach is historically 
constituted which directs on “how a particular social order came to be what it is, and 
how it is likely to change over time”(Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991, p.20). Thus, the 
historical analysis brings upon changes and its emancipation of historical experience 
in the analysis of social phenomenon. Finally, Chua (2005) reveals that critical 
paradigm is attempt to critique the status quo of existing social system by “criticism 
of oppression and exploitation and the struggle for a better society” (Kellner, 1990, 
p.22). This paradigm brings this research in critiquing the status quo concerning 
unequal power relations and transformation of the socio-political and economic 
circumstances, which reflects powerful individual and groups to advance their own 
self-interest and goals (see Hopper & Powell, 1985; Roslender, 1992). Thus, it is 
important to point out that this research does not only aim to understand the social 
phenomenon, but it also aims to challenge the status quo for a better society based on 
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revealing the hidden nature of power relationships in society which is commensurate 
with the critical paradigm (see detailed in section 3.1.2). 
 
Lastly, this study shows interactive linkages between the researcher and the social 
phenomenon under study. Thus, there is no distance between the involvement of the 
researcher and that which is being researched (Cunliffe, 2010).  
 
The view of human nature stance adopted here sees human beings as the voluntary 
controllers of their environment (see Gallhofer, Haslam, & Yonekura, 2013). In other 
words, the individual decision making to engage in fraudulent practices is constrained 
and restrained by interactions of divergence interests, within the creation of an 
autonomous and voluntarily environment. It seems that the particular patterns and 
behaviour of fraud in the Malaysia public sector entail institutionalised relationships 
between social positions and practices. Overall, the human nature stance for the 
current research is that humans create their own environment voluntarily by 
possessing „free will‟ and by being „value biased‟ (Hatch & Yanow, 2003).  
 
Lastly, the methodology adopted in the current research is used as a tool-kit to set 
directions
58
 within an ideographic approach in order to investigate public 
procurement fraud in Malaysia. By exploring and understanding the interpretation of 
personal opinions and human meaning-making in the context of personal experiences 
(Tobi, 2013), the ideographic approach is able to make sense of the hidden voices and 
                                                          
58
 Firstly, the three sets of assumptions (ontology, epistemology and human nature) need to be early 
identified in order to set the „tone‟ of the study (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Secondly, this research 
pursues the ideographic approach in order to get „inside‟ a subject and employ their background and 
life experience in the sense-making of fraudulent and corruption practices as socially constructed in the 
Malaysian public sector. 
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the unrecorded stories of the interviewees. In other words, the methodology adopted 
for the current research helps reveal how people‟s interpretation of their day-to-day 
job routine provide meanings and significance to the study. In order to gain access to 
such unrecorded stories and concealed events in relation to public procurement fraud 
in Malaysia, face-to-face, video conferencing via Skype and email semi-structured 
interviews are conducted. Furthermore, this research also analyses documents to 
better understand public procurement in Malaysia. 
 
The next section discusses the paradigm choices made for the study. 
3.1.2 Justification for choosing the Critical Paradigm 
Research grounded in a critical paradigm works as a whole framework
59
 of beliefs, 
concepts, values and methods that guide a researcher to an inquiry (Guba & Lincoln, 
1994; Laughlin, 1995). In order to understand the social world and the phenomenon, 
the critical paradigm influences the researcher‟s beliefs and practices for investigating 
social problems and constructing them. This section aims to give justification for 




This study follows a critical paradigm
61
 based on the following justification. (1) 
There are a few empirical studies on the nature and magnitude of public procurement 
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 It is important for every social researcher to take a particular stance on how they view the world and 
in what way they best understand the world.   
60
 See Appendix 3.2 for a summary of the research paradigm. 
61
 Research grounded in critical theory draws on many assumptions as an interpretive approach, which 
acknowledges that reality is constructed by the subjective experiences of individuals through the 
interactions of human shared meanings, interpretations, and the construction of a cultural and social 
reality (Lapan, Quartaroli, & Rieme, 2012). Critical theory is a school of thought from the Institute for 
Social Research in Frankfurt. It is generally a social theory oriented toward criticizing the status quo 
and aiming to change and transform society in a progressive way. 
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which adopt a critical approach
62
 (Chwastiak, 1998, Dorn et al., 2008) in both 
developed and developing countries and in Malaysia particularly.  
 
(2) The critical approach is interested in gaining insights into the relationship of 
social practice
63
 and context (Alvesson & Willmott, 2012). It is able to address the 
socio-political, economic, and cultural context in understanding the nature and extent 
of public procurement fraud in Malaysia by articulating the interaction between 
context and social practices when the context influences and is reflected in the social 
practices and vice versa. This approach recognises the interactive links of structure 
and agency framework, as social actors are interconnected with society, institutional 
structures and social relations of human affairs (Marsh, 2010).  
 
(3) The critical paradigm pays particular attention to the historical analysis, as the 
latter helps to create and reproduce social practices towards a transformation of the 
society (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). The historical analysis is able to evaluate the 
inheritance of governance process of colonialism in political and economic 
institutions that has (re)constructed and (re)created the reality of society at the 
intersection of structural contexts and human experiences (see Wijewardena & Yapa, 
1998).  This study addresses the colonial influence on the governance of the 
                                                          
62 As Held (1980) puts it, “…the aim (of critical theory) as being to lay the foundation for an 
exploration, in an interdisciplinary research context, of questions concerning the conditions which 
make possible the reproduction and transformation of society, the meaning of culture, and the relation 
between the individual, society and nature (…). The critical theorists believe that through an 
examination of contemporary social and political issues they could contribute to a critique of ideology 
and to the development of a non-authoritarian and non-bureaucratic politics” (p.16). 
63
 This is because social practices are often embedded in a particular socio-economic, cultural and 
political context. It is noted that this study focuses on the dynamic characteristics of the socio-political, 
economic context that takes into account the history, power relations of business elites, politicians and 
public officials. The critical paradigm is indeed crucial for reminding the researcher that the reality of a 
social phenomenon cannot be studied in isolation of its context wherein it operates (see Hopwood, 
1983). 
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Malaysian public sector in exercising their legitimacy for capital accumulation and 
maximization of profits. Thus, the critical paradigm shows the relevance of historical 
analysis in demonstrating how social order came to be what it is. 
 
(4) The critical paradigm lays great emphasis on criticizing the political and social 
status quo with the aim of transforming society for the better (Held, 1980).
64
 The aim 
of this study is to address with a critical reflection of the status quo in the Malaysian 
society. In particular, this critique concerns the unequal power relations
65
 and 
transformation of the socio-political and economic circumstances, which reflect 
powerful individuals and groups who advance their interests and goals.  
 
(5) The critical approach focuses on the ways power is embedded in the structure of 
society (Pyne, 2005). It is from a critical perspective that one is able to explore where 
power is concentrated and institutionalized through formal and informal social 
networks. This view is often reflected in the power struggles and domination games 
exercised between classes which suggest ingrained structural conflicts within a 
society and through social practices (Held, 1980). The power structure is clearly 
acknowledged in this paradigm in relation to how individuals are permitted to change 
themselves and how the institutional structures and society as a whole show unequal 
power structures and an unequal distribution of resources.  
                                                          
64
 Specifically, this approach provides a radical and critical context, tensions and dynamics formation 
of capitalism (Calhoun & Karaganis, 2006; Roslender, 2006). Further, the critical approach seeks to be 
emancipatory and to eliminate alienation and domination by bringing about social changes in 
contemporary society (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Dillard, Rigsby, & Goodman, 2004).  
65
 It is concerned with the exercise of the authority in power (e.g., the state) by enabling fraudulent 
practices through unjust use of force, authority and societal norms (Galbraith, 2004).  
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(6) The critical perspective provides a potentially more useful way of exploring the 
sources on inequality
66
 and oppression resulted by the exploitation in contemporary 
society (Kellner, 1990). Critical theory asserts the existence of exploitation of human 
beings in allocating resources, in particular from public procurement funds. This kind 
of exploitation in public procurement fraud in Malaysia involves maximizing profits 
for business capitalists and it operates at the expense of society. Therefore, my role as 
a critical researcher is to reveal the inequality, oppression and exploitation in the 
system of public procurement practices in Malaysia.  
 
Based on the above discussion, it is argued that the critical paradigm is appropriate 
for investigating public procurement fraud in Malaysia and for describing, explaining 
and evaluating deep-seated structural problems, criticizing the status quo and for 
addressing contradictions in society.  
 
The next section presents the theoretical framework of this study. 
3.2 The Use of Political Economy Theory 
 
When understanding a social phenomenon, one has to bear in mind that there are 
considerable dynamic features of the social system that exert influence on human 
activity while the individual helps to (re)produce and (re)create the social system. 
Within that context, political economy theory
67
 lays the foundation for the theoretical 
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 The critical paradigm can be used to expose structural inequalities and to raise critical consciousness 
so as to question the dominant cultural, political and social domains (Rabinow, 1991). It addresses the 
unequal allocation of public procurement to the most powerful groups (Nicholas J. White, 2004). 
67
 Political economic theory originated between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries to provide the 
expressions of individual entrepreneur behaviour for pursuing their private interests. The emerging 
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conceptual and normative analysis. In his classic treatise of 1776, Adam Smith 
revealed the involvement of state affairs in defining political economy as follows: 
„Political economy, considered as a branch of the science of a statesman or 
legislator, proposes two distinct objects: first to provide a plentiful revenue or 
subsistence for the people, or more properly to enable them to provide such a revenue 
or subsistence for themselves; and secondly, to supply the state or commonwealth 
with a revenue sufficient for the public services. It proposes to enrich both the people 
and the sovereignty.‟ (cited in Nurmi, 2006, p.1) 
 
In a broader term, the main features of political economy theory are as follows. 
Political economy theory is concerned with power and authority in dynamic features 
of political and economic institutions. Dean (1989) asserts that political economy 
focuses on economic and political power relations in the hands of private individuals 
or of the state. The theory can be used as a powerful tool to search for explanations of 
the power structure of social and economic relationships, attitudes and change (G. 
Brennan & Pettit, 1993).  
 
Political economy draws attention to political forces (states, institutions, individual 
actors, etc.), which have shaped the systems through economic forces (power of 
collective markets and individuals) in order to understand political, social and 
economic life (Nurmi, 2006). In particular, L. M. Hui and Canak (1981) demonstrate 
the complex interactions of economic and political forces in Malaysian and how 
institutions develop in different social and economic systems, such as capitalism.  
 
Political economy theory considers that the appropriation of wealth is subtle and 
undertaken by a rational and narrowly self-interested economic actor (G. Peters, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
market economy has encouraged individuals to emancipate themselves from the social constraints of 
the church and the feudal state (Alt & Shepsle, 1990). 
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Pierre, & Stoker, 2010). However, the narrow self-interest may result in moral 
concerns in social conflicts, unequal relationships between actors and in exploitation 
in society (Boyd-Barrett, 1995). As described by McPherson (1984), there is a role of 
morality in economic life as a limit on wealth self-seeking.  
 
Next, the study of political economy is primarily concerned with public policy 
making in allocating public funds (Caruso, Scartascini, & Tommasi, 2015). Pablo et 
al. (2009) argue that the action of government in public policy making in allocating 
public funds is to maintain the status quo.  
 
Finally, following the formulation of public policy, political economy theory reveals 
the relationship between government and business organizations. From this context, 
Ciepley (2013) shows that state officials and business elites continue to build 
coalitions, negotiate, build consensus, and bargain to generate new policies, 
legislation and institutions so as to secure political support and remain in power. 
Thus, it is important to note that political economy analysis is an interdisciplinary 
discipline, which addresses the complexity of the world in understanding social 
phenomenon and change.  
 
For the purpose of this study, some elements of political economy theory are 
employed in examining public procurement fraud in Malaysia as follows: (1) the 
dynamic of institutions; (2) rational decisions of an economic man; (3) public policy 
making and (4) the nexus of public-private interactions. 
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3.2.1 The Dynamic of Political and Economic Institutions 
Political economy theory is applied to power relations of market and government as 
political and economic institutions in the context of neo-liberal capitalism (see B. 
Clark, 1998). Within a capitalist economy, the production of wealth and the 
distribution of power structures is influenced by the pressures of global forces and 
embraced by the local institutional and governance framework (Wan, 2008). Hence, 
political and economic institutions have relatively (re)created and (re)invented 
enduring power relations; as a result, these power relations have been entrenched in 
the socio-political and economic structure of the nation states. As Elliott (1978) and 
Voytko (1981) suggest, the exercise of a prevailing power structure, according to the 





Hence, by the distribution of power relations, it is argued that public procurement 
fraud has emerged within the dynamic nature and forces of the institutional 
arrangement between politics and economics (see Hessami, 2014; Tabuena, 2010). 
Despite those arrangements, a strong interaction of power relations between politics 
and economic forces continue to influence the possibility of occurrence of public 
procurement fraud (OECD, 2008b; PwC EU Services, 2011).  
 
A study by Dastidar and Mukherjee (2014) argues that the distribution of power 
relations within procurement process is able to affect the resources of power to 
                                                          
68
 That is to say that the analysis of structure and agency within political and economic approach does 
not separate the distinctive features of politics and economics in a social science research. 
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engage in fraud and corruption and, in turn, affect the distribution of resources in 
society by securing accumulation of capital and wealth.  
 
Next, the investigation of historical development is an important feature in political 
economy theory in order to identify the process of embedding capital accumulation 
and profit maximization (Boehmer, 2005; Cohn, 1996; Lange, 2009). A number of 
studies highlight the historical experience that seeks to explore the diversity of the 
human experience and interactions, in shaping and creating political and economic 
processes in a society. Notably, Boehmer (2005), Cohn (1996) and Lange (2009) 
disclose that the lingering ties of colonialism demonstrate material exchange for 
goods and services. That is the exchange of capital accumulation and profits occurs 
between the imperial forces and the colonial country. The ties eventually further 
contribute to an advanced accumulation of capital, crisis and conflict in exercising the 
legitimacy of interest, and expansion of power and wealth of the capitalist class 
(McVey, 1995; Wan, 2008). Thus, nurtured historical institutionalism continues to 
exercise influence in spheres such as legitimacy of interest, law making, regulation 
and expansion of power and wealth in many colonial countries (Owolabi M. Bakre, 
2005). Having this in mind, this study considers some elements of the historical 
analysis of Malaysia‟s feudal system, colonialism and capitalist ideology (see Chapter 
four). 
 
Finally, by using the political economy theory the analysis of political and economic 
institutions considers the creation of formal and informal practices which are 
embedded in institutions in generating mutual shared understandings for formulating 
particular cultural and social norms and moral values (Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv, & 
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Sanders, 1990; Islam, 2004). It is argued that the exercise of formal and informal 
rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, the behaviour of the social actors and 
their operating and meaning-making procedures within which individuals and groups 
operate and interact with each other help to create and shape social practices 
(Hollingsworth & Boyer, 1998). For example, embedding money culture in a system 
encourages amoral and greed behaviour in the pursuit of wealth and power. As Young 
(2003) puts it in his book, Moral Capitalism, 
„There are times when we may sell our souls to gain what money promises in the way 
of power and license. … Money enables us to do what we want. … Money provides us 
with discretionary power, easing our ability to turn people and their needs to use‟. 
(p.136-137) 
 
Here, the same institutional governance framework and the actions of social actors 
both act as constraints and enabling factors influencing the persistence of public 
procurement fraud. For example, there are existing rules and regulations to curb fraud 
and corruption in public procurement in Malaysia (Ishak & Said, 2015). Yet, the 
effort to combat fraudulent and corrupt behaviour is hindered when an individual can 
undertake an action which might be regarded as amoral or „corrupt‟,  but it is within 
legal boundaries and hence they cannot be subject to legal action. In fact, a study by 
W. E. Baker and Faulkner (2003) shows that fraudulent acts are committed in or by a 
legitimate business through social attributes, behaviour and social network of people. 
As suggest by Dwivedi (1967), “An unethical act in one culture may be socially 
acceptable in another” (p.245). Following this, the political economy approach 
provides an understanding of the relationship of how prevalent interests, cultural 
traits, moral values and belief systems within the institutionalised instruments 
(re)create and (re)produce social practices. These discursive elements are further 
explained in the subsequent chapters (Chapter 4 until Chapter 6).   
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3.2.2 Rational Behaviour of Economic Man 
Political economy theory assumes a heterogeneity of interests held by political and 
economic actors as the homo economicus (Acosta & Pettit, 2013).
69
  In this context, 
A. Levine (1989) and Selgin and White (1994) highlight the rational behaviour of 
capitalist economic man as the „invisible hand‟ as demonstrated in political economy 
theory. Given the individual interests in the pursuit of wealth accumulation, Adam 
Smith indicated in the Theory of Moral Sentiments that the invisible hand
70
 aims to 
maximize profits. The classical political economy literature assumes that individual 
(private capitalists) attempting to maximize their own wealth will also be optimal in 
which societal wealth is also maximized. In contrast, J. Stiglitz (2006) provides 
evidence that when there are flaws and  inefficiencies in the working of the free 
market then appropriation of wealth often leads to high levels of inequality,
71
 
characterised by exploitation and domination in both developed and developing 
countries. He further argues that  
„those controlling the natural resource wealth use that wealth to maintain their 
economic and political power…The distribution of wealth is not determined by a 
careful balancing of equity-efficient trade-offs…or by reference to principles of social 
justice; rather, it is the result of naked power. Wealth generates power, the power 
that enables the ruling class to maintain that wealth‟. (p.137) 
 
Therefore, the assumption of heterogeneity of interests exercised within a political 
economy approach may enable gaining insights into the degree of preferences of 
capitalist groups that continue to affect the transformation of institutional structures 
                                                          
69
 It is also known as the basic constituent of economic man; a “desire to possess wealth” (cited in 
Persky, 1995: 223). 
70
 The invisible hand of the market is a metaphor used by Adam Smith when describing the self-
regulating behaviour of the market place (Thornton, 2009). 
71
 Political economic analysis is appropriate for examining the distribution of power and wealth 
between different groups and individuals in relation to fraudulent practices in the Malaysian public 
service. This theory can also show inequality in the distribution of public resources and abusive of 
power in public offices.  
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and social forces through an analysis of the behaviour of various actors (Besley & 
Burgess, 2002). 
 
Next, political economy theory is concerned with the rational behaviour of an 
economic man which provides the possibility of inequality and exploitation that are 
often associated with class conflict or class struggle (N. Poulantzas, 1996; Nicos 
Poulantzas & O'Hagan, 1973). In the context of the current study, political economy 
theory can also show how the decisions by the rational behaviour of an economic man 
may lead to inequality in the distribution of public resources and abuse of power in 
public offices (Khalid, 2014). The rational behaviour somehow reflects “status, 
security, creativity, sociability and a concern for social reproduction” which clearly 
provide motivation to maximize wealth and accumulation of capital in a political 
economy analysis (Persky, 1995, p.229-230). N. Poulantzas (1996), in particular, 
shows that inequality brings tension and antagonism in society due to competing 
socioeconomic interests and desires by which people are grouped in hierarchical 
social categories. Despite various government assistants in distributing public 
contract and resources to the majority group in Malaysia (the Malays group), Shukry 
(2014) and Faizli (2014) reported that the Malay community remains the largest 
group with the highest poverty rate. There is a high income disparity and the gap 
between rich and poor is relatively increasing in Malaysian society (see Chapter 4). 
Therefore, a political economy analysis is perhaps an effective approach for 
understanding inequality, oppression, exploitation of social class because it allows for 
the interaction of political and economic processes in a society (see Moncrieffe & 
Luttrell, 2005; UKAid, 2010). 
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Lastly, the intentions of economic man to possess wealth and pursue their self-
interests, are in a sense as a flaw implementation of the  free market economy (D. S. 
Brown, Touchton, & Whitford, 2011; Chomsky, 1999). Adam Smith in the Theory of 
Moral Sentiments says: 
„Every individual…neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how 
much he is promoting…he intends only his own security; and by directing that 
industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only 
his own gain, and he is in this, as many other cases, led by an invisible hand to 
promote an end which has no part of his intention‟. (184-185, cited in Persky, 1989: 
196) 
 
Cragg (2000) argues that a self-interested pursuit of wealth does not necessarily 
benefit the wider society. The rational interest of economic man is helpful in 
analysing the intention of political and economic actors within the Malaysian public 
sector by showing the legitimate and (il)legitimate interests held by powerful groups 
in allocating and distributing of public resources (Aeria, 2013). Given the element of 
the rational interest of economic man, political economy analysis considerably 
reflects on how powerful groups have nurtured rent-seeking activities, conflict of 
interest elements and cronyism to distribute government projects, licences, contracts, 
funding and privatised projects (see Gomez, 2012a; K. S. Jomo, 2005). The self-
pursuit of wealth as a rational behaviour may lead to or encourage fraud and corrupt 
practices, which may lead to financial crisis and predatory practices. Thus, this would 
somehow reflect the prevailing nature of the self-interest economic man to pursue 
capital and wealth (see Morales et al., 2014; Sikka, 2013).  
3.2.3 Public Policy Making 
Political economy theory is best applied when considering public policy making for 
distributing public resources (D. P. Levine, 1995; Rausser, Swinnen, & Zusman, 
2011). According to this line of thought, Caporaso and Levine (1992) connect 
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political economy analysis with public policy elements. They argue for a deeper 
understanding of the distribution of political power through policy implementation in 
redistribution of income and wealth. Within this context, this study shows the 
prominent role played by the Malaysian state to further advance partisan practices for 
accumulating capital through state-led intervention in the policy making environment. 
Following this, Rausser et al. (2011) describe the policy-making process and 
economic consequences accounts from political economy theory as shown in Figure 
3.2:  
 













Source: Adopted from Rausser et al. (2011) 
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As the above diagram shows, the distribution of political power over the allocation of 
resources in employing scarce resources among competing goals (the box at the top 
of the diagram) is reflected in economic and governance structures in public policy 
making. On the one hand, pragmatic preferences of capital are embedded by 
governance structures through a compromising and bargaining process among 
stakeholders and state officials (the right box of the diagram) (McLeay, Ordelheide, 
& Young, 2004). At this point, political economy analysis arguably seeks to explain 
the conjuncture of selection and implementation of a policy instrument that secures 
private interests for capitalists (Beeson, 2001). Next, the box at the bottom of the 
diagram represents the policy implementation
72
 resulting from the rational choices of 
state officials, which are mutually dependent upon politics and economics (Ruigrok, 
1995). On the other hand, the assessment of policy choices within the market 
institutions (the left box of the diagram) is generally measured in terms of both 
economic growth and the distribution of income and wealth among vested interests
73
 
(Dymski & Elliot, 1989). Thus, the economic consequences of efficiency, growth and 
stability of private property lead to the distribution of power (the top box of the 
diagram). With the conceptualization of policy-making processes and economic 
consequences, the political economy theory considers approaches on the formation of 
power structures, which sustain and transform the socio-economic and political 
contexts.  
 
                                                          
72
 The argument has both intended and unintended consequences, because the vast majority of public 
policy is typically characterized by winners and losers (Christensen, 2010). In other words, some 
groups or sections of the society may suffer the burden of public policies, whilst others may reap the 
benefits. 
73
 From this perspective, restructuring incentives and market adjustments is seen as aligning with the 
interest groups of coalition formation. In that sense, policy making processes employ a mechanism to 
achieve national interests advocated by a privileged elite interaction among bureaucrats, politicians, 
business leaders and the like with enduring power relations (Adrian Leftwich, 1995). 
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Next, political economy analysis inevitably explores the contrasting views of the 
role
74
 of the state and its involvement in public life (Gill, 2003). The lens of political 
economy is able to highlight the complexity and structural constraints on accountable 
and transparent procurement practices by the state.
75
 In order to protect private 
interests, the dependence of the state on capital
76
 has placed control over and captured 
government structures (Khoman, 2015). Yet, the state is also responsible for creating 
conditions to secure development, growth and security through law and order (A. 
Leftwich, 2008). In that case, the state-society and state-capital relationships have 
been considered in understanding the activities of conflict and they involve many 
contradictions and deepening structural actions of crisis in a society
77
 (A. Leftwich, 
2000).  
3.2.4 Nexus of Public-Private Interactions 
Political economic theory postulates a deeper understanding of legitimate public and 
private interactions (and their relation) which have been transformed, and continue to 
be transformed, by the development of capitalist societies (Caporaso & Levine, 
1992). Moreover, this theory shows a pragmatic way of studying the reciprocal 
                                                          
74
 Arguably, the emergence of the state is associated with securing and protecting the collective 
interests of private accumulation process for individual, profit-seeking capitalists (Mosley, 1982). The 
Malaysian state is a developmental state. A developmental state involves state intervention for 
development and growth (Embong, 2012). Therefore, political economy theory also considers the 
sources and conflict faced by the Malaysian state in cases where they greatly influence the market 
through distribution of public resources. 
75
 For many years, the state was the institutionalised instrument with a diversity of interests, 
preferences and shared values, which was involved in exploitation, domination and in promoting 
private interest and thus became involved in transformation and production of society (see Otusanya, 
2012).  
76
 Comparatively, there are greater incentives for attracting capital via public-private and state market 
intervention. Those incentives aim to maintain the state‟s status quo and legitimacy. As a result, one 
can say that there is a structural crisis and constraints on the conflicted role of the state between 
seeking capital from questionable business practices and sustaining the economy  (Johansson, 2014; 
Sundaram & Hui, 2014). 
77
 The state and state capacities arguably possess enduring power structures constructed by political 
maneuvering and economic rationality, which continue to influence and shape individuals‟ actions and 
behaviour. 
P a g e  | 131 
 
 
relationship of a close alignment between government and business. As mentioned 
before, a political economic analysis is routinely associated with political and 
economic power between businesses and public policy design and formulation. By 
pretending
78
 that business interests are different from those of the government, 
capitalist businessmen (including politicians who are also businessmen) are able to 
maximize their profits using the state machinery (Searle, 1999; Tátrai, 2015). Searle 
(1999), in particular, argues for new alignments that have been formed between 
politics, the bureaucracy and business, and shows that the 
„(...) boundaries between politics and businesses became blurred as the government 
sought to enlarge Malay ownership and promote a new Malay capitalist‟ (p.55). 
 
 Within that context, the „blurred‟ interaction between politics, the state, business and 
the economic have facilitated a more intimate and productive relationship between 
the state and the Malay and Chinese elites (Tan, 2015). At some point, the legitimate 
public-private spheres offer opportunities for wrongdoings and misappropriation, 
such as fraud, corruption, rent-seeking, cronyism, patronage, and favouritism (de 
Kadt & Simkins, 2013; Hessami, 2014). 
 
Finally, the mutually reinforcing interaction between public and private spheres is 
generally associated with the trajectory of wealth and power at the intersection of 
public and private domains (Froud et al., 2004). For example, the catalyst of political 
business practice, as illustrated by Kuzio (2014), Ciepley (2013) and Sargiacomo et 
al. (2015), is a web of a powerful group of individual interests of private capitalists. 
The links for the web mark a source of patronage for the well-connected 
                                                          
78
 It is also said that a government is a tool of business when businessmen use government power 
(government machinery) to maximize their profits. 
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businessperson. It is in this context that political economic analysis increasingly 
offers a dynamic mechanism for studying money politics, political funding and 
campaigns, and vibrant elements of „ersatz capitalism‟ or true „productive‟ capitalism 
(Ebrahim et al., 2014; Nicholas J. White, 2004). Thus, the pursuit of capital 
accumulation and wealth creation inevitable goes to the heart of public-private nexus. 
3.2.5 Justification for choosing Political Economy Theory 
Based on the above discussion, political economy theory offers a flexible lens 
through which to investigate the persistence of public procurement fraud in Malaysia 
as follows. First, a political economic analysis is concerned with two conceptually 
distinct societal subsystems: the political and the economic context (J. Williamson, 
1994). Political economy analysis assigns a central role to the enduring power 
structure of historical, socio-political and economic institutions, which have been 
embedded into informal and formal practices where morality, imbued values, and 
customs are institutionalised.  
 
Second, the invisible hand of the homo economicus (the economic man) plays a role 
in political economy approach (Aydinonat, 2008; Kennedy, 2009). Adam Smith in his 
Theory of Moral Sentiments assumes that the rational behaviour of economic man is 
to maximize profits and wealth, and in turn, to benefit all members of society. This 
study challenges that notion, as the invisible hand in the Malaysian public sector may 
serves only to enrich state officials and their families (Berthelsen, 2012; Khalid, 
2014). Political economy theory demonstrates the decision sense making of the 
economic man in the Malaysian public procurement practices.  
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Third, for understanding the enduring power of political and economic institutions 
and rational sense making in public procurement practices (see section 3.2.1 and 
3.2.2), the practices in public policy making are also employed in political economy 
theory. Ping (2008) argues that the institutionalization of the policymaking process
79
 
in Malaysia is created by the state intervening in the economy. The Malaysia state 
intervention, however, also creates a platform for patron-client relationships and rent-
seeking activities (N. R. W. Abdullah, 2008). Political economy analysis is a 
powerful tool to provide distinctive characteristics of many contradictions and 
antagonism of the state for capital accumulation at the nexus of political power and 
economic institutional mechanisms (Gomez et al., 2013; Kehl, 2009). Thus, political 
economy provides this context by providing insights into public policy environment 
in Malaysia.  
 
Finally, to understand public procurement fraud in Malaysia, it is important to focus 
on interaction of government and business in government purchasing.  Political 
economy theory sheds light on how business elites and state officials manoeuvre the 
government procurement practices through „legitimate‟ means. Political economy 
indeed helps to explain the undeniable relationship of government-business because 
the Malaysian state has strongly encouraged the practice of exchanging goods and 
services with the private sectors to develop the country. Thus, the same site used for 
interactions between government and business may provide opportunity for possible 
                                                          
79
 In some ways, Rodan and Jayasuriya (2009) propose that internal and external pressures are 
manoeuvring the architecture of public policy by power relations of the developmental state. Evans 
(1989) and Adrian Leftwich (1995), on the other hand, show an expansion of power and coordination 
of networks in developmental state containing a combination of state and non-state actors. This, in 
turn, has deeply implicated the state‟s structure to be influenced by and heavily dependent on political 
and economic capitalist elites and inevitably correspond with western input for its allocation of 
resources (A. Leftwich, 2008). 
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fraudulent and corrupt actions (Gomez & Jomo, 1997). In fact, an alliance between 
big business and high-ranking state officials
80
 has already emerged from the business-
government relations. Haque (1998) demonstrates that, 
„The legalization and intensification of public-private partnerships may lead to more 
scandalous relationships between public bureaucracies and business enterprise, and 
thus affect bureaucratic integrity and accountability‟. (p.366) 
 
Thus, it is important to realize that political economy theory seems as a suitable 
approach to understand public procurement fraud in Malaysia by addressing the 
dynamic characteristics of institutions or the role of powerful social actors that frame 
public and private entities as well as also the changing and inevitable role of the state 
in global contexts.  
 
The next section describes the qualitative research design employed in the current 
study. 
3.3 Qualitative Research Design 
 
The aim of this research is to investigate the possible reasons
81
 for the persistence of 
public procurement fraud in Malaysia. Because the subject under study is sensitive 
and controversial, the choice of a qualitative research design is crucial for producing 
reliable and insightful social research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2013). The selection of an 
appropriate research design is made after one defines the research problems, 
formulates clear research objectives and research questions and generates the 
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 From this view, the capacity of the Malaysian state officials to legitimate their interest and to make 
laws and regulations somehow detaches them from moral considerations for more narrowly economic 
objectives
 
(K. Jomo, 2000).  
81
 Apart from the main research questions (see Chapter 1), there are also 5 sub-questions to be 
addressed.  
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theoretical framework from the literature review and review of current issues (see 
Bailey, 2007; J. Ritchie et al., 2014). The research design of this study (see figure 3.3) 
should also manage to gain a high degree of trust from the interviewees.  
 










Source: Current Study 
 
Since this research seeks to explore the complex social and behavioural phenomenon 
of public procurement fraud in Malaysia, it is important to highlight that the findings 
and results derived from the study are not to be considered as the only underlying 
causes and explanations.  Rather the views and opinions of the interviewees portray 
their personal experience and individual consciousness about fraudulent practices 
within Malaysian procurement practices. Further, the perspectives expressed by the 
interviewees should not be seen as a mutual view from all members of a group 
(especially procurement officers and professionals) in order to understand the social 
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generalizations about the persistence of public procurement fraud in Malaysia, but it 
can be used as an influential study for understanding the nature and extent of 
fraudulent practices in the Malaysian public sector. 
3.3.1 Sampling 
In order to explore the views of the interviewees (see Appendix 3.3 for a detailed list 
of interviewees), this study employed semi-structured interviews via Snowball 
Sampling Method (SSM). The views selected were based on purposive sampling
82
 
(see L. Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2007). The groups interviewed represent the key 
stakeholders for the subject enquiry. Their subjective views and perspectives about 
the social inquiry have been examined in order to collect evidence about the 
persistence of fraud in the Malaysian public sector. The interviewees provide a range 
of meanings, beliefs, experiences and views on the matter. Below a brief description 
of the 5 participant groups is given.  
Table 3.1: Summary of the 5 Groups of Interviewees 
No. Coded Name Method Duration 
Group 1: 13 Regulators (Public Procurement Officers) 
 R1 - R13 Face-to-face and Email Interviews 32 to 119 
minutes 
Group 2: 13 Public Professionals-PP (Public Auditors and Enforcement 
Officers) 
 PP1 - PP13 Face-to-face and Email Interviews 42  to 136 
minutes 
Group 3: 5 Politicians-P 
 P1 - P5 Face-to-face Interviews 39 to 73 minutes 
Group 4: 4 Media Actors-M 
 M1 - M4 Face-to-face and Skype  Interviews 37 to 161 
minutes 
Group 5: 5 Academics-A 
 A1 - A5 Face-to-face and Skype  Interviews 33 to 98 minutes 
Source: The fieldwork 
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 Purposive sampling is able to provide „rich‟ information and data set that link to the phenomenon 
under study. The sample is typically selected based on its distinctive characteristics and its conceptual 
significance for understanding social practices (Holliday, 2007; Myers, 2009). 
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The main views on the persistence of public procurement fraud in Malaysia were 
derived from Group 1 (13 regulators: public procurement officers) and Group 2 (13 
public professionals: public auditors and enforcement officers). On the one hand, the 
regulator‟s groups consisted of public procurement officers who handle procurement 
process and issues on a daily basis. On the other hand, the public professionals‟ group 
plays a significant role in preventing procurement fraud to ensure the implementation 
of public accountability. There are important reasons for choosing regulators and 
professionals to be the main interviewees for the study. (1) Public procurement 
officers play a critical role in evaluating documentation of government contracts as 
their everyday professional work. Procurement officers face considerable risk at their 
posts as they are possibility sometimes pressurized to obey the instructions and 
demands of a higher authority when rewarding a government contract. (2) Public 
professionals (e.g., public auditors and enforcement officers) face the risks when they 
need to perform risk assessment procedure for providing a reasonable basis for 
identifying and assessing the risks of fraud and corruption (see Colon, 2015). The 
views of professionals were sought on their role in monitoring and detecting public 
procurement fraud practices. Besides, they require appropriate skills, competency and 
professionalism to heighten the scrutiny of the independence of public professionals 
to detect fraud and corruption in public procurement. (3) These interviewees have 
worked in the Malaysian public sector for minimum of 5 years and up to 30 years. 
With such long-term experience in the procurement department, their skill and 
knowledge on procurement practices in Malaysia are extensive. Therefore, their 
subjective views on public procurement fraud in Malaysia is what is required to 
investigate the social inquiry. 
 




 were interviewed since there is little understanding of politicians‟ 
view even though they are considered among the main stakeholder in procurement 
policy (Murray, 2009). As described by Murray (2009), the influence of politicians on 
public procurement policy is pervasive. The elected politicians (or ex-politicians) 
were asked about their decision making process  (at the higher level) when delivering 
their responsibilities. The politicians also have a wide range of knowledge about the 
historical development of the socio-economic and political context of social practices 
in Malaysia.  
 
On the other hand, the media actors and academics selected were able to map the 
social phenomenon because of their critical role in influencing the shape of 
governance in Malaysia. The former represented journalists that were specifically 
accustomed to interviewing and uncovering information about fraud and corruption 
issues (e.g., a journalist who works at the Court reporting fraud and corruption news). 
The latter (academics) did research on particular distinctive aspects of Malaysia‟s 
political economy. By studying their work and research, I was able to locate many 
significant themes and patterns in understanding the (re)creation and (re)shaping of 
social practices. They are also known as „experts‟ in their field and in particular  in 
observing the construction of fraudulent and corruption behaviour in Malaysia. The 
willingness of my interviewees to be interviewed and share their experiences and 
memories about the social inquiry was the most valuable contribution for the thesis. 
                                                          
83
 The former Prime Minister agreed to see me for an interview. It was not easy to gain his acceptance, 
as I needed to submit a supporting letter laying out the purpose of my research and the reason of 
choosing him as one of my interviewees. The letter had to be detailed and convincing. Despite his tight 
schedule (he still holds many posts in the Malaysian‟s administration), I was given the opportunity to 
interview him for approximately 40 minutes at Putrajaya, Malaysia. 
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Therefore, there is a rich variation in relation to how these 40 interviewees 
understand, perceive, and/or experience the phenomenon under study. 
3.3.2 Access 
Gaining access to conduct the interview sessions was a challenging task and there 
was lack of response from the main group of interviewees: regulators and public 
professionals due to the sensitivity of the topic. I began to search for my interviewees 
early and started to contact them (through email and phone) after receiving ethical 
clearance from the university. Since the beginning of the fieldwork, I have been 
trying to get in touch with various politicians, media and journalists through phone, 
emails and social networking. Unfortunately, none of them responded to my requests.  
 
After this unsuccessful attempt, for the second attempt, I used my contacts, friends 
and social networking in securing access. This time I was more successful, even 
though many of those who initially responded positively refused to be interviewed 
after reviewing the interview guide. The reason of their refusal was that the topic was 
deemed too sensitive and it may have threatened their positions in the public offices. 
They were afraid of violating the Official Secretive Act 1972 by exposing secret and 
confidential information of the Malaysian government. Nevertheless, this second 
attempt provided me with more interviewees and a motivation to conduct more 
interviews.  
 
Finally, after getting the permission from some more interviewees to interview in the 
second attempt, it was through recommendations of those interviewees (during my 
second attempt) that I was able to get access to the rest of my interviewees. By using 
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the Snowball Sample Method (SSM) (see section 3.3.3.2), I was more successful in 
securing the interviews needed for this study.  
 
The interviews lasted from 32 to 161 minutes. All interviews were recorded after 
getting the interviewees‟ consent. However, some interviewees were reluctant to 
discuss some questions as they were afraid this might jeopardized their job. Most of 
the interview sessions were conducted in their offices, though some interviewees 
preferred having the interview sessions at their house or at a café. None of my 
interviewees requested to see my transcript nor did I promise to give it to them. 
However, I continuously reminded them of the anonymity and confidentiality of their 
particulars and details (e.g., name, positions, the office), including any publication of 
my findings.  
3.3.3 Research Method 
The study of public procurement fraud in Malaysia was pursued using two research 
methods: (1) documentary sources as secondary evidence, and (2) semi-structured 
interviews as primary evidence. However, it is important to note that although the 
main source of data is the semi-structured interviews, secondary data is also 
important to understand the issue under study. The research methods are explained as 
below. 
3.3.3.1 Documentary Sources 
This study focused on the contextual dimension of the phenomenon such as the 
institutional, historical and cultural elements that have shaped social practices and on 
any behaviour that is related to this phenomenon. The documentary sources offers 
input on the identification of possible reasons, actions and how these link with each 
other in relation to this social phenomenon (Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
P a g e  | 141 
 
 
The first stage of the documentary analysis aimed at a broader understanding of 
historical development issues as well as socio-economic and political issues that 
relate to fraud and corruption practices in Malaysia. The identification and relevant 
sources of information for the documentary analysis focus on issues surrounding the 
theoretical framework selected for the study (see section 3.2), and any emerged 
themes related to the study. As documentary analysis generates a broader 
understanding about the subject inquiry, it provides a good preparation for the 
interviews. The use of documentary analysis (see section 3.4) has identified some 
patterns and themes in order to describe the social phenomenon (G. A. Bowen, 2009). 
 
The second stage of the documentary analysis was established after conducting the 
interview sessions. Documentary analysis can also consult secondary sources of 
evidence. According to Bailey (2007), only relevant document need to be extracted so 
as to understand the social phenomenon under study. At this stage, reviewing 
secondary sources of evidence was paramount for cross validating the data from the 
interview sessions. Within that context, the secondary data is used to verify, confirm 
and/or modify the findings from the primary sources (Lapan, Quartaroli, & Riemer, 
2012). Thus, the publicly available data is used as an instrument to understand and 
verify the understanding of a social phenomenon.  
 
Hence, the document evidence involved publicly available data such as government 
reports and websites (e.g., budgets, Malaysian Plan Book), government documents 
(e.g., Acts, Court conjunctions, circulars), books, speeches, journal articles, 
newspaper clippings, blogs, magazines, presentations, and corporate websites. 
Because of the sensitivity of the topic, many sources of documentary analysis 
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comprised newspaper clippings, magazines and websites. Yet, the secondary data 
chosen originated from reliable sources of information pertaining to fraud and 
corruption issues. These reliable sources have to do with issues concerning relations 
surrounding public procurement practices, and discussions with interviewees. 
Therefore, one can say that the information gained from publicly available data can 
be used to confirm, validate, support or oppose findings for understanding and 
verification purposes.  
3.3.3.2 Semi-structured Interviews via Snowball Sampling Method (SSM) 
Interviews can be used to explore the opinions, practices, understandings and 
motivations of individual interviewees and offer possible explanations of the subject 
matter (Legard, Keegan, & Ward, 2011; Tobi, 2013). This study employs semi-
structured interviews in order to understand the social world through personal 
accounts and narratives with justifications as follows. First, a semi-structured 
interview offers an open structure of questions which are normally prepared in 
advance in a framework of themes, but which are open to probe and the researcher 
can change the sequence of the questions and follow up particular areas that need 
further explanations (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Consequently, semi-structured 
interviews allow new ideas/questions to be pursued when the researcher feels 
appropriate to do so within a fairly open framework. Second, because it is a two way 
communication,
84
 a semi-structured interview format can „ease‟ the interview process 
by creating a more relaxed atmosphere (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). Hence, 
it gives the interviewee the platform to express their views freely regarding their 
                                                          
84
 One important feature of this interview method is that it enables both the interviewer and 
interviewee to build good rapport by exchanging questions, answers and views regarding the topic. A 
good rapport appear to be the most useful way of gaining the trust and interest of the interviewee 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2013). 
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everyday experience and knowledge. Finally, a semi-structured interview involves 
exploratory discussions by answering the “what”, “how” and “why” questions and 
through the understanding of individual circumstances, views, opinions, experiences 
and decision making (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Indeed, semi-structured interviews can 
help researchers develop a thorough understanding of the topic of interest. 
Nevertheless, the collection of rich data should end once data saturation is achieved 
85
 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). 
 
The interview guide for the five different groups of participants (i.e. regulators, 
professionals, politicians, media actors and academics) was devised based on an 
examination of the role that the 5 groups of participants have in the construction of 
public procurement fraud in Malaysia. Justifications for employing semi-structured 
interviews for purposive sampling were selected based on its distinctive 
characteristics in contextualizing social practices as explained in detailed in section 
3.3.1: Sampling. As highlighted by J. Ritchie et al. (2014), purposive sampling is able 
to confirm that all main stakeholders relevant to the study are taken into consideration 
and ensuring diversity of views and perspectives is maintained within each relevant 
group so as to provide rich evidence and information that link to the social 
phenomenon. As a result, the current study employed Snowball Sampling Method 
(SSM) for its semi-structured interviews (see detailed in section 3.3.3.2).  
 
The interview guide (see Appendix 3.4) was developed  using certain scenarios or 
situations so that the participants could easily engage and identify with the interview 
                                                          
85
 Data saturation happens when interviewees do not offer new information or provide additional 
insights. 
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sessions. This was to improve the validity of the responses gathered from participants 
when answering the study‟s research questions. Legard et al. (2011) address the 
importance of qualitative interview designs in seeking to make an association with 
participants‟ experience and viewpoints of particular topics. With some modifications 
or extensions of particular scenarios for particular interviewee groups the interview 
guide was more suited to determining the possible factors for the persistence of fraud 
in Malaysian public procurement.  
 
In this study, semi-structured interviews took the form of email interviews, video-
conferencing interviews through Skype and face-to-face interviews. Email interviews 
were employed in order to gain a wider access to interviewees and save time for the 
transcriptions (Meho, 2006). Unfortunately, there were not enough respondents 
replying to my emails. After this unsuccessful attempt through email interviews, I 
turned to videoconference interviews through Skype and face-to-face interviews. 
 
In relation to the videoconference interviews through Skype and face-to-face 
interviews, the current research used the Snowball Sampling Method (SSM),
86
 also 
known as chain-referral sampling. This technique involves asking people who have 
already been interviewed to recommend other people who are suitable to answer the 
interview questions (J. Ritchie et al., 2014). Christopoulos (2009) illustrates that with 
the SSM, one uses the social networks of the interviewees to expand the researcher‟s 
potential interviewees. As the current study is sensitive and involves conflict 
environments, SSM is a useful research strategy to access and interview groups of 
                                                          
86
 The snowballing method played an important role in finding other relevant interviewees. 
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interviewees. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the SSM for the current study was 
explained as follows.  
 
(1)  SSM is useful when conducted in conflict environments (N. Cohen & Arieli, 
2011). There is a paucity of research conducted in a conflict environment that is 
challenging due to sensitive and controversial issues, and lack of trust given to the 
researcher (J. A. Clark, 2006; Romano, 2006). As the current research is investigating 
public procurement fraud, there is possibility for the research to expose conflict and a 
politically sensitive matter in the country. The current study encountered many 
aspects and challenges where public conflict is a dominant feature: research on 
conflict-related issues, internal security, and the possibility of political oppression, 
secrecy and confidentiality. This can be seen from the difficulty in getting data access 
and gaining the trust of the interviewees as well as difficulties in the analysis, 
interpretation and presentation of the data. Thus, the SSM provides a different 
dimension of research technique in investigating a conflicting social phenomenon.  
 
(2) SSM serves the need of studying a population that is hidden or hard to reach for 
research purposes (Petersen & Valdez, 2005; Valdez & Kaplan, 1998). In this study, 
the population is not hidden but hard to reach for a researcher. The inaccessibility was 
due to the social and political status of the interviewees, especially the procurement 
officers in various government departments. Because of the high degree of 
bureaucracy, sensitivity and confidentiality of government procurement 
documentations, SSM is an effective method for this study.  
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(3) Given the complexities of my research and there is certain sensitivity issues about 
the subject matter, SSM helped me demonstrate a high level of trust by also 
remaining truthful and visible on my research topic. My dual role as a researcher and 
a Malaysian public official provided me with an opportunity to unveil and explore the 
hidden and silent voices of the public officials in relation to this sensitive topic. The 
confidence and trust I was given by my interviewees was mainly due to my 
knowledge and exposure as a public official myself. It is critical for the research to 
establish pleasant and cooperative interactions with my interviewees. SSM is possibly 
useful in enlarging the pool of potential interviewees by increasing the level of trust 
through the introduction of other potential interviewees by people they know 
(Christopoulos, 2009).  
 
(4) After being trusted to be introduced to other potential interviewees (the 
introduction part was the most important element in SSM), I ensured maximum 
sensitivity towards all my interviewees. First, I assured the privacy of my 
interviewees‟ personal particulars (name, positions, office) was to be respected. 
Second, the interviewees were not obliged to expose any sensitive government 
information that could affect Malaysia‟s national interest. Finally, bearing in mind 
that the sensitivity of fraud and corruption issues may affect my interviewees‟ mood 
and emotions, I always adopted a warm, pleasant and sympathetic tone of voice and 
body language.  
 
(5) Lastly, the SSM gives one the opportunity to adopt an empathetic approach 
towards the interviewees (N. Cohen & Arieli, 2011). The reflexivity and credibility 
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gained from being part of the system, makes me
87
 more understanding to as well as 
emotionally involved with their situation as public officials. Since I showed that I 
understand their position, most of my interviewees were willing to share their 
experience and views about public procurement fraud in Malaysia. Showing empathy 
proved invaluable approach for conducting research in this sensitive area.  
 
The next section discusses the use of thematic analysis for this study. 
3.4 Data Analysis: Thematic Approach 
 
The data collected from the interviews was analysed using the thematic approach 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006; Bryman & Bell, 2011; Guest et al., 2012; Thorpe & Holt, 
2008). Guest et al. (2012) describe thematic analysis as the most common technique 
to analyse rich data by coding and developing it in a thematic way. Braun and Clarke 
(2006) highlight the flexibility of thematic analysis in becoming familiar with the 
data, generating initial codes with a template and representing it in a theme identified 
within the textual data. The flexibility of thematic analysis lies in the fact that one is 
able to modify, add to or withdraw from the template or coding something as one 
reads and interprets the text (Saldaña, 2009). Thus, new themes can be established 
that were not captured at the beginning of the data analysis process (Thorpe & Holt, 
2008). The data analysis for the current study was as follows: 
 
 
                                                          
87
 I currently work as a public auditor of the National Audit Department, Malaysia while doing my 
PhD at University of Essex, UK. I have served various government agencies during the 15 years of my 
service in the Malaysian government.  
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Following the principle of thematic analysis as described in stage 1 to 6 (see figure 
3.4), data analysis for the current study started with familiarization of data in stage 1, 
which involved transcribing, translating, reading and re-reading the data several 
times. This data was used for listening again, and for checking and correcting the 
transcripts which helped to increase the robustness and reliability of the analysis (J. 
Ritchie et al., 2014). The participants‟ answers were reviewed separately on an 
individual basis. To avoid losing data, all interview transcriptions were also copied 
from the digital tape recorder to my laptop‟s hard disk as well as to another hard disk 
as a backup. The objective in this stage that 1 was to become immersed and 
intimately familiar with my interview data. At this stage, I underlined all repeating 
words from the transcription and noted ideas and potential coding schemes. After 
that, I made a list of all the repeating words, which in essence involved the initial 
interesting topics or stories and the main ideas expressed by interviewees (Holliday, 
2007).  
 
Stage 2 involved generating initial codes based on 5 groups of interviewees (i.e., 
procurement officers, professionals, politicians, media actors and academics). This 
phase involved generating labels and codes that were possibly relevant to answering 
the research question. The codes and labels were extracted and collated for a later 
stage of analysis (if necessary). Stage 3 involved examining the labels and codes that 
were extracted in stage 2. The codes were grouped together to identify significant 
broader patterns as a possible theme (Saldaña, 2009). At this stage, it involved the 
comparison and contrast of the list of topics and sub-topics as potential themes and 
sub-themes.  
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Then, at stage 4, the data was analysed by reviewing the (potential) themes identified 
and by continuously
88
 checking their relevance in order to answer the research 
question. The review of the themes was typically refined and this offers for a more 
flexible method to split, combine or withdraw the themes (Guest et al., 2012). Using 
the thematic approach, the data under the themes were grouped together according to 
common meanings, which emerged during the analysis of the data. In fact, other 
themes might need to be broken down into separate themes for validity of individual 
themes in relation to the data set (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). In addition, there 
should be clear and distinctions between themes. For example, expressions about 
public procurement practices were collected from participant‟s experience and their 
views/opinions about procurement process. After the data was coded into relevant 
themes, this stage provided an opportunity for creating a „thematic‟ map and a matrix 
framework. It is pertinent to note that the usage of a thematic map and matrix 
framework was useful as it helped me to make a note of any missing details, linking 
elements and see the bigger picture of the „story‟. For example, the thematic map was 
used in order to have a complete picture of all the major themes and sub-themes. 
After that, by listing the major themes and sub-themes, I created a matrix framework 
and carefully filled in the data from the answers of each interviewee. Saldaña (2009) 
suggests that coding the data into themes is very crucial in social research, which is 
highly subjective, in order to determine ideas and concepts as relevant findings from 
the participant‟s answers.  
 
                                                          
88
 As the analytical process developed, the initial template or rough ideas that had been identified 
before was modified by the addition of new multiple sub-themes that emerged during the 
categorisation process; this shows the flexibility  thematic analysis (P. A. Bowen et al., 2012; Guest et 
al., 2012). 
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At stage 5, my data analysis continued by defining and renaming themes. This phase 
started when I was satisfied with the data that put into the thematic map and matrix 
framework. However, detailed analyses for each individual theme were conducted in 
order for me to fit them into the broader overall story of public procurement fraud 
practices. For example, the main themes were political and economic forces 
influencing public procurement fraud in Malaysia. Through a detailed analysis, the 
data provided sub-themes about the practice of political business in Malaysia‟s 
procurement process, the inevitable relationship between government and private 
sector and public procurement environment in Malaysia (see Chapter 5). As 
suggested by Braun and Clarke (2006), themes and sub-themes provided from the 
data must be related to the research questions as it is useful to have a structure in 
order to understand a large and complex story and the meanings within the data. In 
refining and renaming themes, I always made comparisons and analysis of the data by 
working on the focus and scope of each theme. The process of modifying, adding or 
splitting specific themes was carried out in order to decide on an informative name 
for each theme. It is important to note that although common themes and sub-themes 
were established from the interviewees‟ answers, each expression was unique and 
distinctive as a social constructivism of reality (P. L. Berger & Luckmann, 1967). 
 
The final stage, i.e., stage 6, was the last rigorous thematic approach taken to analyze 
my data and produce an analysis of the findings. This phase involved the careful act 
of weaving together the analytical narrative and data extracts in order to contextualize 
the analysis so that it related back to my research questions and the broader 
theoretical assumptions of this thesis.  
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The thematic analysis of the 40 interviews has helped to „unpack‟ the hidden and 
silent voices of my participants in relation to procurement fraud in Malaysia. There 
are 5 themes (and sub-themes, as explained in Chapter 5) aiming to answer the 
research questions. The next section discusses the ethical issues of this study.  
3.5 Ethical Considerations 
 
Ethical considerations are crucial for a research investigating a complex, sensitive and 
controversial social practice.  This is because ethical arrangements promote trust, 
accountability, mutual respect and fairness between the researcher and the 
interviewees (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2011). Ethical considerations for the current 
study involved the following. (1) I have an approved ethical form from my institution 
to conduct this study. This form was a legally binding form for the researcher to 
adhere to the code of conduct of research. (2) I gained the consent from my 
interviewees to participate in this research in every interview session (some consents 
were recorded). (3) In every interview session, I highlighted the anonymity and 
confidentiality of the interview by assuring them that I would not be specific when 
referring to them in my work and I would not reveal any of their details (e.g., name, 
position, office). This research would not have been successful without such clear 
terms on anonymity and confidentiality. (4) My interview recording, interview 
transcript and interview notes are in a safe place and can be accessed only by me. 
There are no details of my interviewees in my recording tapes, interview notes and 
transcript.  
 
The challenges faced and limitations of this research are described in the next section. 
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3.6 Challenges and Limitations 
 
This research aims to understand the persistence of public procurement fraud in 
Malaysia from the viewpoints of 5 main stakeholders (regulators, professionals, 
politicians, academics and journalists). The understanding gained by acquiring and 
studying these views, however, did not aim to make generalizations about social 
practices, but rather to value those specific views and opinions. It is vital to note that 
the opinions and the findings derived from the perceptions expressed by my 
interviewees are from their own views and they are based on their personal 
experiences and positions. Thus, their opinions are not meant to be representative of 
all stakeholders (e.g., procurement officers, professionals, politicians, media actors 
and academics) related to public procurement fraud practices in Malaysia. What is 
more, there must be an open approach, which takes into account the fact that opinions 
and views may change over time according to social transformation in any society.  
 
Inevitably, I cannot separate myself as a researcher from my interviewees.
89
 
However, as a qualitative interviewer I was only supposed to listen, digest and 
comprehend their answer (Denzin & Lincoln, 2013). During the interview sessions, I 
was not allowed to make any assumptions from or judgements on the knowledge and 
exposure I have had as a public official. I only displayed my interests and remained 
inquisitive so as to „unpack‟ public procurement fraud in Malaysia from the views 
and perspectives of my interviewees. This research acknowledges the values, beliefs 
and experiences of both the researcher and interviewees. As a person who was born, 
raised, has worked and lived in the country, I cannot marginalise my own judgment, 
                                                          
89
 This has been explained when discussing  my philosophical stance in section 3.1.1. 
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beliefs, cultural traits, understanding and wide experience of the system of the 
Malaysian public sector. The particular range of views, experience and outcomes give 
robust reliability and validity to a qualitative research (J. Lewis & Ritchie, 2011).  
 
There are some challenges for and limitations of this study. (1) This study 
investigates a sensitive and controversial issue: public procurement fraud. This 
research is regarded as politically sensitive which may or may not affect the potential 
interviewees.
90
 It produces a fear of „exposure‟ as well as lack of trust in researcher. 
The atmosphere of distrust made it difficult for me to secure access for interviews. 
However, by remaining truthful about the objective of the current study and assured 
my interviewees of the maximum anonymity and confidentiality of the interview 
(e.g., by not revealing any information of the interviewees‟ details), interviewees 
were willing to share their personal experience and views in relation to procurement 
fraud in Malaysia during the interview sessions. On the other hand, documentary 
evidence collected in the current study were fruitful in providing confirmation and 
validation to support and/or withdraw themes in relation to issues pertaining to social 
practices.  
 
(2) Despite being a challenging task for me to find and approach willing interviewees 
to discuss a very sensitive topic, the use of personal contacts and networking secured 
me some interview sessions to start with. Then, the SSM made it possible to get more 
interviewees and gain their trust by being recommended to them. There is no doubt 
that the SSM was a useful and efficient way to generate responsiveness (Goodman, 
1961; Heckathorn, 1997).  
                                                          
90
 Therefore, interviewees may be afraid of any (bad) consequences for them or their family. 
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(3) Working in the Malaysian public sector has offered me a significant advantage in 
undertaking the current study. Before each interview, I needed to explain that I am a 
public officer myself, from the National Audit Department Malaysia. I always 
assured my interviewees that I was aware of and understood all applicable Acts and 
the atmosphere working as Malaysian public officials. Most importantly, in each 
interview I did my best to convince my interviewees that the interview sessions were 
only for research purposes and were strictly confidential. Because of my explanations 
and empathetic approach, the interviewees sometimes assumed and took for granted 
that I knew everything in all public procurement issues. I constantly needed to 
encourage them to share their experience and views about the social phenomenon in 
their own words.  
 
(4) As this research was mostly related with government agencies, I could not have 
avoided the „red tape‟, bureaucracy circumstances and protocol when contacting the 
potential interviewees. Sometimes, I had to wait for a whole day outside the office 
only to secure an interview (an interview that I sometimes did not manage to secure), 
I was put on hold for most of the time on the phone and many appointments were 
cancelled at the last minute. My meetings were most of the times postponed, and 
stopped even half way through interview. They would just ask me to come back later 
to continue the interview, something that, needless to say, never happened. 
 
(5) There were also some logistical challenges when I need to travel a long way from 
one government agency to another one, or towards places agreed by the interviewees 
which I was not familiar with. The travelling was exhausting. For me to be in an area 
that was not familiar was also quite dangerous and intimidating. Hence, if the 
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interview was also cancelled at the very last minute or was stopped suddenly, the 
research became more complicated and limited.  
 
(6) Lastly, most of the interview sessions were conducted in the Malay language,
91
 
which is of the language used by most government officers. As I wanted to make the 
interview session as „easy‟ and „comfortable‟ as possible, I let my interviewees tell 
their story in their most familiar language. Therefore, I also needed to transcribe and 
translate the interviews in English, something that was time consuming.  
 
A summary of this chapter is presented below.  
3.7 Summary  
 
This chapter discussed the methodology employed for the scientific investigation of 
public procurement fraud in Malaysia. This chapter has considered the research 
methodology and methods underpinning this study. 
 
The core philosophical assumptions were outlined. This study assumed subjectivist 
ontology, according to which, reality is based on individual consciousness by shared 
meanings and conceptions through human interactions and activity. With its beliefs 
on social constructivism epistemology, the current study focuses on and trusts in the 
meaning-making or personal experience, feelings and views through constructed 
shared meanings and realities by human actions and experience.  
 
                                                          
91
 Some interviews were delivered in English, but, most of the time, people would switch between the 
two languages (Malay and English).  
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No effort has been made to search for any objective „truth‟, as this study is merely a 
search for an understanding of public procurement fraud practices in light of the 
stakeholders‟ perspectives. This study believes that human actors are able to create 
their environment, autonomously and on their free will. The analysis in this study has 
been conducted by „getting inside‟ of the interviewees by making sense and giving 
voice to their story. Justification for choosing critical paradigm was also offered. 
 
From the lens of political economy approach, this study aims to analyse the dynamic 
institutional arrangements of political and economic institutions. First, taking into 
account the prevailing nature of power relations, historical institutions and the 
embeddedness of formal and informal practices results in an insightful analysis for 
understanding the possible factors influencing public procurement fraud practices in 
Malaysia. Second, the rational behaviour of economic man is illustrated through 
diverse interests and personal desires to possess wealth and private enrichment. Third, 
public policy environment sheds light on the distribution of political power through 
policy implementation as well as on the conflicting role of the state. Lastly, the 
theoretical framework chosen for the study shows the relationship between public and 
private interactions.  
 
A qualitative research design was employed for the current study. There were 5 
groups of interviewees for the research (40 interviewees in total: 13 regulators, 13 
professionals, 5 politicians, 4 academics and 5 media actors). In this study, an 
understanding of the perspectives of the main stakeholders is sought in order to aid 
the investigation of the practice of public procurement fraud in Malaysia. Semi-
structured interviews via Snowball Sampling Method (SSM) were used to collect data 
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for the study. The researcher perceptively accepts and values the subjective views, 
opinions and beliefs as one of prime important contributions offered by the 
stakeholders. Documentary evidence aids the understanding of the social 
phenomenon and adds a contextual dimension to the study of public procurement 
fraud.  
 
Data analysis is formulated through a thematic approach in 6 stages: (1) 
familiarization of data, (2) generating initial codes, (3) searching for themes and 
subthemes, (4) reviewing themes, (5) refining and renaming themes and (6) reporting 
the analysis. This is very crucial to see a „bigger‟ picture of public procurement fraud 
in Malaysia.  
 
Ethical arrangements are sought because the research is directly involved with human 
interviewees. Ethical considerations are important to ensure benefits and minimise the 
risk of harm for both the researcher and the interviewees. Some challenges and 
limitations were also outlined in this chapter. 
 
The following two chapters focus on the socio-political and economic characteristics 
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The literature reviews in Chapter 2 were concerned primarily with the distinctive 
nature of procurement process that gives opportunities for fraudulent activities. In that 
sense, the embeddedness of public procurement fraud needs to be explored in the 
settings of the particular socio-political, economic and legal environments where it is 
exercised. Chapter 3 has discussed the political economy approach to provide a basis 
for understanding the enduring social relationships between political and economic 
elites and the institutional structure, particular that of the Malaysian society. This 
chapter examines the influence of global and local forces, which have shaped the 
historical development, socio-political, economic context of Malaysia, in framing the 
persistence of public procurement fraud through secondary data as documentary 
evidence. As described in Chapter 3, documentary evidence were pursued in order to 
understand the contextualized settings of institutional, historical, socio-economic and 
political issues that relate to fraud and corruption practices in Malaysia. The use of 
secondary sources also aided the process of verification, confirmation, and/or 
modification of the findings from the primary sources (Lapan, Quartaroli, & Rieme, 
2012). Documentary analysis illustrated in this chapter, which paid attention to fraud 
and corruption in practices in Malaysia, was conducted by obtaining publicly 
available data as follows: books, journal articles, newspaper clippings, government 
reports and activity, blogs and websites, speeches, magazines presentations and 
corporate websites.  
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This chapter argues that the entrenchment of public procurement fraud in Malaysia 
was influenced by its historical legacies, the flaws in check and balance mechanisms 
in political and governmental structures, the prevalent desire for capital and wealth 
facilitated by the economic structure, and the prevailing professional and obedient 
nature of Malaysian public officials. There are strong values and practices, which 
constitute a cultural and institutional frame that can help in understanding what 
facilitates public procurement fraud practices.  
 
This chapter is divided into five sections (see figure 4.1). Section 4.1 provides 
insights into how the historical legacies of feudal society, colonialism and capitalistic 
nationalism to some extent justify oppression, exploitation, and fraudulent practices. 
Next, section 4.2 illustrates the political and government structure, which, to some 
extent, contributes to pervasiveness of public procurement fraud in Malaysia due to 
the complexity of the check and balance system to work and the concentration of 
power in the hands of the Cabinet. Section 4.3 examines how the economy structure 
is used as a platform for enabling fraud within the state‟s apparatus. Section 4.4 
reviews the professional and obedient nature of Malaysian public officials. It 
describes their role as implementers who are being tainted by the pressure and 
demands of political masters when performing their duties. Section 4.5 concludes the 
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4.1 The Historical Institutionalism: An Evolution 
 
„History is our myth, our story, our dream of reality,  
grounded in the context of the past  
but created to inform the future.‟  
(Archibald, 1999, p.66) 
 
The understanding of history is essential in order to understand human affairs 
(Southgate, 2005). Historical legacies are important because they account for the 
ways societies construct and reconstruct themselves over time. Corfield (2008) argues 
that studying history matters is inescapable, as it helps to understand the polity of a 
society with complex structures, traditions and practices of the past as living histories 
Also, Jordanova (2006) reflects on „historical narratives‟ from the past and legacies to 
understand the roots of society. This section aims to explain three relevant issues 
within the Malaysian historical context: (1) the crystallisation of Malay feudal 
4.1 The Historical Legacies: An Evolution 
 
4.0 Introduction 
4.2 The Political and Government Structure: Flaws of Check and Balance 
Mechanisms 
 
4.3 The Economic Structures: A Platform 
 
4.4 Malaysian Civil Service: Public Sector Governance 
 
4.5 Summary  
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society, (2) the encroachment of an imperialist ideology of colonial capitalism, and 
(3) the Malaysian society‟s sentiments on capitalistic nationalism. This chapter is 
useful to contextualize the evolution of historical institutionalism and characteristics 
that might play a role in public procurement fraud practices in Malaysia. The 
following subsection considers the feudal society in relation to the concepts of blind 
faith and loyalty. 
4.1.1 Feudal Society: Loyalty 
The enduring legacy of the feudal system in Malaya (Malaysia‟s name before 
independence in 1957) is evident in the Malay society today.
92
 The great Malay 
Annals
93
 emphasised the feudal concept in relation to the elite or ruling class as a 
traditional hierarchy of the institution of the ruler. The ruling hierarchy symbolically 
reminded one‟s position and status (Shaharuddin Maaruf, 2014). As a result, many 
elements from feudal system have become part of Malay values and principles.  
 
The first legacy of feudal culture is the attribution of an absolute and arbitrary power 
to the King and the ruling elite. The Malay ruling class is portrayed at the supreme 
position with the highest power and status of an authoritarian rule (Shellabear, 1975). 
Authoritarian characteristics have allowed the ruling class to maintain their status quo 
and be concerned only with matters that best served their vested interests. Huizinga 
(1972) discussed how the ruling elites always ensure the highest profits and financial 
                                                          
92
 The feudal system is a power structure in which a King and the ruling elites rule in an uncontrolled 
way and they act a social order. It is an authoritarian legacy in which there is a link between power, 
position and wealth. The feudal society legitimated legal and military arbitrary power through the 
virtues of nobility and pledge of loyalty between the ruler and his subjects. See Bloch (1962) and 
Huizinga (1972). 
93
 The manuscript of the Malay Annals originally titled Sulalatus Salatin – Genealogy of Kings was 
translated and is located in various countries. The text provided insights into a system of values and 





 centuries. See Gin (2009), A. H. Omar (2014) and Shellabear (1975). 
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gain for them from the allocation of resources of the country‟s wealth. By using their 
power and position
94
 and by dominating their subjects, the ruling elite is able to 
amass great wealth. For example, a noble always protects their subjects who are 
always submissive to any instructions and orders given to them. Also, there is an 
unquestionable obedience to the ruling elite in exchange of protection, even if the 
ruling elite members are „cruel and evil‟ (Shellabear, 1975). As a result, strong 
cultures of loyalty between the ruler and their subjects have been entrenched in 
Malaysian polity up to the present day. 
 
The second relevant heritage from the feudal values has to do with the creation of 
social class based on one‟s power and rank. Bloch (1962) illustrates that one‟s 
position depends mainly on impressing their superior (i.e., the royal elites) by pledges 
of loyalty and faith. In this way, the ruling elites cultivate further inequality, greed, 
arrogance and power to influence. Nevertheless, the question of exploitation and 
social justice has never been raised by the subjects (Huizinga, 1972). The subjects 
cannot challenge the supremacy
95
 of the ruling elites because this would mean 
disloyalty and treason. As the saying goes, „It is the Malay custom never to commit 
treason‟ (Shaharuddin Maaruf, 2014, p.15). Therefore, loyalty and fidelity have 
instilled wrong beliefs and ideas in the Malaysian society. 
 
                                                          
94
 The exploitation of the elite is portrayed in many traditional institutions in the Malay society. For 
example, the chief can easily extort revenues from the common among Malay peasants. The teacher 
and martial arts instructor have seized the non-Malays possessions if they do not bribe and pay them 
compensation. The masses cannot simply resent and are kept in misery. 
95
 It is taboo in the Malay feudal society to question and criticize the highest authority of their actions, 
decisions, commands, punishments, rewards, or prohibitions towards their subjects. It has been 
observed that „Daulat‟(hail) and „Tullah‟(bad omen) become an essential part of the institution of the 
ruler in the Malay feudal social structure (A. Harding, 1996).  
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One aspect of the procurement process in this era involves exchanging materials or 
supplies between the traders, merchants and ruling elites. Buying and selling 
activities at the Malacca port
96
 among traders have involved and tolerated acts of 
opportunism, bribery and extortion by ruling elites and their followers. For example, 
the merchants/traders are expected to give gifts to the King and the ruling elites as 
customs and, in return, they will be protected by a prevailing power structure and 
connections. Otherwise, they will be harassed; their shop will be destroyed and 
demolished. At the same time, procurement activities conducted by the subjects 
include obtaining land, equipment and revenue.
97
  The subjects must give 1/3 of what 
the land produces as tax to the ruling elites.
98
 Failure to do so makes them bond-
slaves to the King and they need to serve him with unquestioned loyalty (Yoong et 
al., 2007).  
 
Opportunities for extortion, bribery and crime (e.g., force and coercion to pay high 
taxes) are always welcomed by the ruling elites (M. Abdullah, 1965; Shellabear, 
1975). Scholars have documented that the powerful groups and their followers are 
commonly protected by the concept of feudal loyalty or fidelity (M. Abdullah, 1965; 
Gullick, 1958; Shellabear, 1975). These groups can behave as they wish even if that 
involves committing wrongdoings, and no action is taken against them. This means 
                                                          
96
 Trading activities emerged for international trade of export-related products in the Malacca Straits. 
The buying and selling activities made the Straits Settlements free-trade Malacca ports as a centre of a 
trading network (B. Harrison, 1955) The golden age of Malaya as the world mercantile trade meant a 
significant growth of capital through trading activities between the Chinese, the Arabs and the Indians 
(M. Abdullah, 1965). 
97
 For example, the powerful group can give land to the common people on certain conditions. A strict 
order from the King may instruct them to use the land to its maximum potential (e.g., by growing 
plants, paddy (rice) or fruits). 
98
 The Malay peasants lived in extreme poverty. The ruling elites and their followers would take any 
surplus from the land to pay the taxes. Most of the time, the Malay peasants could not produce much, 
even for their own consumption. During the feudal era, the people had no choice but to accept injustice 
and inhumanities without much resistance or contestation. 
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that patronage and protection mechanisms of the traditional feudal system have 
encouraged the moral decay of the Malay rulers. Thus, oppression, inequality, 
injustice, cruelty and the fierceness of the Malay rulers are deeply embedded into the 
norms of the Malaysian society (Shahruddin Maaruf, 2014). The next section 
considers the encroachment of colonial imperialist power. 
4.1.2 Imperialist Ideology: Exploitation of Colonial Capitalism 
The importance of the Malacca port is one of the reasons that imperialist powers
99
 
have always been interested in Malaysia. Malaysia experienced 446 years of 
colonialism by three European powers: the Portuguese (1511-1641), the Dutch (1641-
1824) and the British (1786-1941), as well as one Asian power, the Japanese (1941-
1945). The last colonial power invaded the Malaya was the British when they 
returned to continue their rule (1945-1957) until the country gained independence in 
1957. Malaya was considered a valuable colony. The colonial practices aimed to 
create wealth and maximization of profits by exploiting their colony lands for the 
benefit of the imperial powers (Harper, 1999; Milner, 2002). The colonial masters 
brought the capitalism ideology, which champions wealth creation, profit 
maximizations, capitalist industry, and, at the same time, they have shaped and 
created in this way an institutionalised power structure, values and social order in the 
colonial land and governance (M. Abdullah, 1965). 
 
                                                          
99
 There are various reasons for the imperialist power‟s interest to Malaya. First, the geographical 
position of the Malacca port was of fundamental significance for an open trade route to India, China 
and the Far East. Second, there was a clear inability of the Malacca Sultanate to manage their 
constituent as a number of Malay kingdoms began fighting each other. Third, the Malaya was 
disadvantaged with an advanced military equipment and lack of political support from other 
imperialists‟ power. Lastly, Malaya was rich in natural resources (e.g., tin, rubber, mineral resources). 
The colony of Malaya subsequently served the needs and interests of the colonial ideology. See J. M. 
Lee (1967), Hirschman (1986), Kheng (1994), Aljunied (2012) and N.J. White (2004).  
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The imperialist ideology was supported by the Malay feudal ruling class. Amoroso 
(2014) points out that the legitimisation of the British power was generally supported 
by the Malays elites because it helped maintaining their status quo.
100
  The 
traditionalistic nationalism was secured by the imperialists through preserving the 
Malay society in its traditional form – from rural politically ignorant, obedient and 
submissive subjects to the aristocrats and the royal Malay elites (Harper, 2001; J. M. 
Lee, 1967). On the other hand, the virtue of blind loyalty and obedience towards 
authority by the Malay peasants has resulted in them accepting and allowing the 
influence of British imperialism of coercion and consent. An influential study by 
Emerson in the early 19
th
 century shows that Western imperialism has contributed to 
a direct and an indirect rule by the colonial regimes (Emerson, 1937).
101
 In this 
context, the British rule in Malaya was based on the system of indirect rule for 
advancing their imperialism.
102
 The system of indirect rule in a way gave a platform 
to the British to assume the role of a protector of the Malay sovereignty from many 
aspects of the traditional society (Harper, 1999).  
 
                                                          
100
 The feudal Malay elites were given material rewards (e.g., regular allowances), large quarters, 
lovely titles and business ventures because they cooperated with the British. The interests of the Malay 
aristocracy and traditional elites were taken care of and the children of the Malay aristocracy were 
educated in prestigious, high-status schools. For example, only the ruling elites were able to go to 
„selected‟ English schools during that time. The other commoners did not have that opportunity. 
101
 The former (direct rule) shows that the imperial power acquired political control and governed the 
colonists by a colonial central government. The latter (indirect rule) shows a dependency on the 
imperialist power as a „protector‟ and „advisor‟ to govern the colony. 
102
 The British imperialist power applied an indirect rule as a transition from the feudal Malay rulers to 
British rule during the colonial period. The indirect rule gives the conditions of a protected 
dependency, which is more acceptable by the original races, rather than direct hegemony that may 
provoke contestations and fights in the Malaya. The British „advisory‟ and „friendly‟ role could guide, 
reshape and preserve the positions of the traditional elites. See Suwannathat-Pian (2009), Yaakop 
(2010), Emerson (1937) and Harper (1999) for related discussions.  
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The British employed the „divide and rule‟ ideology to control Malaya (Abraham., 
1997).
103
 The British imperialist power transformed the historical, socio-political, 
economic, cultural and other social structural variables of Malaya as follows. First, 
the British rule expanded its colonial capitalism to exploit the foreign lands for the 
best interest of the colonial government (J. M. Lee, 1967). According to William 
Case (1996), the impetus of colonial capitalism for greater wealth and profit was 
„enjoyed‟ by the elite regimes. Being in favour of capitalism, the Malay elites were 
continuously indifferent to the prevalence of poverty and the problems of the masses. 
Second, the racial polarisation
104
 during the British rule was exploited and led to class 
conflicts because of the intrusion of the industrialised world seeking raw materials, 
opportunities for investment and free trade. Consequently, the British colonial 
capitalism protected the imperialists‟ economic interest through accumulated profits 
and capital from Malaya and from the influx of foreign labour. The exercise of power 
by the British rule promoted domination and social class exploitation. It was allowed 
as long as the revenues and huge profits were generated and sent to the shareholders 
in England (Hirschman, 1986). 
 
Thirdly, the legacy of public administration of the civil service from the British 
colonial rule especially in relation to public health, education, and public works has 
                                                          
103
 In many British colonies, the colonial ruler applied the „divide and rule‟ approach by separating 
possible enemies so as to challenge their power. The idea is to maintain the status quo by maintaining 
the power structure without much improvement made for each party. The strategy also aimed to 
control allocation of funds and resources that could benefit the colonial master.  
104
 The consolidation of British rule has created a setting of various institutional structures to serve 
their needs and interests. For example, a large number of labourers from China and India were 
imported to work at the rubber plantations and the tin mining for the capitalists. The Malay peasants 
remained complacent about an indolent and non-capitalistic within the Malay traditional image. 
Nevertheless, the Chinese showed a greater interest in leaving their peasants and feudalistic lives for 
accumulation of capital in the Malaya.  
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shaped the Malaysian public sector until today. The British camouflaged governing
105
 
of Malaya by preserving the Malay traditional elements but, at the same time, they 
instilled the capitalism ideology as necessary for a modern and efficient colony. 
Milner (2002), in particular, discusses political interventions during the colonial rule 
through dynamic interactions of the government and business interests for the 
formation of a modern society. The colonial rule continued to offer the opportunities 
of economic activities under the patronage
106
 of British imperialism. Lastly, the 
hypocrisy of British colonial rule involved an enhanced autocratic government of a 
„close administration‟, which seems to have worked towards public policy 
formulation and implementation. The secretive operations and this „close 
administration‟ have pursued the interests, rights and privileges of well-connected 
groups with the British rulers even after independence. As mentioned by Z. H. 
Ahmad (1986), 
„…„close administration‟ [...was] a legacy of British colonial rule. The powers and 
coverage of the bureaucracy are extensive and has made Malaysia a „closely 
administered state‟ […]. This close administration, to an extent, provides a political 
setting with advantages for the post-colonial governing elite‟. (p.24) 
 
As a result, the colonial patterns continue in the form of a coercive and control 
mechanism which has relied on the support of local ruling elites, with a commitment 
to protect the predominantly imperialist interests in Malaya (C. B. N. Chin, 2000; 
Sundaram & Hui, 2010).  The next subsection discusses the discourse of capitalistic 
                                                          
105
 Amoroso (2014) reflected on British‟s good governance through coercion and consent, when their 
business partner is persuaded to invest in Malaya so as to make profit. 
106
 For instance, foreign investors were given the best lands in the Malaya at nominal rates with 
minimum restrictions. In addition, the liberal labour policy ensured the subsidized supply of labour in 
plantations, mining, services and trade. Subsequently, a reliable infrastructure, such as roads and 
railways, was provided by the colonial government as incentives for capitalist investors. The British 
rule helped to create wealth and capital for themselves and their cronies. The British imperialist power 
never committed themselves for the economic betterment and early political emancipation of their 
colonial masses. See Emerson (1937), Allen (1970), Yoong et al. (2007), Andaya and Andaya (2001), 
Lange (2009). 
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nationalism and how it has contributed to the structural transformation of the Malay 
society. 
4.1.3 Discourse of Capitalistic Nationalism 
Colonial capitalism has inspired the Malay ruling elites to interact and work with 
each other socially, politically and economically so as to improve their well-being. 
Antagonism, however, between the Malay ruling elites and the colonial master was 
created with a gradual decline in the power of rulers and their autonomy which was 
the result of various „friendly‟ treaties  between the Malay ruling elites and the 
colonial master (Gin, 2009). William Case (1996) and Harper (1999) reveal that 
under the influence of the ideology of capitalism, the Malay ruling elites started to 
demand more from the colonial master. As a result, the Malay ruling elites were 
willing to do whatever it took to gain independence, including compromising the 
Malays‟ hegemony. Thus, an influential urban segment of the Malay elite started 
working towards that direction.  This is how the concept of capitalistic nationalism
107
 
emerged (A. Harding, 1996; Shaharuddin Maaruf, 2014). 
 
The establishment of the Malayan Union sparked the sentiment of Malay 
nationalism.
108
 The Malay nationalism focused on the Malay anticolonial resistance 
by protecting three main elements as „Malayness‟: religion (Islam), language (Malay) 
                                                          
107
 A. Harding (2012) explains that the essence of independence on the 31st  of August, 1957 was, as 
referred to in the Malaysian Constitution, „a system of principles, rules and practices of a legal or 
quasi-legal, binding, nature that frame political action and public decision-making‟ (A. Harding, 
2012, p.3). From such legal binding, capitalistic nationalism shows the compromises made by Malays 
and non-Malays on a number of issues in relation to giving up on the Malay hegemony (Ketuanan 
Melayu). 
108
 Malay nationalist sentiments emerged when the British proposed a Malayan Union in 1946 
something that showed a decline of the power and sovereignty of the Malay ruler. This also meant that 
they would give citizenship status to the immigrants coming to Malaya. The Malays feared that they 
would „lose‟ their power and voice in their own country and thus started becoming politically 
conscious and developed sentiments and the desire to become independent.   
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and royalty (Malay rulers) (A. Harding, 2012). Harding (2012) presents a broader 
contextual analysis on the precondition of united and defendable positions from all 
races as the essence of the independence in 1957 through bargaining
109
 of the binding 
rule in the Constitution. The ideology of colonial capitalism has influenced the Malay 
ruling elites in favour of the capitalistic nationalism of wealth creation and capital for 
Malay survival in their own land. As a result, the Malay capitalism is advocated by 
encouraging patronage and giving preferential treatment to ensure the survival and 
progress of the indigenous people (Bumiputeras) (Mahathir Mohamad, 2008). 
 
In conclusion, it is obvious that historically the Malaysian society was built on the 
acceptance of authoritarian ruling elites by favouring a blind loyalty and fidelity of 
the Malays towards those in power (Shaharuddin Maaruf, 2014; Noor, 2002). Next, 
the encroachment of imperialist power of coercion and consent was legitimated 
through the protection of the Malay feudalism and reformation for entrenched 
individualism and material wealth for pervasive industrialization in the capitalist 
economy (N.J. White, 2004; Yoong et al., 2007). Finally, it seems then that the 
colonial capitalism ideology has motivated the Malay ruling elites towards the 
discourse of capitalistic nationalism through patronage and preferential treatments. 
The next section shows the riddle of Malaysian capitalism as championed by the 
                                                          
109
 Malaysia is mainly occupied by its indigenous people (Bumiputera-the sons of the soil). The 
Bumiputera groups are divided into the native „Malays‟ and other Bumiputera. The influx of foreign 
immigrants during the colonial rule has greatly affected the racial composition in Malaysia. In order 
for Malaya to gain independence, the Malays and non-Malays had to cooperate together by 
compromising and closing the inequality and economic gap between the races. By giving up their 
Malay hegemony (including citizenship, education, democracy and resolving issues), the non-Malays 
would give assistance to impoverish the „backward‟ Malays for the sake of unity and equity.  A „social 
contract‟ agreement was made by the country‟s founding fathers in the Malaysian constitution. It refers 
to a quid pro quo trade-off through Articles 14 until 18 of the Constitution, pertaining to the granting 
of citizenship to other races in Malaya (particularly Chinese and Indian). In return, Article 153 grants 
the Malays „special rights‟ and „privileges‟ in order to achieve independence from the British.  
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nationalist party-United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) which has 
influenced the socio-political, economic and government structures in Malaysia. 
4.2 The Political and Governmental Structures: Flaws of Check 
and Balance Mechanisms 
 
The roots of colonialism in the political and government structures in Malaysia are 
shown through the embodied Westminster-type constitutional ideas and traditions 
towards a federal government (R. N. A. R. Omar, 2012).
110
 The Westminster-style 
model, as the system of government, represents the Head of State-the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong or King as a constitutional monarch. Under the King,
111
 there are the 
three branches of government: the executive, the legislative and the judiciary (see 
Appendix 4.1). Theoretically, the check and balance mechanisms should be effective 
when these three pillars of institutions play their intended role and there is separation 
of powers, with neither institution holding too much power in order to achieve 
government accountability. Aun (1978) argues that the exercise of power on the part 
of these institutions involves checking each other‟s role and functions as well as 
being separated from each other. However, the ideology of working independently 
and no institution holding too much power actually aid  the continuity of state power 
and authoritarian governance (William Case, 2010a; Munro-Kua, 1996).  
                                                          
110
 The Malaysian constitution has formally divided the federal and the state powers in governing their 
territory. Although neither the Federation nor the States would be able to trespass each other‟s 
boundaries, the federal structure in Malaysia proclaimed some legislative functions for uniformity; see 
Aun (1978), Faruqi (1987) and Trindade and Lee (1986).  
111
 The King or Yang di-Pertuan Agong as a constitutional head of federation is selected through a 
rotation system among the Malay rulers. The selection and removing of the King is conducted by 
following the recommendation of a Conference of Rulers, which has existed since 1948. The 
Conference has the right to be consulted about judicial appointments and act on the advice of the Prime 
Minister and grants pardon in his role as the fountain of justice. Moreover, the King needs to give his 
consent before certain laws can pass. The King also has a role in legislation affecting the special 
position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of the other races. The rulers in each state remain 
the Heads of Islam, accompanied by his Chief Minister with the advice of the State Executive Council. 
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The section begins by discussing the all-powerful executive. 
4.2.1 The Executive: Concentration of  Power 
The power of the executive is legally stated in the Malaysian Constitution. For 
instance, Article 43 attributed a Westminster-style parliamentary executive as an 
„advisor‟ to the King. The executive member is headed by the Prime Minister
112
 (PM) 
and the Cabinet member is appointed by the Prime Minister and collectively 
responsible for any decisions of capitalist developmental public policy (Abdul Aziz, 
2002). The ideology and beliefs of cabinet collective responsibility mean cabinet 
confidentiality and cabinet solidarity. The former means that debates and discussions 
of the cabinet members are secret. The cabinet members are strictly forbidden to 
reveal the content of the discussions and decisions. The latter emphasizes the unity 
and collective agreement of the cabinet members. It also aims to show a continuous 
support and loyalty to the Prime Minister. Thus, the legislative process accelerates the 
decision-making policy and collectively benefits the political party (Masum, 2012). 
By pursuing state development
113
 capitalism, the Cabinet is able to create and 
maintain policies for the benefits of the country in order to achieve economic growth. 
The executive of developmental state autonomy is explained in this section by 
                                                          
112
 The King, under article 43(2) of the Malaysian Constitution, can appoint the Prime Minister to head 
the Cabinet committee. Both the Prime Minister and the Cabinet members are appointed based on the 
dominant political party in the House of Representatives. The power of the Prime Minister is great 
because he is able to control the dominant political party at the Parliament and exercise the executive 
power via the Cabinet. Therefore, he is responsible for the Federal government and indirectly controls 
most of the State in Malaysia. The Prime Minister is indeed the most powerful person by having 
legitimate power from the Constitution, and support from all angles: the Rulers, the Parliament, the 
Executive and the Judiciary and ultimately the Malaysian citizens.  
113
 An influential scholar provides eight characteristics of the developmental state in Malaysia: (1) 
prevailing state intervention in the economy, (2) development-oriented nationalism by the Malaysian 
elite controlling the state, (3) a state that maintains law and order to ensure social peace and political 
stability, (4) expert and capable state bureaucracy of an administrative elite, (5) continuous chart of 
development policies and strategies, (6) an efficient and powerful planning agency, (7) willingness and 
capacity to learn from others, and (8) encouragement of public-private intervention (Embong, 2008).  
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focusing on: (1) the authoritarian administration, (2) the public policy formulation 
and (3) the (in)effectiveness of government agencies.  
 
First, the incumbency of authoritarian administration in exercising the executive 
power has contributed to the developmental state capacity. Several scholars who have 
reviewed the authoritarian elite‟s regimes in Malaysia suggest that the state is able to 
maintain political stability and, at the same time, bring about development and 
material wealth to the people (Hutchinson, 2014; Munro-Kua, 1996; Slater, 2003). It 
seems that the fact that the Malaysian cabinet has been in power since independence 
(year 1957) has eased the developmental strategies and progress. Undoubtedly, the 
overwhelming power acquired by the state profoundly embodied the transfer of 
governance from the centre of political power to the executive (Slater, 2003).  In 
other words, the same political party, by holding the position of the ruling elites since 
the independence, leads the executive branch: the Cabinet. The Cabinet is able to shift 
the legislative power (as to enact, amend and withdraw any bills in the Parliament) 
into the hands of the executive which is headed by the Prime Minister (H. K. Leong, 
2001b). Thus, it appears that the long incumbency of an authoritarian administration 
has eased the capability of the developmental state – via the Cabinet – to plan, 
formulate, coordinate and implement the decisions for any government policy. 
 
Second, the formulation of public policy in Malaysia (see table 4.1) shows a highly 
bureaucratic process stemming primarily from the Prime Minister‟s Department and 
the Ministry of Finance, which are headed by the same person.
114
 When it comes to 
                                                          
114
 Since 1998, the year of financial crisis, , the Prime Minister (Mahathir Mohamad –the 4
th
 Prime 
Minister) has held the first and second most important post to administer the country. The former 
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mobilizing public policy, getting consent from the Prime Minister is unavoidable. By 
acquiring both positions, the Prime Minister is able to use the state apparatus to make 
decisions about and implement public policies. H. K. Leong (2001b) acknowledges 
that the Prime Minister has gained „unchallenged‟ legitimate power under the 
Malaysian Constitution to formulate and make decisions about government policies. 
A pervasive culture of centralization of power in the hands of the Prime Minister 
might suggest for the inability for a  devolution of power in Malaysia‟s governance 
system (O. K. Beng, 2013).
115
 The government agencies are only seen as 
„implementers‟ of public policies. Hence, a structured centralised bureaucratic 
process of formulation and implementation of public policies is entrusted to the Chief 












                                                                                                                                                                     
indicates his role as the Prime Minister and the latter provides him with the role of the Finance 
Minister. 
115
 Although various government agencies have submitted policy proposals, the formulation and any 
decision-making in relation to public policies depends on the power of the Cabinet committee. 
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Figure 4.2: Public Policy Process in Malaysia 



















Source: Website of Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister‟s Department, Malaysia 
 
Lastly, the government agencies are not efficient enough to eradicate fraud and 
corruption in Malaysia (Siddiquee, 2006a). To start with, it is believed that there is no 
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independence of the related agencies because, to some extent, they have to take into 
consideration, the views of the Prime Minister‟s partisans.
116
 Strong advice by the 
Prime Minister for such appointment seems to influence any activities or decisions to 
curb fraud and corruption within the public offices. Second, the placements of all 
related government agencies are under the authorization of the Prime Minister‟s 
Department. Again, it goes back to the absolute discretion of executive action (see 
www.pmo.gov.my). This major structural flaw makes it almost impossible for any 
government agency to investigate high-level fraud and corruption involving ministers 
and senior officials without getting any clearance from the Prime Minister (Netto, 
2003). Lastly, the head of the civil service in Malaysia is the Chief Secretary who 
ensures smooth implementation of the decisions of the Cabinet (F. Hamid, 2013).
117
 
This has fused his role both as a civil servant to deliver public services and his duty 
towards his political master (A. S. b. Ahmad, Mansor, & Ahmad, 2003). Therefore, 
one can say that the „gatekeeper‟ agencies which are supposed to monitor and check 
for fraud, corruption and malpractices are continuously „unplugged‟ under the regime 
of the all-powerful executive power (William Case, 2013).  
 
The next section examines the legislative branch as a supreme power of the 
Parliament. 
                                                          
116
 The mandate for supervisory and anti-corruption agencies to exercise their duties is stipulated in the 
Malaysian Constitution. Among other responsible government agencies are the Malaysian Anti-
Corruption Commission (MACC), Royal Malaysian Police (RMP), Attorney General Chambers 
(AGC), National Audit Department (NAD), Institute of Integrity Malaysia (IIM) as well as other 
compliance and monitoring departments.  
117
 Despite the „honorable‟ role, the Chief Secretary, also the secretary of the Cabinet, is headed by the 
Prime Minister. 
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4.2.2 The Legislative: Supreme Power of the Parliament 
Firstly, political power has been widely dominated by the Alliance Party since 
1955.
118
 The political institution as the „world‟s longest ruling coalition‟ remained 
powerful with no or very few obstacles in its way of assuming supreme power in the 
political system (Milner, 2002). William Case (2011), for example, specifically 
addresses the practice of electoral authoritarianism in Malaysia. Electoral 
authoritarianism shows resistance to giving up the approach of „divide and rule‟ 
adopted by the governing coalition. The governing coalitions have maintained their 
hegemony with the majority or two-third of the seats in the House of Representatives 
since independence. Marzuki Mohamad (2007) provides evidence
119
 on how law and 
legal coercion within the legislative sphere has been used by the government as a tool 
for political control and as a way to restrain conflict. Such institutionalised system 
demonstrates a reluctance to change, and the idea to curb fraud, corruption, to 
increase public accountability and transparency in particular through legislative 
means has fallen short of public expectations (Siddiquee, 2005; Welsh, 2013a). 
 
Secondly, the entrenched political hierarchy of the dominant coalition system, which 
has been in place since independence, simply makes the Parliament a rubber stamp, 
whose role is to endorse the decisions made by the Cabinet.
120
 The domination of the 
ruling party in Malaysia has made the political system „hegemonic‟ and allows the 
                                                          
118
 The Alliance Party was founded in 1952 as a political coalition aiming for independence. The party 
consists of the ruling elites from three main races in Malaya: UMNO-United Malays National 
Organisation, MCA-Malaysian Chinese Association and MIC-Malaysian Indian Congress. 
119
 He shows a proliferation of ensuring that vested interest are protected by the continuity of the status 
quo and the institutionalisation of the supreme power to supress democracy. 
120
 Proposed bills are rarely discussed in the House of Representatives at length and this is highly 
advantageous for the ruling party. The ruling party exercises its absolute power in the Parliament by 
reading and debating hastily and uses its majority to pass a bill.  Harding (2012) also notes that the 
Senate would avoid any constitutional deadlock and would cater for whatever decisions made by the 
House of Representatives. 
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governing coalition „to make the Parliament as a mere „rubber-stamp‟‟ (Yaakob, 
Kadir, & Jusoff, 2009, p.53). This is supported by the studies of Siddiquee (2005) and 
H. K. Leong (2001b) who argue that in Malaysia the Parliament is no more than a 
rubber stamp in the hands of the Cabinet. In fact, Siddiquee (2005) states that the 
Parliament no longer performs the legislative function effectively but it is rather a 
rubber-stamp institution that gives legitimacy to government policies. On the other 
hand, Zachariah (2014b) criticizes the fact that the parliamentary opposition finds it 
difficult to hold the government accountable for the current situation as any 
corrections or amendments
121
 for bills that are proposed and cases of various issues 
being raised were being merely ignored or rejected (Abd Aziz, 2001; L. H. Hai, 
2002). Moreover, a Parliamentary Committee
122
 system is not fully implemented and 
is greatly ineffective in getting feedback from other stakeholders (Abdul Aziz, 2002). 
The Public Accounts Committee
123
 (PAC), on the other hand, has a role to play in 
check and balance mechanisms. However, the independence and accountability
124
 of 
PAC is questioned when the committee has been continuously headed by the same 
ruling party since independence. Thus, it goes back to the first problem, the 
                                                          
121
 Research by a professor of law and legal advisor in Malaysia, Professor Dr Shad Saleem Faruqi, 
provides evidence that from 1991 to 1995, 80% of the bills were passed without a comma or a full stop 
being amended by the House of Representatives.  
122
 The function of the Parliamentary Committee system is to provide feedback to the government on 
the proposed bills in the Parliament. The members are elected from an intended specialist in the area 
for that bill and by considering all interests involved (e.g., civil society groups, scholars or any affected 
party). However, since independence, the Select Committee procedures have only been applied around 
six times in the Parliament. 
123
 Within the legislative function, PAC is responsible to examine (1) if public funds were used in 
accordance with the laws and purposes endorsed by the budget, (2) any accounting of administrative 
bodies and other associations that handle public funds, (3) the Auditor‟s General Report, and (4) any 
other matters that need further scrutiny or close inspection (Samsudin & Mohamed, 2009).   
124
 By having legislative power, the PAC is responsible for supervising the efficiency, effectiveness, 
integrity and accountability of governmental financial activities. 
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Parliament just „signs, approves and puts a chop‟ on the executive decisions (Z. 
Ahmad & Phang, 2005, p.2). 
 
Finally, the political structural apparatus is not able to check the executive branch of 
the government. First, the concept of warlords
125
 resembles the political system which 
has been nurtured in Malaysian politics (The Malaysian Insider, 2013b). The warlord 
culture is deeply rooted in the political structure. Shi-ian (2014) claims that massive 
wealth and capital by the warlords are shared with their followers so as to retain their 
loyalty. Second, the prevalence of money politics
126
 has become rampant. Money 
politics have been discussed by Teh (2002). He distinguishes two elements in money 
politics: political funding by prominent business leaders and the buying of supporters 
or votes (e.g., money, gifts and contracts) during election time. As the „mother of 
corruption‟, money politics has dampened the economic growth in Malaysia by 
allocating resources for political patronage. Third, political business breeds political 
patronage in Malaysia. Gomez and Sundaram (1999) provide a critical evaluation on 
patronage for regulatory capture and rent seeking activities. The authors link greater 
state intervention in resource allocation with the promotion of a „legitimate‟ 
relationship between business acumen and powerful politicians using the state 
apparatus. Thus, the relationship between business and government is reflected by,  
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 Warlords enjoy the election support and loyalty of their voters. They are also known as the 
„godfather‟ because they do everything for their supporters, especially in a rural area. A warlord must 
always ensure a close relationship with their subjects, helping them to get a job or study at reputable 
schools/university. This culture has been deeply ingrained into the voters. Thus, this culture is 
manipulated for fame, money and power (Tay, 2012; The Malaysian Insider, 2013b).  
126
 The excessive wealth of politicians and their families can also be linked to money politics. There 
are various alleged cases in Malaysia showing donations by a prominent businessperson in order to 
sponsor a political party and, to some extent, lavish the members of the politicians‟ family as well with 
money, assets, and allowances. None of the alleged cases of sponsoring and funding politicians have 
been brought to justice as it is accepted as legal and legitimate (Jong, 2014; Sen, 2012b; Swiss Info, 
2012; The Star, 2012b). 
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 „Malaysia's system of political patronage, in which well-connected tycoons are 
favoured for state contracts, has long been viewed as a breeding ground for 
corruption‟. (Tarrant & Hamid, 2008) 
 
From the above discussions, the political structure in Malaysia might not allow an 
efficient system of accountability because of the following factors: (1) the culture of 
warlord to maintain support base, (2) rampant money politics, and (3) political 
patronage. As a result, it appears that the legislative apparatus in Malaysia does not 
play its role in enforcing and effectively checking on the government and it does not 
act as a watchdog on the functions of the executive. Therefore, the legislative spheres 
have, to some extent, contributed to the pervasiveness and persistence of public 
procurement fraud in Malaysia.  
 
Next, we discuss the selective prosecution legitimated by the judiciary branch. 
4.2.3 The Judicial :  A Tool for Legitimization 
 
„The primary duty of judiciary was to act as a sentinel for the Constitution,  
and to protect it from legislative and executive attack‟ 
 (R.S. Milne & Mauzy, 1999, p.46) 
 
The innate power of the Malaysian judiciary is tainted when judicial independence is 
threatened because it is mostly subjected to an extensive executive influence (Yatim, 
1995). First, it is said that the judiciary is not independent and that its members 
implement „selective prosecution‟ and have „double standards‟ when deciding which 
case can be brought to court. While many analysts have noted that there has been a 
widespread recognition of the problem of Malaysia‟s legal system, no measures have 
been taken to improve the legal system (A. J. Harding, 1990; Soon, 2013; Yin, 2014). 
For example, there have been serious allegations against V. K. Lingam, a powerful 
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and well-connected lawyer, with evidence taken from a video clip, that he was 
involved in a conspiracy to fix judicial appointments of top judges that are apparently 
„in favour‟ of the governing coalition (Anbalagan, 2015b). A Royal Commission has 
been set up to investigate the allegation and the Commission found sufficient 
evidence of serious misconduct on part of Lingam in the video clip. The Royal 
Commission also confirmed that there was a gross interference with the 
administration of justice which affected judicial integrity, but the case only appeared 
to be „morally wrong‟ but was somehow legally right (Jo-Ann, 2009; MalaysiaKini, 
2007). As a result, the case was dismissed because it seems that there was not enough 
evidence or any specific law that can charge Lingam (Lin, 2009). Although the 
Malaysian government has taken further action by barring V.K. Lingam from 
practicing law as he was found guilty of professional misconduct on a scandal of the 
appointment of top judge (Anbalagan, 2014a), the „Lingam‟s video-clip‟ scandal 
seems to have raise questions on the integrity of the judiciary in Malaysia. On the 
other hand, a report by Freedom House reveals a common arbitrariness of the 
Malaysian institution of the judiciary: a political structure motivated by an extensive 
executive influence (Freedom House, 2014). Ironically, it seems that justice is in 
jeopardy when the court decides that those who are guilty of a crime (normally those 
in power or those having close connections with those in power) are not to be 
charged, but in most cases they are to be set free instead (Sarawak Report, 2012a). In 
addition, interpretation and implementation of law depends on proof and evidence 
where the latter might be subject to manipulation and fraud. With inadequate 
evidence, there is the possibility for the exercise and abuse of power and conflict of 
interests may get entangled in many judicial processes and the real culprit is not 




 Diane K. Mauzy (1992) talks about the corrosion of checks on the 
executive power by the judicial branch, when the judicial is perceived as an 
„apolitical institution‟ which „chooses‟ and „picks‟ its court cases. Examples of high-
profile cases (i.e., cases that normally involve those in power) in Malaysia are as 
follows: 
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 For example, due to the complexity of law, there was inadequate evidence to proceed with a case 
against a prominent politician, and the charges were withdrawn (e.g., see Lim Guang Eng v Public 
Prosecutor [1998] 3 M.L.J. 14). Despite of such verdict, an opposition politician criticized the injustice 
of the current judiciary system. In return, he was charged for sedition under the Sedition Act 1948, 
been fined and imprisoned. Next, the ex-Deputy Prime Minister was removed from the Cabinet in 
1998 and jailed for corruption and sodomy. An interesting judicial process which claimed to be 
politically motivated prosecution has „awaken‟ the Malaysian society about „a setback for 
democracy‟(Ooi, 2015). From this ex-deputy PM‟s case, the Malaysian society now dares to question 
and challenge the decisions by the government. As expected, those (opposition party leaders and civil 
society) who dared question and criticize publicly the latest conviction upon him (year February 2015) 
are charged with sedition (Hunt, 2015). See also Kamal (2012), Mustafa (2012), AR and Darwis 
(2013). 
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Source: Current Study 
 
Ironically, the judiciary is the last avenue (in other words, the last institution) to check 
the power of the executive. However, it is possible that the judicial power in Malaysia 
has been restricted and it is unable to curb the actions of the executive. For instance, 
the Malaysian judicial crisis in year 1988 revealed the law of the courts is tampered 
with the granting powers of absolute discretion and it is not free of control by the 
executive arm of government. In the judicial crisis 1988, there was a bold and 
independent decision by the ex-Lord President-Tun Salleh Abas that contravened the 
ruling parties. However, he and other judges were sacked and removed by the Prime 
Minister (M. S. Abas, 1989; A. J. Harding, 1990). Consequently, S. Abas (1990) 
suggests that in cases of constitutional amendment the legislature rather than the 
courts can determine the extent of the court‟s jurisdiction. This means that the 
Parliament can undertake a limited or prohibited judicial review (Soon, 2013). 
Another amendment allows the Parliament to permit the Attorney General (AG) to 
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determine which court will hear a particular case, or transfer a case from one court to 
another court which shows that executive powers are not subject to any judicial 
review (H. K. Leong, 2001b). Conversely, A. J. Harding (1990) points out that the 
Attorney-General (AG) has implicit control on instructing the courts in relation to 
what cases to hear and which court to use, and it assumes responsibility for judicial 
assignments and transfers. It seems that executive power on the judiciary branch is by 
far the most devastating impairment of check and balance systems in Malaysia (Koh, 
2012a; B. Teoh, 2013). The administration of real justice is increasingly undermined 
by the paramount power of the Attorney General of Malaysia (Siang, 2013).  
 
Second, the power to dispense justice through the Attorney General (AG) Malaysia 
works as follows. Firstly, the AG is the principal legal advisor of the government. 
This means he is the one who gives legal advice and recommendations to the Cabinet 
in relation to making decisions, including formulating public policies. Moreover, the 
AG has the power of the Public Prosecutor of the government (see www.agc.gov.my). 
Any decisions
128
 to either prosecute or not prosecute someone are made solely by him 
after all other enforcement and monitoring agencies submit their investigation papers 
on any fraud, corruption and malpractices in the public office (J. Chin & Welsh, 
2013). It is important to point out that the appointment of the AG by the King is 
subjected to the advice of the Prime Minister. That means that it appears that the 
judicial appointments made by the executive branch, result in an indirect check on the 
judicial power (F. A. Aziz & Yi, 2007; MalaysiaKini, 2007).  The question that needs 
to be asked, however, is whether the AG‟s role as an advisor to the Cabinet or as the 
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 The preparation of a judicial process (e.g., fabrication of evidence) for an offence is exercised at 
Attorney General‟s discretion, to constitute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings.  
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country‟s prosecutor is not redundant and does not impair the judicial independence 
when making court decisions (Yin, 2014).  
 
Finally, the erosion of the judicial branch seems to be prevalent when any critique on 
the judicial process and verdicts is being punished (Devaraj, 2015). It seems to be the 
case that if anybody dares to criticise or comment on the legal or judiciary process, 
they may be captured and brought to court for trial under stipulated act (The 
International Bar Association, The ICJ Centre for the Independence of Judges and 
Lawyers, The Commonwealth Lawyer's Association, & The Union Internationale des 
Avocats, 2000).
129
  It is of great concern when it appears that the citizens are not 
supposed to criticise the Judiciary or the state publicly (Hunt, 2015; Lavendran, 
2013). For example, there are many cases for which the current government used the 
Sedition Act 1948 through the Judiciary to convict and charge those which seemed to 
have „conspired‟ to topple the government, or expressed anything that seemed to  
have a „seditious‟ tendency that can upset the harmony of the country (Lavendran, 
2013; Suaram, 2015). Thus, it seemed that the judicial branch has been used to some 
extent as a „tool‟ to legitimize those cases in which the governing coalition has an 
interest since its independence is compromised.  
 
Overall, the three pillars of institutions hardly work as check and balance 
mechanisms. First, it appears that the concentration of power of executive branch is 
centralised in the Prime Minister‟s office. It seems that the executive branch has been 
altered in such a way that the centre of political power has shifted entirely and 
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 For example the Sedition Act 1948, Official Secret Act 1972, Police Act and the Emergency 
Ordinance Act (Public Order and Prevention of Crime). 
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expanded (The International Bar Association et al., 2000). It is also important to note 
that there is no separation of power between the executive and the legislative branch 
and perhaps their role as check and balance mechanisms are mixed (H. K. Leong, 
2001a). Second, it is possible that the legislative power of Parliament is reduced to its 
role as a „rubber stamp‟ (Yaakob et al., 2009). There is seems to be a blend of 
legislative and executive roles. It might be suggested that the political structure in 
Malaysia does not allow an accountable and transparent governance system, thus, it 
can be assumed that the legislative branch is not a true legislative body as it is not 
able to ‟check‟ the executive branch (Loh, 2013; Muzaffar, 2015). Finally, it was 
perceived that there is a lack of independence of the judiciary branch (Abd Aziz, 
2001). It seems that the judiciary has, to some extent, been used to legitimate the 
extensive executive influence in the courts (L. H. Hai, 2002; Yatim, 1995). Thus, it 
might be the case that the executive branch who has full control on the two-third 
majority in legislative is also able to „selectively prosecute‟ any court cases to support 
their interests (The Malays Mail, 2014; Vinod, 2013a). 
The next section examines the Malaysia‟s economic structure. 
4.3 The Economic Environment and Development: A Platform 
 
It is important to point out that Malaysia‟s economic structure has grappled with a 
feudal economic system of exploitation, oppression and inequality in resource 
allocation (see section 4.1). At the same time, the capitalist ideology of the colonial 
powers involved exploiting their colony‟s economic resources and plundering the 
country‟s wealth; all these have transformed Malaysia‟s economic policy. The 
„multifaceted‟ economic exploitation as shown by Tajuddin (2014) indicates the 
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largest economic growth on the hands of imperialist foreign investors and the ruling 
elites of government machinery. The racial riots in 1969
130
 constitute a starting point 
for structural transformation and public policies by economic and political capitalists 
(K. S. Jomo, 1990). Therefore, this section sheds light on the fact that public policy is 
heavily influenced by political and economic elites and public finance management. 
As a result, that influence seems to weaken the public procurement system and 
provide opportunity for public procurement fraud in Malaysia.  
4.3.1 Intersection of Economics and Political Capitalism: Directing 
Public Policy 
The upsurge of Malaysian capitalists embarked after the government decided to play 
a prominent role in the implementation of „interventionist policies‟ and „market 
coordination‟ (R Rasiah & Shari, 2001). An economic framework was created as an 
avenue in championing affirmative action programmes to legitimize the prevailing 
state intervention with an enlargement of the public sector expenditure for 
redistribution of wealth and eradication of poverty.
131
 The pillar of economic 
institutions accounts for a prime ministerial role (as Prime Minister and Finance 
Minister) to reform Malaysia from an agricultural traditional based economy to an 
industrialised economy (Ariff, 2008). However, Malaysia shows a „volatile‟ 
economic growth as follows: 
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 On 13 May 1969, Malaysia experienced racial riots for the first time due to the dissatisfaction of the 
Malays in relation to social inequalities, increased unemployment rate and ethnic social class division 
between the Malays and the Chinese. The Chinese are perceived to be in control of the large portion of 
the economic wealth in Malaysia compared to the Malays, who are the indigenous people, the son of 
the land or son of the oil, of the country. Thus, the racial clashes provided strong justification for the 
government to work towards the economic prosperity of the Malays through an affirmative action 
policy-New Economic Policy (NEP). See Mahathir Mohamad (2008), Huat (2010), R. S. Milne (1986), 
Bruton (1992), and Zubedy (2013b).  
131
 Malaysia‟s economic policies as follows: (1) New Economic Policy-NEP (1971-1990), National 
Development Policy-NDP (1991-2000), National Vision Policy (2001-2010), New Economic Model 
(2011-until now). 
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Table 4.2: Malaysia’s Growth and Inflation Indicators 
Year GDP growth* CPI Inflation* 
1971-1980 7.5 5.9 
1981-1990 6.0 3.8 
1991-1997 9.2 3.6 
1998-2005 5.3 1.9 
2006 5.6 3.6 
2007 6.3 2.0 
2008 4.8 5.4 
2009 -1.5 0.6 
2010 7.4 1.7 
2011 5.2 3.2 
2012 5.6 1.9 
2013 4.7 2.09 
2014 5.8 3.15 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Malaysia, Economic Report, various issues. 
Notes * - % per annum 
 
This section aims to examine the direction of economic policy through the avenue of 
Malaysian economic structure in the context of: (1) political business, (2) money 
politics, and (3) patronage-driven model. 
4.3.1.1 Nurtured political business  
Malaysian capitalism is organized as a political business practice with a strong state 
intervention. Gomez (1994) explains that the Malaysian politicians are allowed to run 
their own business or to run a business on behalf of a political party. The growing 
number of political capitalists have been studied by Searle (1999) and Gomez and 
Sundaram (1999) who focus on politicians who became businessmen and UMNO‟s
132
 
proxy capitalists who also became businessmen. They further argue that development 
of political capitalists shows significant dependence on state patronage. The networks 
of patronage also offer opportunities to non-Bumiputera companies, those who have 
close relationship of the government, the ruling elites and political party. Thus, 
                                                          
132
 UMNO stands for UMNO-United Malays National Organisation, a dominant political party in 
Malaysia since independence.  
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political and economic institutions are intertwined and transactions and dealings 
between the state, the dominant political party and various businesses can be 
conducted legally.  
 
For example, there is a dynamic systematic structure for wealth creation and capital 
accumulation by manoeuvring the state‟s apparatus through: (1) the setup of public 
sector ownership and control of business enterprises by offering government funding, 
licenses, procurement contracts and privatised projects, (2) the allocation of funds, 
concessions and loans from government-controlled banks and other financial 
institutions, and (3) capital control to curb financial speculators and the global 
financial turmoil (E.T. Gomez, 2002). Generally, the existence of political business is 
totally legitimate and allowable in Malaysia‟s governance structure. This is because 
the public policy formulation is used by the ruling elites to help the Malays and 
improve the Malays‟ social wellbeing. Therefore, the implementation of public policy 
although clearly advocating a political patronage system, it is acceptable as long it is 
also used to stimulate growth to the country.  
 
Open market liberalization is important to attract foreign direct investment to 
Malaysia. The push for a neo-liberal ideology, however, is carefully selected by the 
Malaysian state to protect its local infant industries while also induce competition. 
According to Salleh and Osman (1982), the policy indicates strong protection, 
subsidisation of capital, imposed rigid controls on competitors in the domestic market 
and the introduction of other incentives. In doing so, the state develops a strong 
capital for local companies, especially the Bumiputera companies, and improves 
agriculture facilities (Bruton, 1992). This is important as the economic policy has 
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significantly helped to alleviate poverty and income inequality especially in relation 
to encouraging entrepreneur Bumiputera through tariffs, quotas, price controls, farm 
and land subsidies and the awarding government contracts. Therefore, the sanction of 
economic policy by a greater political and bureaucratic control is regarded as 
legitimate for restructuring society and eliminating poverty in Malaysia. 
 
Further, Searle (1999) argues for a competing paradigm for entrepreneurial spirit
133
 of 
Malaysian capitalism. Comparatively, Milner, Embong, and Tham (2014) discuss 
how „supremacy‟ and „long-term incumbency‟ which are ideologically constructed by 
political leaders are accepted by the public; otherwise people would not have voted 
for the same political alliance since independence. Scholars have demonstrated the 
consequences of Malaysia‟s government long-term incumbency‟, a practice 
particularly underpinned by democratic electoral regimes (William Case, 2011; 
Doner, Ritchie, & Slater, 2005; Slater, 2003). William Case (2011) demonstrated the 
dynamic of electoral authoritarian regimes in Malaysia, which have resulted in 
institutional concentration and perpetuated the existence of cohesive elites. William 
Case (2011) further argues that the governing elites coalition appears to have fused 
with the state apparatus through public policy and regulated patronage flows. In 
addition, B. K. Ritchie (2005) illustrates that the way Malaysia‟s coalitions politics 
„often drove illiberal government intervention in the economy to correct ethnically 
based economic inequality, create national heavy industries, and favour politically 
well-connected entrepreneurs‟ (p.745). As a result, one cannot deny that a prolonged 
concentration of executive power in Malaysia appears to implicate things, which 
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 This relates to whether Malaysian capitalists are real capitalist entrepreneurs (productive capitalists) 
or merely depend on ersatz capitalism (rent-seekers).   
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seems to coerce and control decisions made by political and economic elites
134
 to be 
implemented by government agencies, especially through the practice of political 
business, which favour politically well-connected entrepreneurs. A model of the 
practice of political business is adopted and modified in figure 4.3.  
 


































Source: Adopted and modified from Edmund Terence Gomez (2002). 
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 The influence can be assumed as influence by the „invisible hands‟ as portray in political economy 
theory.  
Funds channelled back 





Political Leaders/Political Parties 
Strong role of Government 
 Distribution of State-controlled concessions: government funding, licences, 
government contracts, a variety of privatised projects 
 Funds to secure these concessions from: government-owned or politically-
controlled banks and other financial institutions 
 Used by clients for: shares-for asset swaps, reverse takeovers, mergers, and 
acquisition of public-listed companies 
Creation of politically-linked „new rich‟, insider trading, 
manipulation of share prices, conflict of interest 
situations, fraud, corruption, politicization of the 
economy 







Funds channeled back as 
political funds to 
government: Money 
politics, regulatory capture  
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Looking at the model of the practice of political business as illustrated above, the 
Malaysian state is willing to venture into a commercial and industrial enterprise with 
a „government-in-business‟ strategy enterprise to breed a „new‟ class, the Bumiputera 
entrepreneurs (C. Lee, 2012).  State ownership
135
 and control in the corporate sector 
or financial institutions demonstrate a nexus of political and economic institutions as 
„bed-fellows‟. The role of government-controlled banks and other financial 
institutions is to provide funds and loans to ease many business leaders (including 
politicians) and this is seemed in the vested interests of politicians (Gomez, 2009). 
These are the Arab Malaysian group, RHB group, Hong Leong Bank, CIMB Bank, 
SME Bank and many others. These institutions are promoting Bumiputera capital by 
“securing funds on favourable terms to generate growth, particularly through 
acquisitions, contributing to the rise of huge enterprise within a relatively short 
period” (Edmund Terence Gomez, 2002, p.5). 
 
This means that opportunities might arise for abuse, manipulation, fraud and a  high-
level of corruption with politicians who seem to abuse their power and position to 
interfere and influence the resource allocation and benefit party members, families, 
and closely-connected companies with whom they have common interests (Gomez & 
Jomo, 1997; Khair et al., 2015; J. Ng, 2015). For instance, the privatisation scandals 
of mismanagement, fraud and corrupt practices, huge debts and many others only 
resulted in the „bail-out‟ and rescue approach implemented by the government who 
used public money to do so. Some scholars provide evidence that the restrictions of 
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 Many public institutions have been established to help and promote business for the Malays‟ 
economic prosperity since the New Economic Policy (NEP). Among others: MARA-Majlis Amanah 
Rakyat, FELDA-the Federal Land Development Authority), RIDA-Rural and Industrial Development 
Authority, PERNAS-Perbadanan Nasional Berhad, UDA-Urban Development Authority, SMIDEC-
Small Medium Industries. Regional development authorities: MADA-Muda Agriculture Development 
Authority. There is also the SEDC-State Economic Development Corporation in every state. 
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capital flow by the government in 1998 were made to protect cronyism regimes, 
bailouts and provide support to favoured firms (Johnson, Kochhar, Mitton, & 
Tamirisa, 2006; Johnson & Mitton, 2003). In particular, in relation to capital control 
Jomo observed that, 
„[capital control mechanism] has been abused by certain powerfully-connected 
business interests, not only to secure publicly funded bailouts at public expense, 
consolidate and extend their corporate domination…Capital controls have been part 
of a package focused on saving friends of the regime, usually at the public's expense‟. 
(K.S Jomo, 2001, p.215) 
 
Therefore, it appears that public policy in Malaysia has been directed by the state and 
well-connected businessmen because of money in politics (Gomez, 2012a). 
4.3.1.2 The rampant money politics 
The intertwined relationship of economics with political institutions is what creates 
money politics (R.S. Milne & Mauzy, 1999; Teh, 2002). The practice of money 
politics creates opportunities for fraud, bribery and corruption as it is acceptable for 
politics and business to mix. For instance, licit and illicit campaign funds are treated 
as a political donation, which is legal in Malaysia. What is more, a political donation 
is never disclosed to public scrutiny and this opens up opportunities for abuse (Chen, 
2014). The predicament of such practices has tainted „noble‟ political sentiments: 
strive for race, religion and for one‟s country (M. A. S. Aziz, 2011). Moreover, 
business leaders with vested interests continue to lobby the politicians and „capture‟ 
the regulatory of public offices to secure rents from the state through resources 
allocation by the interference of politicians to business and their interactions with 
business leaders (Teh, 2002; Waythamoorthy, 2013). The culture is deeply rooted in 
the Malaysian society, as also viewed by an ex-political leader, 
„….candidates begin to bribe delegates with money and gifts. As there is competition 
among candidates, the bribes increase in value…A person‟s quality of work or 
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capabilities are not the basis for his nomination. The basis for supporting him is the 
value for the bribe that he is willing to hand out‟ (Mahathir Mohamad, 1996, cited in 
Ghazali, 2004, p.55). 
 
In the end, the rampant culture of money politics in Malaysia has created a vicious 
circle that involves returning the favours through business contracts, licence, permits 
and others, when a political leader wins the election (Tan, 2015). Consequently, there 
is possibility that the rampant money politics seems to support the patronage-driven 
model within the economic structure implemented in Malaysia.  
4.3.1.3 Patronage-driven model136 
The endorsement of affirmative actions in Malaysia‟s economic policy has resulted in 
„legitimate‟ relations between politics and business which seems to suggest for a 
patronage-driven model (M. Cohen & Arkhipov, 2013; Nambiar, 2014). On one 
hand, Gomez (1997) and Hamayotsu (2004) talk about politicians who hold positions 
in the public office and who might gain access and interfere with the distribution of 
large sums of funds, contracts, projects, permits, shares, stock-market and others. On 
the other hand, it appears that the political business ties tend to distribute selective 
rents that seems to help in promoting industrialization and diversification of the 
economy in the global market place (Hamayotsu, 2004; Nicholas J. White, 2004). 
This seems to be highlighted in a study by White (2004a), which argues for the wide 
spread of crony capitalism. The study notes that the crony capitalism concept is based 
on the relationship between the state, and the „selective few‟ favoured entrepreneurs, 
regardless of race. There is a possibility for a „patronage network‟ which uses the 
state apparatus portrayed as inevitable for a diversified pattern of economic growth 
(Jeff Tan, 2008). Thus, it appears that the state has created opportunities for rent-
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 Patronage-driven model is seen as a business style model, advocated within the Malaysian market, 
for allocating and distributing rents among businessmen (see Adhikari et al., 2006; Fraser et al., 2006; 
Gomez & Sundaram, 1999; Gomez, 2012a). 
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seeking activities between political and economic spheres through legitimate means 
with the aim of economic growth (Gomez & Sundaram, 1999; Siddiquee, 2010).  
 
It is possible that the patronage business style of allocating and distributing rents in 
Malaysia is appreciated among its network, which seems to open up new 
opportunities for wealth accumulation, while the benefits of state economic contracts 
and protection are channelled to individuals, groups and companies closely connected 
with the ruling coalition (Gomez, 2012a; Nicholas J. White, 2004).
137
 Searle (1999) 
clarifies that these „selective few‟ businessmen might have built a political-business 
complex for ersatz rent-seekers and/or true productive capitalists, from politicians and 
bureaucrats to people who are both politicians and businessmen. Consequently, the 
boundaries between politics and business seem to become increasingly blurred. As 
observed by Jomo (cited in Teh, 2002, p.339), 
„In fact, it is openly acknowledged that business interests now influence politics more 
than ever before in recent Malaysian history. For instance, at the last general 
assembly of UMNO, the dominant partner in the ruling coalition, about half of the 
delegates were businessman‟.  
 
 
However, despite being championed by the governing coalition that the economic 
policy is to help the Bumiputera economically, it appears that there are various 
complaints and grievance on part of the public in relation to the rising cost of living, 
the deterioration of purchasing power, the low monthly salaries  and the wider income 
gap which lead to inequality (Chooi, 2013; Faizli, 2014; Meng, 2013). The income 
disparity in Malaysia is shown below:  
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 The rents are appreciated among three groups: (1) Bumputera political-businessman, (2) 
Bumiputera non-political businessman, and (3) non-Bumiputera businessman (other races) (see 
Gomez, 2012a). 
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Table 4.3: Malaysia’s Gini Coefficient ( 1979-2012)
138














 between the rich and poor has been consistently increasing for 20 years 
and many Malaysians live below or at the poverty line. It seems that only those in 
position and power own the wealth in Malaysia. The practice of affirmative action for 
Malaysia‟s economic policy has likely, in turn, promoted and is entrenched with 
various forms of practices: rent-seeking and patronage (K. S. Jomo, 2005; Tay, 2012), 
fraud (R.S. Milne & Mauzy, 1999), corruption (Fuller, 2006), cartel like collusion 
(Ghee, 2013; Hunt, 2014), cronyism (Johnson et al., 2006), favouritism (Netto, 2003) 
and money politics (Gomez & Jomo, 1997). The above practices raise questions on 
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 The Gini index measures the dispersion of incomes between the richest and the poorest in an 
economy, with 0 meaning perfect equality, and 100 being maximum inequality. 
139
 The World Databank shows that Malaysia ranks among the 39 most unequal in distribution of 
wealth country in the world with a Gini of 46.2 in year 2002 (Lincoln, 2011). Malaysia is the third 
most unequal nation in Asia, which means that there is a big gap between the very rich and the poor 
(Faizli, 2014). The Household Income Survey shows that the top earners in Malaysia have increased 
their wealth and capital accumulation from 50%  in 1990 to 50.5% in 1999 and 51.2% in 2004. 
Comparatively the poorest of the country, who mainly consist of the Malays and Bumiputera, continue 
to show a decrease from 14.5% in 1990 to 14% in 1999 to 13.4% in 2004 (Department of Statistics, 
2012).  
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the transparency and accountability of public spending within the state‟s apparatus, as 
discussed in the following subsection. 
4.3.2 Public Finance Management 
The Accountant General‟s Department (AGD) of Malaysia is a financial authority 
which consolidates the federal government accounts positioned under the Treasury of 
Malaysia and which directly reports to the Ministry of Finance (MOF) (see Appendix 
4.3). The state officials at all levels act (1) at the decision-making level-politicians 
and top bureaucrats and (2) implementer level-civil servant at all posts. They need to 
assure that the financial position of the public sector complies with the rules and 
regulations
140
 to endorse decisive policies, programs and activities. Under the federal 
account, the expenditure for acquisition of products and services is mainly accounted 
under the development expenditure as distribution of projects, contracts and programs 
in delivering public services (Government of Malaysia, 2013). Below is the federal 
government of development expenditure statistics for 2004-2013: 
 
Table 4.4: Extracted from Federal Government Financial Statistics (2004-2013) 












       Source: Website of Accountant General‟s Department, Malaysia 
 
                                                          
140
 Among others: Financial Procedure Act 1957 (revised 1972), Ministerial Functions 1969, 
Government Contract Act 1949, Delegation of Powers Act 1956, Treasury Instructions, Treasury 
Circular Letters, Treasury Circulars, Treasury Instruction Letters, Federal Central Contract Circulars, 
Guidelines and Manuals. 
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One cannot deny that there is big business involved in government procurement. The 
following examination on public procurement helps to explain the possibility for the 
persistence of public procurement fraud in Malaysia. 
4.3.2.1 Public Procurement 
Malaysia‟s government procurement regime for supplies, services and works aims to 
support government programmes by achieving value for money through petty cash, 
direct purchase, quotation, tender (open and close), federal central contracts, 
requisition, communal work, consulting services, the use of contract from other 
ministries/departments, procurement through technical department, and direct 
negotiation (see Table 4.5).  
 
Table 4.5: Modes/Types of Malaysian Government Procurement  




Endorsed by Treasury, Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) 
1. Petty Cash 
 
- Treasury Circular Letter No.2 Year 2002: 
Amendments to the Treasury Order 97 (D) and 
User Limit Amount Petty Cash. 
- Treasury Order 2008. 
2.  Direct Purchase - Treasury Circular Letter No.12 Year 2007: Limit 
Values and Conditions for Direct Purchase 
Supplies and Services. 
- Treasury Order 2008. 
3. Quotation - Treasury Circular Letter No.5 Year 2009: 
Changes Limit Values and Procurement 
Management Procedures on Quotation. 
4. Tender (open and 
close) 
- Treasury Circular Letter No.5 Year 2007: 
Government Procurement Management Procedure 
in Tender. 
5. Federal Central 
Contracts 
- Treasury Circular Letter No.5 Year 2007: 
Government Procurement Management Procedure 
in Tender. 
- Treasury Order 2008 
6. Requisition - Treasury Order 2008 
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7. Communal Work - Treasury Circular Letter No.4 Year 2004 : 
Implementation of Small Projects in Communal 
Work 
- Treasury Order 2008 
8. Consulting Services - Treasury Circular Letter No.8 Year 2006: 
Procurement Regulations for Consulting Services 
- Treasury Circular Letter No.8 Year 2007: 
Appointing Authority and Approval Cost of 
Consulting Services 
 
9. The use of contract 
from other 
ministries/departments 
- Treasury Order 2008 
10. Procurement through 
technical department 
- Treasury Circular Letter No.3 Year 2006: 
Implementation Projects Worth More Than not 
RM5 Million for Non- Technical Department. 
 
11. Direct Negotiation 
 
- Treasury Directive Letter 17 April 2002: Letter of 
Guidelines of Application for Direct Negotiation 
Procurement.  
- Treasury Directive Letter 26 March 26 2008 : 
Acquisition Price Negotiation Approved in Direct 
Negotiation Procurement 
Source: Website of Ministry of Finance, Malaysia. 
 
Despite various rules and regulations for the acquisition of supply, services and works 
for many government departments in Malaysia, various procurement practices in the 
Malaysia public sector exhibit the following characteristics. First, there is a 
preferential treatment
141
 of locally produced goods especially benefiting Bumiputera 
companies. Rather than this protectionist policy aiming to help the Bumiputera 
companies, Searle (1999) voices concerns about whether those who run Bumiputera 
companies are „real-capitalists entrepreneurs‟ who are willing to compete for a 
quality product, or whether they are only „rent-seekers‟ advocating ersatz-capitalism 
                                                          
141
 For instance, government procurement policy states, among others, that supply, services and works 
must be made locally and it also restricts purchase of import products and it involves preferential 
treatments to Bumiputera companies especially in relation to work contracts (Ministry of Finance, 
2013). 
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and the promotion of patronage networks. The Ministry of Finance, which is the main 
economic institution in Malaysia, appears to „allow‟ such system and embraces the 
concept of „selective competition‟, which is deeply embedded within the procurement 
process (Berthelsen, 2013). One of the existing and allowable concepts characterizing 
Malaysia‟s public procurement is the „Ali-Baba system‟, according to which the 
Bumiputera companies are merely a front for businesses which are in fact run by the 
Chinese (Koya, 2013). It appears that many Bumiputera companies might take 
advantage of the opportunity to deliver government contracts. There is the possibility 
that the preferential treatment practiced in Malaysia procurement practices might not 
be working properly because there are indications that Malay companies would prefer 
to be an „ersatz capitalism‟ entrepreneur
142
 as an easy way to become rich and 
successful (K. S. Jomo, 2005; Searle, 1999). Yet, to date there is no empirical 
research or study that has been conducted in order to explore the preferences of 
creating Malay entrepreneurs.  
 
Second, one might form the impression that such partisan policy has advanced a 
patronage system to promote or protect vested interests. In return, crony capitalism 
might be employed, favouritism and patronage system seems to be preferred, fraud 
and corruption,
143
 nepotism, and many others practices that contaminate public 
procurement process flourish (Malaysiakini, 2010; Zubedy, 2013a). The privatisation 
policy, for example, was abused so as to „bail-out‟ and rescue political „cronies‟ from 
                                                          
142
 This is because mostly the Malay companies are believed to qualify for the preferential treatment in 
Malaysian procurement practices and they believe that the Malaysian government always assists the 
„race-merit‟ policy. 
143
 In particular, on direct negotiation contract, the negotiation is shrouded in secrecy and the 
procurement process is not against any law (Lian, 2012). However, the arrangement of procurement 
process is constructed in such a way that the lack of transparency and „malpractices‟ are hidden. This 
leads to further abuse of power, fraud and corruption activities, and enriches the well-connected few at 
the expense of the public (K. Jomo, 2000; Nicholas J. White, 2004). 
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bankruptcy. Pua (2011) criticized monopoly water privatisation as being implemented 
“without required regulation, [with] profit-making entities seek to maximize profits, 
even if it means offering declining quality of services” (p.89). As a result, it appears 
that the untying system of patronage and rent-seeking behaviour is deeply entrenched 
in the Malaysian social, political and economic scene causing massive leakages of 
money and, at the same time, protecting crony business interests (Nain, 2013; Pua, 
2011). 
 
Third, it is argued that the possibility for the prevalent abuse of power and corruption 
might allow for lopsided agreements, which do not protect the public‟s interest, but 
only provide additional profits to the businesses (Lian, 2011; Mok, 2013). Many 
analysts have criticized that those agreements might have a lopsided element because 
the agreement might lack transparency as such contracts are normally secret and are 
rarely open to public scrutiny (Backman, 2008; Lian, 2011; Searle, 1999). While such 
„sweetheart deals‟ are agreed-upon, nobody takes the responsibility of such lop-sided 
agreements (P. Lee, 2011). Below are some lopsided agreements/arrangements made 
by the Government of Malaysia: 
 
Table 4.6: Lopsided Agreements/Arrangements by the Government of Malaysia 














Any extra cost 
of the price of 
the fuel is 
passed on to 
the customer.  
Buying 
electricity 
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prices 














carmaker decided to 
sell of MV 






share with a 
loss of RM 
500 million  
Eng (2008), 
Pua (2011) 





































hiring a taxi) 
is too high and 
unreasonable. 
But most taxi 
drivers do not 
have any 
choice but 
need to bear 




Source: Current Study 
 
Finally, failure to deliver government contracts as stipulated by the agreement is not 
punitive enough for the businessmen. According to Ministry of Finance, several 





 can be taken against contractors and consultants for 
incompetence in delivering government procurement or projects. Yet, as Nain (2013) 
seems to suggest, such punitive and disciplinary actions are hardly taken by the 
current government. 
 
For the most part discussed in this section, the economic structure and development 
in Malaysia is likely used as a platform for political and economic powerful elites to 
gain market access, something that they presently portray as a „heroic‟ sentiment 
(especially for the Bumiputera) for bigger state intervention. It is possible that the 
dynamic power of political and economic institutions in the form of „government in 
business strategy‟ might be the „influential‟ factor towards directing public policy 
through the likely nurturing of political business, money politics and the patronage-
driven model (K. S. Jomo, 1990; R Rasiah & Shari, 2001; Yusoff, Hasan, & Jalil, 
2000). Thus, there are possibly ample opportunities for fraud and corruption in public 
procurement, because of the existence of patronage system and crony capitalism in 
distributing resources. Consequently, while the various rules and regulations for 
government procurement that are in place are aimed for greater accountability and to 
promote strong governance in the public sector, they appeared to be tainted by the 
astute individuals in the public office which manipulate the procurement system. The 
following section highlights the professionalism of Malaysian civil service that works 
towards the preservation of fraud in public procurement.  
 
                                                          
144
 First, the company violates registration requirements through falsification, amending information, 
manipulation of Bumiputera status, and others. Second, there are the offences which range from 
violating the terms of the tender/contract by falsification, withdrawal, rejecting offer, colluding for 
fixing prices to failure to commit contract obligation (late delivery, failure to supply/services or/and 
with quality, failed to meet specifications and others). Finally, there are those companies with criminal 
offences and civil liability. 
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4.4 Malaysian Civil Service: Public Sector Governance 
 
The professionalism of the Malaysian public service is a legacy from the period of 
feudalism, from colonial times and the period after the independence. It is believed 
that such legacy and bureaucratic patterns embraced an embedded state autonomy at 
the interaction between the state and market forces (A. S. b. Ahmad et al., 2003). That 
is to say, such synergy is fruitful for Malaysia‟s public governance of „New Public 
Management (NPM)
145
 and for its public management reform. Yet, by implementing 
a NPM-style governance, Polidano (1999) questions the public accountability and its 
appropriateness of its adoption in the developing country. This section examines the 
role of Malaysia‟s public service, the impairability of the public service delivery for 
public accountability.    
4.4.1 The role of Malaysian Bureaucracy: The Implementer 
The Malaysian public administration is largely a legacy of the British colonial model 
of public service (Wilkinson, 1972). The pattern of Malaysian public administration 
need to be understood within its context, as Tilman puts it, 
“Contemporary Malayan bureaucracy must be viewed as a product of the total 
Malayan environment, for its development has been influenced by the culture, history, 
and politics of Hinduised, Islam, colonial and independent Malaya” (1964, cited in 
A. S. b. Ahmad et al., 2003, p.7). 
 
The Malaysian public administration has played a vital role in economic and social 
development of the country. First, the civil servant is required to deliver 
administrative and regulatory services. According to Razak School of Government 
                                                          
145
 New Public Management ideology is closely associated with neo-liberal ideology for privatization, 
deregulation and trade liberalization. The idea is to improve public sector performance and make it 
more efficient and effective with results-based management.  The mantra of NPM significantly brings 
in the „ethos‟ of private sector into public entities that promotes competition, empowerment of 
customers and citizens, performance measurement and it is results- and outcomes- based (Hood, 1991; 
Polidano, 1999). 
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(2009), the public service has an obligation to deliver public service with a high 
degree of accountability. There is a top-down hierarchical bureaucratic structure to 
deliver public services with the higher-ranking officers being allowed and expected to 
give instructions
146
 based on the „rigid‟ hierarchy and power relation. This distinctive 
nature classifies civil servants as follows: top management, managerial and 
professional group and support staff for evaluation performance. This structure is 
used, in turn, as a basis for rewards, recognition, and career advancement.  
 
Second, the civil servant is responsible to formulate and implement public policies as 
decided by the Cabinet. Public servants play their role as implementers
147
 of public 
policies (Karim, 1995). A. S. b. Ahmad et al. (2003) argue that any good publicity on 
public policy is given to the Minister, but the civil servant is held accountable for any 
poor implementation of public policy. The system of obedience of the civil servant 
possibly  gives potential space for fraud and corruption because of the politicisation 
of public servant employment in the context of the Malaysian public service (Haidar, 
Pullin, & Hai, 2004). As a result, the role of the Malaysian bureaucracy seems to be 
that of the implementer to deliver public services for the citizens, and/or to maintain a 
„non-political‟ affiliation with governing coalitions (Information Department of 
Malaysia, 2011; Mahathir Mohamad, 1995). 
 
                                                          
146
 For instance, the use of Modified Budgeting System (MBS) ascribed the empowerment of higher 
authority to lower level managers. Following this, John Antony Xavier (1996) shows that MBS 
employed the „intimate‟ accountability concept by making program managers individually responsible 
for the performance outcomes of their department. 
147
 In an attempt to implement public policy, A. S. b. Ahmad et al. (2003) critically discuss the system 
in which policies and decisions are made by the political elites, and the civil servants are  only there to 
implement them.  
208 | P a g e  
 
Finally, a public officer holds a strategic role as a facilitator and regulator at the nexus 
of public-private synergy. The leading role that the public service has in relation to 
economic policies, such as privatisation, industrialization, e-Government and others, 
would gradually result to an interventionist approach and market orientation by the 
state. However, such role might be tainted by many scandals of fraud and corruption, 
abuse of power, patronage, cronyisms, clientele and inequality in distribution of 
resources (Shukry, 2013b; Sundaram, 1989; J. Tan, 2008). Thus, the strategic role for 
the institutionalization of public-private synergy might impair the „noble‟ role of 
Malaysian civil servant, and merely employ politicisation by the ruling elites. The 
next section highlights the impairment of the Malaysian civil servant to exercise their 
duties.  
4.4.2 Impairment of the Public Service Delivery 
The „noble‟ attention of the civil servant to serve the public is hijacked by the greater 
influence of cases of conflict of interests. First, a civil servant has to apply the 
neutrality principle when conducting their daily job (Puthucheary, 1978). The reality 
of the neutrality concept in Malaysia in fact shows a continuous support for the 
current governing coalition by establishing hegemonic control over the administrative 
system. This principle involves a non-partisan perception towards those who gained 
dominant political power in the public sector (UNDP, n.d.). However, a former Chief 
Secretary criticized that the ruling politicians may put pressures and demands on 
public servants to follow their political whims. In his words,  
„certain groups [including political parties] in the country are trying to disrupt the 
neutrality of civil servants by influencing them with their own ideologies…There are 
people who are trying to influence government officers, asking them not to abide by 
the neutrality principle which had been one of the pillars of strength of Malaysia‟s 
civil service. They want civil servants to take sides with the country‟s present political 
situation‟. (Ali, 2000 cited in Haidar et al., 2004, p.9) 
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A. S. b. Ahmad et al. (2003) reveal that there have been cases when the civil servant 
is transferred to other places if known to be of a different political ideology than the 
current government political coalition. Many transfers also take place when there is a 
change of political party at the state level. This shows the use of coercion and control 
against many public officials under an „authoritarian rule‟ (R.S. Milne & Mauzy, 
1999). 
 
Second, the state bureaucracy has to ensure the implementation of decisive public 
policy so as to have a satisfactory yearly performance appraisal.
148
 In many cases, 
public servant who are linked with the opposition party are not promoted, awarded or 
rewarded (Basir, n.d.). Thus, the civil servant is not devoid of political influence in 
exercising their role on a daily basis. It was observed that bureaucracy in the 
Malaysian public office is facilitated by partisan performance evaluations, by a 
politicisation of favours to the supporters, an oppressive attitude towards the  
opposition and by ignoring those in the middle (Husain & Brahim, n.d.).   
 
Finally, the bound rules and regulations
149
 imposed upon the civil service have to 
some extent prohibited any constructive criticism conducted against the government 
(even the implementation of public policy has somewhat violated norms, practices; 
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 On the one hand, a civil servant relies on the distinctive practices for employment, rewards and 
assessment. Yet, the subjective appraisal schemes “has been abused by superiors and used as tool to 
victimise their subordinates” (Haidar et al., 2004, p.10). On the other hand, a study by Pullin and 
Haidar (2003) on the ministerial control in Australia shows that control over employment of public 
servants can effectively fulfill demands by the political elites. Following this, a study by Haidar et al. 
(2004) provides evidence that ruling politicians subsequently influence the recruitment, selection, 
promotion and dismissal of Malaysian civil servants. 
149
 Civil servants in general are bound by the Rules for Public Workers (Conduct and Discipline) 1993, 
Official Secret Acts, Standing Orders, General Orders, Government Circulars and Office Instructions, 
Safety Instruction book, and Letter of Undertaking, and many others. An appointed civil servant needs 
to sign the relevant documentation before their employment starts. 
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clearly not for the public interest). The rational of such bound rules, however, raised 
questions on the obligation and obedience of public officials in delivering public 
services.
150
 The first point is the exercise of bound rules protects the individuals who 
are involved in malpractices and wrongdoings when it continues to be shrouded in 
secrecy. While the use of the Act (e.g., Official Secretive Act-OSA) is to block any 
intelligence activities of espionage, subversive acts, acts of sabotage, or extremist acts 
(especially during the British colonial) from enemies of nation, the Act has been used 
to „protect‟ and „shield‟ fraud, corruption and malpractices in the public office (Khan, 
2014). It appears that individuals who might be involved in wrongdoings are able to 
camouflage any „secretive official documentation‟ under the slogan of national 
interests (Go Malaysian, 2009; R. A. Hamid, 2015; Jam, 2000). Jam argues that, 
„OSA is actually an Act which can deprive people of this country from getting, say or 
divulge anything that is deemed by the government as a secret. Those who are guilty 
of violating this Act shall be imprisoned for at least one year. This Act is a shield to 
certain people in power, his quarter and his cronies who largely benefit from such 
Act. Despite of this, the Act is able to shield all the scandals, mismanagement, 
intrigue and their ultimate goal is protected from the public‟. (p.2) 
 
Therefore, the obligations of the Malaysian civil servant are to some extent seen as 
preserving fraud and corruption in Malaysian public procurement as most 
procurement documentation is protected under OSA. The second point is about the 
obedience of Malaysian public service is seen in the context of the phrase „I am 
following the orders‟ whenever they sign government official documentation. The 
slogan has been changed from the colonial times from „I remain your obedient 
                                                          
150
 The reasons for the imposition of many rules and regulations including (not exclusive): (1) being a 
public official with the most efficient, highest integrity and accountability; (2) to adhere to their public 
duties rather than their private interests (3) to keep the image of public service; and (4) infliction of 
punishment to those who violate the rules (Attorney's General Office, 2002).  
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servant‟ to „I am following the orders‟
151
 (C. S. Hai, 2011). A critical assessment of 
the latter shows the public servant as only following the orders and/or not questioning 
any orders/instructions by the higher superior and appear to have a „blind obedience‟ 
to discharge their duties as instructed (Hooi, 2014; Mansoor, 2013). Nevertheless, 
reliance on that slogan is likely to suggest possible manipulation and abuse which 
give the idea of lack of accountability and affect the governance landscape in 
Malaysia  (N. B. A. Bakar et al., 2011).  
4.4.3 Towards Public Accountability 
Inevitably, all state officials must ensure public accountability in handling public 
money. The Malaysian government sought to „show‟ having made an effort towards 
public accountability of „good‟ governance in public administration (A.-A. Bakar & 
Ahmad, 2013). In combating fraud and corruption in Malaysia, there are various 
strategies and initiatives taken by anti-corruption and watchdog agencies to ensure 
greater integrity and accountability. The anti-corruption framework for eradicating 
corruption has programs for regulatory and enforcement agencies, government 
procurement and grand corruption (NKRA, n.d.). For instance, e-Procurement is 
established to ensure transparency, combat corruption, increase integrity in the 
procurement system and procure goods with value for money for the government. 
However, Siddiquee (2010) provides evidence that despite governmental efforts to 
combat corruption, “corruption has remained acute, widespread and, in fact, 
worsened in recent years” (p.153). These efforts undoubtedly show a lack of 
effectiveness in fighting corruption and managing integrity in the society. 
                                                          
151
 The former („I remain your obedient servant‟) was used during colonial regimes where the public 
servant treated the customer (the public) as their master and the civil servant was the slave. The latter 
(„I am following the orders‟) shows the hierarchy of the institutionalized power structure in the public 
office according to which one obeys the instructions/orders of the higher authority. 
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First, there is lack of effectiveness of public integrity in Malaysia in eradicating fraud 
and corruption in government offices. In addition, various agencies
152
 are also 
established to promote good governance and ethics in the private sector. Despite such 
institutional arrangements, the public is hardly convinced about the preventive and 
punitive dimension of these arrangements.
153
 The magnitude of corruption suggests 
entrenched corruption in the country. The Transparency International Corruption 
Index (CPI) shows a „worrying‟ level of public sector corruption in Malaysia (The 
Sun Daily, 2013). Malaysia was perceived as a „high risk‟ country for conducting 
bribery to seal a government contract (Josie Fernandez, 2013). N. R. W. Abdullah 
(2008) suggests that the governance of the country resulted from political, 
bureaucratic, business and societal behaviour and this has contributed to the 
prevalence of fraud and corruption in Malaysia. Thus, the set-up of various 
institutions to combat fraud and corruption in Malaysia is not effective enough. 
 
Second, it appears that there is an inefficient judicial system that likely supports 
selective prosecution, which only identifies and punishes certain types for fraud and 
corruption cases (as noted in 4.2.3). It has been argued that the Malaysia Anti-
Corruption Commission (MACC) always pursues „the small fish‟ (i.e., cases 
involving unimportant individual people or low-ranked public officials). The degree 
of corruption is low in such cases and enforcement agencies normally will go after 
those individuals that seem to show that  they do their work, and they are not able to 
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 Among other institutions, there is the Bank Negara Malaysia, Securities Commission, Bursa 
Malaysia, Companies Commission, Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance, Business Ethics 
Institute of Malaysia, Integrity Management Committee, the Malaysian Institute of Integrity and many 
others. 
153
 The public believes that little improvement has been made to curb corruption in the levels of 
integrity in both public and private sector (The Malaysian Times, 2014). MACC is accused of  lacking 
independence, having no prosecutor power and being under control of the all-powerful executive (as 
discussed in section 4.2.1).  
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capture high-profile individuals (The Star, 2014). The investigation paper by the 
MACC sometimes cannot convince the Attorney‟s General office to convict 
individuals because there is lack of evidence. Despite this, the judicial spheres seems 
to allow the Attorney‟s General office to simply refuse to take those politically-linked 
corruption companies to court (Anbalagan, 2014c). This is partly because of the 
consensus between the executive and the judicial branch. It is possible that powerful 
political and economic actors might selectively prosecute cases and this normally 
leads to acquittals (Sim, 2013). Even though, the law can undoubtedly bring justice 
and maintain integrity, the judiciary process is inevitably affected by abuse of power, 
conflict of interests, the nexus of the state and business leaders, deviation from rules 
and regulations, and a partisan approach in dealings with such practices (Seah, 2004).  
 
Finally, detective and punitive actions do not work to „deter‟ fraud and corruption in 
public agencies. For instance, every year the Auditor‟s General Report is tabled in the 
Parliament to show the accountability of many government departments in handling 
public money. It is obvious that many issues in the report
154
 are repeated (see 
www.audit.gov.my). It seems that detective and punitive action as laid out in the 
report is highly vague and does not work effectively. The culprits follow a 
„distinctive‟ approach in manipulating the rules and regulations, especially in the 
procurement process, and this is indispensable for not getting caught (Malaysiakini, 
2010). Thus, the detective and punitive mechanisms are relatively weak and limited.  
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 Among others, issues highlighted in the Auditor‟s General report include wastage, overpricing, 
overcharging, failure of government projects, imprudent and illegal spending, improper payment, poor 
supervision, and many others related to the government‟s department of finance and management.  
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As shown in this section, the fact that public sector governance of Malaysian Civil 
Servants seem to preserve malpractices in the public offices raises suspicions and 
requires more serious effort to combat fraud and corruption in the Malaysian public 
sector. First, Malaysian civil service is acknowledged to deliver „reliable‟ public 
services while maintain the authoritarian rule within an embedded state autonomy 
(Balasubramaniam, 2012; Hutchinson, 2014). Second, the impairment of the civil 
servant is caused by the pressures and demands of the politicisation of bureaucracy as 
well as the nature of obedience and loyalty existing in most public offices. Lastly, the 
efforts of the Malaysian government for public accountability are not effective or do 
not work properly in order to suppress and eradicate fraud and corruption in Malaysia 
(N. B. A. Bakar et al., 2011; Yaakob et al., 2009). The next section presents a 
summary of this chapter. 
4.5 Summary  
 
This chapter has provided a summary of the historical development, socio-political, 
cultural, economic context of Malaysia that relate to the institutional structures and 
social actors working towards the persistence of public procurement fraud in 
Malaysia. The chapter considers historical and institutional arrangements that are 
intertwined with the role of political and economic elites. It shows the influence of 
global and domestic forces that influence the powerful group to engage in fraudulent 
practices facilitated through prevailing political and governmental structures, the 
avenue of economic policy and development for accumulation of capital and creation 
of wealth and the preservation of Malaysian state officials.  
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The historical legacies draw attention to feudalism in Malaysia, which left the legacy 
of blind faith and loyalty towards the ruling elites. Next, it addresses the fact that the 
ideology of colonial capitalism, which celebrates wealth creation and capital, is 
embedded in the society. Lastly, the discourse of capitalistic nationalism addresses 
the conjuncture of political and economic means for independence from the colonial 
master.  
 
The political and governmental structure as established in Malaysia provides weak 
check and balance mechanisms. The decline of the three pillars of institutions 
(executive, legislative, and judiciary) might have facilitated many malpractices and 
wrongdoings (including fraud and corruption in public procurement) and those who 
are to blame might get away with it and get off scot-free because their wrongdoings 
are not easily proven in court. This chapter has suggested that the public 
accountability appears to have been further curtailed, because the mechanisms to curb 
public procurement fraud do not work effectively. 
 
The economic structure provides awareness about an avenue of economic policy to be 
legitimated by political and economic elites from the platform of government and 
business relations. It appears that the nexus of public and private organisations seems 
easily endorsed political business, money politics and patronage-driven model. Public 
procurement process is likely to be further „manipulated‟ by the astute individuals 
within the state‟s apparatus. 
 
The public sector governance shows that the Malaysian civil servant retains its 
prevalence role of delivering administration and regulatory services, formulating and 
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implementing public policy and being a facilitator of public-private synergy. 
However, their role is further likely to be compromised if they want to/try to serve 
public interest and/or to maintain a „non-political‟ affiliation with governing 
coalition. This chapter argues for the possibly contaminated state bureaucracy which 
does not follow the neutrality principle, has got a vague system of performance 
appraisal and „rigid‟ rules and regulations that public officers need to follow. It 
suggests that the obedient role of the public servants might only preserve the 
malpractices in the public offices. The Malaysian state official‟s role is riddled with 
contradictions in ensuring public accountability. There is possible lack of 
effectiveness in curbing fraud and corruption, there seems to be selective prosecution 
and it appears that the detective and punitive mechanisms do not function properly. 
Overall, the discussion in this chapter indicates that public sector governance system 
is not effective and/or does not work properly in relation to curbing and supressing 
fraud and corruption in Malaysia  
 
The next chapter provides evidence and views from procurement officers, public 
professionals, politicians, academics and media actors about the possible reasons for 
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Chapter 5 Findings 
5.0 Introduction 
 
The methodological framework employed in this thesis (see Chapter 3) suggests 
studying the arrangements of social interactions between political and economic 
institutions when searching the underlying explanations of the collusive network of 
social practices. It is argued that those institutions are able to permit and constraint 
the actions of social actors when engaging in public procurement fraud. Chapter 4 
discusses the dynamic interactions between institutions in Malaysia and the powerful 
groups that might indulge in public procurement fraud. This chapter (Chapter 5) 
focuses on the narrations of lived experiences of the practices of public procurement 
fraud in Malaysia. The chapter offers the personal views and interpretations of the 
participants in relation to public procurement fraud in order to gather diverse 
evidence from those meaningful experiences and from the patterns of the 
interviewees‟ everyday life. The views were elicited by using semi-structured 
interviews, which helped „unpack‟ the so far hidden and silent voices of people in 
relation to procurement fraud in Malaysia. 
 
This chapter consists of six sections (see figure 5.1). The five thematic analyses are 
organised in sections 5.1 to 5.5, with sub-themes following each section. Section 5.1 
provides the interviewees views on the political and economic institutional 
arrangements that contribute to the emergence of procurement fraud in Malaysia. 
Section 5.2 notes their views about the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of check and 
balance mechanisms. Section 5.3 represents their opinion on the deficiencies in 
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procurement practices. Section 5.4 focuses on what people had to say about the 
constraints of Malaysian public officials face, which have to some extent facilitated 
the occurrence of procurement fraud in the Malaysian public sector. Section 5.5 
explains the peculiarity of Malaysian society in relation to the development of fraud 
and corruption. Section 5.6 concludes the chapter with a summary. 
 













5.1 Political and Economic Institutional Arrangements 
 
This section discusses the views of all interviewees on the link between political and 
economic arrangements that contribute to the prolonged nature of public procurement 
fraud in Malaysia. The nexus of business, politics and the state has played a 
5.1 Political and Economic Institutional Arrangements 
 
5.0 Introduction  
 
5.2 Check and Balance Mechanisms 
 
5.3 Deficiencies in Procurement Practices 
5.4 Constraints of Public Officials 
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significant role in securing wealth and accumulation of capital by sustaining a 
variation of the crony capitalism concept in public funds allocations (Johnson & 
Mitton, 2003; K. S. Jomo, 1998). According to political economy theory, the findings 
reveal that the political and economic arrangements in Malaysia aid in the persistence 
of public procurement fraud as follows: (1) the dynamic of political business practice, 
(2) the powerful influence of economic actors, and (3) by the direction of public 
policy.  
5.1.1 The Practice of Political Business 
The concept of political business is the outcome of the nexus between politics and 
business
155
 in securing government contracts, public jobs and offices, licences, 
subsidies, privatised projects and privileges by those in power (Ashari, 2013). 
Similarly, Gomez et al. (2013) as well as Welsh and Chin (2013) claim that the 
politicians who hold power in the government office use this power to distribute and 
allocate funds to their party members, donors, and selected business associates who 
support their political career. The majority of the interviewees argued that the close 
and intimate link of politics and the business system plays a significant role in the 
persistence of public procurement fraud in Malaysia.  
 
According to Ciepley (2013), the practice of „bed-fellows‟
156
 which has been often 
noted in many government procurement cases might have been compromising public 
benefits. By using political economy theory, this research argues that there are 
                                                          
155
 The practice of political business in Malaysia is likely supported by the state in promoting the rise 
of big business for transfer of wealth and capital in the country. The creation of capitalists through 
state-rents and state assets is preferentially selected for: (1) Malay politicians who became 
entrepreneurs; (2) Malay entrepreneurs who have a close-connection with the ruling party; and (3) non-
Malay entrepreneurs who are well-connected with the ruling party (E.T. Gomez, 2002; Gomez & 
Sundaram, 1999; Searle, 1999; Sloane, 1999). 
156
 In other words, both public and private entities act together and they are dependent on each other. 
220 | P a g e  
 
inevitable relations between government and business. Academic 1 claimed that 
politics and economics are „bed-fellows‟, because business leaders need to strengthen 
their political power through the political vehicle since the political master is willing 
to give access to rents, projects, subsidies and many privileges to the public office. 
Such system is being nurtured in the country and facilitates „state-business‟ 
interaction for public procurement fraud. Politician 5 also admitted that the 
relationship between politics and business is prevalent and that the two complement 
each other. This opens the door to corruption since their fraudulent actions can easily 
be conducted through and facilitated by government-business interactions. Thus, 
fraud and corruption flourish within the context of government-business transactions 
and become entrenched.  
 
Political economy suggests that the interaction between public and private 
organisations is genuine and legitimate (Rausser et al., 2011). Even so, the same 
interaction can be abused by narrow self-interests so as to pursue economic 
domination. The model of political business seems to be acceptable and 
acknowledged by all regulators in the Malaysian public sector. According to them, it 
is fair to secure government contracts for many Bumiputera companies since the state 
is responsible to improve the latter‟s economic well-being.
.157
 In fact, the regulators 
did not think that this is wrong because it is the role of the state to promote the rise of 
big businesses, especially for the Malays capitalists. The increasing role of state 
intervention in the market and public sector investment cultivates a political business 
                                                          
157
 The allocation of public resources to those companies is seen as giving incentives to compete with 
and economically surpass other races, especially the Chinese. 
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concept, which has been nurtured for quite some time now and it is perceived to be a 
normal practice. Regulator 10 explained, 
„When processing any procurement project, we only follow the procurement 
procedures. As long the contractor can fulfil all requirements that are necessary for 
us, it is not a matter of concern to us if that contractor is linked with the Minister or 
any other powerful person. A greater state intervention for ethnic affirmation policy 
was created for capital accumulation on behalf of the Malays through a political 
patronage system for restructuring the country‟s wealth. The initial idea was 
definitely good. After all, it is for the development of the country‟. 
 
What is more, numerous scholars express concern over the impact of big businesses 
on domestic politics. For instance, Edmund Terence Gomez (2002) shows how 
various forms of links between politics and business have possibly facilitated the 
grow of corruption and money politics in Malaysia. Wain (2009) sheds light on the 
money-making opportunities taken by the ruling party to venture into businesses 
publicly known as the „interventionist policies‟ and „market coordination‟ so as to 
facilitate the government-in-business strategy (Vithiatharan & Gomez, 2014). A study 
by William Case (2015) highlights the increasing state power in business and finance, 
which facilitates the practices of patronage and crony capitalism among ruling elites.  
 
Professional 3 talked about patronage and cronyism in response to policies and 
incentives introduced by the government. S/he explained, 
„For ….case [the case is hidden for confidentiality purposes], we found that the 
rewarding of the privatised projects were based on the close-connection with the 
husband of the one of prominent politicians in the ruling party. While his company 
was not viable, he was given the contract. Do you think if you don‟t have any 
connection or relationship with the ruling party, you can bid and get the contract? It 
will not be that easy because the ruling party can select from the state private 
entrepreneurs in order to distribute rents‟. 
 
 
Seeing things from another perspective, Academic 3 argues that the embeddedness of 
the political-business structure contributes to the emergence of public procurement 
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fraud. The creation of well-connected rich companies (e.g., state-owned enterprise) 
involves the extortion of public fund from rents created within the government 
apparatus. This provides an opportunity to those with private interests to maximize 
their profits. According to Professional 8, closely-political connections facilitate 
cronyism, favouritism, conflict of interest cases, business scandals, rent-seeking, 
fraud and corruption. More importantly, Professional 10 also highlights the fact that 
political business as implemented in Malaysia has resulted in endemic fraud and 
corruption through political patronage, unproductive rent allocation and distribution, 
in particular in relation to its public procurement. 
 
Politician 2 believed that there is nothing wrong with applying a patronage system in 
many government procurement cases as long as the project can benefit the country 
and people can enjoy public services. This was also supported by Politician 3, 
„So if the government likes to do business with some politicians and they [politicians] 
can provide them [the government] the goods and services, so what‟s wrong with 
that? I cannot see anything wrong or why there is conflict of interest as long as we 
declare our interest. If everybody is making money, why not politicians as well?‟. 
 
However, Politician 4 expressed his/her concern on the growing power given to 
politicians in influencing public policy decisions.
158
 Many politicians are able to take 
advantage of their position to favour their own interests.  
 
Politician 1 and 3 confirmed that the link between politics and business contributes to 
the wide spread of money politics. They argued that money politics has badly 
                                                          
158
 Politician 4 believed that politicians must act for the public interest and not the private one, and that 
the politicians‟ duty is to serve the people who elected them. 





 how politics operate in Malaysia (Sarawak Report, 2013) . Tan (2015) 
suggests that the practice of rent-seeking and money politics is based on patrons (state 
bureaucrats or politicians) and clients (business leaders) within the political business 
system. Tan (2015) argues that privatisation is the main vehicle for unproductive rent 
distribution for wealth and capital accumulation. Gomez (2012b) and Tan (2012)  
have illustrated state-business linkages for many privatisation projects of state-created 
rents to the well-connected companies.  
 
Yet, the concept of money politics seems to be accepted in the Malaysian society as a 
structured and matured system needed so that a political party survives.
160
 This 
rhetoric was disclosed by Media Actor 1 when explaining that public procurement 
fraud stems from the abuse of power by the politicians since most successful business 
leaders
161
 in Malaysia were heavily supported by government contracts. Media Actor 
4 claimed that,  
„The leader of the country has reasoned his purpose to build fortress with the 
institutionalised power‟. 
 
The ex-Prime Minister (Politician 5) did not deny that money plays a role in a 
political campaign;
162
 however, he claimed that the money was spent for greater 
                                                          
159
 In order for politicians to be elected, they need to pay their voters to support them for the highest 
post possible. This is consistent with the concept of giving money (by politicians) and having demands 
(voters/supporters) and vice versa. 
160
 This includes donations, sponsorships and private funding given by various parties with vested 
interests so as to finance an election. It is seen as an „investment‟ for a political master. 
161
 It is important to note that the rise of well-connected Bumiputera has also supported the rise of non-
Bumiputera businessmen through state patronage and the crony capitalism concept (see chapter 4). 
These profitable rich companies continue to make political donations to the existing government. The 
institutionalization of corruption is nourished by the leader in the country (e.g., The Prime Minister) so 
as to build and establish his power using relations with other powerful people. 
162
 By making an excuse with relation to the development for the country, Politician 5 was confident 
that fraud and corruption only occur when a favour is returned to those who have supported a politician 
in the first place. 
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purposes. He believed that it is wrong to return favours by fulfilling the politician‟s 
promises through abuse of power within the state apparatus. Nevertheless, he 
explained that the system is not bulletproof, which means that it is open to fraud and 
corruption at any level. Politician 5, however, believed that corruption in Malaysia is 
still manageable as it is still conducted „under the table‟. He said, 
„In the Malaysian context, fraud and corruption is still conducted under the table 
where the person normally hides and conceals the wrongdoings. Corruption, 
however, becomes institutional when those malpractices are manifested and 
implemented openly especially by the leaders. It also becomes institutional when it is 
accepted by the society. But not in Malaysia‟. 
 
It has been observed that many interviewees from the regulators‟ group admitted the 
prevalence of money politics between political and economic institutions. Yet, they 
(regulators) justified their obligation to help various businesses as one way of 
delivering good public services.  
 
Academic 5 also affirmed the wide spread of money politics among politicians, 
political parties and the supporters. Academic 5 claimed that public procurement is 
always linked to money politics in financing a political party and stated that, 
„The money politics is linked to the financing of politics in UMNO
163
 [the ruling 
party]. UMNO today is a party to which if you don‟t give money, they will not vote 
for you. Money politics has been mentioned by our ex-Prime Minister as it involved a 
lot of money. Therefore, in return, these people get contracts from the government, 
and when they make money and profits, the money will go back to UMNO‟. 
 
                                                          
163
 UMNO stands for United Malays‟ National Organization (UMNO), the hegemonic partner in the 
ruling party of Barisan Nasional (National Front) coalition.  
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In the same way, money politics encourages „captured‟ bureaucracy.
164
 Politician 1 
and 3 were of the view that political parties are implicated with money culture; hence 
the leaders from political leaders are no longer „true fighters‟ for the wider public. 
Likewise, Media Actor 1 and 5 agreed that many business elites in Malaysia have 
secured influence over the state by having the political master working in their 
favour, in other words, by having him “captured”
165
 so as to safeguard and advance 
their interests in government administration. The majority of the interviewees did not 
deny the link between politics and business as politicians in power and private 
capitalists usually distribute resource allocation. Regulator 4 claimed that, 
„Our politicians are business-related people. There is a lobbying practice between 
business leaders and our politician. Though no law allows this lobbying practice, we 
do not have the proof that they are not doing it. Donating and funding political 
parties was always allowed in Malaysia‟. 
 
Jong (2014) and Welsh (2013b) raised questions on the big money needed behind 
every election held in Malaysia. Moreover, Global Integrity (2014) reported that the 
laws and regulations on political finance and funding in Malaysia are out-dated, that 
there is lack of transparency and they are rarely enforced. Therefore, donating and 
political funding activities in Malaysia‟s landscape promote the political business 
concept as a justification of growth and development. Nicholas J. White (2004) and 
Searle (1999) draw attention to the involvement of politicians and political parties in 
                                                          
164
 In this „captured‟ bureaucracy, R. A. Smith (2006) and Cerny and Evans (2004) provide evidence 
that money plays an important element in influencing a political campaign and the fundraising for 
electoral reasons. 
165
 It can be accepted as universal that business leaders influence political masters so that they 
formulate public policies in ways that favour the former‟s vested interests (Bernhagen, 2007). The 
increasing dependence of politicians on businesses takes the  form of political donations, financing 
elections, general election campaigns or buying the support of party members (William Case, 1994; 
Teh, 2002) State patronage, in return, has allowed influential politicians with a business background to 
access rents, large government contracts and privatised projects in order to maintain a power base. 
Therefore, the reciprocal interaction in many government procurement cases in Malaysia is common 
and, to some extent, facilitates fraudulent practices.  
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Malaysia which are primarily involved in business. In reality, they (politicians and 
political party) serve the interests of a selected group supported by the state. In that 
context, Professional 3 commented on the patronage network and rent-seeking 
activities, which result in lobbying practices and state capture and which may have 
other consequences, such as fraud and corruption. In the case of lobbying practices, 
Regulator 8 expressed their concern, 
„There is nothing wrong with any businessmen to come and meet the Minister. They 
[business leaders] often give the Minister their business proposal for his 
consideration. In addition, it is not surprising when certain projects, which are 
announced by the Cabinet as public policy, are given to those businessmen. This is 
especially so if the instruction for the project is based on direct negotiation; we just 
implement the public policy. You can see that from most of our privatised projects‟. 
 
Some interviewees suggest that the institutionalization of fraud and corruption in the 
Malaysian public sector is the result of the collective perceptions and actions of 
regulators. For example, many regulators acknowledged that donations for political 
funding were retrieved and returned from rewarding government projects. Reasonable 
justifications „to accept‟ the situation, among others, were to help the business leaders 
survive in the market, being important for the political base of their ministers, and in 
the name of growth and development. This is the result of political involvement in the 
Malaysian public machinery. Academic 2 stated, 
„I feel that to some extent we are politically captured by political donation and by 
financing a political party. This becomes possible when the alliance between politics 
and economics makes them do whatever it takes to get what they want. Of course, this 
is done at the expense of others‟. 
 
Most interviewees acknowledge the existence of political donations and the practice 
of funding a political party in Malaysia. The majority of politicians confidently said 
that the system does not violate any law. Correspondingly, the majority of media 
actors and academics said that the lack of transparency of the practice of political 
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donation and funding raises questions about the legitimacy of the funds channelled 
back to the political party. For Regulator 10, there is no necessity for any political 
party in Malaysia to disclose sources of funds to parties, even during a general 
election. Regulator 9, however, believes that such practices are not only confined to 
Malaysia, but to other countries as well. The big money behind political funding, 
especially during a general election is associated with state-created rents in a form of 
licenses, government contracts, subsidies and privatised projects (Edmund Terence 
Gomez, 2002). Without declaration of any secret political donations from undisclosed 
sources
166
 the same funds are abused for political advantage, including funding and 
enriching the families of the politicians (Meng, 2012; Sarawak Report, 2012c). It is 
likely, then, that lack of transparency in political donation and sponsoring a political 
party favours public procurement fraud in Malaysia.  
5.1.2 The Alliance of Political Power With Economic Interests 
Within the context of political economy theory,
167
 this study shows the influence of 
powerful economic actors in rewarding government contracts. Numerous regulators 
experienced interference of powerful groups,
168
 who have their own institutionalised 
power relations mostly with political and economic institutions, in rewarding a 
government contract. This is parallel with the concept of (in)visible hands and the 
concentration of institutionalised power in the hands of specific groups of people 
(Faizli, 2013; Kennedy, 2009). These power relations have been experienced by many 
                                                          
166
 Even the Prime Minister is in a position to accept „undisclosed sources‟ for political contribution as 
a normal practice for the ruling party, this has legitimized the act of political donation since „proper‟ 
procedures are followed (Chooi, 2012a; Izwan, 2012a). 
167
 Political economy theory often focuses on the interpenetration of power relations of political and 
economic institutions, with the powerful group having common interests for their own benefit (Froud 
et al., 2004; L. Y. Lim & Stern, 2002). 
168
 They mainly came from politicians, top bureaucrats, and business elites (including royal 
descendants). 
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regulators in the study.
169
 Regulator 3 and 5 also confirmed that there are political and 
business interests influencing the rewarding of a government contract. Regulator 5 
elaborated on this by saying that, 
„I cannot deny that there is some interference. I‟ll be lying if I said that there is not 
any. However, it depends on the kind of wording from a higher authority to us; for 
example, “please consider this application”. Therefore, when we present to the 
procurement committee, we will normally make a note to the Chairman that this 
proposal has remarks from a higher authority. Perhaps from there, we can say that 
there is a certain degree of influence when rewarding the contract‟. 
 
The influence exercised by the powerful group in the public office comes in a variety 
of forms. The merging of cultural customs and practices within the institutional 
frames of the Malaysia public service helps to serve the interest of invisible hand
170
 
according to the political economy approach. Yet, the argument of invisible hand in 
this new era has been manipulated since capitalists have an innate tendency to 
deceive and oppress others in the society while maximizing their profits. The very 
notion of interference in Malaysia‟s procurement process provides evidence on the 
flaws of the invisible hand concept, since it only involves pursuing private interests at 
the expense of society. Regulator 4 refers to some kind of interference, which can 
come from almost all levels of power. 
„When we talk about government procurement we know that the rewarding decisions 
are to some extent shaped by certain parties. The extreme situation is that 
interference comes from all levels. Such influence comes in a variety of ways, 
sometimes in the form of a phone call or a small note‟. 
 
                                                          
169
 This took the form of instructions, which came in a variety of wording, given to procurement 
officers during the procurement process. 
170
 The interest of invisible hand within the political economy theory was differently conveyed by 
Adam Smith, a prominent actor of this theory. Smith wished to demonstrate that the invisible hands of 
the owners of capital would inadvertently promote public interest by pursuing their own private 
interest (Grampp, 2000). 
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When sharing their experience on how political and economic actors collaborations 
influence the rewarding of a government contract, Regulator 4 provided evidence that 
when political and business relations are intertwined, strong elements of fraud and 
corruption can complement such relationships. Reflecting upon corrupt and 
fraudulent practices, Regulator 4 explained, 
„The business leaders always need to ask for political support to get a government 
contract. This is because they have „invested‟ [business elites aim to gain something 
in return from state officials] in that political party through donation and financial 
support for election campaign. At one occasion, a company was not viable enough to 
get the government project. But they got the contract‟. 
 
In case of wrongdoings in the public office, most regulators admitted they did not 
dare to report them because in most cases the culprit will not be caught because of the 
reign of power relations. Especially when the wrongdoing involves a higher-ranking 
officer, the regulators are afraid that their career will suffer consequences. As 
experienced by Regulator 1, 
„Even though I reported the wrongdoing to the authority, I was the one who was 
monitored afterwards. It seemed that I was the culprit, not them. Because of that 
event, I have been transferred many times; there is no room for promotion in my 
career.‟ 
 
Most regulators are not convinced with the effectiveness of the Whistle-blower Act 
2010 as the cultural, customs and practices in the Malaysian public office do not 
support the nature of whistle-blower actions.  
 
Embong (2008) and Jomo (2003) critically pointed to the effort political and 
economic elites make to maintain the status quo. Equally important for their survival, 
Professional 6 claimed that an elected politician needs to work hard to ensure that 
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their political career lasts for long. The participant explained that the concept
171
 of „I 
scratch your back and you scratch mine‟ is widely applicable in relation to the 
political and economic interests in Malaysia. The analysis of interviews suggests the 
existing system in public procurement in Malaysia is highly influenced by political 
power and economic interests. Thus, the influence of political power and economic 
interest possibly nurtures fraudulent practices in procurement process. 
5.1.3 Direction of Public Policy  
In promoting growth and development, public policy is used as a way to create 
avenues for powerful groups to gain access to large government contracts. In the 
Malaysian context, the policy
172
 followed by the Cabinet clearly benefits certain 
vested interests. Regulator 8 expressed his disappointment, 
„Public policy is supposed to be formulated by public officials. We look at and study 
in depth any government projects including the budget to implement the project. 
However, the decision to choose and implement the public policy lies collectively on 
the Cabinet; definitely not on us‟. 
 
The dynamic of policymaking and policy implementation allows the ruling party to 
show to the public that the interest of the citizens is protected and that they can help 
them (especially the Malay community) economically. Although this must be true, 
the public policy framework is also used as an avenue to promote and offer benefits 
to selected well-connected business elites (O. K. Beng, 2013; Gomez & Sundaram, 
1999). As a matter of fact, Regulator 9, 12, and 13 admitted that there are cases when 
government projects, which are given to a contractor who has a „big cable‟ (i.e., a 
                                                          
171
 The concept (I scratch your back and you scratch mine) indicates the dependency between corrupt 
actors in fraud and corruption in public money. As long the corrupt officials continue to secure rents 
and allocation of public funds to their supporters, business elites continue to offer their loyalty to and 
support the power base.  
172
 Political economy theory takes into consideration the important reciprocal relations between politics 
and economics. Caporaso and Levine (1992) show that politics and economics serve the allocation of 
resource mechanisms. It is true that the formulation of public policy is intended to deliver public 
services for the public interest. 
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network of political and powerful connections), are not delivered. For a variety of 
reasons, the „unperformed‟ contractor will get help from the government by bailing 
out their companies before/after becoming bankrupt (Shukry, 2013b; J. Tan, 2008). 
 
The decision of the Malaysian state to bail out domestic companies, especially during 
a financial crisis, is justified for the national interest. Johnson and Mitton (2003) 
argue that the implementation of capital control by the Malaysian state during the 
financial crisis of 1997 created a setting for cronyism. This was abused by influential 
politicians to save their cronies by securing publicly funded bail-outs at the public‟s 
expense (K.S Jomo, 2001). On the other hand, Searle (1999) confirms that recession 
in Malaysia was a catalyst for radical policy reform, with the hope of a speedy 
recovery. Wain (2009) shows the intensification of important collusive networks of 
political patronage and close connections with politicians and political parties.  
 
In this study, fraud seems to be facilitated because the fraudsters have a strong 
network of political and powerful connections. In that sense, that strong network is, to 
some degree, abused by few well-connected with political and economic elites 
individuals through public policy mechanisms (Wain, 2009).
173
  As long as 
businesses have strong connections, public policy mechanisms will continue to 
benefit the „legitimate‟ decisions made by the Cabinet.
174
 The politicians will always 
                                                          
173
 As a consequence, public policies are formed based on biased decisions made by the legislators via 
the Cabinet members which favour private interests rather than the general public. 
174
 The institutionalization of various interests of politics and business as connected to political 
economy theory has influenced the formulation of the Malaysian public policy. Focusing on improving 
the social-welfare and on safeguarding the special positions of the Malays and indigenous people, the 
affirmative action policy is implemented to accelerate social restructuring and eradicate poverty (see 
H.-A. Lee, 2015a). 
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show that they help the public especially during an election period. By acting 
professionally, the Malaysian public officials need only to be the implementers of any 
public policy decided by the Cabinet. Regulator 11 said: 
„We never argue against or question any public policy decided by the Cabinet. 
Although sometimes we do feel that a certain policy only benefits certain people, i.e., 
those who are close to the Minister, We just implement it; we don‟t dare to ask. Who 
are we to ask?‟ 
 
According to most regulators, there are frequent interactions among politicians, top 
bureaucrats, political party and business elites to formulate and laminate public policy 
in Malaysia. Rather than being open to public scrutiny, most regulators argue that 
public policy arrangements are „hidden‟ and conducted behind the close door of a 
government office. This is so because they may affect national security and they are 
protected under the Official Secret Act. One dimension in political economy approach 
addresses the existence of policy arrangements that provide the ruling party with 
incentives and impose constraints on potential changes (Cerny & Evans, 2004). When 
discussing the implementation of public policy, Media Actor 2 criticised many 
policies as being lop-sided agreements and argued that the government contracts are 
„manipulative‟ and „biased‟ in favour of private interests.  
 
Interestingly, the majority of the regulators agreed that there are decisions taken in 
rewarding a government contract to unviable companies because of their political 
connection; such decisions have influenced public procurement fraud in Malaysia. 
However, the connection is not simply proven in procurement documentation, as it 
needs more investigation and evidence of conflict of interest. To some extent, the 
political and economic actors use their position to manoeuvre their way within the 
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institutional context so as to generate new policies and legislation and to protect or 
strengthen their political and economic position and interests. Academic 5 stated that: 
„The idea of sharing a bigger piece of the cake for the Malays was initially good. 
Nevertheless, Malaysian politicians are very creative in manipulative the situation. 
They develop a policy for their own vested interest but they are very clever in 
announcing that it is for development and growth‟. 
 
 
The transformation of Malaysia promotes liberalization of economy initiatives
175
 for 
modernity and growth (Milner et al., 2014). Rather than reaping the benefits, 
Malaysia faces various losses of public funds when privatising state-assets (Jasin, 
2013; Salazar, 2004). There is no person held „accountable‟ for the failure of 
privatised projects. Although there is a high magnitude of losses of public money in 
many  privatised projects, Regulator 9, 11, and 12 pointed out the that the success of a 
privatised project is not guaranteed as the government faces some risks, which are 
seen as „collateral damage‟, when privatising the projects. Besides, as mentioned by 
Professional 3, 5, and 7, although some projects were badly delivered or not 
successful at all, the political-connected companies continue to be awarded with 
various government contracts. They also believed that those companies know that 
they are protected by those in power and this makes public procurement fraud 
perennial. These interviewees claimed that many public policies do not favour the 
public interest but mostly benefit the private interests at the expense of the wider 
public. Media Actor 3 said: 
„We can see that highways, commercial buildings and financial institutions grow like 
mushrooms in Malaysia. The government always says that it is for national interest, 
for growth and development.  I can only see extravagant and lucrative profits for the 
private sector gained from such contracts‟. 
 
                                                          
175
 Among other initiatives taken by the Malaysian state while promoting neo-liberal capitalism logic 
are: privatization, deregulation and trade investment. 
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Professional 7 argues that extravagant and lucrative profits gained by the private 
entrepreneurs need to be monitored as they might involve bribery, fraud, collusion, 
and corruption activities. Professional 3 also shared their experience, 
„Yes, the cost of the project is so high for only delivering [the items are not disclosed 
due to sensitivity of the item] to … office. Only after some causality, for example, a 
stadium collapses or a school‟s roof falls down, we would  know that the quality and 
material of the building is so poor, fails to meet the specifications or the high prices 
demanded by the contractor. The tendency to „cut-corner‟ is very high. But as always, 
the company is a close-connected company with some politicians, so we cannot really 
see any culprit been convicted and punished‟. 
 
Some media actors and academics believe that moral values have been eroded 
because of the pursuit of money and wealth. Academic 3 linked this with the 
capitalism mantra. When no one pays attention to the moral consequences of seeking 
capital and wealth, then this may create a society that is based only on satisfying 
human needs. In order to strive for economic growth by providing opportunities in 
the market, it can be argued that the assistance provided by the state may at the same 
time be tainted from a moral standpoint and only be focussing on generating wealth 
and profits. Friedman (2007), Bakan (2005) and Chomsky (1999) argued that 
economic growth must be more evenly distributed, the rich should not be the only 
ones getting richer. Consequently, they suggested that for any material benefits to 
foster economic growth there must be a moral benefit for society. 
 
In that sense, the concept of „ersatz capitalism‟
176
 that has been implemented in 
Malaysia has jeopardized the true spirit of an entrepreneur by being willing to do 
whatever it takes to maximize profits (K. S. Jomo, 2005). Some scholars have 
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 The ersatz capitalism concept promotes a variety of assistance by the state in creating „connected-
rich‟ companies by using the privilege and opportunities of preferential treatment of many aspects in 
allocating public funds. It is argued, however, that this has undermined the vigor of real-entrepreneurs 
for fair and highly competitive environment (see K. S. Jomo, 2005; Yoshihara, 1988). 
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mentioned and questioned the concept of real entrepreneurship and the way it has 
been applied in Malaysia (Searle, 1999; Nicholas J. White, 2004). Academic 4 talked 
about the concept by relating it to „ersatz capitalism‟ and commented that: 
„I refer to „ersatz capitalism‟ and not industrial capitalism because industrial 
capitalists are the ones who are the real entrepreneurs. In our case, do we have real 
industrial capitalists? I doubt there are…..the reason we face this situation is that the 
road to success has to be shortened. Our road towards modernity was compressed in 
terms of time and, as a result, moral values also underwent a rushed process of 
change which instead of lasting a hundred to two hundred years it lasted only three 
decades!‟ 
 
Professionals 6 and 7 reported on cases where procurement processes clearly follow 
the concept of Ali-Baba
177
 in most government purchasing. In processing 
procurement documentation, most regulators admitted that they knew about the 
practice of the Ali-Baba concept when most of the sub-contractors are non-Malays.
178
 
Yet, for regulators, it is a common practice because the system has existed for so long 
and nobody checks it. 
 
As can be seen from the empirical evidence, there is a variety of responses about the 
arrangements of political and economic forces that contribute to public procurement 
fraud in Malaysia. Having presented the evidence, this section sheds light on the 
nurtured system of political business in procurement practices (Tay, 2012), the 
alliance of powerful actors in creating wealth and capital (H.-A. Lee, 2015b; Netto, 
2003), and the direction of public policy by few individuals that are infiltrated in the 
                                                          
177
 The Ali Baba concept in Malaysia promotes a fast and quick way to get money by the Bumiputera 
entrepreneurs from the non-Bumiputera entrepreneurs. It is so common for the Malay companies to get 
government contracts through their privilege of the affirmative action based-policy. However, the 
project is sub-contracted to another company for a profit, usually the non-Bumiputera companies, 
which are more skilled and have more capital (see chapter 4). The Ali refers to Malay, and the Baba 
refers to the Chinese.  
178
 To some extent, the Malays are only selected as a proxy in order to get the government contract 
while the Chinese are the ones who run the business (Crouch, 1996; R.S. Milne & Mauzy, 1999). 
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political context, who enrich themselves and their cronies.
179
 The political and 
economic forces appear to be consistent with the political economy approach in 
understanding public procurement fraud in Malaysia. The next section discusses the 
check and balance mechanisms.  
5.2 Check and Balance Mechanisms 
 
The successive administration of Malaysian bureaucracy has applied a constitutional 
monarchy based on the British colonial rule (the Westminster model) (A. S. b. 
Ahmad et al., 2003). All interviewees generally argued that although there have been 
some attempts to curb procurement fraud in the Malaysian public sector, the attempts 
were not good enough and showed little success. The interviewees commented on the 
three pillars of institutions (i.e., the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary 
branch as stipulated under the Malaysian Constitution) that are supposed to play their 
role as check and balance institutions in the country. This section provides evidence 
and a discussion on: (1) historical legacies, (2) lack of independence, (3) 
inefficiencies, (4) judicial system as a „tool‟, and (5) modes of power. 
5.2.1 Historical Legacies 
Political economy theory pays attention to the historical institutionalism since it 
serves as a mechanism to understand the transformation and changes of the society 
(B. Clark, 1998) . Historical legacies are important because they show the 
understanding and linkages between past and present. The regulators explain that the 
establishment of the three pillars of institutions in Malaysia are part of the legacy that 
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 They do so by misusing allocation of public funds through government contracts, license, quotas, 
subsidies and privatised projects (Fuller, 2006). 
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the British left. Regulator 4 and 5 argued that the British colonial administration still 
applies in many Malaysian public administrations. Regulator 5 said: 
„Yes, half of our government machinery is copied from our colonial master and 
adopted based on the Westminster model, a legacy from the British‟s style‟. 
 
Siddiquee (2013), Yaakop (2010) and Sundaram (1986) have well documented the 
legacies from the colonial rule in the Malaysia‟s administration system. Despite 
undergoing many structural and administration changes, Malaysia‟s public 
administration system has been shaped by its colonial history and it has promoted a 
centralized system, a prevalent top-down approach for decision making, dominating 
top bureaucrats, a Malay-dominated civil service, government information shrouded 
in secrecy, and a bureaucratic politicization which suggests “political power and/or 
political control over administration”(Siddiquee, 2013, p.39). The views expressed 
by the majority of the regulators acknowledge the embeddedness of the legacy from 
the colonial British rule in the Malaysian public administration. More importantly, 
most media actors agreed that the three pillars of institutions have been set up based 
on the British colonial model- this is linked with the „divide and conquer‟ idea.
180
 
Media Actor 2 said that, 
„Our institutional structure is formed and set up based on our colonial master - 
British administration. During British colonial rule, the British used the concept of 
divide and conquer. Therefore, with this legacy from colonial times, Malaysia has 
actually improved the divide and conquer concept. We did not only follow the system; 
we perfected the system!‟ 
 
                                                          
180
 The divide and conquer concept employed by the British rule has been followed by the Malaysian 
government (see Chapter 4). The British used that concept to remain in power by preventing any 
alliance that could have challenged them. The existing ruling party in Malaysia still implements that 
concept in order to gain and maintain their supreme power within the 3 pillars of institutions. For 
example, all the enforcement agencies set up to prevent fraud and corruption in Malaysia were 
appointed with the advice of the Prime Minister. All enforcement agencies normally link back to the 
Prime Minister‟s office (see Chapter 4). 
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Although Malaysia has undergone structural changes and transformations from the 
colonial rule, Siddiquee (2005) argues that the accountability system in Malaysia is 
still far from satisfactory. Some Professionals who focused on the feudal system that 
is traditionally embedded in the Malaysian society expressed another point of view. 
They argued that although Malaysia no longer follows the feudal system, the culture 
of respect and loyalty towards one‟s superior is maintained in the society (The Malay 
Mail Online, 2015). At the same time, academics explained that entrenched values, 
norms and practices from previous  historic times have been instilled and reproduced 
in the Malaysian social structure.   
5.2.2 Lack of Independence 
Throughout history, the ruling elites have made a vital rearrangement of social 
structures and processes in order to give themselves privilege and benefits (A. 
Harding, 2012). In relation to the independence of the 3 institutions as a check and 
balance mechanisms to prevent public procurement fraud in Malaysia, Regulator 4 
said: 
„In our constitution we have a separate entity for these three branches. However, the 
appointment of our enforcement agencies, for example the Anti-Corruption Agency, 
police and even the National Audit Department, is according to the advice of the 
Prime Minister. The Prime Minister‟s advice is so powerful. On paper yes, there are 
three branches, which work independently. However, what happens in practice? The 
political rule is too entrenched in the Malaysian public administration‟. 
 
The majority of the interviewees perceive that a „tone at the top‟ is very important to 
set a good example in public administration. However, the prevalent financial 
scandals or alleged cases of corruption by people of higher social status and a 
respectful position often resulted in total impunity and have led to an „integrity crisis‟ 
in many aspect of public governance in Malaysia at all levels. Consequently, fraud 
and corruption activities have more consequences because some top leaders of the 
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country appear not to be „clean‟ from committing wrongdoings, unethical and illicit 
behaviour but yet they remain untouchable. As Professional 3 explained, 
„Sometimes I realize that a wrongdoer of low level status committing fraud and 
corruption in the public office has purposely done something wrong. The fraudsters 
believe that if the top people in the country do it openly without being caught, why 
can‟t they? We can see from the evidence of alleged illicit behavior by the top leaders 
in the country, but hardly anything or anyone can touch [take action against] them. It 
is definitely an integrity crisis!‟ 
 
On the other hand, professionals viewed that the three branches lack independence as 
check and balance mechanisms to curb public procurement fraud. They believed that 
the business leaders have taken advantage of the flaws in the check and balance 
system from those institutions for their private interests. Professional 3 stressed out 
that the independence of the check and balance of the enforcement agencies is vague 
and claimed that, 
„Yes, they are supposed to be independent. However, you need to consider they are 
also a „yes man‟ person as their appointment is linked with the advice of the Prime 
Minister. Therefore, when there is an alleged abuse of power, the enforcement 
agencies need to take care of those who appointed them. Who? In addition, who 
dares to take action against the more powerful ones? That‟s why in Malaysia abuse 
of power cannot be avoided in government procurement‟. 
 
In this thesis, a „Yes Man‟ person is associated with the governance structure in the 
Malaysian public sector. In this context, many enforcement agencies have been set up 
as check and balance mechanisms to curb fraud and corruption in the public sector. 
However, as described by Siddiquee (2002) and Siddiquee (2005) the institutional 
location of many enforcement agencies that has been set up in Malaysia which 
subordinates to the Prime Minister office seems as an impediment to the execution of 
the enforcement agencies‟ roles and responsibility. In many ways, the enforcement 
agencies need to respect and listen to the Prime Minister as the highest authority and 
linked with their appointment. It then goes back to the legacy of historical 
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institutionalism in the Malaysian society: among others this includes the quality of 
respecting the authority, obedient and fidelity (see Chapter 4).  
 
When the three institutions are not able to act independently, the governance and 
accountability of the country to curb fraud and corruption are tainted. Surprisingly, 
the ex-Prime Minister (Politician 5) confirmed that the three institutions cannot be 
totally independent and further emphasized that, 
„The three institutions cannot play their role independently. For example, the process 
of making laws should be confined to the legislative institution; it is not the role of the 
judiciary to question the law. The judiciary institution‟s role is to judge people and 
actions according to the law. But when the judiciary says “no you are wrong” then, 
of course, there is interference between the judiciary and the legislative institutions‟. 
 
Here, the ex-Prime Minister perhaps was referring to the Malaysian judicial crisis in 
1988. In 1988, there was a constitutional amendment in order to amend and repeal the 
law that seemed to have subordinated the judiciary to the executive arm of 
government and various reputable judges in the country were sacked (M. S. Abas, 
1989; A. J. Harding, 1990). The constitutional amendment was made when “the 
judicial award decisions in favour for those challenging the government” (H. K. 
Leong, 2001b, p.14). As a result, the Malaysian judicial crisis perhaps involved 
executive interference with the judiciary since the Prime Minister was able to remove 
the Lord President of the Supreme Court, the country‟s most senior judge and other 2 
judges of the Supreme Court (Koh, 2012b).  
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In a different view, Media Actor 2 focused on the various roles of the Attorney 
General (AG) in Malaysia.
181
  
„The Attorney General is the Chief Prosecutor who also plays a role as government 
advisor that sits at a Cabinet meeting. His department formulates and amends the 
laws before they go to the Parliament. Which hat does he need to wear? For example, 
a Minister sitting at a cabinet will normally listen to the advice of the AG. The 
Cabinet, which consists of various ministers, will then decide on whether a particular 
government contract should be rewarded to intended companies only, with the advice 
from the AG. If the Prime Minister is not in favour with the decisions, the AG can 
prosecute the Minister with the instructions of the Prime Minister‟. 
Academic 1 argued that institutional decline and failure in Malaysia have been tainted 
by the undue influence of hegemonic power and authority of the governing coalition. 
This academic also claimed that the erosion of the three pillars of institutions has 
been a turning point and has opened up the gates to many „malpractices‟. It is 
suggested that those institutions must be and be seen to be independent from any 
parties (Pua, 2011).  
5.2.3 (In)Effective Roles 
Regulator 5 explained that the role and functions of the legislative and the executive 
are overlapping and stated that, 
„Our Minister is a politician elected for his constituency for the legislative branch. At 
the same time, he holds a position as a Minister in this ministry as one of the 
executive branch of the Cabinet. So like it or not, his roles as a politician and a 
Minister clearly overlap‟. 
 
 
In relation to the lack of independence of the three institutions, Media Actor 1 seemed 
to agree with the ex-Prime Minister‟s view that those institutions cannot work in 
isolation as they complement each other and, to some extent, have overlapping roles. 
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 The various roles of the Attorney General in Malaysia include acting as government advisor in the 
Cabinet meeting, as a formulator to propose, implementing and amending laws and as a prosecutor to 
prosecute fraudsters (Pragalath, 2012). 
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Since there are overlapping roles, many ministers can simply abuse their positions 
and enrich themselves. Professionals shared their experience of ministers using the 
ministry‟s budget for their political activities. It was said that politicians should not 
use public money for their political activities.
 
Regulator 13 explained that it is 
common for the Minister to use the ministry‟s money for their political activities 
especially during election because the budget for those programs is endorsed by the 
Parliament. As the practice of using public fund is justified by the Minister for the 
benefit and activities of the Ministry, there is no provable abuse of power since it 




In a different context, some regulators, politicians and the majority of professionals, 
media actors and academics strongly believed that Parliament in Malaysia is not a 
„true‟ legislative body. They strongly agreed that the Parliament seems to act as 
merely a „rubber stamp‟ for any decisions made by the Cabinet (Jo-Ann & Chin, 
2013; H. K. Leong, 2001a). In other words, the Parliament appears to act, amend and 
repeal laws according to the Cabinet‟s decisions. As a result, no check and balance 
procedure is applied as the Parliament basically legitimates a decision, especially 




 taken by the Malaysian state to eradicate fraud and corruption in 
order to mould a strong and spiritual base in the Malaysian society are laudable 
                                                          
182
 Each Minister in Malaysia has their privileges as constituted in the Ministerial Functions Act 1969. 
183
 Among other initiatives in the Government Transformation Programme (GTP) are establishing 
compliance units in key enforcement agencies, Whistleblowing Protection for Civil Servant, 
Expediting Corruption Trials „Name and Shame‟ Databases, implementation of e-Procurement for 
government purchasing, implementation of integrity pack and Corporate Integrity Pledge (CIP) (see 
www.pemandu.gov.my). 
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(NKRA, n.d.). However, these government agencies are not effective. They are open 
to question as they do not seem to be good , efficient and effective enough to curb 
fraud and corruption. Academic 2 jokingly said that in many cases of malpractices in 
the country, 
„It is as if we captured all the ants in the world, but a big elephant passes by and we 
either ignore it or fail to see it at all!‟ 
 
Professional 7 supported this view, 
„It is so frustrating to see the culprit, especially the top people [those who have high 
social status and are closely connected with powerful group] getting off scot-free, 
with fewer penalties or no prosecutions or convictions at all. We do our part as 
professionals, but it is not up to us to catch the culprit. I believe the public feels 
frustrated, too‟. 
 
It has been observed that many responsible agencies have been established, but those 
agencies are not effective in curbing fraud and corruption. Although a considerable 
progress has been made over the years to improve public accountability and 
transparency by establishing many responsible agencies in Malaysia, N. B. A. Bakar 
et al. (2011) and Samaratunge et al. (2008) argued that control mechanism and the 
limitations of the responsible agencies have undermined the intention and work of 
those agencies. Thus, the effort and actions  to curb fraud and corruption in Malaysia 
are still far from satisfactory and fail to put in place important accountability 
mechanisms as would be expected from many responsible government agencies 
(Chee, 1991).  
5.2.4 Judiciary as a ‘Tool’ for a Political Party 
According to Welsh (2013a), the increasing erosion of the three pillars of institutions 
has deteriorated people‟s confidence in them. Several segments of Malaysian society 
expressed concerns over the fact that ruling coalition mostly control and govern most 
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of Malaysia‟s institutional structures (Z. Ahmad & Phang, 2005). Academic 4 pointed 
out that, 
„When people see that the judiciary is independent and that it dares to take action 
against whoever engages in fraud and corruption, they dare to report the 
wrongdoings because they believe everybody is equal before the law. But since the 
power of check and balance mechanism is contested by the executive branch, every 
attempt is a failure‟. 
 
The majority of the interviewees agreed that the judicial branch plays an important 
role in charging a fraudster. However, the requirement of the law to prove „intention 
for fraud‟ or that „an offence has been committed‟ is not easily met in court. 
Professionals believed that it appears that if the fraudsters have a „manipulative‟ 
lawyer, they might get away with it. Most of interviewees have given the example of 
a financial scandal in Perwaja Steel, when the ex-Managing Director was acquitted 
because there was not enough evidence for prosecution (Khair et al., 2015; Norwani 
et al., 2011). The interviewees also mentioned the Port Klang Free Zone scandal, 
when the Minister was acquitted as the defence was able to raise reasonable doubts 
against all charges (I. Lim, 2013b). There were also some examples given by the 
interviewees about losses of RM8 billion due to mismanagement in Malaysia Airline 
System; eventually, an out-of-court settlement was reached (Anand, 2015; Jeff Tan, 
2008).  
 
Professional 10 shared their experience of bringing a culprit to the court for alleged 
corruption in the public office. However, due to the absence of witnesses the judge 
withdrew the case without further notice. The culprit got off scot-free. This 
professional expressed frustration as s/he compiled all the investigation paper work 
but the judiciary simply rejected the case. Therefore, the particularities and 
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complexity of law might open up the opportunity for and are prone to manipulation 
and abuse (M. S. Abas, 1989; Seah, 2004). 
 
In contrast, Media Actor 3 highlighted the weaknesses of the judiciary‟s role in 
approaching decisions on fraud and corruption cases in Malaysia and stated that, 
„Nowadays we can see many fraud and corruption cases being adjourned for too 
long. I also witnessed a court decision favouring [those having] vested interests. 
Ultimately, those in power always escape prosecution‟. 
 
Soon (2013) believes that the controversial amendments made to the Constitution in 
1988 curtail the powers of the judiciary by turning over its powers to the Parliament. 
This permanent damage made to the judiciary was reported by A. J. Harding (1990) 
when noting of a political party‟s ability to overturn court decisions by legislative 
interference. The increased centralization of power by the ruling coalition raised 
“suspicious […]about how the judicial decisions in high-profile cases or cases with 
high net-worth litigants were arrived at” (Soon, 2013, p.373). It appears then that the 
politicization of the judiciary has further disadvantaged the judicial institution 
(Anbalagan, 2015a; Yin, 2014). 
 
Specifically, there are flaws in the judiciary institution in Malaysia which suggest 
selective prosecution of fraud and corruption cases; in other words, someone with a 
close power relation gets away while other people - normally those who only take 
instructions – are held accountable.  Such selective prosecution seems to benefit the 
ruling elites. In many cases, professionals were of the view that some culprits might 
know that people in power protect them because they have close connections with 
them. It is argued that many fraud and corruption cases marginalize high-profile cases 
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involving prominent politicians, top bureaucrats or business leaders (Welsh & Chin, 
2013). The interviewees seemed to believe that the judiciary is inefficient in 
prosecuting the real fraudster. What is more, Regulators 6, 7 and 8 discussed the 
„choosing‟ and „selecting‟ of various cases by responsible government agencies. They 
believed those agencies tried their best to investigate and prepare the paper work. Yet, 
charging and prosecuting depends on the discretion of the AG‟s chamber. Academic 
5 stated that,  
„When there is alleged fraud and corruption in Malaysia, we can see some people 
being prosecuted and others being exonerated. The non-powerful people are put in 
jail; mostly the bureaucrats or a person who has been instructed to do something. 
Powerful people or people connected with the source of power are cleared‟. 
 
There are cases involving high-profile political partisans (as mentioned in Chapter 4) 
for which court decisions are not „judicial independent‟ but „executive-compliant‟ 
(Thomas, 2001; Yatim, 1995). The high degree of power vested in the executive and 
the fact that the three branches (the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary 
branch) are not separate make the judicial branch a mere tool of a political party. The 
empirical findings show this when the media actors and some politicians argued that 
the appointment of the Attorney General-AG with a prosecution power has a political 
purpose. They agreed that politicians used the AG for their political agenda because 
they are extremely powerful. They concluded that no one dared to accuse the Prime 
Minister of misconduct because in that case they (politicians or state officials) would 
be removed from their posts. In order to have a political career, many politicians 
normally support the decisions of the Prime Minister to administer the country merely 
based on the modes of power mobilized in Malaysia (Diane K. Mauzy & Milne, 
1983).  
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5.2.5 Mobilizing Modes of Power 
The political economy approach forms the basis of understanding the power relations 
in relation to how actors use their position to protect their interests (Twigg, 2012). 
This approach also presents the positions of power, which facilitate political and 
economic elites to engage in fraud and corruption in public procurement. Thus, the 
monopolization of power by the governing coalition has constrained the check and 
balance mechanisms in Malaysia. Politician 4 argued, 
„We definitely do not have checks or have very few checks; this allows them (i.e., the 
political and economic elites) to get around the system very easily. Whatever system 
you design, they will find a way to get around it. Here they do not really try to change 
their system, as the culture of the ruling party is to ensure that they stay in power. 
There is no reason for them to change the system or make an attempt to make further 
changes in the existing institutions. Being complacent, they will not try to correct any 
mistakes. Furthermore, there is no devolution of power in the public office. In fact, 
our Prime Minister also holds the power of Ministry of Finance. And our Parliament 
is merely a rubber stamp‟. 
 
Most interviewees generally agreed that there are no changes made to improve any of 
the institutions, as the current situation is comforting and safe for the ruling party. 
When commenting on the institutionalised power of the state, Academic 1 was of the 
view that the centralised power may have created certain rules and regulations to 
protect the ruling elite‟s interests to remain in power.
184
 Academic 3 claimed that 
there is no devolution of power in Malaysia as all power is concentrated in the 
executive office. It appears that if there is any suspicion of fraud and corruption 
involving the Cabinet, nobody seems to dare to investigate or prosecute anyone (The 
Star, 2012a). All academics agreed that the check and balance mechanisms in 
Malaysia might be very limited in scope and ineffective and it seems that hardly 
anything can be done to minimize fraud and corruption (see chapter 4).  
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 This provides a strong institutionalised power to the Cabinet ministers headed by the Prime 
Minister. The decision for any public policy and the direction of the Malaysian public sector is decided 
by the political master via the Cabinet. 
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For most regulators, in cases of alleged fraud and corruption activities by any higher-
ranking superior in the public office (including top bureaucrats and politicians), they 
do not dare question or challenge the government. As long as the event does not 
disturb their monthly salary and as long as there is no proof, they perceive it is as 
something that they need not to bother themselves with. Thus, perhaps there might be 
some degree of compliance and acceptance by the individuals that should be in 
charge of control in Malaysia‟s public bureaucracy (A. S. b. Ahmad et al., 2003). 
Regulator 1 explained, 
„We did hear of alleged cases of wrongdoing even by our top leader in the country. 
However, we can only wait and see as these are only alleged cases, which are not 
proved yet in the court. Therefore, I guess it just hearsay and there is no evidence to 
prove it. After all, they are powerful people‟. 
 
Sundaram (1986) claims that a specific set of social relations of power, as also 
supported by political economy theory, lead to exploitation, oppression and 
inequality. In the Malaysian context, the legislative branch can act „above the 
board‟
185
 since it can issue, appeal and amend the laws. Interestingly, academics 
always pointed out how the ruling party has been in power for so long since the 
independence of Malaysia (1957).
186
 They argued that the ruling coalition
187
 seems to 
be able to overrule the rules of the country,; this might act in their full favour and 
against anyone who tries to oppose or challenge them. The political system has to 
some extent facilitated fraud and corruption in Malaysia as those who hold the power 
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 In the Malaysian judicial crisis in 1988, the Prime Minister sacked the Lord President of the 
Supreme Court due to „non-alignment‟ of judiciary decisions with the state. It shows that the Prime 
Minister has power over the board with his supremacy over the executive and legislative branches.  
186
 Only one coalition, i.e., the multi-party Alliance of Barison Nasional has hold a long trust 
recognition by the Malaysian society to rule the country (D.K. Mauzy, 1983; Wah, 2003). 
187
 In addition, the Cabinet (from the Legislative branch) can formulate and decide on public policy as 
a supreme power of the Executive branch. 
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want to remain powerful. This ideology was articulated by Academic 4 when stating 
that, 
„Being in power for so long has made those holding power reluctant to let it go. 
According to them, they have been serving the greater good of the country with the 
power and from the position they are trusted with. That is the ideology of 
incumbency. By having supremacy power in the political system combined with the 
incumbency, they simply become untouchable!‟ 
 
When a powerful group becomes „untouchable‟, fraud and corruption easily emerge 
and flourish. This is facilitated by a strong connection between the central powers and 
the state. Entrenched institutional arrangements appear to exist that might open up 
opportunities to restrain public accountability and control mechanisms in order to 
curb fraud and corruption (see William Case, 2013; Gomez & Jomo, 1997; Norwani 
et al., 2011). Following this view, Academic 3 pointed out that, 
„The socio-political institutions are definitely the ones responsible for what we are 
now. And eventually it will change the landscape of the economic environment and 
will change the behaviour of the people. They [the ruling party] are definitely in a 
position to engage in these malpractices. Therefore, this structure was given that way 
and then it was left to grow and mature with no action taken to protect it. They turn a 
blind eye to fraud and corruption‟. 
 
The empirical evidence shows the complexities of governance institutions to ensure 
check and balance within procurement practices. Thus, the complexities of 
governance institutions in Malaysia seems to shed light firstly on the legacy of 
historical institutions in many aspects of the Malaysian society (R. N. A. R. Omar, 
2012). Secondly, it shows that those institutions are not independent and this leads to 
an institutional decline in some way (H. K. Leong, 2001b; Loh, 2013). The 
centralisation of power by the ruling coalition damaged the independence of the 
governing system by hardly implementing the idea of the separation of power for the 
governance institutions (Z. Ahmad & Phang, 2005).  Thirdly, there are overlapping 
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roles that have been entrenched in the system. The responsible agencies for ensuring 
public accountability appear not to be effective enough (N. R. W. Abdullah, 2008; 
Siddiquee, 2005). Fourth, the interviewees were of the opinion that judicial branch is 
used as a tool for selective prosecution and awarding court decisions tailored to suit 
the ruling elites and those closely connected to them. Lastly, the evidence suggests 
that the long-term incumbency and supremacy of the ruling governing coalition 
makes them untouchable, the powerful groups appear to be „above the law‟ and 
escape with impunity (Miller, 2013). The next section presents the deficiencies in 
procurement practices, which the fraudster often seek to exploit and which likely 
contribute to public procurement fraud in Malaysia.  
5.3 Deficiencies in Procurement Practices 
 
There is an infinite number of deficiencies that can create loopholes
188
 in procurement 
practices. Institutional deficiencies in Malaysia procurement practices are as follows: 
(1) playing around the system, (2) lack of evidence, and (3) the hegemonic power of 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF). 
5.3.1 Playing around the system 
Most regulators and professionals affirmed that the complexity of procurement 
process provides opportunities to „astute individuals‟
189
 to play around the system and 
engage in public procurement fraud. Professionals‟ view about the loopholes in a 
                                                          
188
 Among other loopholes within a procurement life cycle are lack of transparency in procurement 
process (Oyegoke, 2012; Racca & Perin, 2013), breach of internal control and monitoring practices 
(Chang, 2013; Neu et al., 2015; Sikka & Lehman, 2015), conflict of interest (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; 
Schapper, Veiga Malta, & Gilbert, 2006), and corrupt collusion to weaken the competitive market 
(Caldwell et al., 2005). 
189
 The „smart people‟ (also known as astute individuals) who are mentioned here refer to people with 
knowledge about the loopholes in the public procurement process who usually seek to exploit these 
weaknesses. The smart people hold powerful positions so they are able to manipulate the weaknesses 
and get away with it.  
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procurement process is that they have been manipulated by the astute individuals. 
Professionals admit that loopholes have created more opportunities to engage in fraud 
and corruption. According to Professional 10, 
„The loopholes and weaknesses exist either at the contractor‟s side or at the 
government‟s side. Normally, the weaknesses arise when the contractor is able to 
take advantage of loopholes in the procurement system‟.  
 
 
Professional 1 supported this view in regards to conflict of interest and said, 
„One area that is not easy to prove is conflict of interest in rewarding government 
projects. A cunning culprit is able to avoid violating the law by declaring their 
interest in the procurement committee but by not being involved in any decision 
making process [getting out of the room where the meeting takes place]. By declaring 
their interest, they have not violate any rule, thus they cannot be brought to court. 
The culprits know where the line is and they do not cross it‟. 
 
Astute individuals, as mentioned earlier, are those who often seek to exploit the 
opportunities to indulge in fraud and corruption activities in the Malaysian 
procurement system. Professional 12 explained that many contractors were ex-public 
officials with high status, who were part of the system. These people know where the 
weaknesses of the system lie and they know how to profit from them. 
190
 Confirming 
this view, Professional 4 said that,  
„Those who were involved in procurement fraud were those who had extensive 
experience with the procurement process [including those who have high status]. 
They studied the government rules and regulations a lot. They know the strengths and 
weaknesses of any procurement process... Only smart people can do this and this 
would normally involve high-value contracts. The small amount contracts will 




                                                          
190
 The high status represents powerful political and economic actors, who are people with a title or 
people closely connected with powerful groups. Within the Malaysian society, it seems that those with 
titles need to be given priority and more pleasant treatments compared to normal ordinary people. This 
is linked to the legacy of feudal system where the submissive subjects must be loyal to those in power 
and with authority. 
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Regulator 7 said, 
„Many contractors can take advantage of the weaknesses. For example, if they fail to 
deliver the project they know they will be fined for a late delivery project according 
to the contract signed. They will appeal and give „justifying‟ excuses for late delivery 
to the highest position in the country. Unfortunately, when we have the approval and 
instruction to „waive‟ the fine earlier, we have to follow the instruction. Thus, this is 
one weakness of the system that a contractor can exploit. It does not even violate the 
law‟. 
 
Many professionals have „seen‟ a culprit managing to play around the rules and 
regulations by providing and furnishing procurement documentation. Professional 7 
in particular emphasized that their auditing job was based on procurement 
documentation, which seems legal and genuine. All accounting and procurement 
documentation
191
 is seemingly well organised and full-documented. Professional 7 
admitted that based on government documentation, fraudulent activities are unlikely 
to detect, as most procurement transactions are made according to rules and 
regulations. In contrast, Regulator 1 argued that fraud can be facilitated and sustained 
by people working around rules and regulation. Fraudulent activities can also be 
concealed and disguised using legitimate procurement documentation. S/he further 
argued that fraud and corruption activities in government purchasing are „not easy to 
detect as A, B, C. [They] will normally be hidden and concealed‟.  
 
Professional 4 concluded that loopholes (playing around the system) in procurement 
process can conceal the fraudulent activities behind legal and genuine procurement 
documentation. S/he further concluded that public procurement fraud is being 
facilitated by astute individuals abusing the loopholes in the procurement process. By 
                                                          
191
 Relevant documentation involves invoices, receipts, contract, quotation, tender forms, and minutes 
of meetings. 
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taking advantage of the loopholes in the procurement process, there is hardly any 
evidence about public procurement fraud as discussed in what follows. 
5.3.2 Lack of Evidence 
Political economy approach pays attention to resource allocation related to agents, 
institutions, processes, values, practices and organizational culture (March & Olsen, 
1984). From this point of view, the entrenched power relations are more likely used to 
create opportunities for the political and economic elites‟ benefits (Rose–Ackerman, 
2008). Thus, there are opportunities to exploit the deficiencies in procurement 
practices, something that is concealed within the governance structure. 
 
To start with, regulators are positive about loopholes in the public procurement 
system. Even if there have been alleged fraud and corruption cases in government 
deals, regulators maintained the view that the procurement documentation is 
genuine
192
 and in accordance with the rules and regulations. Regulator 2 asserted, 
„If you ask me about any procurement fraud and corruption in government agencies, 
I will tell you that you can go and check the relevant files. When the Anti-Corruption 
Agency came to investigate, I told them that the contract is legitimate. It has been 
awarded based on all stipulated rules and regulations; there is no evidence of fraud 
or of any abuse of power in rewarding this contract. All the documentation was there. 
That kind of abuse, you cannot find in any documentation, there will always be black 
and white. So there is no real evidence!‟ 
 
Neu, Everett, Rahaman, et al. (2013); Omurgonulsen and Omurgonulsen (2009); 
Sikka and Lehman (2015) critically emphasized the fact that accounting manipulation 
facilitates fraud and corruption activities. Regulator 3 shared their experience of when 
their procurement team was instructed by the Minister to award a contract to a 
                                                          
192
 While many regulators were positive about the genuineness of procurement documentation, they 
also mentioned that loopholes (lack of evidence) in procurement process via abusing of power could 
not simply be pointed out as the procurement officer will normally follow the procedures when 
rewarding the contract. 
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particular company (although to some extent the company is not reliable or viable to 
get the contract). According to Regulator 3, there was, in fact, no evidence of those 
instructions. As a result, it appears that nobody could prove anything since 
government procurement documentation is strictly confidential. Thus, Professional 9 
questioned the ability to expose and detect fraudulent and corrupt activities in public 
procurement, by saying that, 
„Do you think that if there is no evidence for fraud and corrupt activities, there is no 
such wrongdoing? I doubt it, as those activities can also be hidden and concealed 
under procurement documentation. Especially if it does not breach any laws or there 
is no black and white evidence, no one will know or notice‟. 
 
In addition, Professionals also argued that astute individuals (see section 5.3.1) can 
manipulate the weaknesses in the procurement system because it is very hard to get 
evidence for any abuse of power
193
 when rewarding a government contract. 
Professional 4 further argued that there is abuse of power when those in power have 
authorised and approved the rewarding contract to a non-viable company.
194
 
According to Professional 4, the evaluation of the non-viable company clearly 
showed that company was not the best option for executing the project. However, the 
committee has selected the non-viable company and there might have been 
interference from the higher authority for the decision-making. This professional also 
pointed out that lower level management is afraid to make any decisions that are 
against the rules. This is not the case with people with institutionalised power in the 
public sector who are not easily accused of abuse of power. Thus, s/he claimed that, 
                                                          
193
 In contrast, Professional 4 strongly believed that abuse of power was not easy to trace if there was 
collusion between public official and contractor. If it is based on procurement documentation, the 
abuse of power is not easily proven as government agencies normally follow the rules and regulations.  
194
 The government contract was given to a company which was not viable enough to complete the 
project. 
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„We cannot simply charge people for abuse of power for rewarding the government 
procurement. In my experience of handling procurement fraud in Malaysia, most of 
procurement documentations are clear! There is no evidence of abuse of power on 
the documentation. Although we know something is fishy in a particular project, how 
can we proof that abuse of power elements within the government administration took 
place?‟ 
 
Because all public procurement documentation in Malaysia is protected under the 
Official Secrecy Act 1972, any official secret documentation is not allowed to be 
publicly distributed.
195
 Regulator 4, for example, strongly disagrees with the 
secrecy
196
 of government documentation because it breeds fraud and corruption and 
culprits can hide their wrongdoings by taking advantage of the documents 
confidentiality policy.  
 
Professionals, on the other hand, who need to check government documentation, 
believed that procurement documentation should be confidential in order to safeguard 
the country‟s reputation. This means that there are contrasted opinions between 
regulators and public professionals about the secrecy of government documentation. 
The former (regulators) disagree with the fact that the government documentation is 
kept secret and confidential as this may result in concealed and hidden fraud and 
corruption activities. The latter (professionals) want procurement documents to be 
secret as to not tarnish the reputation of the public office. The contrasted opinions 
regarding the secrecy of government documentation show evidence of the loopholes 
in the procurement process. This shows that not all public officials (regulators and 
public professionals) share the same views regarding the secrecy and confidentiality 
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 Those documents are controlled and classified under „Top Secret‟, „Secret‟, „Confidential‟ or 
„Restricted‟(The Commissioner of Law Revision Malaysia, 2006). A public servant may suffer 
repercussions if violating the act. 
196
 S/he further argued for the importance of transparency to ensure public accountability for all 
government projects so as to implement the public policy decided by the Cabinet. 
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of procurement documentation. This is most probably because they are bound to the 
applicable Act as Malaysian public officials, which restricts their views about fraud 
and corruption.  
 
It is widely known amongst Malaysians that large contracts are rewarded to powerful 
people or people with connections (Shukry, 2013b; Tan, 2012). Under the Malaysian 
court of law (see Chapter 4, section 4.2.3), Politician 2 confirmed the fact that the 
evidence required to prove that fraud has occurred is such that in many cases the 
culprit gets away with it. It can be said that the technicality of the law is to some 
extent able to „protect‟ and let the culprit get off scot-free because one needs to show 
evidence that decision made for rewarding government contract is either purely or 
intentionally influenced, which is not easy to prove. This is illustrated from court 
decisions in many high-profile cases in Malaysia, where the culprit was acquitted and 
discharged due to lack of evidence for conviction (see chapter 4, Khair et al., 2015; I. 
Lim, 2013a; Norwani et al., 2011). Next, the hegemonic role of Ministry of Finance 
Malaysia in government procurement is discussed. 
5.3.3 Hegemonic Role of Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
All regulators admitted the „unchallenged‟ power of the MOF as an institutionalised 
power structure in the procurement process because they normally follow the decision 
made by the MOF in rewarding government contracts. Interviewees, such as 
Regulator 1, 2 and 3, argued that the MOF has a powerful role in rewarding direct 
negotiation contracts. Regulators agreed that the justification for any direct 
negotiation contract must be at the discretion of the MOF as a leading agency in 





 Regulator 3 mentioned that a direct negotiation process 
must always involve the MOF as the only approving body that gives „special 
approval‟ when the ministry wants to be exempted from the current rules. S/he stated 
that, 
„For any direct negotiation contract, the user will normally suggest at least 5 
contractors to implement the project. The user needs to justify why they only want this 
company to do the project and further justify the use of a direct negotiation 
contract.
198
 The user‟s proposal must go through the procurement department and we 
will forward the proposal to the MOF. Only the MOF has the power to approve a 
direct negotiation contract. Only they can do it, no one else‟. 
 
On the other hand, politicians were very concerned with the way the MOF‟S 
institutionalised power is exercised. Politician 3 believed that direct negotiation 
contracts have opened up ways for more fraud and corruption activities. S/he argued 
that, 
„The malpractices in many government contacts can be traced back to direct 
negotiation contracts in Malaysia. Although the circulars clearly state that all 
government contracts should go through a tendering process, there are always 
exceptions to the rule. In the case of exceptions, the department must always have an 
approval obtained from the MOF, especially in the case of direct negotiation 
contracts‟.  
 
Regulator 2, however, disputed the way power relations are utilized by the MOF 
when approving a direct negotiation contract. They explained that the ministry was 
given a list of contractors to choose from for a particular contract. Unfortunately, the 
price offered by those contractors was too high and they tried to negotiate the price. 
                                                          
197
 According to the MOF, the types of procurement for any government agencies must be categorized 
under 3 modes: direct purchase, quotation and tenders. If the Ministry wishes to be exempted from any 
of the types of procurement, for example, a direct negotiation contract, it needs to give concrete 
justification for that exemption. Among others, justifications given by the Ministry for approving 
direct negotiation contract are the following: strategic reasons, sole contractor in supplying goods and 
services, and lack of expertise.  
198
 The user mentioned by the regulator is the department or section in the Ministry who intends to 
procure or buy goods and services from the private companies. 
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By using the power relations of the MOF, the project was rewarded to the company 
with the approval of the same institution. Regulator 2 expressed their frustration as 
that contractor pulled „politically-connected‟ strings to get the contract. In the end, the 
ministry rewarded the contract to that company, as that was the decision made by the 
MOF.  
 
Given the evidence in this study, the deficiencies in Malaysian procurement practices 
suggest three broad explanations that largely support the persistence of public 
procurement fraud. First, there are astute, creative people who take advantage of the 
weaknesses in the procurement process by playing around the rules. Second, it is very 
hard to prove abuse of power in rewarding government contracts since procurement 
documentation is legitimate and genuine. Government documentation shrouded in 
secrecy under applicable Acts results in fraudulent transactions being undetected and 
unreported.
199
 Finally, the institutionalised power structure embedded by the MOF in 
managing government procurement has to a degree opened up opportunities for fraud 
and corruption. The next section examines the governance constraints of public 
officials and how those constraints relate to the preservation of fraud in public 
procurement. 
5.4 Constraints of Public Officials 
 
The quality and productivity of the public service requires that it implements public 
policy with a high degree of accountability, integrity and transparency (Mahathir 
Mohamad, 1995). Despite the fact that a high level of professionalism is expected of 
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 However, this raises the question on whether when there is lack of evidence for a wrongdoing can 
this automatically mean that there is no fraud and corruption in the public office. 
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civil servants to deliver public service, public officers face governance constraints in 
exercising their public duties. This section discusses how the constraints faced by the 
Malaysian public officials have to some extent helped the preservation of public 
procurement fraud by: (1) the role of the obedient implementer, (2) the conflicting 
role, and (3) politicisation of bureaucracy.  
5.4.1 The Obedient Implementer 
The administration frame in Malaysia depends on the civil service to uphold public 
service delivery (H. K. Leong, 2001b).
200
  As urged by the ex-Chief Secretary to the 
Government of Malaysia, the civil service must professionally deliver and ensure the 
successful implementation of the public policy (Public Service Department, 2010). 
However, evidence was given by Regulator 4 that as a procurement officer they needs 
to accept the instructions professionally and implement them.
201
 In many government 
procurement cases, the „wahyu‟, i.e., instructions coming from the high-ranking 
people need to be followed.
202
  Regulator 4 commented that, 
„If we ever have a „wahyu‟ project from above, we must ensure that procurement goes 
according to the rules and regulations. For example, when government procurement 
involves the Minister, I don‟t really bother about the interference. Sometimes we 
know the contractor is closely connected to the Minister. Then, if you would like to 
violate the rules, you need to ask the Ministry of Finance for a special approval for 
projects initiated by the political master but this might breach the applicable 
procurement regulations‟.  
 
 
                                                          
200
 Without the capability and dedication of its civil service, Malaysia could not have developed 
accordingly. Moreover, the Malaysian bureaucrats are responsible for implementing development 
projects. 
201
 As an implementer, the public official needs to ensure the government procurement is based on 
applicable rules and regulations.   
202
 „Wahyu‟ refers to instructions received from the top level to civil servants which normally need a 
special approval from the Ministry of Finance (MOF). The special approval from the MOF is required 
because that government procurement might violate the procurement guidelines and/or instructed by 
the higher power hierarchy. 
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Majority of regulators affirmed that the public servant as an implementer must 
advocate the delivery of public services. A. S. b. Ahmad et al. (2003) and Dahlstrom 
(2012) argued that generally public officials act as implementers of public policy and 
continue to obey instructions especially when the order comes from a higher status 
person. Such norms and practices have also been embedded in the Malaysian public 
sector. 
 
Professional 10 claimed that many procurement officers simply listen to their 
superior.
203
 All regulators admitted that the decisions for rewarding government 
contract are often imposed in a „top-down‟ fashion, according to which, decisions are 
made collectively and getting instructions from above. On the other hand, Academic 
2 argued that public officials normally obey the instructions given to them and that is 
a part of being a professional public official. Professional 6 insisted that state officials 
are normally decent but somehow the state‟s apparatus abuses its power and engages 
in public procurement fraud. S/he stated that being obedient and decent means that 




Thus, the mantra of „I‟m following the orders‟ in the Malaysian public service, which 
has been entrenched in many aspects of the public administration, facilitates public 
procurement fraud activities. When asked about the meaning of that mantra, 
Regulator 12 explained, 
„Everything that a public servant does is guided by the management‟s policy and 
standards. The instruction comes from above based on the jurisdiction and power 
                                                          
203
 The effects of merely listening and obeying such commands are part of  the consequences of the 
hierarchy of power and status existing in the Malaysian public sector. 
204
 Consequences affecting the public official‟s job security include transfer to other department, no 
promotions or no excellence award.  
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given to every level in the administration. Therefore, it is not a personal decision; 
when a public servant signs a letter or a document the „I‟m following the orders‟ 
comes before the signing of the signature‟. 
 
In justifying the rewarding of a contract for the public interest, the regulators claimed 
for the importance of giving preferential treatments to help the domestic industry. 
This is usually instructed by the procurement policies circulated by the Ministry of 
Finance. Regulator 1 described the situation as below: 
„In rewarding a government contract, we always prefer the local industry. Even 
though they may be a little more expensive that others, we always prioritize their 
application. This is to support and protect our local markets. We never bother with 
any relationship between a minister and the contractors. We only do our job and wait 
for the decisions to be taken to reward the contract. We are only the lowest level 
implementers in procurement processes‟. 
 
All Malaysian public officials confirmed their obligation to follow the orders or 
instructions given to them with submissive obedience. Relatedly, Kelman and 
Hamilton (1989) and Beu and Buckley (2004) raised questions on the morality for 
people to commit illegal acts when so instructed by authority. Yet, this way of 
thinking was challenged by Professional 7 who believed that not all public officials 
want to be blindly obedient. Sometimes they are just forced to do so by being pressed 
upon or threatened. Professional 13 explained about the entrenchment of fraud and 
corruption, especially within the uniform body in Malaysia (e.g., police force, 
soldiers, etc.) which has been tainted by their sense of collective action when 
performing their duties. Thus, when fraud and corruption in the office occurs, these 
people will normally allow it so as to show their loyalty to their team (Carsten & Uhl-
Bien, 2013).  
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In relation to the complexity of handling government procurement, most regulators 
agreed that they could only act within the context they have as procurement 
officers.
205
 Interestingly, Regulator 5 explained that when handling big government 
projects, the procurement officers do not have the power to finalise a deal. In a 
different view, Regulator 13 discussed direct negotiation that is open to abuse.
206
 This 
seems to show the „restricted power‟ of procurement officers when handling 
government contracts in particular when these involve a closely connected contractor 




On the contrary, Politician 5 believed that professionalism means that the public 
officials need to just do what they are asked to and not try to make any changes. 
According to him, being a professional Malaysian public official means that one 
needs to only implement decisions and obey whatever instructions are given to them 
in accordance with particular decisions made by the Cabinet. Therefore, it appears 
that the cultural values, practices, norms, system and structure that have been 
embedded into the Malaysian public sector likely aid the pervasiveness and 
persistence of public procurement fraud. 
 
Interestingly, most of the interviewees explained that Malaysian public officials 
always face dilemmas when asked to follow „questionable‟ instructions from their 
                                                          
205
 In answering a different question about the extent to which their „voice‟ is heard in rewarding 
government contract, all regulators said that they usually follow the rules and instructions given to 
them to the extent that their job as procurement officers allows them. 
206
 S/he mentioned the justification of direct negotiation contract of strategic reason in order for 
procurement officers to choose certain contractors. During such procedure, a direct negotiation 
contract can easily be manipulated. 
207
 For procurement committee decisions, all regulators agreed that the committee has a right to choose 
contractors accordingly, or even change their decisions. 
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superior. The interviewees admitted that they learned to obey, not to talk back and 
never question the orders given by the higher authority. They also highlighted that the 
system (subservient obedience) is a normal practice; it is culturally accepted and 
ingrained in the public office.  Regulator 7 claimed that fraud and corruption is 
embedded in Malaysian public sector because no public official dares to confront any 
decisions made by a higher superior. Although this might be possible because there is 
perhaps the lack of communication between superior and subordinates during the 
decision making process in the public administration, however A. S. b. Ahmad et al. 
(2003) and Mahathir Mohamad (1995) argued that the style of administration as well 
as its own cultural values have been highly influenced by the hierarchical 
bureaucratic structure of the Malaysian administration. The majority of regulators and 
professionals confirmed that they are restricted according to administration rules and 
the way they conduct their work determines whether they get a promotion, a 
certificate of achievements or a transfer. This situation causes suffering for these 
officials in many ways. Placing an emphasis on procurement officers, Professional 5 
said that when there is alleged fraud in a public procurement process,  
„Public officials sometimes act as scapegoats and accept the blame for fraud. We 
know they are sometimes instructed to do the paperwork for a government project, 
particular in cases of direct negotiation contract. They do not really want to do it but 
if the instructions come from the higher authority, who dares to say no?‟ 
 
If a problem arises or any practices in the public sector are questioned, many public 
official are made the scapegoat (I. Lim, 2013a). The reality of the Malaysian 
administration, as explained by Academic 3, when fraud and corruption is detected in 
the public sector is that in the majority of the cases wrongdoings and mistakes are 
attributed mostly to public officials and not the Ministers. An example given by 
Regulator 3 was the Port Klang Free Zone‟s (PKFZ) scandal where only the public 
264 | P a g e  
 
officials needed to step down from their position when there was alleged 
wrongdoings, maladministration and malpractices (L. H. Beng & Lian, 2012; Pua, 
2011). Regulator 10 gave the same example when they emphasised that in the 
PKFZ‟s scandal no one seemed to be held accountable for the RM12.5 billion losses 
of tax payers‟ money (D. Leong, 2014). Although the Malaysian public service has 
undergone major changes and development in public delivery system, it might appear 
that the system created in the Malaysian public service consists of public servants 
who act as desk officers ultimately obeying instructions by their superiors to prepare 
paperwork for the sake of promotions, salary and transfers (Siddiquee, 2013; John 
Anthony Xavier, 2013a). 
 
Lastly, the question about the governance constraints of procurement officers as the 
obedient implementers when handling government procurement has generated 
various responses. Some interviewees view the procurement officer as only a „victim‟ 
if fraud occurs. Other interviewees relate this with the obedience concept and link it 
with the intentional or unintentional conduct of fraud in public procurement. Thus, it 
can cause conflict and this is something discussed next. 
5.4.2 The Conflict   
Political economy lays the groundwork for a dynamic creation of formal and informal 
practices which have become the customary practices of political and economic 
institutions (Wickramasinghe & Hopper, 2005). Therefore, the fear and suppression 
the Malaysian public officials face when they carry out their daily duties have been 
entrenched in their professional life. That is why Academic 3 expressed 
dissatisfaction with the public officials because they are too obedient to politicians. 
S/he said, 
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„Public officials are too obedient to the politicians [as the high ranking officers] 
when conducting their duties. We always say yes to them, we never say no. Always 
yes sir, always do what they ask us to do without asking questions even though 
sometimes their instructions are questionable‟. 
 
Being a professional Malaysian public official has partly contributed to corruption 
and fraud practices in public procurement processes. Some professionals, media 
actors and academics expressed their frustration when they acknowledged that many 
public officials that might engage in fraud and corruption activities possibility do it 
on behalf of the Minister. To some extent, those public officials are forced to do it; 
otherwise, they will be immediately transferred.  
 
Contrary to the above views, Politician 2 highlighted the dilemmas faced by 
everybody in authority. He mentioned that those who are empowered to handle public 
funds by the state officials always have a contradictory role to play. On the one hand, 
they want to serve public services by benefitting everybody. On the other hand, they 
need to consider their private and business interests to survive in the market. As he 
mentioned, the system is not bulletproof and it has always had weaknesses to be 
manipulated. 
 
When acting professionally, the regulators pointed out one important issue, i.e., their 
views on the rewarding contract for the sake of public interest. Regulator 8 said, 
„When rewarding a government contract, we act professionally. Yes, perhaps 
rewarding contract to certain contractors was decided by those at the top. However, 
sometimes, the contract was rewarded based on certain justifications, at the 
discretion of the Minister. Who knows if this is intended for the public interest?‟ 
 
As clear justification for fraud and corruption in Malaysian public sector, regulators 
can rationalize the decisions they take in rewarding such government contract as 
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having to do with diplomatic reasons. It is important to note that the Malaysian civil 
servant apparently sustained the „neutrality principle‟ by maintained the tradition of 
being politically neutral (A. S. b. Ahmad et al., 2003). Although there have been a 
code of ethics of the Malaysian civil servant as values and principles in decision 
making, there are possibility instructions given and interference from the higher 
ranking officer. There is, however, the indication of being „powerless‟ within 
contemporary Malaysia‟s cultural values, norms and practices in public 
administration as described by Politician 3, the fact that the Malaysian public officials 
act professionally means that they do not have the power to reject any instructions 
given to them.  
 
Politician 3 stated that, 
„The public officials are merely powerless. They cannot do anything because they 
always have someone on top of them telling them what to do. They take instructions 
from someone on top of them, from the Minister probably. The moment you say no, 




On top of this, the majority of politicians were of the view that public procurement 
fraud in Malaysia is prevalent and persists because the public officials have partly 
allowed this to happen. The chains of performance and crisis in Malaysian 
governance of its public sector are also affected by the politicization of the state 
bureaucrats. This is examined in the next section. 
5.4.3 Politicization of Bureaucracy  
All regulators acknowledged that they play a prominent role in managing the 
country‟s public administration. However, the governance constraints of the 
politicisation of Malaysian public officials in serving the public interest have been 
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tainted by the interference of politicians in rewarding a government contract (Cross & 
Stuart, 2006). Regulator 5 commented that, 
„The instructions from the Minister‟s office go down to the Chief Secretary and then 
reach the lowest level i.e., us, the procurement desk officers. As desk officers, we 
don‟t get to call the shots. Based on my experience, in many governments 
procurement cases there is always interference from the politicians but we always 
need to be professional when handling procurement processes‟. 
 
 From another point of view the „neutrality‟ concept for the civil servant seems to be 
only applicable to the current regime as the ruling party. The interviewees explained 
that they need to sign the „Letter of Undertaking‟
208
 before starting work in the public 
office as a bond between the public official and the government. Despite this, 
Politician 5 (ex-Prime Minister) insisted that the Malaysian public officials need to be 
professional and implement any public policy decided by the Cabinet. He asserted 
that, 
„According to the system, the administration officials must act professionally and do 
their job. Their job is not to decide but to implement. If the administrative wants to 
decide, they are encroaching on the work of people who are empowered to decide. If 
the administration says “no this is wrong” in relation to a decision made by the 
Cabinet, the public policy cannot carry out its work and the system will not work‟. 
 
Those perspectives perhaps show how the Politician 5, as ex-Prime Minister, reflects 
on the „unquestioned‟ policy i.e., public officials who act only as implementers and 
obediently follow the orders. However, Academic 4 viewed that the professionalism 
of Malaysian public officials is supposedly based on the professional bureaucracy of 
experts. Academic 4 further argued the professionalism of Malaysia‟s public 
bureaucracy started „deteriorating‟ in 1981. During that year, Malaysia ventured into 
privatisation and industrialisation by transforming its public administration (Dass & 
                                                          
208
 The „Letter of Undertaking‟ obliges the civil servants to be loyal, not to smear the country‟s name, 
to always keep the information of government agencies private and confidential and to exercise their 
public duty with a high degree of accountability and integrity (F. Hamid, 2013). 
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Abbott, 2008). The aim was to change the nature of Malaysia‟s economy from 
agricultural to industrial in order to achieve economic growth and modernisation of 
the state. Privatisation aimed to improve efficiency and lead to economic growth but 
study by Salazar (2004) and Jeff Tan (2008) appear to argue that the decision to 
privatise according to New Public Management policy in Malaysia seems to have 
opened up opportunities for rent-seeking activities, it has nurtured a   patronage 
system and a lack of accountability and transparency conditions. In a similar vein, 
Academic 4 further explained that, 
„When the Prime Minister decided to liberalize, privatise and deregulate this was his 
decision, his personal choice and he has passed it to the bureaucrats. These actions 
have to some extent generated fraud, corruption, and cronyism. At that time, there 
was an increased need for public procurement and this allowed fraud and corruption 
to flourish. The nightmare of developmental state Malaysia started when the boss 
started ruling by making his own decisions without referring to the public officials‟. 
 
It is also important to point out the moral hazard that seems to pollute governance 
mechanism for the Malaysian public officials (Rachagan & Kuppusamy, 2013; Rodan 
& Hughes, 2014). Academic 1 clearly stated that the moral hazard is created when the 
political master disregards the expertise of civil servants. In the name of their 
personal interests, powerful groups neglect the public bureaucrats and take advice 
only from closely connected friends‟ rather than from the experts. Media Actor 3 
argued that the institutions have started to erode and this has opened up more space 
for fraud and corruption. This view is clearly expressed by Academic 5 when 
claiming that, 
„The procurement process has no check and balance mechanisms. The ministers are 
quite powerful and the state bureaucrats are sub-servants of the Minister. In this 
country, state bureaucrats take their cue from politicians‟. 
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All academics interviewed agreed that a powerful Minister is the one who sets the 
direction for the state, not the civil servants. Although it is legitimate for Ministers 
from governing coalitions to set the direction for a country (Doherty, 1988), the civil 
servants are the ones responsible to implement public policy for the greater benefits 
of the citizens. It appears that when a Minister uses their position and power to 
influence and interfere with public administration by not taking into consideration the 
expertise of civil servants opportunities for abusing the system arise; all academics 
clearly confirmed the way the system is structured in Malaysian public administration 
is wrong (L. H. Hai, 2002). 
 
The evidence gathered from the interviews excellently show how governance 
constraints faced by the Malaysian public officer have contributed to the persistence 
of public procurement fraud in Malaysia. First, public officers are likely to follow the 
culture of being obedient, not to talk back and never question the instructions
209
 given 
by their superior. This system has prevailed in many aspects of governance of public 
administration. To some extent, it is also pertinent to link the values; practices and 
organizational culture in the Malaysian public administration from colonial past and 
the legacy left from historical institutionalism (see Chapter 4).  Second, the 
conflicting role of Malaysian civil servant is often masked with the justification and 
rationalization for procurement fraud. The civil servants are powerless, as they never 
say „no‟ to any instruction given to them by politicians. Finally, the study highlights 
the politicisation of bureaucracy in the Malaysia public sector and that is affected by 
the interference of political engagement, which is intended for the pursuit of certain 
                                                          
209
 The role of Malaysian public officials is to follow the instructions received from their superior even 
though that may make them victims of scapegoating. 
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vested interests. Therefore, the social structures which have been created in the 
Malaysian public sector perhaps may have enabled, and/or might constrained the 
actions of social actors in many aspects of procurement practices in the Malaysian 
society. 
5.5 Public Procurement Fraud within the Malaysian Society 
 
The occurrence of public procurement fraud and corruption practices can be seen 
from the media coverage of the annual Auditor‟s General report, Anti-Corruption 
Agencies report, and other international agencies‟ reports. Most of the interviewees 
acknowledged that the problem of public procurement fraud still exists in the 
Malaysian public sector. This section describes the views of stakeholders regarding 
public procurement fraud in relation to the distinctiveness of the Malaysian society 
that supports (1) the successful ideology for wealth, material goods and money, and 
(2) the institutionalization.  
5.5.1 Successful Ideology of Wealth, Material goods and Money 
The central argument of political economy theory is how political and economic 
forces co-exist (Banks & Hanushek, 1995). In this context, creation of wealth and 
capital and the pursuit of materials, development and growth is perennial. Ironically, 
Nambiar (2014) argues Malaysia is a developing country and, as such, there are many 
infrastructural projects running at the same time. The mushroom of mega projects and 
the lack of control mechanisms may impose serious treats to weak and not advanced 
control systems that in many cases proved to be inadequate to cope with this 
new/sudden growth which may likely open up a space and opportunity for 
malpractices, fraud and corruption (Malaysia Today, 2015; J. Ng, 2015; Tan, 2012). 
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At the same time, evidence of business and government activity for development and 
growth was given by Regulator 12, who linked the needs of mega projects under the 
pretext of „national interest‟ and pointed out that, 
„The overarching policy and mega projects may be heavily influenced by the ruling 
party. The monopolization of power of the ruling party has to some extent forced the 
implementation of the projects. After all, the decisions made by the ruling party are 
for the development and growth of Malaysia‟. 
 
 
In order to achieve greater economic growth, the Malaysian state has concentrated on 
industrialization, which has created reasonable materiality values and growth to its 
society. Regulator 2 claimed that the new ethos of public services has made the public 
office extravagantly ambitious. Regulator 4 supported this idea by saying, 
„Even in the public sector, which provides public services, the government contracts 
entail materialistic values. They aim for more wealth and money‟. 
 
For this reason, Academic 4 insisted on emphasizing how quickly Malaysia has 
achieved growth and development. He explained how it took other developed 
countries 100 to 200 years to develop both economically and socially – i.e., in ways 
that they also found solutions to various social problems they were facing. However, 
Malaysia was developed at an extraordinary speed, only in a few decades. This 
academic was confident that this occurred at the expense of institutional rules and 
regulations, which were neglected and never addressed. In this way, fraud and 
corruption continue to flourish within the Malaysian society.  
 
However, the views of ex-Prime Minister contradicted those of the other 
interviewees. He was very proud of the development and growth achieved in 
Malaysia within such short time. In his words,  
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„You see the country has developed much faster than most other countries which 
became independent about the same time. Now when the country is developed, it 
means that it is possible to do business. In Malaysia, you will see the roads, the 
railway and the government offices are built and subsidies are given. All things have 
been done here. As far as corruption is concerned, corruption is universal; otherwise 
this thing [he refers to development] cannot be achieved‟. 
 
The ex-Prime Minister‟s view on the universality of corruption is used by him as a 
justification for fraud and corruption in the Malaysian public sector, and perhaps as 
necessary in order to achieve development. Despite the fast growth and development, 
Tan (2012) and O.M. Bakre (2010) argue that when development and growth are not 
achieved by having robust structures of control and good governance, this likely 
opens up space for wrongdoings and abuse. Perhaps, the ex-Prime Minister was not 
as concerned about corruption as he was about growth and development in Malaysia. 
Although the ex-Prime minister was concerned about the loss of government fund 
from procurement frauds and the failure to carry out government projects, he accepts 
that fraud and corruption happen all over the world. 
 
From another point of view, Academic 4 strongly believed that the new-liberal 
globalization
210
 aims to create more wealth and maximize profits. Also, the new-
liberal globalization provides motivation and opportunities for accumulation of 
capital as economic expansion (Handley, 2008; Ward & England, 2007; Waters, 
2001). The outcomes from that ideology hence may sometimes involve fraud, 
corruption, malpractices and financial crisis (see Michele Chwastiak, 2013; Morales 
                                                          
210
 S/he, however, claimed that the new mantra of new-liberal globalization favours profit 
maximization and wealth creation (including many government contracts) which has been embedded 
in the society. By pursuing self-interests in a free market system, entrepreneurs are willing to do 
whatever it takes to get a richer and appear to be successful, regardless violation of ethical and moral 
values. 
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et al., 2014). In relation to this, Academic 3 drew attention to the vicious circle of 
capitalism within the Malaysian society and stated that, 
„In order to get rich, people are willing to do anything. It‟s okay to chase money, it‟s 
okay to get rich because the target is to get richer, to maximize profits for wealth. It‟s 
okay to step on other people‟s head, it‟s okay to lie, cheat and stab someone in the 
back. It is all okay as long you reach your target. This is clearly embedded and 
engrained in our society‟. 
 
 
The idea of getting rich is also mentioned by Professional 13 when mentioning the 
paradigm shift of the Malaysian society towards money culture. This professional 
explained that money culture to towards growth and development in Malaysia and the 
obsession with getting rich quickly. This obsession has led to many causes of 
corruption, be it petty or grand corruption cases. The concept of capitalism is one way 
for people to create wealth and achieve profits (The Economist, 2013). Academic 5 
commented on the role of the state in relation to this, 
„The role of the state in this [public procurement fraud] comes from the abuse of the 
procurement system by the engagement from the state in giving all these contracts 
through a patronage system and by manoeuvring public policy itself‟. 
 
The concept of capitalism (i.e., creation of wealth and capital) is embedded in the 
Malaysian society (even without realizing it) through the capitalism transformation. 
Academic 2 believed that people are always searching for a new way of getting rich 
by chasing money and wealth and that they are driven by a lust for materiality. 
Academic 2 claimed that the fact that the Malaysian society embraced the capitalism 
mantra has contributed to the emergence of fraud and corruption. 
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The consequences of materialism and of giving value to money are quite deep in the 
Malaysian society.
211
 Engaging in fraud and corruption practices has been justified 
and rationalized under the pretext of the rapid growth of the society and the country. 
Being rich is considered a success in life and offers someone a higher social status. 
Despite the fact that the majority of the citizens in Malaysia are Muslims, the country 
has adopted a liberal capitalist economic system for its economic transformation 
(Pemandu, 2011). K. S. Jomo (1998), Athukorala (2002) and Tajuddin (2014), 
however, have pointed out the flaws of the capitalist economic system in Malaysia 
that perhaps promotes inequality, suppression and prioritizes the most powerful and 
rich groups. In talking about the justification of wrongdoings, Media Actor 3 claimed, 
„In many cases, we can see that those who engage in fraudulent and corruption 
activities generally will go to perform the Hajj: Pilgrimage to Mecca to the sacred 
sites in Mecca. Sadly, the illegitimate money gained from fraud, corruption and 
malpractices is used to perform the Hajj. These people say that in order to clean 
themselves from the „sin‟, they perform the Hajj with the intention to ask forgiveness 
from the God‟. 
 
Regulator 1 stated that some wrongdoers like to donate to charity every year (perhaps 
by using the money gain from corrupt deals). S/he further explained that the good 
deeds „performed‟ to the community by donating money to charity as one way to 
show their ethical values. Thus, Islamic ethics have continuously faded within the 
Malaysian society as described by Academic 3,  
„We have been instilled with a life structure of the so-called establishment in the 
country. That structure of life is based on how you are brought up – the family 
institutions, moral values, and religious teaching. Our development has sacrificed the 
human capital development in terms of morality and good governance. Even our 
Islamic values have been weakened in order to be rich. Good governance is never 
                                                          
211
 Materialism and giving value to money contradict the Islamic religion, which teaches people to help 
the poor, to be fair and just, to have an ethical and good character, and „to command the good and 
forbid the evil‟ in all aspects of life. The consequences of materialism are that it erodes moral values 
and human ethics (see Sloane-White, 2011; Sloane, 1999; Welsh, 2013b).   
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instilled. On paper it is good, but we are hiding behind the good governance to 
conduct corrupt practices‟. 
 
 
The next section addresses the trend towards the institutionalization of fraud and 
corruption in Malaysia.  
5.5.2 Towards Institutionalization  
The institutionalization of fraud and corruption in Malaysia has been encouraged 
under the pretext of developing the country by using public policies. Public policy in 
Malaysia has legitimised state intervention in the market and increased public sector 
expenditure so as to generate capital and wealth (Sundaram & Hui, 2014)  This is 
explained in detailed by Academic 3,  
„The model of development encouraged by the government was actually aiming to 
make certain people rich, very rich while others lose their money. The existing 
government is the one that has been implementing this structured system and has let 
it mature throughout all these years‟. 
 
The endemic system of fraud and corruption is possibly nurtured by the 
implementation of public policy in Malaysia. Politician 1 disclosed that the 
government is the one which seems to be the most capable institution to engage in 
many „malpractices‟ and nurture this system in the public sector. S/he further 
explained that systemic fraud is embedded in the institutional structure of a 
country,
212
 something that helps malpractices to flourish.  
 
It is interesting to note that most of the interviewees also insisted on emphasizing that 
income disparity in Malaysia resulted from the implementation of Malaysia‟s public 
policy (Faizli, 2014; Roslan, 2001). Media Actor 3 explained that in many occasions, 
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 In particular, Migdal (1988) explored the highly-centralised capabilities of the state to control the 
mobilization of human and resources.   
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fraud and corruption is committed to ease and speed up a government process. This 
media actor confirmed that such wrongdoings have been widespread in the society 




At the same time, all interviewees agreed that Malaysian society is still bound to the 
historical, socio-political and economic structures that have shaped and created many 
social practices (including fraud and corruption practices). Regulator 2 and 4 believed 
that the way many Malaysians think has been shaped by the socio-political, economic 
and cultural values as those have developed throughout its history. Political economy 
responds to the prevailing directions of the cultural and values context created as the 
result of political consequences and as an economic phenomenon (E. Brown & Cloke, 
2005). Regulator 7, Professional 10 and the majority of politicians, media actors and 
academics suggest that historical roots, socio-political and economic values and the 
cultural context influence how people think and react to different situations. For 
example, the culture and values of respect and loyalty to one‟s superior and authority 
are deep-seated within the community (Daniels, 2005). Professional 5 in particular 
argued that, 
„We always believe our top leaders and their leadership. We always respect and put 
our trust that what they (the ruling elites) are doing is always good for the country. 
[If this hadn‟t been the case] people would not have voted for the same party all this 
time‟. 
 
This view seems to reflect on the institutionalization of fraud and corruption when the 
masses believe that whatever the ruling coalition‟s decision is, it is for the interest of 
the country, regardless of the fact that many ruling elites have been accused of fraud 
                                                          
213
 It highlights how the system of bureaucracy in many government departments results in  paying 
many public officials „under the counter‟ so as to get one‟s job done.  
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and corruption activities openly (Anand, 2015; The Economist, 2001; The Malay 
Mail Online, 2015). Some regulators and professionals, in particular, justified this 
with a rationalised reason. It is important to point out that perhaps other ideologies, 
such as nationalism, also make things difficult and prohibit change from happening. 
This is because anybody who challenges the government or questions the action of 
the authority seems to be called a traitor and disloyal to the country. Considering that 
historical institutionalism might have influenced and shaped socio-political, 
economic, cultural values, norms, practices and organizational cultures in the modern 
society, Media Actor 4 expressed their concern, 
„In Malaysia, all the actions of the ruling elites are acceptable as they are assumed to 
be for the national interest or good for the country. But anyone who tries to challenge 
or ask questions about their actions and decisions is called a traitor or one who is 
trying to tarnish the country‟s name‟. 
 
This is evident when the Sedition Act 1948 is used to prohibit discourse that is 
„deemed‟ seditious and disrupts the peace and harmony in the country (Devaraj, 
2015; Palatino, 2015). On the pretext that in this way they  maintain „harmony‟, the 
governing coalition appears to expect total obedience from the public and 
consequently, this is probably how they are able to maintain their hegemony and 
power (E. Ng, 2014; The Malaysian Insider, 2015b).  
 
Moreover, Media Actor 3 commented on the peculiarity of the Malaysian society that 
allows fraud and corruption practices to flourish: 
„We, as Malaysians, always look up to those who are of a higher status than us. We 
believe they need to be treated in a special way and differently than others as their 
status protects them from the system, especially those clinging on to a powerful 
person‟. 
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What is more, the nature of Asian values tends to favour forgiving and forgetting of 
any wrongdoings occurring in the country.
214
 Unfortunately, culprits take advantage 
of these values.
215
 Many interviewees highlighted the differences between Asian and 
Western cultures. Politician 5 expressed his views highlighting that, 
„The Asian culture is different from the Western culture. In Western culture, people 
do not have an extended family. They don‟t even consider that their family owns 
anything to them. But in Asian culture you have families, friends who always put 
pressure on you to help them‟. 
 
From this point of view, favouring one‟s extended family and friends may be seen as 
cronyism, favouritism and bias in rewarding government contracts. The person in 
authority is vulnerable to fraud and corruption, as they need to consider their 
relationships and friendships with other people when evaluating and negotiating 
government tenders. Thus, crony capitalism in Malaysia‟s government procurement 
has spawned a legitimate form of allocating and distributing the country‟s wealth.  
 
As shown by empirical evidence, the development of public procurement fraud in 
Malaysia has to some extent been influenced by the nature of Malaysian society. 
First, there is transformation of the society in terms of what being successful means; 
it now means to possess wealth, materials and money. Although the successful 
ideology of being rich and acquiring a higher social status may contradict Islamic 
values
216
 (by engaging in fraud and corruption activities), the ruling elites have 
„colonised‟ the mind of the Malaysian society and made them believe this is 
acceptable as long as it is for fortune and prosperity. Second, the institutionalization 
                                                          
214
 Common values for the Asian society involve, among others, high tolerance, respect for a superior 
and the elder people, the concept of politeness, the idea of not giving defensive and offended opinions, 
the avoidance of confrontation in order to remain happy and peaceful (Yoong et al., 2007). 
215
This is because they know that eventually their wrongdoings will be forgiven and forgotten.  
216
 The contradiction with Islamic values are justified and cleansed accordingly. 
P a g e  | 279 
 
 
of fraud and corruption is supported for the sake of development and growth. 
Historical roots, socio-political and economic values and the cultural context have 
shaped customs and practices in such a way that fraud and corruption are tolerated 
and acceptable. The next section provides a summary and an overall discussion of the 
analysis chapter. 
5.6 Summary  
 
This chapter has presented the views of various stakeholder groups about public 
procurement fraud in Malaysia. Taking together their responses and perspectives on 
the issue, it provides evidence to explain why procurement fraud continues to persist 
in the Malaysian public sector.  
 
This section draws attention to the dynamic power of political and economic forces 
which suggest (1) for a nurtured system of political business which operates through 
legitimate interactions of public and private organisations. Notably the same 
interactions promote crony capitalism, patronage, favouritism and rent-seeking which 
have been greatly influenced by financing and donations for a political party; (2) that 
the political power works in alliance with narrow economic interests for wealth and 
capital accumulation and (3) that when business meets government over public policy 
issues, public policies might be formed or implemented in such as way so as to create 
opportunities for and enable fraudulent practices which benefit people with vested 
interests at the expense of the public. 
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The complexity of check and balance mechanisms in Malaysia was identified 
through: (1) the historical legacies that are deeply embedded in Malaysia‟s 
administration; (2) lack of independence amongst the three pillars of governance 
institutions; (3) the ineffectiveness of many government agencies to curb public 
procurement fraud; (4) judiciary branch as a „tool‟ for a political party; and (5) the 
longevity of the power of the ruling elites that provides them with a means of 
conducting public procurement fraud in Malaysia. 
 
There are institutional deficiencies within Malaysia‟s procurement practices as below: 
(1) astute individuals are able to exploit the weaknesses in procurement process so as 
to play around the system; (2) there is lack of evidence because the abuse of power 
can be camouflaged by legitimate and genuine government documentation; (3) the 
existence of hegemonic control of the Ministry of Finance in many aspects of 
government purchasing. 
 
The governance constraints of the Malaysian public servants in conjunction with 
certain structures created in the Malaysian public sector have resulted in the creation 
of a set of norms, practices and cultures that contribute to the occurrence of fraud and 
corruption. The section casts light on (1) the public official as an obedient 
implementer who does not question the instructions given by their superior; a practice 
that has long been instilled in the public office; (2) the conflicting role that the public 
servants have in relation to whether to serve the public interest or do their political 
master‟s favours and (3) the influence of political discourse in public administration.  
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The Malaysian society has to some extent „allowed‟ and helped public procurement 
fraud in Malaysia „persist‟. (1) The interviewees argued that the Malaysian society 
developed in such a way that it celebrate the chase of wealth, money and social status 
and it may encourage fraudulent behaviour. Consequently, people are willing to do 
whatever it takes to achieve their materialistic aims, including engaging in fraud and 
corruption. (2) By tolerating and accepting „malpractices‟ under the pretext that this is 
for growth and development, institutional fraud and corruption has been practiced and 
embraced openly, especially by those in power. Thus, the sense-making for prosperity 
and wealth has been eventually (re)shaped and (re)created into cultural, values and 
practices. 
 
Chapter 4 discussed how the nature of historical legacies, the socio-political, 
economic, and cultural context of Malaysia has contributed to the emergence of 
procurement fraud. Chapter 5 provided the empirical evidence for the persistence and 
prevalence of public procurement fraud in Malaysia. The next chapter reviews and 
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Chapter 6 Discussion  
6.0 Introduction 
 
This penultimate chapter of this thesis provides a discussion of the findings of the 
documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews with 5 main stakeholders 
involved in Malaysia‟s procurement practices. Evidence of public procurement fraud 
practices was collected from the views and perceptions of the main interviewees. It is 
important to note that those stakeholders are social actors who experience and 
construct meaning of social phenomenon in their own way and can perhaps aid the 
understanding of public procurement fraud practice in Malaysia. Nevertheless, this 
study does not aim to make generalisations or draw substantial conclusions regarding 
the social phenomenon but instead aims to shed light on the understanding of 
fraudulent practices in procurement. This chapter aims to synthesise the findings
217
 of 
the two previous chapters (chapters 4 and 5) and to provide critical explanations for 
them in the context of the relevant literature and the theoretical framework 
underpinning this research.  
 
This chapter is divided into 6 sections (see Figure 6.1). In order to illustrate the 
persistence of public procurement fraud in Malaysia, the discussions are based on the 
theoretical framework described in Chapter 3 and aim to demonstrate various 
interlinking elements taken from the political economy approach. This chapter 
considers potential explanations for the persistence of public procurement fraud in 
Malaysia. Following this introduction, section 6.1 explores the prevailing power 
                                                          
217
 The results of the document analysis and the semi-structured interviews (see chapters 4 and 5) are 
considered in light of the research questions. 
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relations of political and economic institutions in Malaysia. This section shows how 
dominant power relations are a catalyst for certain stakeholders to engage in public 
procurement fraud. The third section reflects on the rational decisions made by 
economic actors in relation to resource allocation (section 6.2). This section sheds 
light on how individuals look after their interests and how they maximise their profits 
in their pursuit of capital. Next, section 6.3 considers policymaking practices in 
Malaysia and discusses the interaction of prominent social actors and their 
consequences on policymaking processes. The institutionalisation of the 
policymaking framework in Malaysia innately reflects the relative power and interests 
of the coalitions of social actors. The chapter continues with a synthesis of findings in 
relation to the existence of a crony network at a close nexus of government and 
business relationship in section 6.4. The crony network manages to award 
government contracts to favoured economic groups and it is usually able to 
„camouflage‟ these fraudulent transactions through legitimate transactions of 
government purchasing. The structure of social networks consisting of politicians, top 
bureaucrats and business elites, is explored accordingly. The final section (section 
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6.1 The Power of Political and Economic Institutions: The 
Prevailing Institutional Arrangements 
 
The current study discusses the significance of the institutional power structure, 
which is embedded in the social structure and culturally shapes the behaviour of 
groups and practices of institutions. The political economy approach forms the basis 
of understanding the power relations on how actors use their position to protect their 
interests (Twigg, 2012). To strengthen the legitimacy of the state‟s role and their 
practices, an analysis of power relations in this section sheds light on three main 
attributes: (1) the institutional power structure, (2) historical institutionalism and (3) 
the creation of formal and informal practices. This thesis then considers the prevailing 
power elements in both institutions: politics and economics. 
6.1 The Prevailing Power of Political and Economic Institutions 
 
6.0 Introduction  
6.2 Rational Decisions of Economic Actors 
 
6.3 The Policymaking Practices 
 
6.4 Businesses-Government Network 
 
6.5 Summary  
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6.1.1 The Institutional Power of the Governance Institutions 
There are dominant power relations of the government and the market that act as 
political and economic institutions
218
 within Malaysia‟s governance system. The 
socio-political and economic elements of Malaysia‟s governance system are 
exemplified in Chapter 4 as the constitutional structure of power of the Malaysian 
state. Regardless of the structure of the power exercised by the executive, the 
legislative and the judicial branch, there are noticeable forces that play a role in the 
persistence of public procurement fraud in Malaysia.  
 
The findings seem to address on prevailing power of the executive branch and the 
prime-ministerial system in the government. First, the executive powers influenced by 
the Prime Minister and the Cabinet
219
 lead to a concentration of power in public 
office (section 4.2.1 and section 5.2). Accordingly, it appears that any procurement 
policies and their implementation reflect the power, influence and discretion of the 
office of the Prime Minister.
220
 In this regard, the power accrued by the Prime 
Minister has reinforced an authoritarian administration by using the government 
apparatus (Loong, 2013). Most importantly, the authoritarian rule is institutionalised 
with power and influence through a legitimate system of being elected by voters 
(section 4.2.2).  
                                                          
218
 The practice of political business in Malaysia has been nurtured and supported through social 
actors‟ capabilities and institutionalized actions in many areas of public procurement (E.T. Gomez, 
2002; Nicholas J. White, 2004). This element is explained in detail in section 6.5-Business-
Government Crony Network.  
219
 The Cabinet profoundly adheres to the principle of collective ministerial responsibility as stipulated 
in Article 43(3) of the Malaysian Constitution. The „cabinet collective responsibility‟ is 
constitutionally based on government using the Westminster System where all ministers and 
parliamentary representatives must publicly support all decisions made by the government through the 
Cabinet even though they do not agree with the decisions made (Masum, 2012). 
220
 In their study of the concentration of power of the Prime Minister, Hwang (2003); Khair et al. 
(2015) and A. Harding (2012) disclose the personalisation power of Malaysia‟s Prime Minister to 
control the ruling coalition as well as the legislative and judiciary branches. 
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Second, the same authoritarian regime appears to impose constraints upon the public 
officials discharging their accountability as civil servants (section 4.4 and section 
5.4). However, there seems to be tendency for conflict of interest in relation to the 
public‟s interests, especially in delivering public policy,
221
 and the public officer‟s 
obligation to accept the instructions and implement the order given to them without 
further questions (section 5.4.2). In relation to the concern of the accountability 
constraints of the Malaysian public officials, this study aims to address how those 
constraints have, to an extent, preserved fraudulent practices in the public offices.  
 
Third, findings indicate that the government‟s agencies, which are responsible for 
curbing and minimising fraud and corruption in the Malaysian public sector were 
seen to have been compromised when their appointment, hierarchy of power and 
other forms of undue influence go back to the discretion of the Prime Minister‟s 
office (section 4.2.1). There are also some perceptions that the lack of effectiveness of 
the government agencies to ensure public accountability and good governance is 
because public administration under the influence of by the hierarchical power of the 
authoritarian rule (section 5.2). Thus, it implies that the authoritarian nature of the 
executive power in the current study predominantly affects every aspect of the nature 
and operation of the public-administrative institutional environment. 
 
Given that the fact that the incumbent ruling party has been in power since 
independence (year 1957) they implicitly maintains the status quo of the governing 
coalitions and helps them staying in power (Khair et al., 2015, Tajuddin, 2014). First, 
                                                          
221
 While public policy mechanisms are (supposedly) used for development and growth (A.-A. Bakar 
& Ahmad, 2013; Hutchinson, 2014), there are, however, some questions on the exercising of public 
accountability of its public funds. 
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pervasive characteristics of the incumbent dominant ruling party, which has been the 
supreme power for 58 years with no or very little resistance or contesting from other 
parties especially through electoral practice, were noted (Chapter 4, William Case, 
2011). There are some indications that the strong powerful government of the ruling 
governing coalition places them in an advantageous position since they are able to 
secure the majority of the seats in the Parliament so as to endorse any public policy, 
laws and rules for the country they want to. It is argued that the prolonged 
institutional power of the ruling elite lacks the political will to eliminate fraud and 
corruption, especially the elite level corruption in most high-profile cases (section 
4.2.2 and section 5.2).
222
 These findings support the studies conducted by Caulfield 
(2014) and Heggstad et al. (2010) who claim that investigation of fraud in public 
procurement appears to be rather restrained because of the limited chances of 
bringing the culprit to the court. There is lack of prosecution for the misuse of 
political and administrative power (Pemandu, 2009). The above might suggest that 
politicians as well as of politically-linked individuals in alleged cases of fraud and 
corruption are protected and that is why they are rarely prosecuted (Khair et al., 2015; 
D. Leong, 2014). 
 
Second, the entrenched political power exercised by the same governing coalition as 
described by Abdul Aziz (2002) and Masum (2012) appears to consolidate the Prime 
Ministerial supremacy in the Parliament. The main stakeholders‟ perception is that 
the Parliament is merely a „rubber-stamp‟ institution that gives legitimacy to the 
decisions made by the Cabinet (section 5.2.4). The majority of the interviewees 
strongly agree that the constraints of the Parliamentary roles mean that it is not a 
                                                          
222
 High-profile cases normally involve high ranking officials, politicians and business leaders.  
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„true‟ legislative body but rather a fusion of the powers of the executive branch 
(Thomas, 2001; Yaakob et al., 2009). The study indicates that overlapping roles are 
unavoidable within Malaysia‟s governance system as the same Minister from both the 
ministry and the Cabinet attends the Parliament session. Therefore, it seems that the 
decision for any government projects and contracts is influenced by the legitimate 
political power of the same government, thus enabling them to promote and favour 
certain practices or policies. The point that is often overlooked here is how powerful 
groups, as described in this study, can interact and legitimise their actions by holding 
the power of the incumbent government and the supreme power of Parliament 
(section 4.2.2 and section 5.2). As can be seen, the participants of this study appear to 
highlight the untouchable position
223
 of the ruling coalition that exercises an absolute 
power in Malaysia. This leaves the impression that the power of the government and 
the supreme power has made the ruling party invulnerable because they are never 
likely to be charged with engaging in fraud and corruption activities in government 
purchasing. 
 
The judiciary institution in Malaysia somewhat contributes to the persistence of 
public procurement fraud in Malaysia. First, some of the interviewees indicated  
„selective prosecution‟ exercised by the judiciary in favour of those in power (section 
4.2.3). It was observed that the same party has ruled in Malaysia since its 
independence in 1957. The institutionalization of the supreme power by the ruling 
government coalition in Malaysia enables selective prosecution to be applied. In other 
                                                          
223
 The ruling coalition of Barisan Nasional (the Alliance Party) in Malaysia is known as the world‟s 
most successful ruling coalition as they have been able to be in power for more than half a century. 
Because of the dominant and legitimate political power, their influence and actions are justified and 
rationalised with complete impunity (Z. Ahmad & Phang, 2005; Miller, 2013). 
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words, the institutionalized power is concentrated and the executive can prosecute 
whomever they want. For example, in terms of the investigation and prosecution for 
fraud and corruption cases, there is no real arm‟s length relationship among the three 
institutions. The arm‟s length principle in this thesis is about the conditions of check 
and balance mechanisms that exist among the 3 pillar of institutions in Malaysia 
which are rarely independent and it seems that efforts to curb fraud and corruption in 
Malaysia do not  stand on an equal footing (F. A. Aziz & Yi, 2007; Koh, 2012b; The 
Star, 2012a) 
 
To some extent, it would appear that the role played by the Attorney General suggests 
a case of conflict of interest that impairs the judicial independence (A. J. Harding, 
1990). As has been discussed in Chapter 5, the judicial institution is not able to check 
and monitor the power of other governance institutions (section 5.2.4). Not only is 
there a wide perception of the lack of judicial independence, the findings also pointed 
out the curtailed power of judges prior to the controversial legislative amendments to 
the constitution in 1988. The curtailed power of judges indicate the exercise of 
selective prosecution by the judiciary because it seems that much of the judicial 
power has been discharged and it is in the hands of the Parliament (Soon, 2013, 
section 4.2.3). Most interviewees noted the lack of transparency and coverage on the 
actions taken against perpetrators, especially in high-profile cases. Following this, the 
monitoring government agency
224
 highlights that for corruption cases reported in 
2009 the conviction rate for politicians and local authorities is extremely low 
                                                          
224
 The monitoring agency refers to PEMANDU which stands for Performance Management and 
Delivery Unit and it is a unit under the Prime Minister‟s department which oversees the 
implementation, evaluation and examination of a policy progress; it also facilitates and supports the 
delivery of public policy. One of the roles of the monitoring agency is to monitor crime and any 
programs which are designed to curb corruption (see www.pemudah.gov.my).  
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(Pemandu, 2009). It seems then that the judicial branch is used as a tool to legitimise 
the actions of the ruling party in the court cases that involve people favourable to 
those in power (section 4.2.2 and section 5.2.4). 
 
Second, the complexity of the law in proving intent to commit fraud and corruption 
can be easily manipulated and this results in a lack of prosecution and punishment. 
Some interviewees considered that if the fraudster has a close connection with the 
ruling party, any allegations of fraud and corruption seem to be rationalised, and any 
investigation on the matter will probably be dropped (section 5.2.4). These views are 
similar to those of R. J. Berger (2011) as well as P. Green and Ward (2004) who 
argue that when a malfeasance is committed by the political and economic elites, or 
those with close connections with powerful people, the criminal justice system tends 
to overlook such crimes. The findings seem to suggest that in order to escape 
punishment and prosecution in Malaysia, it is very crucial to understand that „who‟ 
you know (those who have close connection with people in power) and not „what‟ 
you know (the crime and its details) is important  (Devaraj, 2015; The Malaysian 
Insider, 2012). In the events of great losses of public funds in many high-profile 
cases, B. Teoh (2013) argues that the public‟s confidence in judiciary is shaken. The 
current study, in particular, refers to the powerful of the governing coalition who with 
their institutional power structure can simply „choose‟ and „select‟ cases that are in 
their interest (section 5.2.4). 
 
Third, given the prevailing hegemonic control held by the powerful groups, there are 
some indications that these people have been able to define and construct what is and 
what is not considered to be criminal activity. Herman and Chomsky (2002) and 
292 | P a g e  
 
Johns (2010), for instance, suggest that control and influence in constructing a „crime‟ 
is performed through the mass media and public opinion. Yet, it is important to note 
that the mass media play a role in constructing the definition and understanding of 
„crime‟ in the society by being an agency which is controlled by the powerful people 
in society (e.g., the ruling party). From this point of view, the perception is that the 
crimes of the powerful people in Malaysia are justified as common sense and it is 
unlikely that their wrongdoings would be defined as criminal acts (section 5.2). For 
example, there is evidence in this study to suggest that the regulators are able to 
justify themselves for rewarding government projects to a company that has close 
connections to the ruling party (e.g., for the national interest or diplomatic reasons) 
(section 5.4.2). However, in line with the studies of Neu et al. (2014) and Stefes 
(2007), it is difficult to detect and prosecute a network of systemic corruption. It is 
assumed that when fraud and corruption are systemic, endemic and highly 
institutionalised, the informal rules and norms are embedded in a myriad of informal 
networks which are highly unlikely to be detected and prosecuted as they have been 
normalised in day-to-day activities (see Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Stefes, 2008, 
section 5.5). As a result, the judicial system faces difficulty in detecting and 
prosecuting criminal activity, especially if it is conducted by powerful individuals.  
 
While many interviewees acknowledge the existence and importance of check and 
balance mechanisms to ensure public accountability, their existence may to a large 
extent be regarded as irrelevant since the political influence from the current regime 
has been able to endure for a very long time without any interference (section 4.2.1 
and section 4.2.2). The findings and discussions presented earlier demonstrated how 
power is used as a medium to influence the governance structure in Malaysia and why 
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check and balance mechanisms are very limited in what they (can) do and hardly 
anything can be done to curb fraud and corruption (section 4.2 and section 5.2). This 
raises the question of to what extent Malaysia may be considered a democratic 
nation,
225
 one which typically elects representatives by voting in a Parliament (section 
4.2.2, A. Ibrahim, 2014). The conflict and antagonism in a democratic nation like 
Malaysia may reflect the predominantly social unrest and tensions existing in a civil 
society when there is high level of inequality in the country (Shukry, 2014, section 
4.3.1.3). Ooi (2015) and Muzaffar (2015) raised concerns over the impediment of 
democracy in Malaysia. As a result of the impairment of democracy in Malaysia, the 
important role
226
 of civil society actors (CSA) in a democratization process and social 
change for the society has to be emphasized (Schmidt, 2010).  
 
The media has a particular important role to play in disseminating news and 
information, in reflecting social reality and as powerful ideology institutions that 
influence people‟s views on a particular subject (Herman & Chomsky, 2002). 
Herman and Chomsky (2002) provide evidence on how media has consistently toed 
the government line and how some issues/topics have been framed and manipulated. 
Thus, the media affects people‟s perspective according to how they present and 
interpret the news. The power of media in Malaysia is controlled as follows. Firstly, 
media control
227
 is predominantly placed under a politically-connected ownership 
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 Ooi (2015) and Muzaffar (2015) raised concerns over the setback of democracy in Malaysia where 
the centralized power of the executive branch is able to control the Parliament as the legislative and the 
judiciary, which indirectly brings a predicament to the check and balance system in Malaysia (A. 
Ibrahim, 2014; Yatim, 1995).  
226
 The World Economic Forum suggests that the CSA roles include that of a “watchdog, advocate, 
service provider, expert, capacity builder, incubator, representative, citizenship champion and definer 
of standards” (The World Economic Forum, 2013, p.9). 
227
 The ownership of mainstream press in Malaysia is monopolized and in the hands of one 
businessperson with close ties with the ruling elites. The concentration of media ownership eases and 
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especially in relation to mainstream media (Kim, 1998). Radio and television are 
almost entirely in the hands of the government or pro-government organisations. 
Therefore, the news is framed, filtered and portray  various events and situations as 
approved by the government (Nain, 2002). For their survival, the media is willing to 
distort its reporting to favour the government or businesses in order to stay in 
business. J. Chin and Welsh (2013) state that controlling over the mainstream media 
is done by allowing more political appointments and being run by individuals or 
business groups allied with the governing coalition. Those media companies with 
close ties with the ruling party particularly lack „investigative journalism‟ as many 
journalists would like to „play it safe‟. Weiss (2013) argues that „the old media‟ are 
advantaged when the government gives them a wider coverage on radio and 
television station. This results in a monopoly controlled by the government on how 
news presented by the media.  
 
Secondly, the state has imposed restrictions on the media in the name of national 
security and to secure public order (Malaysia Kini, 2016; Palatino, 2015). The 
restrictions have restricted to a degree the exposure and reporting of news by 
journalists and the media
228
 in Malaysia. For instance, the revised Printing Presses 
and Publications (PPPA) Act 1984 gives absolute power to the internal security 
Minister to grant, refuse, suspend and revoke the licenses of the news media stations. 
What is more, the Minister has the power to ban and prohibit publications. In other 
words, the proliferation of news media is undermined and controlled by the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
facilitates the ruling elites with the surveillance and access of „selected‟ news and timely information 
in Malaysia (J. Chin & Welsh, 2013; Weiss, 2013). 
228
Laws that can restrict freedoms of expression are among others the Sedition Act 1948, the 
Defamation Act 1959, the Official Secrets Acts 1972, the Internal Security Acts 1960, and the Printing 
Presses and Publications Act 1984.  
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government (Yeoh, 2013). Continuous controls restrict
229
 media openness by creating 
fear. There are laws, as mentioned by Suaram (2015), which legitimise abuse of 
power and allow the ruling party to silence those who disagree with the government. 
For example, one cartoonist was harassed, investigated and detained due to his 
„drawings‟ which in various ways criticised the government. All of his publications 
were confiscated, his assistants were investigated, the printing plates were seized and 
the publisher was given a stern warning. The government justified their actions on the 
grounds that his drawings were „detrimental to public order‟ and could „influence the 
people to revolt against the leaders and government policies‟ (see www.zunar.my). 
Clearly, such laws favour the ruling coalition. 
 
Finally, repression of media freedom
230
 is exercised by denying licenses to press, 
repressing news and restricting access to information (Freedom House, 2014). Other 
draconian laws
231
 also suppress media freedom (Lopez, 2007). The media actors that 
dare to criticise the Prime Minister and the ruling party are faced with prosecutions,
 
imprisonment, detention and residence orders or the imposition of fines. Any 
individual (especially one who supports the opposition) who dares to expose 
government favouritism in contracts and projects, mismanagement and malpractices 
can be arrested and detained (R.S. Milne & Mauzy, 1999). The ruling party justifies 
                                                          
229
 Although the Malaysian Constitution provides a room for freedom of speech and of the media, the 
Constitution also specifies that freedom can be curtailed by legislation for the interests of security and 
public order.  
230
 The World Press Freedom Index shows a historically low ranking of Malaysia‟s freedom of press, 
ranking it 147 out of 180 countries (A. Ibrahim, 2014).  
231
 Malaysia inherited „prevention detention‟ laws from the British to fight conflict, dissent and other 
alleged offences. There are, among others,  the 1948 Emergency Regulations to crush opposition in 
pre-independence Malaya, detention without trial as Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of 
Crime) and Ordinance 1969 – used against suspected gangsters and violent criminals and many others 
(Netto, 2013).  
296 | P a g e  
 
their actions based on national sovereignty; the detention is needed to protect public 
order, for the suppression of violence or for the protection against crimes involving 
violence. Consequently, Malaysia‟s media is not free to disclose fraud, corruption, 
malpractices and mismanagement, especially cases which involve influential political 
elites or prominent business leaders (Kaur, 2014; Sani, 2005). 
 
The widely perceived lack of freedom of expression is also experienced by academics 
in Malaysia who to some extent do not have the freedom to communicate their own 
unbiased knowledge and expertise. For example, one prominent scholar of Malaysia‟s 
constitutional law was detained under Sedition Act 1948 for his remarks on the role 
of royalty in politics. The academic was suspended, issued a show-cause letter and 
has been barred from entering the academic institutions (Manimaran, 2011). 
Restriction laws also apply to other scholars (e.g., in the private sector). Thus, 
academics cannot „speak their mind‟. In case they do they will “either be [...] 
charged with sedition, facing trial or under investigation” (E. Ng, 2014, p.5).  
6.1.2 Historical Legacies 
This study shows Malaysia‟s historical experience has „sparked‟ the ideology of 
capital accumulation and profit maximisation (Tajuddin, 2014; N.J. White, 2004). As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the imperialist ideology involves substantive exploitation
232
 
of the lands of a colony for the benefits of the imperialist home country. The ideology 
has indeed been constructed in such a way that it is acceptable for everybody to 
achieve their dreams, regardless of the consequences (good or bad) (Milner et al., 
2014). Regulators highlighted the existence of the legacies of governance in the 
                                                          
232
 This refers to the colonial practices of pursuing capital and wealth by exploiting colonial lands. The 
legacy of the  British rule has been the driving force behind implementing colonial administrative 
policies (Amoroso, 2014). 
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current public administration originating from the British colonial times (section 
5.2.1). It was perceived that the powerful ruling elites in Malaysia are able to use 
following their colonial master the „divide and conquer‟ approach so as to maintain 
the status quo and use their power, to some extent, to supress, exploit and manage 
public funds (A. Harding, 2012). In chapters 4 and 5, it was shown that politics and 
economic forces are able to mobilise the three pillars of institutions (the executive, 
the legislative and the judiciary) for their vested interests. The ability of the ruling 
party to divide and conquer paramount governance institutions profoundly contributes 
to the persistence of public procurement fraud in Malaysia.  
6.1.3 Formal and Informal Practices  
There are prevailing forces of politics and economics, which have created formal and 
informal practices and transformed them into the institutional arrangements in the 
Malaysian public sector and more generally in Malaysian society. The former, i.e., 
the Malaysian public sector, follows the concept of professional bureaucracy and 
public officers are „obedient‟ implementers of the public policy as illustrated by A. S. 
b. Ahmad et al. (2003) and Siddiquee (2006b). The analysis in this study shows that 
public officials do their work professionally, they follow the instructions given to 
them, and they highly respect the hierarchy of authority without asking questions. 
Adams and Balfour (2008) verify that the root of this unquestioned dominance of the 
structures of authority is in core values, a living culture, and the ethical behaviour of 
public administrators. This research adds new insights on how the norms, cultures 
and practices in the Malaysian public sector to some degree facilitate fraudulent 
behaviour in public procurement (section 5.4). Mansor and Ariffin (2015) argue for 
the presence of a highly submissive culture of Malaysian public officials; to respect 
and not to question their superior. However, perhaps in reality, that submissive 
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culture is rather an expression of „fear‟. In other words, this „unwritten rule‟ of 
respecting the hierarchy may reflect employees‟ concern about their job salary, 
promotions and career advancement (Jamaludin, 2013; John Anthony Xavier, 2013b). 
The mantra of „I‟m following the orders‟ in the Malaysian public sector has been 
embedded in many aspects of public administration and, to some extent, it has helped 
preserved the existence of fraudulent activities in public procurement (section 5.5).  
 
What is more, it seems that in the Malaysian society, the institutionalisation of fraud 
and corruption is „camouflaged‟ as development and growth of the country. This 
research argues that the pervasiveness in the society of this idea of economic growth 
Malaysia which also nurtures the ideology of materialism and wealth is another factor 
leading to the persistence of fraud (section 5.5.1). The study adds insights on how the 
ruling party has been able to „colonise‟ the mind and sense-making of the society that 
rent-seeking activities, cronyisms, patronage systems, favouritism, and many immoral 
practices in public procurement are justified for the growth and development of the 
nation. After all, the ruling elite believes that the citizens of Malaysia „owe‟ them for 
the economic progress and development of Malaysia (Amoroso, 2014; Shaharuddin 
Maaruf, 2014). This study also points to the norms and practices of a „money culture‟ 
and wealth creation in Malaysian society for the sake of or under the pretext of 
achieving development although the society appears at the same time to respect moral 
values and ethics. It seems that although people in this country respect Islamic values 
at the same time some individuals engage in fraud and corruption and finds ways to 
rationalise their actions (section 5.5.2). The presence of systemic corruption is also 
supported in a study by Stefes (2008) who reveals how formal and informal 
institutions interact, stabilise and protect each other. The characteristics of the 
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institutionalisation of corruption in the current study place an emphasis on the 
cultural aspects of Malaysian society. These include values such as respecting older 
people, respecting leaders and/or superior persons, especially those with a higher 
social status, forgiving and forgetting for public peace, gift-giving, helping each 
other, especially family members, and always returning favours (Daniels, 2005; 
Tajuddin, 2014). Overall, this study has addressed the systemic nature of fraud in 
public procurement and how it has been rationalised into imbued norms and cultural 
values, which seek the attainment of higher social status (section 5.5).  
 
The next section discusses the rational decisions of economic actors to indulge in 
public procurement fraud.  
6.2 Economic Actors: Rational Decisions 
 
In this study, the concept of an invisible hand gives a different dimension to the 
analysis when the invisible hand comes to intervene in the market rather than 
depending on free market forces. G. Brennan and Pettit (1993) describe the interplay 
of the actions of various economic actors that aim to maximize profits for the benefits 
of society. Hence, the current study shows how the economic man is able to influence 
the rational decisions in distribution of wealth: (1) in the pursuit of self-interest, (2) 
the attribution of social class domination and (3) the pervasive elements of a free 
market in public procurement. 
6.2.1 Rational for Self-Interests 
Political economy approach places an emphasis on the rational for self-interests of 
political and economic actors by the pursuit of wealth (Acosta & Pettit, 2013). In 
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other words, the political and economic actors may have visible and invisible interests 
in certain government purchasing practices. The former i.e., visible interests, involve 
the interests of economic actors to make commitments and influence the delivery of 
good public policy to promote economic growth (Ramli, Kamarunzaman, & Ramli, 
2013, section 4.3.1 and section 5.1.3). The latter i.e., invisible interests of the 
Malaysian state, takes the form of deliberately intervening in the market. Such 
intervention has its consequences. It may cause the misallocation of resources through 
government contracts, permits, licenses, and privatization projects as the outcome of 
implementing public policy (e.g.,, New Economic Policy) (Gomez et al., 2013; Yean, 
2014). The findings suggest that although public policy may result in inefficiency in 
resource allocation by giving projects and government contracts to cronies and by 
being favorable to Bumiputera companies (especially those who have close 
connections to a powerful group), most regulators believe that it is the obligation of 
the Malaysian state to assist those companies (section 5.1.1). Regulators strongly 
believe that favourable treatments in government purchasing are perceived as 
assistance by the state in order for the domestic companies to compete in the market. 
As suggested by Kui (2001), the public sector is obliged to help the private sector and 
play a role as the „protector and trustee‟ on behalf for the Bumiputera community, 
which is the main indigenous group in Malaysia. 
 
As discussed in section 3.2.2, political economy theory is assumes that profits gained 
by capitalists are then returned to the society (Thornton, 2009). In regard to this, there 
is, however, little understanding of what benefits or profits are actually returned to the 
society. This study suggests addressing the rational decisions made by economic 
actors in government purchasing which they are in conflict with and constrain 
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transparent and accountable procurement practices. The works of K. S. Jomo (1990) 
and  R Rasiah and Shari (2001) are particularly useful to show how the economic 
actor is able to enunciate the implementation of an affirmative policy for poverty 
eradication and distribution of income and wealth. Yet, this current study also argues 
that the rational decisions of economic actors can also be used as an attempt to 
indulge in fraudulent and corrupt acts of behaviour in public procurement through 
power relations, as discussed in section 6.1. In this case, it appears that the 
capabilities of economic actors for employing their „rational decisions‟ are 
legitimated by using the state‟s apparatus (section 4.3.1 and section 5.1.3).  
 
Following the decision to implement a procurement policy, public officials continue 
to act professionally in order to implement the public policy (section 4.4 and section 
5.4). The interpretation of the rational decision of the economic man by the 
interviewees provides a further potential explanation of the alliance of political power 
with economic interests (section 5.1.2). In that sense, political economy sheds light 
on the preferences of the capitalist group for wealth creation which has been realized 
by using the state‟s machinery (Beeson, 2001). Hence, it appears that the interest of 
the ruling elites in embarking on government purchasing is something that becomes 
acceptable especially by procurement officers as a means for their political 
survival.
233
 Although some interviewees did, to a certain degree, question the decision 
to reward government contracts to unviable companies closely connected with the 
ruling party, most public officials normally follow the decisions made from those at 
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 Acknowledging the importance of survival, further evidence suggests that public procurement fraud 
in Malaysia is facilitated by enduring power relations for collusive procurement decisions (K.S Jomo, 
2001; Khair et al., 2015). Crouch (1996), Teh (2002) and Gomez and Sundaram (1999) affirm that 
many Malaysian politicians have businesses on behalf of themselves or the political party as a form of 
political survival.  
302 | P a g e  
 
the top of the hierarchy (section 5.4.3). The findings in this study confirm those of 
Nathan (2002), K. S. Jomo (2003) and Nicholas J. White (2004) about the influence 
and power exercised by both businesses and politicians in rewarding government 
contracts. At the same time, the empirical evidence shows that political survival and 
maintaining the power base is also consistent with the ideology of improving the 
well-being of the Bumiputera community and of reducing the gap between ethnic 
groups. Using the supposedly reason of the need of survival as an explanation, this 
study sheds light on the attempt to preserve the position and power even though they 
engage in fraudulent practices in public procurement (section 5.1, 5.3 and 5.4). Thus, 
it also appears to be consistent with how the preference in individual‟s narrow 
interests in government purchasing affects the behaviour of the economic actors who 
wish to maintain their political and economic status quo (Johansson, 2014; 
Lovrenciear, 2013).  
6.2.2 Social Class Domination 
The institutional legal arrangements most likely influence or maneuver public 
procurement policy towards practices of inequality, exploitation and economic 
discrimination (R. S. Milne, 1986, section 4.3; Roslan, 2001). In that sense, the 
political economy articulates the oppression, tension and social class struggle in a 
society where some private benefits may result to social disruption (Kehl, 2009). It 
was asserted, in the current study, that the promotion of the Malay capitalist class has 
eroded the true spirit of entrepreneurship and it has facilitated ersatz capitalism
234
 
through the dispensation of political patronage and assistance from the Malaysian 
state (Searle, 1999, section 4.3.1 and section 5.1). To some extent, ersatz capitalism 
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 Ersatz capitalism is adopted when the state aims to generate a class of domestic industrial 
entrepreneurships, but it has been retarded by the inefficiency of public funds of crony capitalism and 
ethnic affirmative action policies (see K. S. Jomo, 2005; Yoshihara, 1988).  
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results in unequal allocations of public funds in the form of rent-seeking activities, 
state patronage and cronyism which are supposedly promoting economic 
development and embracing developmental strategies (E.T. Gomez, 2002). It seems 
that the institutional set up which generates the domestic industrial capitalist can also 
facilitate fraud and corruption activities in Malaysian public procurement (Tan, 
2015). 
6.2.3 Free Market Economy System 
In the challenging environment of a free market economy system, there are groups 
and individuals with vested interests that possess wealth and capital that can result in 
conducting actions and implementing or adopting policies that sometimes do not 
promote a productive allocation of investment (see Bakan, 2005; Chomsky, 1999). 
Although political economy theory believes that profits gained by private capitalists 
are then returned to society, it can be argued that the drive of self-interest for wealth 
and capital in a free market may contribute to the emergence of unintended social 
orders (Otusanya, 2011; Petras, 2013).  
 
The findings from the current study broadly suggest that the industrial capitalist 
entrepreneur has a higher chance for further growth and profit because the economic 
framework created in Malaysia favours economic liberalization, privatization and 
deregulation (Nambiar, 2009; Shukry, 2013b). In that sense, it is perceived that the 
promotion of rational self-interests for wealth creation and profit maximization 
impose the neoliberal ideology in many aspects of life. It was viewed that in some 
way the neoliberal ideology of wealth creation for self-interest perhaps has influenced 
the industrial entrepreneur to do whatever it takes to seize the opportunity offered in a 
free market economy, even if that means committing fraudulent and corrupt activities 
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in public procurement (section 5.1). Moreover, it is perceived that the economic 
system of the free market helps the ruling party to implement mega projects for the 
sake of development (Welsh & Chin, 2013, section 5.5.1). The evidence points to the 
intimate and integrative relationships of the state and the economic business elites 
who welcome government initiatives
235
 which are supportive of a neoliberal ideology 
(Salazar, 2004; Shukry, 2013b). 
 
Under the influence of the free market economy system, there is a transformation of 
norms and values in Malaysian society. In the economic system, being successful in 
life is exemplary of having more money and material wealth, therefore, Islamic 
values (most Malaysians are Muslims) are clearly compromised (section 5.5.2). Many 
Muslim entrepreneurs act in a way that contradicts Islamic religion since they are 
influenced by the ideology of being successful with money and modernity, rather than 
obeying their moral responsibilities as a good Muslim
236
 (Sloane, 1999). Altogether, 
the findings show that Malaysian society has moved towards striving for money and 
material wealth for a success story and higher social status. This is regardless of the 
fact that supporting the ideology of money and wealth might undermine the Islamic 
ethics and values, and the widening wealth gap among social groups (William Case, 
1994; Waythamoorthy, 2013).  
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 State intervention in Malaysia takes various forms: preferential treatment for government contracts 
(Adham & Siwar, 2012), favourable regulatory mechanisms and protection (Athukorala, 2005; Teik, 
2012), import-export licences (Krueger, 2002; Diane K. Mauzy, 1988), capital controls (Bhattacharya, 
2001; Johnson & Mitton, 2003; Ventura, 2013), preferences to debt financing (K. S. Jomo, 2003), 
subsidies preferential sectors (Hart Energy Publishing, 2008; Yean, 2014) and bailouts of companies 
(Asian Business, 1998; William Case, 2005). 
236
 As in many other religions, Muslims also advocate the idea of a good Muslim and a bad Muslim. 
The former represents a Muslim with good behaviour, who strives for rewards only from God, who is 
fair and just, and aims to command good and forbid evil. The latter shows Muslims who are willing to 
justify the wrongdoings and immoral behaviour that they have committed. To some extent they can 
rationalise such behaviour by justifying their actions rather than pursuing the true Islamic role.  




In the next section, the landscape of policymaking processes of the Malaysian public 
sector is discussed as one of the driving forces behind fraudulent activities in the 
procurement system. 
6.3 The Policymaking Environment: The Practice 
 
The political economy approach advocates the process of both policy formulation and 
implementation (Howlett, Mukherjee, & Koppenjan, 2015). The policymaking 
environment shows collaboration
237
 and links between actors and advocacy coalitions 
within policy networks (Howlett et al., 2015; Jung, 2010). The current study provide 
insights into Malaysia‟s policymaking framework on wealth restructuring by 
identifying the objectives, the blurring of the distinction between corporate and 
political power and in what way political and economic actors interact and the 
implications their interaction has on public policy. The outcomes from those 
interactions are examined by reconsidering the policymaking processes as an element 
that contributes to the possible reasons for the persistence of public procurement 
fraud in Malaysia: (1) distribution of public funds and (2) the conflicting role of the 
state.  
6.3.1 Distribution of Income and Wealth 
Malaysia‟s public policy mechanisms seems to demonstrate the ideal framework of 
distribution of income and wealth (Sundaram & Hui, 2014). However, the empirical 
evidence suggests that there is lack of transparency and accountability in the public 
sector when political and economic elites seek to manipulate the rules, budgets and 
                                                          
237
 It is argued that the interrelationships and interactions existing between the main stakeholders 
elucidate and influence policymaking processes for pursuing and achieving their strategic objectives. 
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public officers of governmental institutions to achieve their goals. The prevailing 
views expressed by interviewees suggest Malaysia‟s public policy is directed by the 
power relations of politics and economics (section 4.3 and section 5.1). The 
interviewees voiced their concern on the continued potency of authoritarian rule 
(Balasubramaniam, 2012, section 4.2.2 and section 5.2.5). It seems that an 
authoritarian regime affects and becomes part of many decisions for government 
procurement by exercising public policy on affirmative programs and by protecting 
politically influential Malaysian business interests (William Case, 2010b). This 
current study is of the view that the same platform
238
 (public policy environment) 
may bolster the government purchasing power, especially for the majority 
Bumiputera companies in the award of government projects as examined by Cross 
and Stuart (2006). These findings are in line with the study by Guccio, Pignataro, and 
Rizzo (2014) who believe that preferences should be given to private military and 
security companies (PMSC) and that there should be restrictions on the bidding 
process by having a small number of contractors participating. Such preferential 
treatments have, to some extent, created opportunities for fraud and corruption in the 
Malaysian procurement practices through rent-seeking activities, nepotism, the 
patronage system, cronyism, state-capture, money politics and many other 
questionable practices (O. K. Beng, 2013; Gomez & Sundaram, 1999; Vithiatharan & 
Gomez, 2014).  
 
There appears to be a general concern about public accountability and good 
governance within the policy networks of the state and businesses in the allocation of 
                                                          
238
 Sundaram and Hui (2010), Rajah Rasiah (2010) and Sundaram (1993) argue that the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) has legitimated the growing state intervention in the market and public sector 
expansion for inter-ethnic redistribution and poverty eradication.  
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public funds (section 4.3). It was viewed that the primary concerns associated with 
these interrelated elements are returning favour to supporters, lobbying practices and 
politically captured people, political donations, financing and funding the political 
party (section 4.3.1). First, most of the interviewees acknowledged the requirement of 
politicians to have big money
239
 in order to be elected (section 5.1.2). It is perceived 
that there is an engrained practice of money politics
240
 as a way to return favours to 
political supporters through public procurement policies by private negotiations (e.g.,, 
privatisation of state assets), increasing government intervention in the economy and 
lucrative state rents (Gomez, 2012a; J. Tan, 2008; Teh, 2002). Chapters 4 and 5 show 
the rampant money politics involved when politicians are allowed to hold businesses 
and posts for themselves or on behalf of the political party. As a return of favours and 
in order to maintain the loyalty of their supporters it was shown that politicians 
secured business opportunities from the public offices‟ contracts and policies. Yet, 
the reaction from most regulators regards the secured opportunities for supporters by 
most politicians as a contribution of gaining the support and loyalty of their voters 
(section 4.2.2).  
 
Second, it is argued that political capture and lobbying practices are to the result of 
the intimate relationship between politicians and business people in the Malaysian 
                                                          
239
 In that sense, there is a situation of giving money (by politicians as wealth-dispensers) and pushing 
demands (by voters/supporters as wealth-seekers) (R. A. Smith, 2006). The former represents the 
initiatives taken by most politicians to stay in power and be elected in their political posts (Nathan, 
2002). The latter describes the „bribe-taking‟ and the giving of money, special treatments, and the 
providing of accommodation to delegates and voters  during general elections so that they elect those 
politicians (William Case, 1994).  
240
 Money politics are predominantly a means to receive illicit funds for political campaigns and 
elections. Yet, in Malaysia, money politics also involve using money, gifts and contracts to „bribe‟ and 
„buy‟ supporters for politicians to be elected. For example, during a political general election, 
supporters are given gifts and money to attend elections and vote for their chosen politicians so that 
they are re-elected (Johns, 2010; Tarrant & Hamid, 2008; Teh, 2002).  
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policymaking environment (Vithiatharan & Gomez, 2014). Within policymaking 
mechanisms, both political capture and lobbying practices represent structural 
weaknesses in the regulatory system (Gomez & Jomo, 1997; Nicholas J. White, 
2004). While most interviewees did not directly talk about political capture and 
lobbying practices in the policy networks for public funds, they always viewed and 
emphasised the common network of politicians and political parties, business elites 
and business groups and the outcome of this in relation to public policies. Most 
importantly, this study addresses the political influence of the invisible hand (see 
section 6.1) in preferential policies towards politically favoured companies as a 
means to give favours in the interactions between business and political players (M. 
A. Bliss & Gul, 2012; Gul, 2006). Within this context, it seems that the abuse of 
power in the public office serves vested interests by having decisive influence over 
government institutions and procurement policies. The views and the findings in 
chapters 4 and 5 show that the whole system of patronage (especially from the 
practice of a political business) and money politics have been nurtured for quite some 
time in Malaysia. As can be seen from the discussion above, it seems that due to the 
nature of political capture, lobbying practices, state patronage and money politics, the 
appropriation of public funds has become part of the system; they are entrenched and 
accepted in many aspects of governance in the Malaysian public sector. 
 
Third, there is the questionable practice of political funding and donation, financing 
political parties and sponsoring by businesses (Global Integrity, 2014; J. Ng, 2015). 
There was a mixed response regarding these practices on the part of the interviewees. 
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Some view the lack of transparency
241
 of political donations as an opportunity for 
fraud and corruption in many government transactions. R. A. Smith (2006) argues 
that the abuse of entrusted power by political leaders so as to enrich themselves and 
their families constitutes institutional inefficacy; it has become a structured political 
tradition and results in the erosion of moral values and ethics. Another point of view 
advanced by some interviewees was that there is nothing wrong with receiving 
sponsorships because it is legal and legitimate. The legitimacy of political donations 
seems to be accepted when the funding transfer is done through a legal framework 
(Swiss Info, 2012; The Star, 2012b, section 6.2). The overall perception on the wide-
spread phenomena of money in politics due to the activities of political funding, 
donation, financing and sponsoring of businesses for a political party appears to be 
acceptable and allowable within the political structure in Malaysia (Jong, 2014; Tan, 
2015). Since any political donation or financing for general elections in Malaysia is 
legal and does not violate any laws, the Malaysian political system is prone to 
violations or abuse of the existing regulatory frameworks. However, those who abuse 
the system do not easily get caught and they often do not face punishment for doing 
so (this is because of the existence of the power relations of both political and 
economic institutions as explained in section 6.1). Therefore, the raising of money for 
a special interest group as part of policy networks and the institutional power 
structure likely contributes to the persistence of public procurement fraud in 
Malaysia.  
                                                          
241
 Lack of transparency in political donation represents the institutional designs that can hinder 
effective enforcement and become coordination system failures and there are opportunities that are 
created and weaknesses to be manipulated by most politicians (Global Integrity, 2014). 
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6.3.2 The Conflicting Role of the State 
The conflicting role of the state in policy mechanisms may result in the lack of 
accountability and transparency that might also preserve fraudulent practices in the 
public procurement process. First, the hegemonic role of the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) is seen as the „unchallenged‟ government institution that plays a part in 
forming many decisive procurement policies (section 4.3.2). Most interviewees argue 
that any special approval, especially for direct negotiation procurement processes, 
requires all respective government departments to gain the „permission‟ of the MOF 
(Khan, 2014). Despite a „long‟ decisional process by the MOF, it was argued that 
there has been no dispute from other government agencies on the decisions made by 
the MOF. That is to say, the stakeholders argued that the fact that the implementation 
of procurement policy faces no confrontation from the public officials is normal 
because they believe they are merely the implementers of the public policy (section 
4.4 and section 5.4). The findings provide evidence that in general the Malaysian 
public officials remain obedient and try to avoid any confrontational circumstances 
with their superior. This is closely connected with the role of Malaysian bureaucracy 
(as explained in section 4.4) and the constraints of Malaysian public officials 
(explained in section 5.4). 
 
Nonetheless, some frustration was expressed by procurement officers when referring 
to the MOF‟s decisions to reward government contracts to politically-connected 
companies rather than considering first their viability to complete government 
projects (section 5.3.3). To some extent, regulators admitted the existence of 
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questionable decisions „behind closed doors‟
242
 on the part of the MOF, but they 
attributed the rationalisation of the decision to reward the contract by the MOF 
mostly to diplomatic reasons and for the good of the country.  
 
Second, public officials have a conflicting role to play because they face governance 
constraints for accountable and transparent actions within public administration of the 
country. Although the administration system in Malaysia has undergone many 
changes after independence, there are some indications for the continuation of the 
public bureaucracy system to maintain the colonial legacies which followed a top-
down approach on decision-making. Hence, there are highly centralised 
administrations of federal ministries and agencies and secretive government 
operations and processes (A. S. b. Ahmad et al., 2003; Siddiquee, 2006b). Siddiquee 
(2013) also affirms that Malaysia‟s administrative system was shaped by its colonial 
history and merged in a unique socio-cultural and institutional setting by maintaining 
its traditional institutions and local customs. Although public administration in 
Malaysia may uphold the neutrality principle of being „politically neutral‟ in many 
aspects of government operations, the empirical evidence points at the difficulty of 
separating politics from public administration (section 5.4.3). This begs the question 
of whether the Malaysian public bureaucracy is an apolitical institution which is 
powerless to reject any instructions given by the political master for fulfilling political 
interest.  
 
                                                          
242
 The meetings between contractors and officers from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the 
negotiation process are private and secret. The discussion resulting in the award of government 
contracts is never open to the public or to the public officials who need to implement the projects at 
various ministries.  
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Third, the politicisation of bureaucracy affects the policymaking environment (see 
Christensen, 2010; Rouban, 2012). The interviewees seem to argue that there is 
tainted professionalism among public officials when a political master is able to 
influence, coerce and interfere with the decision of the administration (section 5.4.2). 
The instructions given to public officials are sometimes hidden and concealed so as to 
„protect‟ the higher authority of the administration system. For example, the 
government requires every public servant to sign a Letter of Undertaking when 
commencing their appointment to the public service (Malaysian Anti-Corruption 
Commission, 2012). The letter is the so-called „the oath‟ for public officers and 
emphasizes the importance of loyalty, honesty, responsibility, dedication and 
professionalism. Yet, the same medium can be used by the powerful group to 
demand, pressurise and take advantage of the commitment of most public officials 
when exercising their public duties (section 5.4).  
 
Finally, the most compelling evidence in this study points to the all-encompassing 
degree of indoctrinated subservience of Malaysian public officials that ensures the 
policymaking institutional setting to some extent facilitates the preservation of 
fraudulent practices in public procurement. Chapters 4 and 5 fully discussed the 
concept of obedience which characterises Malaysian public officials who see 
themselves as the „implementers‟ of what it is asked of them to do when acting as a 
professional public servant. In relation to this, there was the view that emphasised the 
„restricted‟ power of most procurement officers in rewarding government projects as 
they always need to obey and follow the decision made by the higher authority who 
has the power (section 4.4 and section 5.4). It seems that the hierarchical power 
structure plays a prominent role in the public office where public officials feel they 
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will face repercussions for not following the orders and not respecting those in power 
(section 4.4.2). The overall views of the stakeholders direct to formal and informal 
customs and practices which result in the public officials being at the end of the 
spectrum as victims and the „scapegoat‟ when government projects fail or 
opportunities exist to indulge in fraud and corruption activities (David S. Jones, 
2007a; Soong, 2010).  
 
The next section looks into the concept of the powerful crony network as well as its 
process and interfaces with other constructs.  
6.4 Crony Network: Business-Government Relations  
 
There is empirical evidence that demonstrates the influence of business and 
government arrangements for legitimate public procurement activities (Andrews et 
al., 2015; Singaravelloo, 2013). This supports Farnell and Booth (2014) who talk 
about the massive spending of the UK‟s public funds on procurement of goods and 
services, in particular engaging with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In 
relation to engaging with SMEs, Tátrai (2015) suggests that the decision to cut back 
legislation on public procurement can become a threat to the small industries as the 
SMEs are considered to be a fundamental support for economic and growth. A similar 
view is given in the current study where relations between government and business 
are intimate and in the form of bedfellows and this is the result of continuously close 
ties and shared interests (Johnson & Mitton, 2003). Within that context, this study 
then shows a crony network which depends on the close relationship of business 
elites, political party, politicians and top bureaucrats. Therefore, this research closely 
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examines and provides a deep understanding of the institutional context of crony 
network functioning in respect of: (1) legitimate relations and (2) the blurred 
relationships that seems to contribute to public procurement fraud in Malaysia.  
6.4.1 Legitimate Activities 
It seems to be believed by most interviewees that there is a close relationship between 
government agencies and businesses. Chapter 4 has identified some elements of the 
Malaysian social history and distinctive socio-political conditions and ethos on the 
close relationship between the government and merchants/traders of that time. First, 





centuries which was characterised by the acquirement and obtainment of materials 
and supplies on part of the merchants and the Malay rulers (M. Abdullah, 1965; Noor, 
2002, section 4.1.1). Second, there was exploitation of raw materials, new places for 
investment and free trade for the colonial capitalists (Harper, 2001, section 4.1.2). 
Third, the ideology for the Malay survival was associated with capitalistic 
nationalism of wealth creation and capital accumulation (William Case, 1996, section 
4.1.3; Mahathir Mohamad, 2011). The evidence of the historical analysis from pre-
colonial to the modern post-independent state highlights the extortion, exploitation, 
opportunism, bribery, and inequality in allocating and distributing the funds and 
resources of the country (Amoroso, 2014; Hirschman, 1986; Milner, 2002). It is 
argued that the concepts of patronage, nepotism, and favouritism in protecting the 
interests of the Malay Sultanate, British imperialist colonial power and the Malay 
ruling elites have become engrained in many aspects of Malaysian society (Noor, 
2002). Although many changes have affected the Malay society and Malaysia in 
general, the empirical evidence shows that the close ties between Malaysian 
businesses and politics, in particular in relation to government purchasing, license, 
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contracts and projects, serve as a persistent framework for accumulation and creation 
of wealth (section 5.1).  
 
Following the partaking of the historical institutionalism in Malay society, there 
seems to be a continuity of political influence in rewarding government contracts and 
projects (Abdul Aziz et al., 2007; Gomez & Jomo, 1997; Edmund Terence Gomez, 
2002). It was viewed that public procurement policy in Malaysia in general has 
nurtured the practice of political business (section 5.1.1). The perception was that the 
networks
243
 of state officials and business leaders are legitimate and regulate as an 
incentive to assist the domestic industrialist. The findings illustrate the link of 
policymaking framework in Malaysia by showing how the economic policy has been 
able to legitimize state intervention in the market for poverty eradication and 
restructuring society (Aeria, 2013, section 4.3.1; Ariff, 2008). 
 
The perspectives from empirical data also indicate that the political business alliances 
have created politically „new rich‟ companies designed to promote a variant of 
capitalism, aimed at economic extension by strategically channeling available funds 
between leading politicians and big businesses using a vast array of institutional 
power structures within the state (Schmidt, 2002). Yet, the ideology of race-based 
policy,
244
 as described by Gomez and Jomo (1997), has also fostered the activity of 
rents, rent-seeking and rent distribution which „camouflage‟ the assistance given by 
                                                          
243
 The network in the practice of political business has been embedded in many aspects of government 
procurement by allowing politicians and political parties to venture into businesses and/or take part in 
the gaining of government contracts, projects, licenses, and shares through state funds. It encourages 
conflict of interest cases and money politics between politicians that hold power in the public office 
and their supporters (Tan, 2015; Teh, 2002).  
244
 The policy is part of the affirmative action program for poverty reduction and wealth distribution 
(Sundaram & Hui, 2014). 
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the state to promote the „new-rich‟ capitalist entrepreneurs. By playing around the 
system, the riddle of Malaysian capitalism, as argued by Searle (1999) and Jeff Tan 
(2008), poses the question of whether the creation of domestic entrepreneurs in 
Malaysia has promoted rent-seekers or true capitalists. It was suggested that the social 
structures associated with the development of the new-rich business actors are 
concerned with the manipulation of rent activities, crony capitalism, entrenched 
patronage and money politics (section 4.3.1 and section 5.1). The study addresses 
these aspects of manipulation of the legitimate relations that are likely to encourage 
fraud and corruption practices, which function based on collaborations within 
networks and on the influence of politics, political power, bureaucrats and business 
actors.  
 
It is important to note about fraud in public procurement, which entails a multi-
complex range of schemes within the collaboration and close relationship between a 
strong network of politicians, bureaucrats and business elites. For example, when the 
bidding for government purchasing is only mobilised among cronies and business 
networks, there is no competition for the contract as per its value for money, hence 
there is lack of transparency. When a bribe amount is exchanged, there is up-front 
cost pricing for goods and services. To some extent, there are many low quality 
materials provided for the contract or government projects, thus affecting the usage or 
efficiency of public service delivery. If a government project cannot be delivered 
accordingly, there are structural flaws which prohibit the punishment and penalisation 
of the culprits (see ADB, 2014; Hessami, 2014; McCarthy, 2013; Sargiacomo et al., 
2015). Thus, legitimate activities in procurement process to some extent may 
contribute to the persistent of public procurement fraud practices.  
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6.4.2 Blurred Relationships 
While the evidence points to a legitimate core activity and determinant of network 
behaviour, there are blurred relationships at the nexus between the state and business 
in Malaysia (Gomez, 2007). Various views have been expressed that indicate crony 
networks thrive when there is lack of evidence in proving abuse of power in the 
public offices (section 5.3.1). First, the data from procurement officers and 
professionals confirms the difficulty of acquiring evidence from procurement 
documentation on any abuse of power and malfeasance in government purchasing. 
Many public officials agreed that procurement documentation is genuine as it has 
been prepared according to rules and regulations (Adham & Siwar, 2012). Because of 
the difficulty of getting the relevant evidence, concerns over the inability to expose 
fraud, corruption and malfeasance transactions in the public office, especially fraud 
conducted by those with close networks with the higher authority and by the powerful 
groups, were raised by the interviewees (R. J. Berger, 2011, section 5.3.1; Walklate, 
2011).  
 
Second, in relation to crony networks, Haber (2002) describes the abuse of power in 
the form of returning favours and rewarding politically connected economic agents. 
Pua (2011), in particular, shows abuse conducted in the public office in decision-
making processes, which is generally veiled, and this makes detection and 
prosecution processes mostly unsuccessful as the culprits play around the system and 
do not violate any laws. For instance, most public information on financial 
scandals
245
 in Malaysia was deliberately incomplete for public scrutiny or lacked 
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 Other financial scandals in Malaysia (with losses) are as follows: (1) Perwaja Steel with RM15 
billion losses, (2) Bank Bumiputera losses of at least RM10 billion,  (3) Bank Negara foreign exchange 
losses of RM23 billion, (4) Tin industry savings was injected by RM1 billion, (5) alleged illegal 
318 | P a g e  
 
evidence for prosecution (R.S. Milne & Mauzy, 1999; Wain, 2009). While those 
scandals mostly incurred enormous losses of public funds with blatant embezzlement, 
write-offs on the losses, bailout of cronies
246
 and opportunity costs in the name of 
ventures, the ruling leadership was able to justify the failure of public policy as the 
result of financial crises or for the national interest (Edmund Terence Gomez, 2002; 
Khair et al., 2015). The findings are broadly similar to the collusive and collaborative 
endeavours of industrial networks from both the state and business leaders as studied 
by Nicholas J. White (2004), Gul (2006) and Gomez (2009). There is lack of 
evidence on collusive crony networks in appropriation of public funds earned 
privately by political and economic elites through abuse of power (section 5.3.2). It 
seems then that politically-related companies and their family members are able to 
enrich themselves with allocations of public funds and privatised projects (Jeff Tan, 
2008). Subsequently, the blurred state-business linkages, in particular of those 
companies that are owned or controlled by the ruling coalition, although incurring 
huge public losses, are protected and „swept under the carpet‟(Haggard & Low, 2000; 
Wain, 2009). 
 
Finally, the secrecy and confidentiality imposed on most Malaysia government 
procurement documentation is protected under the Official Secrecy Act 1972, and 
other applicable acts that protect government documentation from public scrutiny 
                                                                                                                                                                     
political donation of RM 2.6 billion, (6) commission for timber licenses of RM40 million, and many 
others (see A. Harding, 2012; Khalid, 2014; Norwani et al., 2011; M. Parker, 2005; Sivalingam, 2014; 
Wain, 2009).  
246
 The Malaysian government was able to justify its actions to save and bail out many conglomerates 
and domestic companies by arguing that the aim was to protect the industry and the economy from 
deteriorating, especially during periods of financial crisis. The government actions deliberately used 
the state‟s machinery and budget by injecting capital, capital control, offer loans and borrowing 
through government-controlled banks, by deregulating the financial sector and privatising projects by 
increasing state intervention in the economic sector (see Asian Business, 1998; Johnson et al., 2006; 
Millman, 1995; Woon, 2013). 
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(Law of Malaysia, 1972). Some interviewees
247
 see the secrecy in government 
activities, which can breed fraud and corruption, as a result of the document 
confidentiality and classification policies (section 4.2.1 and section 5.4). It was also 
argued that the various applicable acts
248
 for the Malaysian public officials are 
supposedly enforced to improve their accountability and integrity to exercise their 
duties. Failure to adhere to the Public Officers (Code and Disciplines) Regulations 
1993 seems to result in disciplinary actions, transfers or dismissals from the public 
service. It can be argued that the same institutional framework can also stop the 
public servant from reporting the wrongdoing and corrupt practices in the office 
(section 4.4.2 and section 5.3.2). Moreover, the findings of this thesis seem to suggest 
that the enactment of the Whistle-blower Protection Act 2010
249
 is not able to 
convince the public servants to report the wrongdoings of corrupt actors, especially 
those with authority (Rachagan & Kuppusamy, 2013). This is also true when the 
details described by the whistle-blower is not only not secured by the authority but 
they may instead be charged with both civil or criminal actions as they disclosed 
secretive and confidential information (Izwan, 2012b; The Malaysian Insider, 2015d, 
section 5.4). Based on the above discussion, one has to ask whether lack of available 
evidence further ingrains the crime of fraud and „safeguards‟ the corrupt crony 
network in Malaysia.  
 
                                                          
247
 However, professionals prefer the procurement documentation being kept secret and confidential as 
otherwise this may tarnish Malaysia‟s reputation. 
248
 There are various multiple acts and applicable laws that need be obeyed by all Malaysian public 
officers. Among others there are the Official Secrets Act 1972, Financial Procedures Act, Public 
Officers (Code and Disciplines) Regulations 1993, and all sets of guidelines on exercising their duties 
as a civil servant.  
249
 The Malaysia Whistleblower Protection Act 2010 came into force to provide protection and 
encourage inside informants to give confidential information over malpractices, fraud, bribery, or 
corruption without fear.  
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The blurred relationships characterising crony networks may support the persistence 
of fraudulent practices in the public offices when fraudulent acts of behaviour are 
committed within legal boundaries. First, the empirical data suggests the existence of 
astute individuals who know the procurement system well. Procurement officers and 
professionals believe that these individuals
250
 know the loopholes in the procurement 
system and are able to take opportunity to exploits the weaknesses of the system 
(section 5.3.1). For instance, the contractor knows there is lack of internal control 
system when most procurement officers do not make a market study for price 
comparison of goods/products/services whenever they want to make government 
purchasing. Because of these weaknesses, the contractor uses the opportunity to 
increase the price, and the government needs to pay more than the market values 
(Banoo, 2015; National Audit Department, 2011).  
 
Second, because of the shortcomings in law and blurred relationship in most crony 
networks, the corrupt actors use their knowledge to manipulate those shortcomings to 
avoid being charged (section 5.3.2). The example given by interviewees was a 
situation when there was conflict of interest in rewarding government contracts. 
Professionals involving public auditors and enforcement officers admitted that in 
certain cases the culprit was able to escape prosecution because they know where the 
line for not violating any laws is and they do not cross this line; in other words, they 
do not break the rules and regulations (Joe Fernandez, 2013). If a state officer‟s 
                                                          
250
 As mentioned in chapter 5, astute individuals are those with the knowledge and the powerful 
position to manipulate the weaknesses in the procurement system. They are sometimes those who have 
been working in the public offices and who have high social status, i.e., people who were once part of 
the system and were respectable by the society. 
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family members bids for contract, the state officer needs to declare their interest
251
 
and walk away from the procurement committee meeting. To what extent the 
declaration is made and the non-participation in the decision-making process for that 
procurement project is true, however, is open to dispute. For example, Tan (2012) and 
Wain (2009) argue that the rewarding of many privatisation projects are given to 
closed-political companies although they are sometimes not based on merit or conflict 
of interest. Therefore, it seems that as long the rewarding of government contracts 
does not violate any laws, and interest has been disclosed accordingly, there is no law 
enacted in Malaysia that can be used to prosecute the alleged corrupt actors.  
 
Finally, it seems that there are flaws in the technicality of laws in Malaysia 
(Palansamy, 2015, section 4.2.3). It was argued that the intention to commit fraud, 
which is not easy to prove, has to some extent „protected‟ and let the culprit get off 
„scot-free‟ (section 4.2.3 and section 5.3.2). Since there is a thin line separating what 
government and businesses can do and there are blurred relations between them, 
some public officials seem to believe that their choices to preserve (or not) fraudulent 
or wrongdoing behaviour are legitimated because they are able to rationalise and 
justify the actions. Therefore, a crony network of business-government relations is 
socially constructed for both legitimate and illegitimate forms of co-operation that 
likely contribute to malpractices of human actions (see Ashforth & Anand, 2003; 
Linstead, Maréchal, & Griffin, 2010). This study addresses the lack of evidence and 
the playing around the system as well as the blurred crony networks in Malaysia as 
likely reasons for the persistence of public procurement fraud.  
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 By disclosing the interest and not being involved with any decision-making, that public officer did 
not violate any law if his/her family member gets the contract (The Edge Malaysia, 2014). 
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As discussed in this chapter, sections 6.1 to 6.4 provide the possible reasons for the 
persistence of public procurement fraud in Malaysia based on the theoretical 
underpinnings of the study and as such it has addressed the main research question of 
this thesis. The possible reasons are: (1) the power of politics and economic 
institutions, (2) rational decisions of economic actors, (3) the policymaking 
environment, and (4) crony networks. These conclusions are the result of the 
discussion of the five sub-research questions as explained in chapter 5: the political 
and economic forces, the institutional outcome, deficiencies of procurement practices, 
governance constraints, and the paradox of Malaysian society. 
 
The following section concludes the chapter. 
6.5 Summary  
 
This chapter provided a discussion of the findings pertaining to the main research 
question; i.e., why procurement fraud continues to persist in the Malaysian public 
sector. The discussion was conducted with reference to the theoretical framework as 
described in Chapter 3, i.e., in the context of political economy approach. The 
discussions consider the findings derived from other sub-research questions as 
described in chapters 4 and 5 using documentary and interview-data analysis. As 
described earlier in section 6.0, the findings do not aim to make generalizations about 
the persistence of public procurement fraud in Malaysia, in fact the fundamental aim 
is to gain insights into the constructive meanings of social phenomenon from the 
perspectives and views of the main stakeholders.  
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The study considers the possible reasons for the persistence of public procurement 
fraud in Malaysia as follows: (1) the prevailing power of politics and economic 
institutions provides a mixed range of collective actions conducted by the powerful 
group to indulge in fraudulent practices in public procurement. While the institutional 
power structure is devoted to maintaining the status quo and protecting the power 
base, the powerful actors remain untouchable. In addition, with the social processes 
of historical institutionalism, formal and informal practices equally place an emphasis 
on the exercise of power and the practice of domination. (2) The rational choice of 
economic actors in the current study has been rationalised for fulfilling vested 
interests, social class domination and the prevalence of a free market. Economic 
actors concentrate on bringing modernity, larger capital and wealth via ersatz 
capitalism, by eroding, at the same time, Islamic ethics and values. (3) In the event of 
a policymaking environment, the ruling elites seem to direct public policy and, at the 
same time, they may have created opportunities for fraud and corruption activities via 
rent-seeking activities, nepotism, patronage system, cronyism, state-capture, and 
money politics. In that sense, public administrators are in this way conflicted and 
compromised: subservient and protecting their political master or being a good civil 
servant. (4) The returning of favours in the context of crony networks between 
business and government often results in fraud and corruption practices in public 
procurement. Yet, blurred relationships between the two parties mean a hard time for 
the prosecution process whether it is because of lack of evidence and/or that the 
corrupt actors have committed malfeasance within legal boundaries.  
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The following chapter (Chapter 7) concludes the thesis with the reflections of the 
findings, describes its contribution, discusses its limitations and gives 
recommendations for future research.  
P a g e  | 325 
 
 
Chapter 7 Conclusion 
7.0 Introduction 
 
The aim of this thesis has been to examine the persistence of public procurement 
fraud in Malaysia. Investigating fraudulent practices and corruption associated with 
procurement is often described as an under-researched area, particularly within the 
context of the public sector (Heggstad et al., 2010; Khi V Thai, 2001). The study of 
fraud in Malaysia, which is the context of the current study, is an empirical work 
from a different cultural setting and belief system within the domain of public 
procurement (W. S. Hui et al., 2011). There are huge losses of public funds because 
of fraud and corruption in relation to Malaysian public procurement (Bernama, 
2015b; National Audit Department, 2011; Pua, 2012). This study argues that 
fraudulent practices in public procurement are related to institutional practices and the 
capabilities of social actors which have been shaped, created and influenced by 
historical institutionalism and the power relations of the governance system. 
Furthermore, such practices have been fostered by the prevalence of political and 
economic institutions, the deep vulnerability of the public service and the 
distinctiveness of Malaysian society. It is important to recognise the enduring nature 
and modes of power that are entrenched and ingrained in the system and which 
perhaps contribute to the governance and accountability failures in Malaysia.  
 
The study employed a political economy approach to investigate public procurement 
fraud practices in Malaysia. The research design involved document analysis and 
semi-structured interviews collected through the Snowball Sampling Method (SSM). 
326 | P a g e  
 
The views and perspectives of 40 stakeholders constitute the evidence of this study. 
The findings should be interpreted in light of the views and experiences and the so far 
hidden stories of the stakeholders in the current study, and does not aim to make 
generalisation or arrive at a singular conclusion about this social phenomenon. 
 
This chapter is divided into 5 sections. The chapter continues by offering reflections 
on the findings of the current study (section 7.1). Specifically, this section answers 
the main research question outlined in Chapter 1. The salient findings from Chapter 4 
and 5 are presented as well as the discussions from Chapter 6, which suggest the 
possible reasons for the occurrence of fraudulent practices in public procurement 
practices. Then, the contribution of the current study is discussed (section 7.2). The 
chapter continues by describing the limitations of this research (section 7.3) and by 
sketching an avenue for future research as this study appears to open up „doors‟ for 
providing explanations for fraud in public procurement (section 7.4). The last section 
presents the concluding remarks of the thesis in the form of a personal reflection by 
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7.1 Reflections on the Findings  
 
The thesis has investigated public procurement fraud in Malaysia. Evidence in this 
thesis has shown that public procurement fraud is constructed by the enabling and 
constraining institutional structures, which have shaped and influenced the social 
actors‟ behaviour and capabilities. Given these elements, fraud in the Malaysian 
public sector is understood by making sense of events, values and ideologies which 
have become embedded in and restructured into legitimate activities and processes 
where personal interests are served and fulfilled. All these potentially lead to a 
decision to engage in fraudulent and corrupt practices. Through the lens of the 
political economy approach, the possible reasons for the persistence of public 
procurement fraud as evident in this study are as follows: (1) the influence of 
institutional arrangements of political and economic interactions, (2) the complexities 
7.0 Introduction  




7.4 Avenue for Future Research 
 
7.5 Concluding Remarks  
 
7.1 Reflections on the Findings 
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of check and balance system, (3) deficiencies in procurement practices, (4) 
constraints of civil servants, and (5) peculiarities of the Malaysian society.  
7.1.1 Prevailing Political and Economic Structures 
The findings from this study predominantly show how institutional arrangements of 
political and economic forces, which have „legitimate‟ power and position in the 
country, tend to contribute to fraudulent and corrupt activities within the procurement 
life cycle (sub-research question 1). Political and economic interactions to some 
extent have enabled public procurement fraud in Malaysia through: (1) designated 
privileged policymaking; (2) the arrangements of a crony system in a political 
business framework for the allocation of public funds; and (3) the institutional power 
structure of the ruling coalition.  
 
First, a considerable embedded belief of the Malaysian people is that the 
implementation of public policy decided by the Cabinet serves the public‟s interest. 
Yet, the designated public policy for creating Malay capitalists has been „hijacked‟ to 
serve the interests of a selected group rather than the interests of the masses (K.S 
Jomo, 2001). Fraud and corruption in public procurement within the policymaking 
context exist when state intervention in economic distribution provides the 
opportunity for unproductive rent allocation in ersatz-type ways. Malfeasance and 
malpractices in government purchasing are linked with the process of seeking special 
business favours, such as licenses, contracts, concessions, and privatisation of state 
assets from the powerful social groups, by using legitimate public policy 
mechanisms. It was noted that the implementation of public policy has particular 
aims; to help, protect and improve the well-being of its citizens, in particular the 
Bumiputera community. There are, however, indications of an exceptional abuse of 
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policymaking mechanisms as an avenue for capital accumulation for private interests. 
There are also arguably indications of the ability of the ruling party to „colonise‟ the 
mind setting of the Malaysian society and convince them that this same public policy 
promotes poverty eradication and a restructuring of the welfare of the social class. 
 
Second, it seems that the appropriation of public funds through a cronyism system of 
political business framework is enabled because of the nexus between the state and 
business, and this is considered acceptable in the practice of Malaysian public 
procurement. The study examines the blurred relationship of political parties and 
private sector through a political business system in the public office. The evidence 
clearly indicates a close relationship between government and businesses in most 
government purchasing. The alliance between the public and the private sector with 
the extensive involvement of political parties in business has resulted in the creation 
of „new-rich‟ and politically well-connected companies (Gomez, 2013). The evidence 
also suggests that the same crony system of political business has been nurtured, 
encouraged and enabled in many government purchasing transactions to promote 
industrialization and diversification of the free economy. The views of the 
stakeholders seem to link fraud and corrupt practices with the political business 
interests which are served when the distribution or the securement of rents have been 
awarded to favoured economic groups through corruption, bribery, insider trading, 
manipulation of stock prices, mispricing of contracts, state patronage, conflict of 
interest and rent-seeking activities (Gomez & Jomo, 1997; Edmund Terence Gomez, 
2002; K. Jomo, 2000; Nicholas J. White, 2004). The rampant culture of money 
politics and financing political parties via political donations, financing general 
elections, lobbying practices and state-capture as an attempt to exert pressure on the 
330 | P a g e  
 
political leadership for greater business opportunities was also noted (Searle, 1999; 
Wain, 2009). Generally, the overall perceptions of the stakeholders seem to suggest 
that the political business system has become ingrained in many parts of government 
purchasing and it falsely appears to promote the growth and development of the 
country. 
 
Finally, the hegemony of the incumbent government coalition in Malaysia has to 
some extent created an „unchallenged‟ power in the country. In a sense, the 
persistence of public procurement fraud in Malaysia seems to be related to the 
invulnerable institutionalised actions of the powerful groups. Discussions with 
interviewees and their experiences highlighted the role and influence of the power of 
political and economic actors in relation to how they interfere with the rewarding 
process of government contracts. This study has also questioned the actions of the 
„invisible hand‟ in Malaysia‟s public procurement since wealth creation and capital 
accumulation mechanisms through public policy that has been created by the state to 
some extent may provide opportunity for fraudulent practices. Thus, creation of 
wealth and capital through government purchasing do not necessarily benefit the 
masses but are perhaps only beneficial to certain closely connected individuals with 
the ruling elites. There is also the idea conveyed from the interviewees that the role of 
the free market as conceived by the ruling coalition also serves their interest by 
allowing and promoting government intervention in the economy under the pretext of 
the growth and development of the country (K. S. Jomo, 1990). What is more, the 
allocation and distribution of public resources to some degree creates and protects a 
selected privileged class of Malay capitalists (Searle, 1999). The views of the 
stakeholders seem to suggest that those in power engaging in fraud and corrupt 
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behaviour in public procurement do it under the hegemony of the ruling coalition 
because they have an exclusive control of the governance institutions (socio-
economic, political, bureaucratic and judicial).  
7.1.2 Complexities of Check and Balance Mechanisms 
The study has investigated the ability of check and balance mechanisms to curb 
public procurement fraud in Malaysia. Despite the various initiatives taken by the 
Malaysian government to curb fraud and corruption in public procurement, there are 
complexities, which hinder the constitutional governance from working successfully 
to curb fraud and corruption in public procurement (sub-research question 2). The 
complexities identified in the study are: (1) the erosion of the governance institutions 
and (2) the „divide and conquer‟ approach.  
 
First, there is the belief that the ruling coalition controls the power of all three pillars 
of institutions. Rather than acting to ensure public accountability and implement good 
governance, the overall views of the interviewees indicate that the check and balance 
institutions in Malaysia have been undermined and compromised. According to the 
perceptions of the interviewees, there is no separation of power in the constitution. 
Most interviewees also acknowledge the unchecked power of centralisation of the 
executive branch headed by the Prime Minister. The broad view is that the Parliament 
is not a true legislative institution but merely a rubber-stamping institution and that 
the judicial branch is a tool used by the political party. This has contributed to the 
persistence of fraud and corruption in Malaysia. The check and balance mechanisms 
are a legacy of the Westminster-model, and the overall perceptions seem to be that 
there is lack of independence, ineffective roles of enforcement agencies and selective 
prosecution by the judiciary. It has also been argued that corrupt actors who engage in 
332 | P a g e  
 
public procurement fraud are confident that they are protected and that they will not 
be caught since they have close connections with those in power.  
 
Secondly, public procurement fraud in Malaysia, as viewed in this thesis, has 
„perfected‟ the system of „divide and conquer‟, a legacy from the colonial rule. As 
argued by the interviewees, just as the exploitative and oppressive colonial 
government did before them, the current ruling coalition has been able to prevent 
alliances that could challenge their status quo and their power base. It appears from 
the various views expressed that one may be witnessing the demise of check and 
balance mechanisms of the constitutional government since people with executive 
power and governmental roles arrest and threaten those who openly criticize the 
government through various applicable Acts (Hookway & Fernandez, 2015; Suaram, 
2015; The Malaysian Insider, 2015b). Despite the growing contestation and protests 
by the masses, the ruling party has consolidated and advanced their grip on power by 
securing the majority of political seats in Parliament since Malaysia‟s independence 
in year 1957. It seems then that by having the legitimate authority, the ruling elites 
are able to influence the enactment of laws, rules and regulations, by endorsing public 
policies that benefit most politicians and their business allies (Welsh, 2013b). In that 
sense, the political economy approach sheds light on these issues by focusing on the 
(alleged) crimes committed by political and economic powerful actors,
252
 crimes 
which are normally concealed and  not reported compared to ordinary crimes (see 
Barak, 2015; L. Lim, 2014). It would appear from the views expressed by the 
                                                          
252
 Tomasic (2012), Doig (2011) and Whyte (2009) in particular argue the crime committed by 
powerful and wealthy individuals, business elites, national state and influential groups brings more 
harmful and systemic forms of injury to the masses. However, there is lack of attention in examining 
the possible crime of the powerful because most citizens are unaware of the routinized and „hidden‟ 
actions of political and economic actors.  
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interviewees that the increased centralisation of power allows the current regime to 
reject court decisions; this amounts to legislative interference. In relation to many 
corrupt cases in Malaysia, especially the high-profile ones, there is the question why 
in some cases people are exonerated or get off scot-free while those who accept the 
orders and/or instructions from the higher authority are punished (Shukry, 2012b). It 
appears that „powerful‟ perpetrators or culprits who have close connections with 
those in power can escape punishment. Thus, the battle for combating fraud and 
corruption in public procurement is further compromised by the non-performance and 
the crisis in the governance institutions in Malaysia. 
7.1.3 Deficiencies in Procurement Practices 
Despite various procurement rules and regulations adopted in the Malaysia public 
sector, the internal control systems established to ensure greater accountability and a 
transparent procurement system have systematically been violated. This study has 
shown the deficiencies in procurement practices in Malaysia which enable the 
occurrence of fraudulent practices (sub-research question 3) as follows: (1) lack of 
evidence; (2) playing around the system; and (3) the hegemony of Ministry of 
Finance (MOF). 
 
First, it was argued that there is some difficulty in acquiring evidence of the abuse of 
power when rewarding government contracts. For the most part, the interviewees did 
not challenge the fact that procurement documentation is „genuine‟ within the 
procurement life cycle. As most government documentation lies behind the wall of 
secrecy and is not open to public scrutiny (Bernama, 2009), it seems that fraud in 
public procurement can easily be concealed and hidden. Some interviewees pointed to 
the inability of the Whistle-blower Act 2010 to report wrongdoings in public office as 
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the public officers fear facing repercussions. For the most part, it appears that fraud in 
Malaysian public procurement continues to be hidden, undetected and unreported. 
 
Second, it has been emphasized in the interviews that the possible crimes of the 
powerful perpetrators usually involve well-respected, educated, influential individuals 
who hold positions that enjoy some sort of social status. It seems that these are smart  
individuals who take an opportunity to manipulate weaknesses and/or loopholes in 
procurement system (Malaysia Kini, 2010). As noted in this research, the perceptions 
of the interviewees seem to be that the wrongdoer knows how not to get caught by 
playing around the system and by creatively indulging in fraudulent and corrupt 
activities. Thus, the crimes of powerful people as illustrated in this study present a 
different kind of deception practiced by a collusive network of politicians, top-
bureaucrats and business leaders (Sundaram, 1989; Tan, 2015).  
 
Finally, the interviewees highlighted the hegemony of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
as the most powerful and unchallenged institution within the context of public 
procurement. Given the evidence in previous chapters, the paramount power relations 
of the MOF is perceived to lie behind the authority of the Prime Minister, who holds 
the same position in the Ministry of Finance. It appears that decisions and instructions 
from the MOF have never been challenged or disputed in order to implement 
government contracts, projects or policy. It is possible that the hegemony of MOF 
over procurement decisions may reinforce the ease, severity and pervasiveness of 
fraudulent practices in the Malaysian public sector.  
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7.1.4 Accountability Constraints of Public Officials 
It is believed that public servants are responsible for exercising their public duty with 
the utmost accountability and integrity (Mansor & Ariffin, 2015). Yet, there appears 
to be pressure and constraints on ensuring accountable and transparent public 
procurement practices in the Malaysian public office. The research has examined how 
the accountability constraint on the Malaysian public officials preserves fraud in 
procurement (sub-research question 4). The predicament and constraints on 
exercising their duty faced by public servants to some degree support and help in the 
preservation of the prolonged nature of public procurement fraud through: (1) the 
obedience concept; (2) conflict of interest in discharging their professional duties; and 
(3) politicization of bureaucracy. 
 
First, it seems that public administrators in Malaysia appear to be obedient 
implementers, always doing what has been required of them and never questioning 
the orders or decisions made by a higher superior. Discussions with the interviewees 
seem to suggest for the non-separation of politics and administration in the public 
office. This non-separation also influences  the accountability and control process as 
well as formal and informal practices within the institutional mechanisms (Røiseland, 
Pierre, & Gustavsen, 2015). It appears that most public officers in Malaysia are often 
influenced by prevailing cultural customs, practices and a specific socio-political 
context when exercising their duty. For example, the idea of respecting the authority, 
one‟s superiors and those who have a higher social status is entrenched and engrained 
in the public service. The interviewees provided insightful thoughts about Malaysian 
public officers who believe that they need to be loyal to their superior and the ruling 
party. But, to some extent, it appears that the doctrine of submissive cultural values, 
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respect, and loyalty of public officials can conceal and preserve the conduct of 
wrongdoings. It is also suggested that the Malaysian public service is structured in a 
hierarchical structure of administration according to the British colonial model. The 
overall perceptions of the interviewees seem to suggest that the fear of being 
transferred, not getting promotions and the fear that one‟s monthly salary may be 
affected imposes a strong culture of „only‟ following the orders without questioning 
them. The interviewees were of the opinion that the hierarchical structure plays an 
effective role for the civil servant to become accustomed to following orders and 
accomplishing their given tasks without asking any questions (see Kelman & 
Hamilton, 1989; The Malay Mail Online, 2015). Although, it is inevitable that 
wrongdoings and acts of immoral behaviour can occur at different levels of the 
hierarchy, there seems to be a pattern according to which offences conducted by those 
in power are often overlooked, remain hidden and normally involve massive amounts 
of money (Doig, 2011; Malaysia Today, 2015). 
 
Second, it appears that there are conflicting goals and interests
253
 on the part of 
Malaysian civil servants, as illustrated in this study. This research shows institutional 
arrangements of bargaining, negotiation, pressure, coercion, persuading and mutual 
concessions, in particular in relation to its policymaking environment. From what the 
interviewees said, it seems that there is a high number of dilemmas faced by the 
Malaysian public officers when doing their public duties. It appears that the dilemmas 
have to do with either implementing the decisions made by the Cabinet, which is the 
public officers‟ political boss, or working for the interest of the masses.  
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 Conflicting goals and interests arise when public officials are willing to compromise the interests of 
the masses for the private reasons.  
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Finally, it seems that there is a politicization of the civil service when political 
arrangements of government apparatus are of a particular importance for Malaysian 
public administrations. It was noted that only the Cabinet committee, which consists 
of various ministers selected by the Prime Minister, can decide on public policy in 
Malaysia. After decisions are made at the Cabinet level, the respective minister 
informs the Ministry so that public officials implement the public policy. This 
research appears to show the professional role of the public servant as being steadfast 
obedient implementers, rarely challenging or questioning the orders given to them. It 
appears that the politicization of bureaucracy is prevalent as it is perfectly legal and 
acceptable for the ruling party to interfere and intervene in the socio-economic and 
administration matters (e.g.,, decisions for public policy, budgets for each 
government agencies) of the country as these politicians have been elected 
legitimately by the public. In relation to the influence and control over public 
administration, the interviewees suggest that their appointment, career path, merit 
system, as well as any disciplinary action taken against them and any punishment 
they may suffer are dependent on their performance in the office. Their performance 
also means implementing public policy, orders and instructions from their superior. 
Thus, this sometimes results in them mainly satisfying their political master, and not 
working for the public‟s interest. 
7.1.5 The Malaysian Paradox 
The persistence of public procurement fraud in Malaysia needs to be understood 
within the context of its socio-economic, political, and cultural embedded values and 
practices within the multi-racial solidarity of the society. This study has shown what 
the peculiarities of the Malaysian society are in relation to fraud and corruption 
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practices (sub-research question 5). These have to do with (1) the transformation of 
society and (2) a tendency towards institutionalization. 
 
First, this thesis provides a general overview on the change which occurred in 
Malaysia. The latter was transformed from an agricultural and plantation country into 
one with a liberal economy and a capitalist system. The Malaysian society was 
structurally changed and transformed towards development and growth after her 
independence. The findings of this research show the prominent role of the Malaysian 
state, which can intervene in and reform the economy and market forces. Under these 
circumstances, the government has legitimate reasons to pursue a public policy for 
poverty eradication and for the restructuring of society. It is perceived that the ruling 
party promotes the growth of Malay capitalists and the middle classes as a way to 
improve the social well-being and domination of capital, especially for the indigenes. 
The affirmative action programmes developed by the government include preferential 
access to various interests stipulated in the Constitution, among others: educational 
opportunities, business licenses, employment and promotion in particular working in 
the civil service, subsidies, and tariff protection. These preferential treatments, as 
viewed in this thesis, are reflected in most government purchasing as Malay business 
interests have been generally favoured by the government practices of state 
patronage, rent-seeking and distributions, cronyism, and favouritism (William Case, 
2013; R.S. Milne & Mauzy, 1999; Wain, 2009). While the above practices appear to 
be blurred in relation to whether they are legitimate or not, it appears that the ruling 
party aggrandize their effort to be regarded as the „champion‟ for the development 
and economic growth for the country. As a result, it seems that the opportunities 
arising within the capitalist economy for profit maximization and wealth creation 
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through government initiatives are acceptable, allowable and rationalised as a means 
for the good and development of the country. 
 
Second, the pursuit of a successful life in Malaysia seems to require wealth, material 
and money, in other words, economic development and growth make a successful life 
possible. The Malaysian society has also been influenced by following this path of 
economic development, modernity, wealth, as well as material and money culture 
(Shi-ian, 2014; Shukry, 2013a). As promoted by the ruling elites, the perceptions of 
the interviewees show that the successful ideology of having privileges as indigenes 
serves a persistence framework of systemic and endemic fraudulent and corrupt 
practices. Apart from maintaining the traditional cultural values and customs (such as 
respecting and remaining loyal to one‟s superiors and the authorities, acknowledging 
the social status and the hierarchy of society, being submissive and never challenging 
those in power, high tolerance for harmonization, gift-giving practices, returning 
favours for extended relationship), it seems that the desire for money and material 
goods has been ingrained in people‟s minds and has ultimately led to people being 
self-centred in the society. Although to some extent, committing fraud and corruption 
activities has tainted the Islamic values and ethics, it appears that the „sin‟ is forgiven 
when the illicit money is used for charitable activities and/or to benefit other people. 
All these have become possible since the interest in money and wealth exists at all 
levels of the society and serves as a prime element in measuring one‟s success. In 
particular for the public office, there is the impression that fraud and corruption are 
institutionalized from the top leadership to the lowest implementers of public policy 
(Brian, 2014; Geyzel, 2015). Because fraud and corruption are widespread in the 
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public office, it appears that institutionalization undermines any accountable and 
transparent procurement practices.  
 
Taking together all the findings and evidence presented in the earlier chapters 
(chapter 4, 5 and 6), this research contributes to a number of important areas of 
knowledge as illustrated in the next section. 
7.2 Research Contributions 
 
This thesis has contributed to the literature by examining the possible reasons why 
public procurement fraud in Malaysia continues to persist. As described in chapter 2 
(Literature Review), there are diverse gaps in the literature that this study  aimed to 
address. Therefore, this study is novel and original with a potentially beneficial 
impact on the study of public procurement fraud in Malaysia in relation to three areas 
of knowledge: empirical, theoretical, and practice- and policy- related areas. 
7.2.1 Empirical Contributions  
Several empirical implications have arisen as a result of this study; informed mainly 
by the analysis of the data collected by the documentary analysis and 40 interviews 
conducted.  
 
This study has investigated a complex, conflicting, sensitive and controversial issue 
by nature. This is because fraud and corruption activities are normally hidden and 
kept secret. This study is an important contribution on exploring the potential spaces 
for investigating fraudulent practices which are perhaps greatly dependent upon the 
secret nature of procurement government documentation. Conducting research on this 
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topic is inevitably challenging and might at first seem impossible. However, this 
thesis provides evidence that such challenging research can be conducted with an 
appropriate methodology, techniques, and willingness from participants. Thus, it may 
attract the interest of other scholars to unpack public procurement fraud in another 
setting or by taking another perspective.  
 
This study contributes to the fraud literature by providing evidence on why public 
procurement fraud in Malaysia continues to persist. In this way, this thesis offers 
interested scholars important insights into the investigation of fraudulent actions, 
corruption, malfeasance, malpractices, and wrongdoings in government purchasing. 
As a result, this study offers rich possibilities for interdisciplinary research (see Neu 
et al., 2015; Sargiacomo et al., 2015), as it opens „doors‟ for investigating some of the 
social problems in the world. 
 
The study contributes to the literature by contributing to the existing literature on 
business and government practices in Malaysia. Despite the existing literature 
debating on various views about fraud, there is a dearth of research that examine 
social problems related to fraud and corruption activities which are not necessarily 
illegal or unlawful but socially amiss and with detrimental effects for the public (P. 
Green & Ward, 2004; Kramer et al., 2002; Quinney, 2003). This research presents 
empirical evidence on procurement fraud in the Malaysian public sector and offers an 
understanding of fraudulent and corrupt practices within public procurement that is 
perhaps highly effective and operates within legal boundaries and can out-smart the 
system but is immoral, in the context of rewarding government contracts (Pua, 2011; 
Searle, 1999). Therefore, it contributes to the academic debate by acquiring a broaden 
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understanding of fraudulent practices embedded within the governance of Malaysia‟s 
public procurement practices.   
 
The study adds to the extant literature by studying procurement fraud practices  in 
Malaysia which is a setting with a specific culture, ideologies, religion, customs and 
values which is different from developed countries that have already been studied 
(see Araujo, 2013; O.M. Bakre, 2004; Caulfield, 2014; Celentani & Ganuza, 2002; 
Murray, 2009). Therefore, this study has been conducted in an attempt to fill that gap 
in the literature.  
 
This research also responds to the calls of procurement fraud scholars for a much 
more critical examination of specific procurement fraud practices (for example 
Murray, 2009; Caulfield, 2014). Relatively few studies on procurement fraud in 
public sector settings have been examined within Malaysia‟s context which appears 
to be shrouded in secrecy and behind the closed doors of many government 
departments (Balakrishnan & Matthews, 2009; W. S. Hui et al., 2011). Also, the 
investigation of fraud within the Malaysian public sector can provide an opportunity 
to examine the subtle and complex relationship between public and private 
organisations in many government purchasing activities (see Gomez, 2004; Othman, 
Aziz, & Ibrahim, 2010). The investigation of the public sector is another area which 
remains largely unexplored in the literature; thus it is a novel setting for an 
investigation of public procurement fraud practices.  
 
This research explored the possible factors accounting for the persistency of 
procurement fraud in the Malaysian public sector. The research presents empirical 
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evidence in relation to 5 main stakeholders (regulators, professionals, politicians, 
academics and media actors) so as to understand the nature and extent of public 
procurement fraud in Malaysia. It contributes to the academic debate by offering an 
avenue for a discourse on differences (or similarities) of the perceptions and „hidden 
voices‟ of those stakeholders. The research borrows from and builds on sharing the 
experience, views, perceptions and understanding of fraud from 12 regulators, 12 
professionals, 5 politicians, 4 media actors and 5 academics about fraud and corrupt 
practices in government purchasing. The call to investigate other group of 
stakeholders was made by other scholars such as Murray (2009) and Hessami (2014).  
 
The final significant empirical contribution of this study is the use of  a qualitative 
approach in investigating public procurement fraud practices in Malaysia. Despite the 
growing numbers on procurement fraud studies (Hessami, 2014; Karpoff, Lee, & 
Vendrzyk, 1999), it was observed that there is a general lack of qualitative studies in 
understanding the nature and extent of public procurement fraud. This study is different 
because it explores and understands social practices with the use of semi-structured 
interviews via the Snowball Sampling Method (SSM) by getting the participants‟ 
consent and by making them willing to share and discuss significant issues of fraud in 
public procurement. This qualitative study is pertinent to „unpack‟ a complex 
phenomenon that is subjectively reflected by a reciprocal relationship of both the social 
context and the role of human actors (see Bailey, 2007; J. A. Clark, 2006; J. Ritchie et al., 
2014).  
7.2.2 Theoretical Contributions  
The study of public procurement fraud has been approached and theorized in various 
ways by many competing disciplines (Haron, Mohamed, Omar, & Jomitin, 2013; 
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Matthew et al., 2013; Murray, 2015; Sargiacomo et al., 2015; World Bank, 2013). 
This study has used a political economy theoretical framework, which has made it 
possible to investigate the persistence of fraud in public procurement and the role of 
social actors within a broader social-political and economic context.  
 
One particular characteristic of political economy theory is the role of the „invisible 
hand‟ in a free market in the pursuit of self-interest for wealth and profits. Political 
economy theory describes how the invisible hand of market forces allows individuals 
to make profit and maximize it, without the need of government intervention 
(Thornton, 2009). However, this study adds to the literature where the „invisible 
hand‟ in many government purchasing contracts in Malaysia instead has used 
prevailing institutional power structures that perhaps enable, shape and create 
fraudulent and corrupt practices in public procurement. It can be said that those 
powerful individual hands in Malaysia has convinced Malaysian society that 
procurement policymaking arrangements are only for the benefits of society when in 
fact those procurement arrangements may involve fraud and corrupt activities, and 
may be socially amiss and detrimental to the public at large. Consequently, this study 
has shown that legitimate and (il)legitimate interests held by powerful groups in 
Malaysia in allocating and distributing public resources, to some extent, do not 
actually benefit the wider society (Siddiquee, 2006b; Singaravelloo, 2013).  
 
The current study provides deeper theoretical insights when it shows the prevalence 
of political power with economic interests within the policy-making process 
(Caporaso & Levine, 1992; Rausser et al., 2011). There is lack of studies in 
connecting fraud and corruption activities and the transformation of the public sector 
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to improve government accountability and effectiveness (Brewer et al., 2008; David 
Seth Jones, 2013). The current study argues that the reformation of public sector 
governance through modernisation programmes can also become the site where 
fraudulent and corrupt activities are carried out (Gomez et al., 2013). In this respect, 
the study makes a theoretical contribution by showing that the exercise of power in 
Malaysian public administration within the policy-making process in rewarding 
government contracts are legitimate and legal through public policy with the aim of 
improving the social well-being of people, especially that of the indigenes, even 
though such activities perhaps also involve immoral behaviour (including rent-
seeking activities, state patronage, cronyism, and money politics). For example, the 
study  examined how there is lack of evidence in abusing of power for rewarding 
contracts on part of a collusive corrupt network which intimately engages in fraud 
and corruption. The irony is that fraud and corruption activities are manufactured 
within the applicable law (Baer, 2008; Boyce, 2014). To the best of the researcher‟s 
knowledge, no previous study in the public procurement fraud literature has showed a 
connection between the legitimate public-policy settings and fraud and corruption 
activities.  
 
The use of a political economy framework for the study has provided an additional 
insight on a new theoretical dimension to the literature pertaining to the relationship 
between legitimate activities and the collusive institutional arrangements in 
government purchasing at the nexus of business and government and their 
interactions (see Andrews et al., 2015; Grødeland & Aasland, 2011). Specifically, this 
research adds a possible and alternative lens to look into the legitimate public-private 
interactions as both a constraining and an enabling factor to engage in fraud in public 
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procurement. Most importantly, this study provides evidence on the platform of 
government-business framework of political business and crony capitalism, which 
facilitate the emergence of fraud and corruption within the procurement process 
(Embong, 2012; E.T. Gomez, 2002). Some scholars have highlighted the nexus of 
business and government that may be prone to fraud and corrupt activities (Asquer, 
2011; Hawkins et al., 2011). However, the literature on the interaction of government 
and business is frequently about economically advanced countries (Chomsky, 1999; 
Schneider, 1998), and there is still a lack of studies on public-private interactions with 
fraud and corrupt activities in many developing countries and in Malaysia in 
particular. As a result, the study has aimed to fill that gap in the literature. 
 
This study provides some additional contribution to theory by showing how historical 
institutions and the governance of colonial rule has been entrenched into Malaysia‟s 
structural transformation, especially its public administration, which continues to 
exist in today‟s society (Amoroso, 2014; Milner, 2002). By looking at historical 
development, this study has been able to bring an understanding on how Malaysian 
societies construct and reconstruct themselves over time. More specifically, the study 
shows how history matters to understand social practices as also addressed by other 
scholars such as Shaharuddin Maaruf (2014) and  Harper (2001).  
 
The current study has helped to unpack the unchallenged power relations in the 
governance system of Malaysia. While the political economy theory is concerned 
with power and authority in a dynamic political and economic institutions (Dean, 
1989; Nurmi, 2006), the current study provides evidence on how the exercising of 
power has to some extent facilitated fraud and corrupt activities in government 
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purchasing. The existing literature has rarely drawn attention to illegal, unethical, 
deviant activities or crimes conducted by those in power in relation to fraud and 
corrupt activities (Barak, 2015; Goldstraw-White, 2012). There is still lack of 
research that addresses crimes or practices of the powerful people in public 
procurement studies. In contrast, this study is particularly useful in explaining the 
complexity, secrecy, norms, customs and habits of the powerful elites that have been 
embedded into Malaysia‟s procurement practices. In other words, it seems that many 
cases of fraud in public procurement in Malaysia are hardly detected or reported; 
these are cases where the culprits can escape punishment as they are protected by 
those in power (Pua, 2011; Wain, 2009).    
 
Finally, the study contributes to emerging theoretical perspectives since it helps to 
shed light on how institutional values and practices in public procurement provide an 
important platform for understanding the systemic nature of fraud and corrupt 
activities. For this reason, the study provides unique insights on how the creation of 
formal and informal practices has shaped and reshaped particular cultural, social 
norms and moral values (see Ashforth et al., 2008; Dwivedi, 1967; Islam, 2004) in 
Malaysian society. This particular contribution presents a case that pushes the 
boundaries of this theory, which has received relatively little attention in the context 
of the systemic nature of fraud and corrupt activities in Malaysia.   
7.2.3 Practice and Policy Contributions  
The value and impact of the current research to managerial practice is demonstrated 
from the essential and fundamental findings underpinning the study. This means that 
the findings benefit the policymaker and enforcement agencies in Malaysia by 
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deepening our understanding of the persistence of public procurement fraud in 
Malaysia. The thesis provides additional insights on practice and policy as follows. 
 
The thesis contributes to practice by highlighting the prevailing power structure of the 
governance institutions in Malaysia. The study has shown the flaws of governance 
institutions if the „separation of power‟ is not endorsed or implemented by all 
institutions. Therefore, it may be possible to improve the governance system by 
restricting any domination and control of power, including any „personalisation‟ of 
power, even to the Prime Minister. 
 
The current research may influence the vigorous prosecution and the enforcement of 
the appropriate sanctions towards perpetrators. The complexity of law needs to be 
addressed so as to ensure the culprits do not walk free with impunity. This research 
also implies that stiffer penalties and prosecutions are required; those who commit 
fraud must be labelled as such and identified so as to „shame‟ their social status and 
strip them from any privilege given to them because they betray the public trust. For 
example, the existing law on conflict of interest in rewarding government contract 
need to be strengthened in order to reduce opportunities for abusing power in public 
office.  
 
The study has evaluated the deficiencies of the procurement system implemented in 
the Malaysia public sector. In this regard, the study has proposed that there should not 
be any direct negotiation of contracts, but only through public tenders. The decision-
making process as well as other activities in government purchasing should be more 
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transparent and open to public scrutiny. A requirement of public disclosure is needed 
to break the „wall‟ of government secrecy. 
 
This study has clearly highlighted the accountability constraints by public officials in 
exercising their public duties. This research has shown that the laws and 
administrative rules can constrain the Malaysian public servant in exercising their 
public duties. Therefore, the laws and rules need to be revised to promote accountable 
and transparent procurement practices. Furthermore, the flaws of the Whistle-blower 
Act 2010 require greater participation from all parties: public servant, civil society, 
and the masses. Freedom of Information should also be sanctioned.  
 
Finally, a contribution of the study has to do with the conceptualization of fraud and 
corruption within the Malaysian society. This study yields insights on the 
„camouflaged‟ conceptualization of fraudulent activities with the pretext of improving 
the social well-being of the indigenous population. To a certain extent, the public‟s 
conception of what is „wrong‟ and what is „right‟ in procurement practices cannot 
assess the wrongdoings and immoral activities even if they are supposedly conducted 
for the development and growth of the country. Thus, this study can enlighten the 
policymaker and enforcement agencies in (re)considering what exactly constitutes 
fraudulent and corrupt activities. Activities which do not violate any laws but they are 
in fact unethical and immoral, clash with norms, values and beliefs, they are socially 
amiss and brings losses to the country and the public at large need to be taken into 
consideration and be addressed (Hirsch & Morris, 2010; Lounsbury & Hirsch, 2010). 
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7.3 Limitations  
 
As with any other research, despite best intentions, this research is not without its 
limitations. First, this study is limited by the lack of publicly available data. There is 
lack of information and evidence to study fraud and corruption in the Malaysian 
public procurement. Any reports from publicly available data were derived only from 
government reports, on which the information can be tampered or restricted in order 
to „protect‟ and conceal activities that may smear the reputation of the government. 
 
Second, due to the problem of accessing interviewees to talk about this sensitive 
matter, there are only a limited number of interviewees forming the sample of 
stakeholders who were willing to be interviewed (40 participants). The use of a 
specific methodological approach has helped to partly overcome that limitation. 
However, all findings and discussions of public procurement fraud practices in 
Malaysia used these 5 groups of interviewees (13 regulators, 13 professionals, 5 
politicians, 5 media actors and 4 academics). As a result, the current study is limited 
to this particular sample and no claims can be made for its generalizability. Therefore, 
the understanding of public procurement fraud practices in Malaysia emanating from 
this study is particular to these stakeholders only.  
 
Finally, in any study of this type, there is a number of possible interpretations of data 
and, therefore, although I have relied on direct quotations provided by participants, it 
should be recognized that my interpretation of the data is but one of a number of 
possible interpretations. Therefore, it is inevitable that my personal experience, 
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feelings, attitude and thoughts are embedded and reflected on the research process 
and the presentation of the findings.  
7.4 Avenue for Future Research 
 
This research has revealed possible explanations for the persistence of public 
procurement fraud in Malaysia. However, future research can enhance the current 
study and raise further questions on the investigation of public procurement fraud as 
follows. First, future research can consider investigating fraud in public procurement 
by examining several cases, either cases that have been prosecuted or alleged fraud 
cases. Perhaps, a comparison of diverse case studies can provide insights into the 
pattern and reveal other possible factors for fraud‟s persistence (assuming access 
would be granted).  
 
Second, further research might expand the current study by interviewing a wider 
range of interviewees who can provide their views and share their experience of the 
subject matter. For example, the views from different stakeholders (e.g.,, media and 
NGO parties) can be solicited. . 
 
Third, future research may consider adopting a different theoretical framework for 
investigating public procurement fraud. Different methods, for example, a 
quantitative method or a mixed-methods approach can be employed and it would be 
interesting to see what kind of results they will produce.  
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Finally, it would be beneficial to research different settings (e.g.,, private sector). It 
might also be useful to compare and contrast different settings (public sector vs. 
private sector) in order to understand their similarities or differences. What is more, it 
can be fruitful to investigate this social phenomenon in different developing countries 
in order to understand its similarities or differences (if any).  
7.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
This thesis has investigated public procurement fraud in Malaysia. The thesis has 
argued that the history of Malaysia as well as its socio-political and economic context 
have influenced, shaped and created public procurement fraud. Considered as a 
whole, this thesis has sought to challenge several dominant accounts. First, it has 
challenged the prevailing power of the governance institutions in Malaysia that have 
given political and economic powerful actors the opportunities to engage in fraud and 
corrupt practices. The thesis argues that the long incumbency and the supremacy of 
the ruling coalition make them untouchable as they are able to make their actions 
legitimate, and their decisions unquestionable. Second, it has challenged the rational 
decisions made by the economic actors in order to create wealth and maximize their 
profits. The study has questioned the notion of the invisible hand by claiming that 
increasing private wealth and serving narrow self-interests do not necessarily profit 
the masses. Third, while this study has acknowledged the legitimacy of public policy 
processes, it has challenged the policymaking environment that enables the 
occurrence of fraudulent practices in public procurement. The study has been 
critically concerned with the legitimization of public policy by allowing government 
intervention in the free market and the public sector expansion for development and 
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growth. Thus, this study provides insights on the conflicting role of the Malaysian 
state, which seems to facilitate the prolonged nature of fraud in public procurement. 
Finally, it draws attention to a blurry cronyism network that conducts legitimate and 
illegitimate activities at the nexus of collusive interactions between politicians, top-
bureaucrats and business leaders. The success of this corrupt crony network raises 
concerns over the lack of evidence for fraud and corrupt practices in procurement 
process. The current study has also addressed the blurred relationships between 
business and government organisations. Thus, irrespective of the accounts mentioned 
above, this study has perhaps only made visible the „tip of the iceberg‟ of the 
examination of fraud in public procurement. 
 
The unpacking of public procurement fraud in Malaysia provides an opportunity for 
an understanding why it has endured for so long. Being a public auditor in Malaysia 
for 15 years has enabled me to raise more questions about its persistency in most 
government departments. Thus, it is important to note on the positive points as an 
insider who works in the public office undertaking this research. Firstly, I was able to 
gain access to the participants, as they were able to tolerate with me as a public 
servant. Secondly, my knowledge and wide experience as a public auditor in 
Malaysia were able to give confidentiality and privacy assurance to my participants 
which allowed them the opportunity to project their own feelings and provide an 
honest and representative answers by using their own words and language (Berg & 
Lune, 2014; J. Ritchie et al., 2014). My knowledge also enabled me to decode 
answers given by the participants, which only insiders would know about. Lastly, as 
an official, I was able to empathise with the participants especially those who work in 
the public office. However, there were also negative aspects in undertaking this 
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research as a staff member in the Malaysia public office. Firstly, there were some 
preconceptions about fraudulent behaviours in the public office. In other word, the 
researcher approaches the research problem with a background and a set of 
experiences and knowledge that cannot be turned off. In this respect, steps were taken 
to minimize this by using the participant‟s voices whenever possible. Next, there 
might be biased in some interpretation of the findings and responses of the 
participants in this study. However, in order to overcome this, the researcher tried to 
minimise the intrusion of her own opinions on those of the participants. The 
researcher has explained in detail (in Chapter 3) how the data was obtained and 
analysed and give a clear description of the usage of the data for the research to 
ensure the results were up to the highest qualitative standards. Finally, this research 
has challenged the status quo of the current regime and questioned procurement 
practices in the Malaysia public sector. Thus, it has touched a sensitive issue but 
though the research design it has also ensured that the prejudices of the researcher 
were minimised in order for the findings to be reliable and meaningful. It is hoped that 
taking these precautions will have minimised the negative aspects for the current study 
and implied a neutral research.  
 
To explore a complex, sensitive and controversial issue like this one, requires a high 
degree of understanding and trust that may shape future action, attitudes, beliefs, 
emotions, knowledge, sentiments, thoughts or perhaps a combination of these. Never 
was my intention to tarnish my country‟s name by exposing and revealing the 
possible factors of the persistence of public procurement fraud in Malaysia. In fact, I 
believe that the current study will benefit my country and its people.  
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Appendix 2.1: Various Definitions of Fraud 
Perspectives Definition of Fraud Scholars Descriptions 
Law  A criminal 
deception, which 
involves the use of 
false 
representations to 
obtain an unfair 
advantage or to 
harm the interests 
of others. 
 The making of a 
misrepresentation 
of a material fact, 
with knowledge of 
its falsity and with 
the intention of 
having the other 
person rely upon it. 
If the other person 
reasonably relies 
upon it to their 
detriment, they can 
make a tort claim 
for damages 
against the person 
making the false 
representation. 
 An intentional act 
of lying to, 
cheating, or 
stealing from a 
customer (or 
attempting to do 
so), which is 
punishable as a 
crime in any 
jurisdiction. 
 A defence to a 
breach of contract 
action, an 
affirmative cause 
of tort and crime. 
 A violation of trust 
and breach of any 

































Legal definitions of fraud 
are used to condemned 
fraudulent behaviour 
(Burdick, 1916; Klass, 
2009). However, the 
generic definition of fraud 
seems to legitimate the 
current legal law system 
and assumes that such laws 
are universal and are 
uncontested. According to 
Stone (1975), the weakness 
of the legal and judicial 
structure is likely to 
restrain the role of law 
from working to curb 
fraud. Correspondingly,  
Michalowski and 
Bohlander (1976) and 
Quinney (2003) suggest 
that the formulation of law 
has been controlled and 
refrained in order to serve 
the interests of powerful 
groups. As a result, the 
ambiguity of fraud 
definition from a legal 
perspective may result to 
selective prosecution in 
fraud cases. In many 
countries with weak legal 
and regulatory structure, 
selective prosecution is 
openly practiced by 
powerful groups through 
the abuse of power and 
manipulation  of the law 
for their personal gains in 
order to prosecute those 
who challenge their 
position (Vinod, 2013a). In 
doing so, selective 
prosecution cases are 
extremely difficult to 
prove, especially those 
involving the powerful and 




by failing to 
disclose 
information and by 
abusing one‟s 
position. 
wealthy elites (Otusanya, 
2012). Consequently, 
selective prosecution is a 
different mode of powerful 
source in a society and it is 
based on historical 
background, institutional 
structures and modes of 
accountability of each 





 Law violation 
arises from the 
desire to discover 
and study wrong, 
which are absolute 
and external rather 
than mere 
violations of a 
statutory and case 
law system. 
 A legal description 
of an act as 
socially injurious 
(violation of any 
law, civil or 
criminal) and legal 
provision for 
penalty for the act.  
 An intentional act 
of violation of the 
criminal law 
(statutory and case 
law) committed 
without defence or 
excuse, and 
penalized by the 



















Fraud is also defined by 
criminologists and 
sociologists. They believe 
fraud exist because of 
violation of any law, civil 
or criminal, but such 
definition requires a more 
complex definition of fraud 
(Arevalo, 1999). In that 
case, Petrucelli (2012) 
suggests that each element 
of fraud has to be proven in 
court in order for an act to 
be considered a legally 
culpable act of fraud. He 
further explains that four 
important elements need to 
be proven in court, as 
follows: misrepresentation, 
intention, reliance and 
damage. Alternatively, 
Coleman (2006) suggests 
that the element of fraud is 
not easily proven in court. 
Depending on the fraud 
cases, Ormerod (2007) 
claims that failure to 
demonstrate the element of 




 and the 
fraudster may easily be 
freed. In short, 
criminologist and 
                                                          
254
 This is due to the difficulty of proving in the court of law intent and the underlying motive behind 
fraud.. 
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sociologist have been 
restraining definitions of 




 An intentional act 





 A deliberate, 
rational choice to 
circumvent 
accounting rules 
and regulations for 
personal gain, 
which results in 
financial reporting 
that is misleading 
or deceptive. 









 Use of false 
numbers to suit 
private interests, 








of materials, illegal 
side payments and 
theft. 
 A deliberate 
attempt to deceive 
































In the accounting and 
auditing context, the 
definition of fraud is 
dynamic but limited to the 
violation of law as the main 
principle of its definition. 
According to Lehman and 
Okcabol (2005), 
“accounting practice has 
always been concerned 
with fraud, and has always 
been effected by financial 
collapses, management 
transgressions, and 
misstatements by corporate 
officers” (p.614). Funnel 
(1998) has demonstrated 
that accounting is a source 
of disguise and can be used 
by interest groups to 
achieve very particular 
purposes. Comparatively, 
this relates to the myth 
about accounting, i.e., the 
belief in its legitimacy, 
reliability and trust, values 
which are obviously 
violated when accounting 
fraud occurs (Bayou, 
Reinstein, & Williams, 
2011; Macintosh, 2002). 
Thus, the definition of 
fraud from the accounting 
and auditing‟s perspective 
does not imply rich 
understanding of fraudulent 
phenomenon as it merely 
adopts a legal standpoint.  
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person or group by 
misrepresenting or 
omitting the 



























 Acts of corporate 
illegality which 










own interest at the 
expense of 
organization 


















Greve et al., 
2010 
 
From a management and 
ethical perspective, an 
insightful understanding of 
fraud is offered by looking 
at violation of conduct 
norms (Greenberg, 1997). 
Kulik et al., (2008) and 
Vaughan (1982) claim that 
fraudulent behaviour is 
institutionalised when 
norms, values and beliefs 
have  justified attitudes or 
actions which then become 
embedded in structures, 
processes and routines. 
Assuming that norms, 
values and beliefs are 
consistent with wrongful 
actions, a fraudster 
essentially concludes that 
their decisions to commit 
fraud is, in fact, rightful 
(Punch, 1996). In contrast, 
that definition does not 
offer a boundary separating 
fraudulent act from non-
fraudulent acts in an 
organization (Greve et al., 
2010). In addition, the 
definition of fraud from 
management and ethical 
perspectives does not 
identify the extent to which 
an action is fraudulent. 
Ultimately, the vague 
boundaries of fraudulent 
conducts are located within 
a social, economic, ethical 
and political culture, which 
is situated in specific social 






of informal and 
implicit norms 
 Unethical decision 






362 | P a g e  
 
harm others either 
illegally or 
immorally and  can 
be acceptable to 









 Failure of moral 
reasoning which is 














and Hoeger  
2008 
(Cooper, Dacin, & Palmer, 
2013). 
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Appendix 3.1: Key Philosophical Stance for the Current Research 
Philosophical 
Issues 
Elements The Current 
Study 
Justification 
Ontological The assumptions 
that the researcher 
makes about the 
nature of reality 





idealism as a 
my nature of 
reality 
The reality for the current 
study is a product of 
individual consciousness 
shared by meanings, views 
and conceptions. I clearly 
reject the notion that reality 
is hard, real and 
independent from the 
subject under study 
Epistemological A general set of 
assumptions about 
how we acquire 
and accept 




In investigating public 
procurement fraud in 
Malaysia, this research uses 
anti-positivist approach to 
understand the subjective 
meaning making of the 
social phenomenon. This 
approach is subjected to 
day-to-day language, 
individual experiences and 
multiple perceptions in 
producing and reproducing 
social reality by the human 
actors 












This research offers 
profound insights into how 
humans create their own 
environment completely 
autonomously and by 
possessing free will. The 
institutionalised 
environment in the 
Malaysian public sector 
seemed has been created 
voluntarily and offers a 
fertile ground for the 
prevalent nature of 
fraudulent practices. 
Methodology A system of 
methods used in a 
particular study 
which is closely 
connected with the 






approach to give 
voices to my 
interviewees 
This approach ideally 
shows the role people‟s 
interactions and 
perceptions of their own 
experiences play in 
constructing public 
procurement fraud in 
Malaysia. The ideographic 
approach is preferred and 
adopted with the use of 
364 | P a g e  
 
analysis of documentations 
and semi-structured 
interviews 
Source: Current Study 
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Appendix 3.2: Paradigm Choices for the Current Research 






 The nature of reality is 
hard, objective and 
tangible 
 Social reality can be 
discovered based on 
unbiased, independent 
and observation of 
external reality 
 This approach uses 
scientific testing in 
order to show patterns, 
causal relationships and 
make generalisations 
whether to accept or 
reject hypotheses 
 This approach assumes 
that theories should be 
as simple and concise 
as possible to 
understand a social 
phenomenon 
 The positivist 
researchers „divorces‟ 
themselves from the 
subject matter as they 
believe the research 




 This research rejects the 
fact that that the nature of 
reality is hard, objective 
and tangible 
 Social reality is 
constructed based on 
individual experience and 
consciousness. This 
research pays particular 
attention to meaning-
making of the 
construction of public 
procurement fraud in 
Malaysia by human 
interactions and actions 
 This approach uses semi-
structured interviews to 
subjectively situate the 
perceptions of social 
actors. The 
interpretations of the 
social phenomenon are 
made through personal 
experiences, feelings and 
attitude towards fraud in 
the Malaysian public 
procurement 
 I reject the positivist 
approach because I 
believe the world we live 
in is complex, and most 
social practices are 
reflected by reciprocal 
dialectic relationship of 
both the social context 
and the role of human 
actors 
 My involvement in the 
research reflects the fact 
that the reality to the 
subject matter is 
persuasively subjective. 
Therefore, this research is 
clearly „value biased‟ as I 
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cannot detach myself 





 The social world is not 
„given‟, but it is 
produced and 
reinforced through 
human actions and 
interaction 
 The analysis of the 
social world is 
conducted by taking 
into consideration 
constructed subjective 
shared meanings and 
realities 
 The shared meanings 
are constructed through 
symbolic interactions 
by human action and 
personal experience 
 Human actors actively 
make representations 
and hold consensual 
views of a particular 
reality through norms, 
rites, rituals and day-to-
day activities 
 The researcher is part 
of what is being 
researched, and is 
immersed  in the 







 The interpretive 
perspective does not 
address the particular 
socio-economic and 
political contexts where it 
operates. Arguably, such 
contexts clearly influence 
meanings and the 
experience of social 
actors 
 The interpretive approach 
attempts to ignore the 
historical analysis and 
changes in social 
structure 
 An interpretivist only 
explains the status quo, 
they do not criticize it 
and aim to preserve it 
 The interpretive approach 
lacks in examining the 
structural contexts within 
society. Major conflicts 
and power struggles 
between classes are 
neglected as human 
actions are restrained by 
prevailing systems and 
the social order 
 Interpretive research does 
not critically evaluate 




 The critical approach 
draws on many 
assumptions as the 
interpretive approach 
 The critical approach is 
interested in casting 
light on the relationship 
of social practice and 
context 
 Critical studies pay 
particular attention to 
Suitable  A critical perspective is 
able to address political 
and ideological 
influences in order to 
understanding a social 
phenomenon 
 The critical paradigm 
pays attention to the 
historical analysis, 
working towards 
transformation of society 
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the relevance of 
historical analysis 
 The critical paradigm 
attempts to criticize the 
status quo in relation to 
unequal power 
structure and the 
prevailing systems of 
social order 
 The critical theorist 
focuses on the ways 
power is embedded in 
particular structures of 
society. This approach 
demonstrates ingrained 
structural conflicts 
within society and 
social practices 
 The critical approach 





 This approach presents a 
critique of status quo, 
which is maintained in 
the particular political 
and social context 
 The critical paradigm 
throws light on unequal 
power structures, where 
power is concentrated 
and institutionalised 
 The critical approach can 
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Appendix 3.3: Detailed List of Interviewees 
No. Coded Name Method Duration 
Group 1: Regulators-R (Public Procurement Officers) 
1. R1 Face to face Interviews 50 minutes 
2. R2 Face to face Interviews 77 minutes 
3. R3 Face to face Interviews 53 minutes 
4. R4 Face to face Interviews 32 minutes 
5. R5 Face to face Interviews 49 minutes 
6. R6 Face to face Interviews 91 minutes 
7. R7 Face to face Interviews 57 minutes 
8. R8 Face to face Interviews 119 minutes 
9. R9 Email Interviews N/A  
10. R10 Email Interviews N/A 
11. R11 Email Interviews N/A 
12. R12 Email Interviews N/A 
13. R13 Email Interviews N/A 
Group 2: Public Professionals-PP (Public Auditors and Enforcement Officers) 
14. PP1 Face to face Interviews 91 minutes 
15. PP2 Face to face Interviews 64 minutes 
16. PP3 Face to face Interviews 136 minutes 
17. PP4 Face to face Interviews 75 minutes 
18. PP5 Face to face Interviews 50 minutes 
19. PP6 Face to face Interviews 60 minutes 
20. PP7 Face to face Interviews 42 minutes 
21. PP8 Face to face Interviews 49 minutes 
22. PP9 Email Interviews N/A 
23. PP10 Email Interviews N/A 
24. PP11 Face to face Interviews 65 minutes 
25. PP12 Face to face Interviews 66 minutes 
26. PP13 Face to face Interviews 52 minutes 
Group 3: Politicians-P 
27. P1 Face to face Interviews 70 minutes 
28. P2 Face to face Interviews 73 minutes 
29. P3 Face to face Interviews 71 minutes 
30. P4 Face to face Interviews 65 minutes 
31. P5 Face to face Interviews 39 minutes 
Group 4: Media Actors-M 
32. M1 Skype Interviews 161 minutes 
33. M2 Face to face Interviews 48 minutes 
34. M3 Face to face Interviews 55 minutes 
35. M4 Skype Interviews 37 minutes 
Group 5: Academics-A 
36. A1 Skype Interviews 48 minutes 
37. A2 Face to face Interviews 33 minutes 
38. A3 Face to face Interviews 98 minutes 
39. A4 Face to face Interviews 69 minutes 
40. A5 Skype Interviews 57 minutes 
Source: Generated from the Fieldwork 
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This interview guide is to be structured accordance to five identified groups 
(regulators, public professionals, political officials, media actors, and civil society 
group (Academics and/or NGOs). The questions are intended for particular 
objectives, or may be used repeatedly based on the themes and methodological 
frameworks. 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR REGULATORS 
 
Question 1 
In the public sector, the usage of public fund for public procurement is for the benefit 
of society by providing good facilities and amenities, education, subsidies and various 
developments.  However, weaknesses in public procurement and emerging issues of 
accountability, transparency, fraud and corruption, integrity and cronyism are 
continuously raised by the public towards Malaysian public procurement.  
 
a) What is your opinion on the issue raised on public procurement specifically in 
relating to public procurement fraud? 
b) In your views, how would you rate public procurement fraud in Malaysia? 
(good-no fraud; fair-acceptable; bad-cannot be fixed), if so why? 
c) In your opinion, do you think public procurement fraud has tarnished the 
images, accountability and transparency of public organization? 
 
Question 2 
Public procurement fraud in Malaysia is committed in several ways: bid rigging; 
creation of shell companies to facilitate fraudulent payments; collusion between 
suppliers; purchase order and variation orders and false invoices.  
 
a) Can you please describe with me the public procurement system in Malaysia 
(perhaps by giving the process in a diagram)? 
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b) Some contend that profit motives by global capitalism towards competitiveness 
have motivated the flourish of much fraudulent behaviour. What is your view 
regarding this? 
c) In your view, what is (are) the internal and external factors for organizations to 
engage in fraudulent activities? 
d) In your opinion, why do individuals commit fraud? 
e) Based on your experience, could you please share with me on how the fraudster 
commits such immoral activities (no evidence of fraud in the procurement‟s 
documentation)? 
f) As the public procurement system involves many layers (pre-contract, contract 
and post-contract), can you please explain at which layer frauds normally 
occur? 
g) Why do you think auditors were not able to detect fraudulent transactions in 
many public procurement frauds? 
 
Question 3 
In the public sector, lack of transparency, prevalence of interference from outside 
parties and cronyisms, has affected the credibility and integrity of the public 
procurement system in Malaysia. Instructions from „above‟ and confidentiality of 
government contracts seem to be manipulated in the public procurement system for 
vested interest.  This is supported with oppressive and restrictions on governmental 
procedures (e.g. Official Secrets Act, The Oath of Allegiance, the Statutory Bodies 
(Discipline and Surcharge) Act 2000, Staff General Order). 
 
a) Based on your experience, have you encountered any interference from outside 
parties (e.g. local politicians, prominent businessman, member of parliament 
or high ranking officer) in awarding any government contracts?  
b) In your opinion, do you think the procurement system in Malaysia (direct 
purchase, open/close tender and direct negotiation) aids fraudulent practices 
and corrupt activities? If so, can you please provide an example? 
c) What barriers/challenges have you encountered for implementation of 
procurement policies and procedures?  
d) Why do you think government contract is always private and confidential? 
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e) Based on the above, to what extent do you think that government projects are 
shrouded in secrecy that can lead to fraud? 
f) To what extent do you think secrecy of government documents can undermine 
the investigation and enforcement‟s role in detecting and preventing fraud? 
g) In your opinion, do the oppressive and restrictions of government policies hide 
and conceal any fraudulent activities among public organizations and may be 
open to abuse? 
 
Question 4 
Socio-political and economic policies of Malaysian history has been based on 
economic mismanagement and corruption. This section invites your thoughts about 
reform that have taken place since independence. 
 
a) In your opinion, do you think that government has been able to control  
fraudulent practices and malfeasance activities in the country since 
independence? 
b) What are your thoughts of level of success, if any, with which successive 
governments has achieved in controlling fraud? 
c) In your opinion, what should the government be doing to restrain and curb  
fraudulent activities in Malaysia? 
 
Question 5 
As a successful developing country in its region (e.g. ASEAN), Malaysia continues to 
grow and progress aided by international and domestic support for economic growth. 
The international support is normally associated with foreign direct investments 
(FDI). The domestic support comes from strong intervention of the Malaysian 
government in its public policy (New Economic Policy, National Development 
Policy, and New Economic Model). However, the increasing interdependencies of 
countries in a globalised world by capitalism and global competition has transformed 
Malaysia with it protectionist economy to be more vulnerable to economic problems 
such as the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990‟s. 
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a) Can you please describe the negotiation process between Malaysia and foreign 
countries, for example in setting up the terms for foreign direct investment 
between the two countries? 
b) In your opinion, how much influence does international forces on development 
have on public policy in Malaysia? 
c) To what extent do you think the protective economic policies of the Malaysian 
state tend to develop fraudulent practices between politician, public officials 
and business leaders? 
d) What do you understand by the word „globalisation‟? 
e) In your opinion, do you think globalisation prepares a means for people to  
engage in this immoral behaviour of fraud (e.g. using technology) which leads 
to the financial crisis? 
 
Question 6 
As part of public policy processes in early 1980‟s (in particular in New Public 
Management-NPM), privatisation has been implemented by the Malaysian 
government for improving efficiency and introductory of various competition (J. Tan, 
2008). However, the implementation of privatisation in Malaysia entails continued 
state intervention, rent-seeking activities, fraud and corruption, mismanagement and 
policy failure. (e.g. the collapse of Malaysian Airlines System, Perwaja Steel, Indah 
Water Konsortium). Public official on the other hand are suppressed by all the 
regulations and restrictions to comment on governmental policies, with the motto of 
„I‟m the obedient servant‟. 
 
a) In your view, what are the factors that influence the failure of privatisation in 
Malaysia? 
b) In your opinion, do you think the outcomes of resource allocation (e.g. yearly 
budget of development programs) in public policy can provide evidence of 
fraudulent practices and mismanagement? 
c) To what extent, do you think that development policy by the Malaysian state is 
based on the monopolization power of the ruling party associated with 
„entrepreneurial subjects‟ beyond the public interest? 
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d) Can you please explain to me the significant of „I‟m the obedient servant‟ in 
Malaysia public sector? 
e) In Port Klang Free Trade (PKFZ)‟s case of fraud, our former Prime Minister 
indicates that if any fraudulent or cheating elements in the cabinet papers, then 
it implies that the people who were preparing the cabinet papers (public 
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INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR PUBLIC PROFESSIONALS 
 
Question 1 
Public procurement fraud in Malaysia is committed in several ways: bid rigging; 
creation of shell companies to facilitate fraudulent payments; collusion between 
suppliers; purchase order and variation orders and false invoices.  
 
a) Some contend that profit motives by global capitalism towards competitiveness 
have motivated the flourish of much fraudulent behaviour. What is your view 
regarding this? 
b) In your view, what is (are) the internal and external factors for organizations to 
engage in fraudulent activities? 
c) In your opinion, why do individuals commit fraud? 
d) Based on your experience, could you please share with me on how the fraudster 
commits such immoral activities (no evidence of fraud in the procurement‟s 
documentation)? 
e) As the public procurement system involves many layers (pre-contract, contract 
and post-contract), can you please explain at which layer frauds normally 
occur? 
f) Why do you think auditors were not able to detect fraudulent transactions in 
many public procurement frauds? 
 
Question 2 
Matechak (2005) opined that public procurement is one of the key areas where the 
public sector and the private sector interact financially and politically with each other. 
Indeed, public procurement seems to facilitate corrupt activity, cronyism and 
favouritism as well as outright bribery. 
a) What is your view on this? 
b) In your opinion, do you think fraudulent activities can occur at the intersection 
between government and business interactions? If so, why? 
c) To what extent do you think business and political interest are influencing 
public procurement fraud in Malaysia? 
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d) Are you aware of any fraud cases involving politicians, public officials, or 
reputable businessman in Malaysia? 
e) In your opinion, does the existence of a middle man between public and private 
sphere has facilitated corrupt and fraudulent activities? 
 
Question 3 
Every year, Auditor General of Malaysia reported in its Audit Report the public 
sector‟s activities and the inherent financial negligence, corruption, malfeasance 
activities and breach of trust. In particular of public procurement fraud, it has 
established massive wastages of public funds, creating frustration and cynicism 
among the Malaysian people towards accountability of public funds. 
 
a) What is your view about the Malaysian situation? 
b) Some have argued that fraudulent practices and wrongdoing activities are major 
impediments to the development of Malaysia. What do you think are the 
consequences of fraud in Malaysian public sector? 
c) In your opinion, do you think the wastage of public money has been dealt with 
sufficiently by the regulators and judicial party? 
d) As an independent body, the Auditor‟s General staff is surrounded by expertise 
and „technical know-how‟ to prevent and detect fraud. To what extent do you 
think the auditors have played their role in preventing and detecting fraud in 
Malaysia public sector? 
e) Then what is your comment on other regulatory bodies (e.g. ACCA, Police 
Force, and judiciary) on their role in public procurement fraud? 
 
Question 4 
With the widespread nature of frauds in public organisations, the role of auditor in 
preventing and detecting fraud has been questioned and criticised. Specifically, the 
conflicting role between external auditor and internal auditor in exercising their duties 
in many public organizations in Malaysia has recognized some fallacies and damages 
public confidence. The Public Accounting Committee (PAC) on the other hand is 
relies on the Auditor‟s General report on how far the Government has complied with 
authority to raise and spend public money.   
P a g e  | 379 
 
 
a) Based on your experience in reporting fraud and improper activities in 
Malaysian public sector, what barriers have you encountered? 
b) If an auditor does not agree principally with some of the findings in the audit 
report, what steps can they take to highlight the issues? Can your please provide 
an example for this case. 
c) In what way, do auditors reflect independence, integrity and free from bias in 
maintaining their professional self-images? 
d) What do you think can further improve the role of auditors in preventing and 
detecting fraud in Malaysian public sector? 
e) In your eye, what do you think the profession should do to restore public 
confidence towards the profession? 
f) In your opinion, to what extent does the auditor-management relationship 
impair independence and reliability of the audit report (give example)? 
g) To what extent do you think the independence of the auditor in checking other‟s 
auditor work? (for example between internal and external audit‟s jurisdiction)? 
 
Question 5 
It has been consistently claimed that professionals in Malaysia have not effectively 
used their special knowledge, special training, professional opportunities, and special 
gifts to promote development in our country. Some believe that the judgment of 
professional conduct by these groups are further impacted by interference by „people 
from above‟ and used for particular purposes. It has been further claimed that the 
professional service is no longer within the reach of ordinary people. 
 
a) What is your view about this? 
b) In your opinion, do professionals in Malaysia act with the highest integrity, 
with professional conduct and for the public interest.  
c) Some have argued that professionals have been involved in all sorts of 
professional misconduct in Malaysia, including fraudulent practices. What is 
your opinion on this? 
d) Some argued that audit‟s report are selective and influenced by powerful 
groups (e.g. ruling elites) and to impress management. Only some reports are 
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exposed to public while others tend to hide or conceal fraudulent practices. 
What is your view about this?  
e) Can you please give example of any interference from outside parties when 
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INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR POLITICAL OFFICIALS 
 
Question 1 
The Malaysian variant of developmental state was moved by imperatives of 
postcolonial development, impulses of economic nationalism, aspirations of Asian-
style capitalism and expectations of economic solutions to deep political and social 
problems (Teik, 2012). However, these concepts may be seen as motivating and 
encouraging fraudulent behaviour and misconduct activities among Malaysian 
society.  
 
a) In your opinion, what do you think is in Malaysian culture or history that  
    encourages fraudulent practices and wrongdoing activities in Malaysia? 
b) How do such immoral practices became entrenched and normalised in ou 
    socio-political and economic life? 
c) In your opinion, what is/are the main factors (s) that influence people to  
    perpetrate fraudulent practices? 
 
Question 2 
Politicians and public officials are responsible and powerful actors in managing 
public administration in Malaysia. Both of the groups are involved directly with the 
public policy processes and implementation arrangements. These actors as ruling 
elites demonstrate monopolization of power and have considerable influence in how 
resources are allocated between public and private institutions. 
 
a) What are your views about what politicians and public officials have been 
doing in the public policy processes which perhaps lead to fraudulent activities 
and mismanagement? 
b) In your opinion, do you think that the corrupt activities of politicians and public 
officials have had an effect on the general public and development of Malaysia? 
If so, how? 
c) In your view, do you think that political officials play any role either in 
facilitating or regulating fraudulent practices in Malaysia? 
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d) Do you know any cases where a complaint has been lodged against Malaysian 
politicians by the public regarding the issue of corruption or frauds? 
e) It has been argued that a method of check and balances is not fully conceived in 
managing public funds in Malaysia. What is your opinion on this? 
 
Question 3 
The existence of patron-client cultural traditions within a politically dominant group 
(the ruling elites) has encouraged fraudulent practices within Malay-dominated 
government institutions. The „money politic‟ between the politician, bureaucrats and 
businessmen has established revenues or rents earned by these private businesses as 
well as government officials (L. Y. Lim & Stern, 2002). 
 
a) In your views, why are these powerful groups (politician, bureaucrats and 
prominent businessman) willing to engage in fraudulent practices? 
b) How important do you think it is for the same group to exploit scarce resources 
to grow power, status and wealth in Malaysia based on profit seeking motives 
using political and economic institutions for their own self-interest? If so, why? 
c) In your opinion, do you think fraudulent practices and immoral activities are 




It has been argued that the lobbying process has captured the regulation of public 
policy in and aids in determining favourable business private interests rather than the 
public interest. For example, it is common for businessmen in Malaysia to support a 
political party that campaign to retain the ruling elites to stay in power and maintain 
the status quo in the distribution and accumulation of wealth. 
 
a) To what extent do you think money play an important role for any political 
campaign? If so why? 
b) Can you please explain how normally political parties finance their campaign? 
c) In your view, what is the nature of political campaigning in Malaysia? 
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d) Based on the above scenario, is there any evidence of the lobbying process in 
political campaign which seems to influence fraudulent practices in Malaysia? 
If so why and how? 
 
Question 5 
In Malaysian judicial episodes, there have been continuous conflict and 
contradictions in practicing its integrity and independence. It has been argued that in 
the history of the  judiciary in Malaysia has exposed the institution to unethical 
practices of case fixing, selective prosecution, corruption and abuse of power 
(Embong, 2012). For example, in the case of Datuk Eric Chia in embezzlement 
RM76.5 million to pay bogus company in Hong Kong, he escaped from serving a 
sentences due to a flawed prosecution case. Thus, the law in Malaysia is seen as a 
means of domination, exploitation, intimidation, and the subversion of the public 
good by some people.  
 
a) What is your view regarding this issues? 
b) In your opinion, do you think our judicial mechanisms are controlled by the 
executive especially the Prime Minister? 
c) In your view, do you think our judiciary had acted with independence and 
integrity in particular of fraud and corruption cases in Malaysia? If so, why? 
d) To what extent do you think our current law (rules and regulations) is sufficient 
o really plays its intended role in this regard? 
e) To what extent do you believe that the public in Malaysia is free to complain of 
any occurrences of corruption and fraudulent practices committed by 
politicians, public officials and prominent businessman? 
f) In your view, do you think the enforcement bodies in Malaysia (e.g. police, 
Anti-Corruption Agency) are success in bringing the culprit (in particular 
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INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR MEDIA ACTORS 
 
Question 1 
Matechak (2005) opined that public procurement is one of the key areas where the 
public sector and the private sector interact financially and politically with each other. 
Indeed, public procurement seems to facilitate corrupt activity, cronyism and 
favouritism as well as outright bribery. 
 
a) What is your view on this? 
b) In your opinion, do you think fraudulent activities can occur at the 
intersection between government and business interactions? If so, why? 
c) To what extent do you think business and political interest are influencing 
public procurement fraud in Malaysia? 
d) Are you aware of any fraud cases involving politicians, public officials, or 
reputable businessman in Malaysia? 
e) In your opinion, does the existence of a middle man between public and 
private sphere has facilitated corrupt and fraudulent activities? 
 
Question 2 
The existence of patron-client cultural traditions within a politically dominant group 
(the ruling elites) has encouraged fraudulent practices within Malay-dominated 
government institutions. The „money politic‟ between the politician, bureaucrats and 
businessmen has established revenues or rents earned by these private businesses as 
well as government officials (L. Y. Lim & Stern, 2002). 
 
a) In your views, why are these powerful groups (politician, bureaucrats and 
prominent businessman) willing to engage in fraudulent practices? 
b) How important do you think it is for the same group to exploit scarce 
resources to grow power, status and wealth in Malaysia based on profit 
seeking motives using political and economic institutions for their own 
self-interest? If so, why? 
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c) In your opinion, do you think fraudulent practices and immoral activities 
are aided and supported by political and economic institutional structures? 
If so, why? 
 
Question 3 
The media play an important role in disseminating information to the public. 
However, media freedom is restricted by Printing Presses and Publications Act 
(PPPA) issued by the regulators. This creates a difficult situation for the media and 
journalists to report any fraudulent activities and wrongdoing behaviors for citizens in 
Malaysia. 
 
a) In your opinion, do you believe that the media is playing their intended role in 
Malaysia? 
b) Do you believe that fraud cases in Malaysia are fairly circulated by the media? 
If so why? 
c) Do you believe that sometimes the media presents fraud cases in Malaysia in 
favour of someone or in certain private interests? 
d) In your view, do you think media‟s reporting of fraud cases is constrained or 
limited or restricted by anything? If so, what is/are the constrain (s)? 
 
Question 4 
The Malaysian variant of developmental state was moved by imperatives of 
postcolonial development, impulses of economic nationalism, aspirations of Asian-
style capitalism and expectations of economic solutions to deep political and social 
problems (Teik, 2012). However, these concepts may be seen as motivating and 
encouraging fraudulent behaviour and misconduct activities among Malaysian 
society.  
 
a) In your opinion, what do you think is in Malaysian culture or history that 
encourages fraudulent practices and wrongdoing activities in Malaysia? 
b) How do such immoral practices became entrenched and normalised in our 
socio-political and economic life? 
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c) In your opinion, what is/are the main factors (s) that influence people to 
perpetrate fraudulent practices? 
 
Question 5 
Socio-political and economic policies of Malaysian history has been based on 
economic mismanagement and corruption. This section invites your thoughts about 
reform that have taken place since independence. 
a) In your opinion, do you think that government has been able to control 
fraudulent practices and malfeasance activities in the country since 
independence? 
b) What are your thoughts of level of success, if any, with which successive 
governments has achieved in controlling fraud? 
c) In your opinion, what should the government be doing to restrain and curb 
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INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR ACADEMICS 
 
Question 1 
The Malaysian variant of developmental state was moved by imperatives of 
postcolonial development, impulses of economic nationalism, aspirations of Asian-
style capitalism and expectations of economic solutions to deep political and social 
problems (Teik, 2012). However, these concepts may be seen as motivating and 
encouraging fraudulent behaviour and misconduct activities among Malaysian 
society.  
 
a) In your opinion, what do you think is in Malaysian culture or history 
that encourages fraudulent practices and wrongdoing activities in 
Malaysia? 
b) How do such immoral practices became entrenched and normalised in 
our socio-political and economic life? 
c) In your opinion, what is/are the main factors (s) that influence people 
to perpetrate fraudulent practices? 
 
Question 2 
In the public sector, lack of transparency, prevalence of interference from outside 
parties and cronyisms, has affected the credibility and integrity of the public 
procurement system in Malaysia. Instructions from „above‟ and confidentiality of 
government contracts seem to be manipulated in the public procurement system for 
vested interest.  This is supported with oppressive and restrictions on governmental 
procedures (e.g. Official Secrets Act, The Oath of Allegiance, the Statutory Bodies 
(Discipline and Surcharge) Act 2000, Staff General Order). 
 
a) In your opinion, do you think the procurement system in Malaysia 
(direct purchase, open/close tender and direct negotiation) aids 
fraudulent practices and corrupt activities? If so, can you please 
provide an example? 
b) Why do you think government contract is always private and 
confidential? 
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c) Based on the above, to what extent do you think that government 
projects are shrouded in secrecy that can lead to fraud? 
d) To what extent do you think secrecy of government documents can 
undermine the investigation and enforcement‟s role in detecting and 
preventing fraud? 
e) In your opinion, do the oppressive and restrictions of government 
policies hide and conceal any fraudulent activities among public 
organizations and may be open to abuse? 
 
Question 3 
As a successful developing country in its region (e.g. ASEAN), Malaysia continues to 
grow and progress aided by international and domestic support for economic growth. 
The international support is normally associated with foreign direct investments 
(FDI). The domestic support comes from strong intervention of the Malaysian 
government in its public policy (New Economic Policy, National Development 
Policy, and New Economic Model). However, the increasing interdependencies of 
countries in a globalised world by capitalism and global competition has transformed 
Malaysia with it protectionist economy to be more vulnerable to economic problems 
such as the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990‟s. 
 
a) Can you please describe the negotiation process between Malaysia and 
foreign countries, for example in setting up the terms for foreign direct 
investment between the two countries? 
b) In your opinion, how much influence does international forces on 
development have on public policy in Malaysia? 
c) To what extent do you think the protective economic policies of the 
Malaysian state tend to develop fraudulent practices between politician, 
public officials and business leaders? 
d) What do you understand by the word „globalisation‟? 
e) In your opinion, do you think globalisation prepares a means for people to 
engage in this immoral behaviour of fraud (e.g. using technology) which 
leads to the financial crisis? 
 




In Malaysian judicial episodes, there have been a continuous conflict and 
contradictions in practicing its integrity and independence. It has been argued that in 
the history of the judiciary in Malaysia has exposed the institution to unethical 
practices of case fixing, selective prosecution, corruption and abuse of power 
(Embong, 2012). For example, in the case of Datuk Eric Chia in embezzlement 
RM76.5 million to pay bogus company in Hong Kong, he escaped from serving a 
sentences due to a flawed prosecution case. Thus, the law in Malaysia is seen as a 
means of domination, exploitation, intimidation, and the subversion of the public 
good by some people.  
 
a) What is your view regarding this issues? 
b) In your opinion, do you think our judicial mechanisms are controlled by 
the executive especially the Prime Minister? 
c) In your view, do you think our judiciary had acted with independence and 
integrity in particular of fraud and corruption cases in Malaysia? If so, 
why? 
d) To what extent do you think our current law (rules and regulations) is 
sufficient o really plays its intended role in this regard? 
e) To what extent do you believe that the public in Malaysia is free to 
complain of any occurrences of corruption and fraudulent practices 
committed by politicians, public officials and prominent businessman? 
f) In your view, do you think the enforcement bodies in Malaysia (e.g. 
police, Anti-Corruption Agency) are success in bringing the culprit (in 
particular corrupt elites) to justice? If so, why? 
 
Question 5 
Academics in Malaysia play a prominent role in promoting awareness about fraud 
phenomenon amongst students. From education, it is hoped students will reject all 
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a) I would like to hear your views on this? 
b) How are academics participating in shedding light and disseminating 
awareness about fraud phenomenon among students? 
c) To what extent does the curriculum that has been used in the universities 
help academics to do this? 
d) How do academic see their role in the future in promoting ethical and 
moral behaviour to restrain fraudulent practices? 
e) What are your views about the current situation of fraudulent practices 
in public procurement fraud in Malaysia? 
f) How important it is for academics to critically express their views 
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